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ABSTRACT 
The thesis focuses on the Aristotelian argumentation of Alasdair 
Maclntyre's After Virtue project. I ask why a Thomist natural lawyer 
might put forward an Aristotelian account of morality without an 
explicit theological standpoint. I posit assumptions to the effect that 
God's purposes for humanoids are necessarily realized in humanoid 
flourishing. I deny these assumptions. I counter with a Scotist claim 
that the good life is morally distinct from the flourishing life. 
In Part One I argue for the necessity of an unambiguous position in 
theology/metaphysics for an adequate account of the virtues. I argue 
against the claim that genuine virtues are necessary to sustain 
Maclntyrean "practices. " Virtues are defined with respect to goods. 
The goods of practices are ranked relative to exclusive conceptions of 
the good life. Practices do not transcend traditions. Virtues are not 
transferable to rival conceptions of the good life. Practices are 
therefore insufficient to identify genuine virtues. An exclusive 
conception of the good life is therefore necessary to an adequate 
account of the virtues. 
The three-part Aristotelian structure of morality connotes a framework 
transcending our conception of the good life. Maclntyre supplies 
neither that framework, nor an unambiguous answer as to whether 
there is indeed a final end of human existence independent of human 
will, nor therefore an adequate conception of the human telos. He 
famously concludes After Virtue with the choice between Aristotle 
and Nietzsche. His refusal to take a stand on cosmological first 
principles seems to concede the confrontation to Nietzsche, by forfeit. 
Part Two presents a reduction theory of theological voluntarism with 
respect to the biblical God Almighty. Maclntyre has often opposed 
any such theory. I trace the abandonment of Aristotelianism in the 
natural sciences to theological voluntarism and argue that for one of 
the same reasons leading to its abandonment, we should not take 
humanoid flourishing as a metaphysical necessity: the attempt to 
discern necessary final ends in nature is misguided. I argue for divine 
creative and legislative freedom in establishing human ends short of 
our ultimate end. The only strict dictate of natural law concerns the 
divine nature, as greatest good. Drawing on Maclntyrean 
argumentation, I deny the possibility of reasoning concerning the just 
authority of purported divine commands on bases independent of 
beliefs surrounding the purported deities giving those commands. God 
Almighty's authority with respect to humanoid ends is theoretical with 
respect to our ultimate end (union with God), but practical with 
respect to any logically possible means to reach that end. Moreover, 
the structure of the human will permits us to will in accordance with 
this distinction, to will justice (God's will concerning the means to our 
ultimate end) over what fits our nature (our flourishing). 
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PREFACE 
All references in parenthesis without author or date-for example: 
(123)-refer to Alasdair Maclntyre (1981/1984) After Virtue: A Study 
in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press). 
NE. Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle. Sectional references are listed 
after the citation of the modem translation. 
ST. Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas. All references to the 
Summa are Dominican Fathers translation listed in the bibliography. 
The format of the citation is Part, Question, Article. For example, ST 
1-2.91.1 refers to Part One of the Second Part, Question 91, Article 1. 
Throughout the thesis I have attempted to follow the following 
guidelines with respect to gender in personal pronouns. Where an 
author uses one gender in his/her writing, I tend to follow suite in 
reference to his/her argument. In my own account, I either alternate, 
roughly, or use both genders for the sake of clarity. With respect to the 
Godhead, I resort to the admittedly awkward avoidance of personal 
pronouns. The biblical language clearly favors the masculine. So do 
most of the authors cited. But there is no short explanation of this 
usage to a modem readership that does justice to the Ancient Near 
Eastern horrors of goddess worship, yet also to the scriptural 
references to God as mother and helpmeet, or to the imago Dei as both 
sexes. 
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Part One 
FLOURISHING AND THE GOOD 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the contemporary field of moral philosophy, few thinkers have had 
the productivity and historical reach of Alasdair Maclntyre. Moreover, 
he addresses essential questions, and conscientiously attempts to be 
accessible to non-professionals. His thought is important. It is with 
neophytic boldness that my project takes Maclntyre, in After Virtue 
and its sequels, as a dialogue partner concerning the nature of moral 
obligation. 
Maclntyre declares not only that modem moral philosophy has failed, 
but that it had to fail, given the framework of the approach that the 
Enlightenment had set for itself. The claims of After Virtue 
(1981/1984) are roughly as follows (condensed from Maclntyre 1998, 
pp. 69-72): 
The modem socio-cultural context is characterized by irresolvable 
disagreements over issues such as abortion, war, and property rights. 
In public debate nowadays, arguments originally based in early 
liberalism, medieval natural law, and utilitarianism clash with each 
other. Without their original social and conceptual context, the 
arguments traceable to each theory have become little more than 
expressions of attitudes and feelings. This predicament is largely due 
to the failure of "the Enlightenment project, " the attempt by the 
luminaries of the modem age to formulate an account of morality to 
which all rational persons must necessarily give assent. This failure 
has led to a crisis in belief in reason and therefore to the resort to 
emotivism. Moral concepts have been reduced to "useful fictions" 
such as human rights and utility. Because these have lost their rational 
justification as concepts, their use in social relations is merely 
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manipulative. It is Nietzsche who has best understood the deception 
and self-deception inherent to moral accounting in this context. 
Despite Nietzsche's insights, however, his story of this development is 
defective. Maclntyre locates the fateful wrong turn not in Aristotle's 
philosophy, but in its abandonment, and particularly in the truncation 
of Aristotle's three-part structure of practical rationality. This 
structure sees the development of human nature as the transition from 
its uneducated state, by means of rules of morality, to the actualization 
of human nature's telos or full potential in the good life. To salvage 
moral philosophy is to return to Aristotle and to a common vision of 
the good life. So in the final analysis, our choice is between Aristotle 
and Nietzsche. While the abandonment of Aristotelianism is 
intelligible, Maclntyre says, it is unwarranted. Rightly understood, 
Aristotelianism can both withstand Nietzsche's assault and also enable 
us to understand our present condition. 
In After Virtue, Maclntyre builds a neo-Aristotelian moral teleology in 
three stages. ' He begins by arguing that a core of three virtues is 
required to attain the goods internal to what he calls practices- 
courage, honesty, and justice. These core virtues and others are also 
required for realizing the narrative unity of a life, and for the 
maintenance of a communal tradition. We might expect him to claim 
that this socially sustained understanding of virtue is itself reflective 
of a meta-teleology or of the will of God. We would be wrong. He 
stops there. His return to Aristotle's structure is explicitly not a return 
to Aristotle's metaphysical biology. 
I say that Maclntyre has not, finally, redressed the failure of modem 
moral philosophy, because he has not offered an adequate replacement 
for Aristotle's metaphysical biology. His negative argument is 
damning, and much of his positive argument I find compelling, as far 
The reader should note that there are three sets of "threes" to be 
distinguished in Maclntyre's argument-the three-part structure of 
Aristotelianism, the three stages of Maclntyre's account of the 
virtues, and the three virtues that he emphasizes in that account. 
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as it goes. It does not go far enough. Maclntyre's neo-Aristotelian 
account of morality cannot succeed without theology. 
Considered only from within the perspective of human life, no end of 
human life, including the end of human flourishing, can serve as the 
ultimate end of human life in an Aristotelian account of morality. An 
adequate account of the type that Aristotle systematized is possible 
only if human flourishing is an important good from a frame of 
reference transcending the interests of human life. 
The claim to an objective, supra-human conception of the good 
presents a question to our understanding of the moral agent. A 
conception of the good can only be the object of practical rationality if 
it can be perceived as "good" to humans. Can humans rationally will 
goods that rise above, or even limit, their own flourishing? I say that 
they can. Aristotelianism sees no need for a distinction between the 
flourishing life and the good life. Recently, in Dependent Rational 
Animals, Maclntyre claims that the meaning of "flourishing" for 
gorillas, dolphins, or humans is not an analogical but a univocal 
predication. 
What it is to flourish is not of course the same for 
dolphins as it is for gorillas or for humans but it is one 
and the same concept of flourishing that finds 
application to members of different animal-and plant- 
species.... And what it needs to flourish is to develop 
the distinctive powers that it possesses qua member of 
that species. [All emphases added] 
And the concept of flourishing in this respect resembles 
other concepts that involve applications of the more 
fundamental concept of good ('to flourish' translates eu 
zen and bene vivere). (1999, pp. 64-65) 
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I will contend that these distinctive powers transcend not just the will 
to biological flourishing, as Aquinas and MacIntyre recognize, but 
also the will to human flourishing as an end. We can will the good. 
2 
John Duns Scotus makes the case for this position, developing 
Anselm's earlier insights into it. For MacIntyre, however, Duns 
Scotus and his heirs (Pascal, Luther, Calvin and their heirs) are 
responsible for our current debacle, at least in seminal form. They 
have hijacked the Aristotelian tradition, passing on a wrecked vehicle 
that was finally abandoned in the Enlightenment. 
I can only offer here the beginnings of a reply to this accusation. Even 
that will only be in the course of formulating my own account of 
morality. My account runs counter to non-biblical cosmologies, on the 
one hand. Contra Maclntyre, it sees Scotus as a step forward in the 
development of an explanation of objective morality and of the will, 
on the other hand. I develop recent research into Duns Scotus by John 
E. Hare and Thomas Williams in order to argue against the 
eudaimonism of Aristotle and Aquinas. I join this with a 
corresponding Scotist difference in practical rationality. I reject both 
the Aristotelian grounding of morality in human nature and also its 
conception of the will directed only to our good. I propose a structure 
of morality anchored in the nature and will of God, and asserting the 
freedom of the human will to will the good. 
So much for where I'm going. Now, how will I get there? 
The structure of my argument is, negatively in Part One, to follow the 
stages of MacIntyre's inductive approach "upward" or "outward" to 
an ever-larger and ultimately comprehensive frame of reference, so as 
to demonstrate the inadequacy of this account. My principal 
2 Throughout this argument I will assume that the full realization of 
human powers is possible by God's gracious intervention and only 
by Gods gracious intervention, in ways that are not central to my 
thesis. 
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disagreement with Maclntyre concerns the degree to which his 
account can succeed without asserting a basis for thinking that there is 
an objective good that is independent of human will and well-being. 
Secondly and positively in Part Two, I argue for the validity of my 
version of theological voluntarism deductively "downward" from 
concepts about God toward norms of behavior in particular 
circumstances. Chapters 2 and 10 present a comprehensive summary 
of MacIntyre's eudaimonistic theory and of my voluntarist theory, 
respectively. Chapters 3 through 5 and 8 through 9 emphasize the 
teleological nature of the virtues in all theories of the virtues (Part 
One) and in theological voluntarism in particular (Part Two). Chapters 
6 and 7 respectively point to the need for, and then offer, an account 
of the good and the good life. The role of the will is central to both 
subjective and objective morality. The thesis is therefore roughly 
chiastic in structure. 
In Part One, chapters 2 through 6, I follow the structure and sequence 
of Maclntyre's positive argument, from practices to the narrative unity 
of a life to a tradition. This is a multi-chapter demonstration that there 
can be no Aristotelian account of "the virtues of the good life" 
independent of a particular and exclusive conception of the good. 
Virtues are most accurately defined in terms of the ends they serve. 
Social goods as ends can only be realized through dispositions that 
make those goods possible. Differences in virtues therefore 
necessarily follow from differences in ends. The dispositions that 
enable the realization of one end, however, will be simulacra of 
dispositions that enable the realization of an end contrary to that end, 
and vice versa. Genuine virtues are those directed toward the right 
ends and specifically to the right ends for the sake of the ultimate end, 
whatever that end might be. 
In After Virtue, Maclntyre rejects the metaphysical biology of 
Aristotle (and of Aquinas, by extension). What then is good and how 
do we recognize it? MacIntyre thinks that we recognize goods in 
relationship to our nature. We progressively discover what fulfills our 
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nature via excellences of many sorts. We can discern the essence of 
our nature in the realized potentialities of human functions. 
Chapter 2, "Aristotle Abandoned, " begins with a summary of 
Maclntyre's argument, especially the failure of the Enlightenment 
project in Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard and his plan to reestablish 
morality with respect to function, along Aristotelian lines, but without 
metaphysical biology. I explain what is usually seen as objectionable 
about metaphysical biology, its metaphysics. Aristotle's account, I 
say, is irreducibly metaphysical. I suggest possible presuppositions 
explaining why a Thomist might think that reference to God is 
unnecessary in an account of morality. These presuppositions include 
the assumption that there is a necessary positive relationship between 
flourishing and the good, an assumption leading to a conflation of the 
flourishing life and the good life. 
In chapter 3, "Virtues and Practices, " I consider Maclntyre's central 
claim that genuine virtues are required to attain the goods internal to 
"practices. " The virtues are circularly defined, defined as those 
qualities necessary to attain the goods of practices. Social goods can 
only be realized through dispositions that make those goods possible. 
In itself this is not a problem. It presents a problem for his conclusion 
that genuine virtues are required to sustain practices, however, since 
genuine virtues are qualities that obtain beyond the scope of practices. 
If these dispositions do not necessarily obtain beyond a practice, then 
it follows that it is not genuine virtues that are sustaining that practice, 
but some sort of simulacra of the virtues instead. So practices are too 
narrow in scope to identify genuine virtues. I argue that even if the 
virtues turn out to be genuine on one conception of the good life, 
practices can be sustained by what rival conceptions can only consider 
simulacra. Identification of the virtues requires the other two stages of 
his argument at least. 
In making this case, chapter 4, "The Goods of Practices and the Good 
Life, " argues that without some conception of the good life, we cannot 
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answer critical questions concerning the goods internal to practices. 
And because it is these goods that define and individuate practices, we 
cannot even identify a practice adequately without reference to 
exclusive conceptions of the good life. That implies that medicine 
for 
Muslims and Confucians, for example, is therefore strictly speaking 
different practices, despite similarities, and this turns out to be the 
case. It is the relationship of the goods of practices to the good life 
that determines why the goods of practices are legitimate goods: they 
contribute to the good life. I emphasize the relationship between a 
good human being and a good practitioner. 
This fourth chapter continues to formulate my disagreement with 
Maclntyre's claim that there is a core content to the virtues that can be 
identified independently of exclusive understandings of the good life. 
This disagreement becomes sharper in my fifth chapter, "Virtues and 
the Good Life. " Chapter 5 begins with a section bridging from the 
previous chapter and considering the virtues associated with different 
practices of medicine in rival traditions. 
I examine one attempt by medical ethicists to outline an ethic of 
medicine from an explicitly Maclntyrean understanding of medicine 
as a "practice. " This attempt fails, because it explicitly avoids the 
question of identifying the good life. What we see is that on the 
Confucian understanding of the practice of medicine, for 
counterexample, the virtues of medicine just are the virtues of 
Confucianism. As a result, virtues cannot be "transferred" from one 
conception of the good to another. Against Maclntyre's position in 
After Virtue on this question, I give reasons why a reformed 
"courageous Nazi, " for instance, could not without comprehensive 
reform carry into another conception of the good life what he has 
learned about courage in Nazism qua Nazism. It is the exclusive 
particularity of the ends of the Nazi life that make it questionable that 
a Nazi's courage will carry successfully into a rival conception of the 
good life without extensive "interference. " 
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I consider another of Maclntyre's central virtues, truthfulness. Given 
the practical necessity of truthfulness even for communication, how 
much variation could there then be in truthfulness by social 
conception of the good? Surprisingly, some social systems require 
lying and deception. I finish the chapter with Anselm's theory of 
"doing the truth. " This theory draws a functional distinction between 
the natural and contingent senses in which moral behavior is true or 
good, a distinction to which I will return in Part Two. 
Maclntyre's positive argument is a return to the Aristotelian three-part 
framework of human-nature-as-it-is, rules of behavior and the virtues, 
and human-nature-as-it-can-be-if-it-realizes-its-essential-nature. In 
chapter 6, "Telos and Transcendence, " I review the second and third 
stages of his argument, the narrative unity of a life and a communal 
tradition. I argue that here also, the conception of the good life is 
determinative of these goods and of the virtues necessary to realize 
them. These goods are subordinate to the good. 
Aristotle's account of the virtues is tied to the human good as partly 
constitutive of the good. MacIntyre does not substantively define the 
ultimate end, but rather only the penultimate end, human flourishing, 
or "the good life for man" in the context of a tradition. Unless the 
human good is coterminous with a specific understanding of the 
ultimate good, the human good is inadequate as an end of the virtues. 
Without Aristotelian metaphysics, why should we assume that any 
particular conception of human flourishing is coordinate with the 
ultimate good? 
My argument to this point emphasizes the nature of virtues as even 
more thoroughly teleological than Maclntyre might be interpreted as 
saying. Genuine virtues are those directed toward the right ends and 
specifically to the right ends for the sake of the ultimate end, whatever 
that end might be. We cannot maximize every good. So how do we 
rank them? Only from a larger frame of reference can inevitable 
conflicts be resolved. I point out simply that the three-part Aristotelian 
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framework entails a vantage point that transcends that three-part 
framework. Maclntyre does not supply that transcending vantage 
point or that telos. Maclntyre's account posits human functions and 
thereby some version of morality in virtue of these functions. He has 
not told us what humans collectively are good for. Is there a basis 
independent of convention for thinking that humans are good for 
anything? Do we have a determinate final end requiring the virtues? 
MacIntyre does not present a complete account of practical rationality. 
It might be objected that in After Virtue, Maclntyre is arguing only for 
the formal necessity of a conception of the good, not for any particular 
and substantive conception of the good. This objection misses my 
point. I am asking why we should think that there is such an end. 
Without Aristotle/Aquinas' metaphysics, why should we think that 
there is a good independent of human will, and that Maclntyre's 
account is not, all told, merely a species of preference-satisfaction or 
consequentialism? Is there or is there not a human function that 
transcends social constructions? 
MacIntyre is arguing for a teleological ethics without an adequate 
telos. We are asked to choose between Aristotle and Nietzsche, yet 
without an ultimate perspective that excludes Nietzsche. Without 
such a meta-teleology, and in a forced choice between Aristotle and 
Nietzsche, the premises point to Nietzsche. 
My negative conclusion is not that there can be no rational account of 
morality without God. Maclntyre's argument demonstrates powerfully 
that morality of some sort is rational without positing God. It will not 
be a Christian morality, of course. Even in quotidian questions, at best 
it will only be a simulacrum thereof. My conclusion concerning his 
argument is rather that this will be a morality without a basis 
independent of human will. Even if the resulting account is not 
Nietzschean, it will have no basis from which it can oppose a 
Nietzschean assertion of will. 
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Is there an adequate alternative to Aristotle's final causation? Can 
human agents will other than their own flourishing for its own sake? 
Part Two favorably contrasts one form of theological voluntarism with 
eudaimonistic theories, including Maclntyre's. My version of 
theological voluntarism is developed from a Christian, specifically a 
Reformed, perspective. Maclntyre's arguments for his version of 
natural law theory are occasionally and sometimes explicitly opposed 
to theological voluntarism of the sort I propose. Theological 
voluntarism revolves around the claim that something is right because 
God intends or commands it. It does not consider the question of 
God's existence, though it is my position that the God of the biblical 
narrative does exist. 
Chapter 7, "Natural Law and Theological Voluntarism, " continues the 
line of argument that I began in chapter 6. I question the 
anthropocentric orientation of natural law arguments such as 
Maclntyre's. One moral implication of an ex nihilo creation is that 
God is not constrained by any pattern or generalization of a recurrent 
fact/event in pre-existent matter. Since the only pre-existent norm is 
God's nature, the purpose of any created thing is only whatever 
intention God has for it. Following John Duns Scotus, I claim that the 
only strict dictate of natural law, therefore, concerns the divine nature, 
as greatest good. Human flourishing (on its own terms) is only 
constitutively related to the good life because God has freely, not 
necessarily, placed a high rank on human flourishing as a good. 
I show that doubts concerning our ability to know final causes in 
natural science follow, historically and logically, from the Scotist shift 
in theology and morality. The now-evident limitations of the 
Aristotelian model for the natural sciences, and the fruitfulness of the 
empirical model that replaced it, suggest that Aristotelian arguments 
concerning necessary final causes for human life are also deficient. A 
eudaimonistic conception of flourishing, at least as it is usually 
formulated, is not a metaphysically necessary or an eternally 
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immutable end of human life to which we are directed in practical 
rationality. I identify that end instead with respect to the goodness and 
will of God. 
The relationship between natural law theory and theological 
voluntarism has close parallels with the relationship between "good" 
in the functional and role-determined sense described by MacIntyre's 
neo-Aristotelian ethics, and "good" in the sense of the biblical 
affirmation, "God is good. " "God is good" is true tautologically; the 
notion of an evil omnipotent being is conceptually incoherent. 
Chapter 8, "Authority and Theological Voluntarism, " explains the 
relationship between personal authority and personal recognition of 
authority. I follow G. E. M. Anscombe's (1990) theory of authority, the 
right to rule, as a right derived from what is necessary to the 
fulfillment of a function. Continuing, I show that in the fulfillment of 
a role, a practical authority actualizes decisive reasons for action 
through communicated intentions. By creating previously nonexistent 
goods, an authority can be both theoretical and practical with regard to 
the same reason for action. God's authority over rational creatures is a 
function of God's control over the means by which they are unified 
with the goodness of God. Subsequently, God is also a theoretical 
authority concerning those means. Within this framework I respond to 
objections to divine practical authority that are based in objections to 
salient coordination theories of political authority. 
Chapter 9, "Theological Voluntarism and the Virtues, " outlines the 
structure of morality in the moral agent. Following on my earlier 
demonstrations of the differences between accounts of virtues because 
of the contrary ends served, I note the difference between dispositions 
motivated by pursuit of flourishing and those motivated by the pursuit 
of the ultimate good. I trace the shift in the theory of the will from 
Aquinas to Scotus, corresponding to a shift in understanding of 
logically possible human ends, and present arguments in favor of the 
shift. I finish with some broad practical differences from theological 
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eudaimonism derived from my theory. In the absence of knowledge 
concerning these intentions, humans have a "default setting" of 
practical rationality in pursuit of the good they discern in conceptions 
of human flourishing. This confirms much of Maclntyre's theory, 
though as conclusions contingent on the ranking of human flourishing 
as a good. 
Chapter 10, "The Nature of Moral Obligation, " gives more specificity 
to my positive argument by showing that, within the parameters of 
natural law with respect to God's nature, obligation depends on divine 
communicated intentions. All human obligations other than those 
stipulating love of God's basic goodness are dependent on' divine acts. 
The nature of this relationship is one of reduction. The concept of 
obligation is dispensable in favor of divine communicated intentions. 
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ARISTOTLE ABANDONED 
The responsibility for the impasse of modem moral philosophy lies 
squarely at the feet of those in the post-Reformation era who 
abandoned the Aristotelian structure of practical rationality in moral 
reasoning. This is the central negative argument of After Virtue. The 
only way around the impasse, Maclntyre says positively, involves 
returning to the structure of Aristotelian argument, though without 
Aristotle's metaphysical biology. I question whether the resultant 
account can be successful, since Aristotle's ethics depend on the 
metaphysical component of his conception. The structure of 
Aristotle's Aristotelianism is irreducibly metaphysical. I offer an 
explanation of why a Thomist might assume that reference to God is 
unnecessary in an account of morality, assumptions resulting in a 
conflation of the flourishing life and the good life. This explanation 
will foreshadow reasons given in subsequent chapters for thinking that 
Maclntyre's argument cannot succeed without staking out a positive 
position in theology or metaphysics. 
In order to understand Alasdair MacIntyre's positive argument, as 
well as the objections to it and my positive argument, we have to 
understand the abandonment of Aristotle's three-part structure of 
morality. Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard fail especially in the attempt 
to justify morality without the third part of this structure, human 
nature in its full flourishing and development as the telos of human 
life. 
The failure of the Enlightenment project 
To understand the failure of the Enlightenment project, says 
Maclntyre (36-50), 3 we must contrast it with what went before. In 
3 References to page numbers only refer to After Virtue (MacIntyre 
1984). 
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modem usage, "moral" has come to refer to an increasingly narrow 
area of life, cut off from the rest. In medieval society there was no 
conceptual scheme for separating the moral from the practical as we 
do in the modem world. There is not even a word in Latin for "moral" 
as modems use it, MacIntyre tells us. The term moralis concerned the 
character and dispositions of a person. In early use, "moral" is a noun 
and relates to the practical use of the lesson taught in a piece of 
literature ("the moral" of the story), and does not contrast with 
"prudential" or "self-interested" or "legal" or "religious. " The term is 
actually closest in meaning to our "practical. " (38f. ) 
To locate the sources of this development, Maclntyre strides through 
the history of philosophy, through the efforts of Hume, Kant, and 
Kierkegaard to find a rational basis for traditional ethical notions 
without a given understanding of the ends of human life and without 
presupposing what it means to be a finished person. Maclntyre shows 
why the task is impossible. In each case it is because the attempted 
account tries to develop ethical mandates with reference only to 
uneducated human nature. 
Hume seeks to demonstrate that the satisfaction of our passions 
dictates an ethical rule of life. His argument does not succeed, simply 
because in their uneducated state, our desires are contradictory. 
Moreover, these desires do not of themselves provide a basis for 
ethical rules by which to reconcile or order these internal 
contradictions. 
Kant endeavors to build a case for conventional moral nouns from 
supposedly universal principles of reason. These universal principles, 
however, do not necessarily yield the norms which he wishes to 
derive, and may indeed produce norms both trivial (e. g., "Always eat 
mussels on Mondays in March. ") and morally repugnant. ("Persecute 
all those who hold false religious beliefs. ") 
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Finding the approaches of Hume and Kant unsuccessful, Kierkegaard 
simply abandons the attempts to ground morality and proposes the 
acceptance of ethical norms for no reason at all. Yet he insists that 
they are still binding. This cannot stand, says Maclntyre, because the 
authority of a decision comes from the reasons for a choice: "This is 
the right course of action because.... " If my reasons are sound, then 
my choice is also sound. If my reasons are not sound, then neither is 
my choice. If we choose this or that ethical principle for no reason, 
following the model of Enten-Eller, such a "principle" cannot have 
any authority over us, despite Kierkegaard's contention that it does. 
For authority is bound to reason. 
So the arguments of these three giants of the Enlightenment fail. But 
not only do they fail as positive accounts, they negate each other. 
Maclntyre pits each of the accounts of Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard 
against the others. While the positive arguments of each fail, this 
failure is due to the success of their rivals' negative arguments. For 
different reasons, the negative argument of each effectively 
undermines the positive arguments of the other two. Maclntyre then 
proceeds to show not only that their arguments did fail, but that the 
quest of Enlightenment had to fail, given the task its representatives 
had set for themselves. 
In spite of their differences, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard and company 
all agree on what a rational justification of ethical behavior would be. 
They share in the project of "constructing valid arguments which will 
move from premises concerning human nature as they understand it to 
be to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts. " 
(52) He dismisses utilitarian teleology as a substitute for Aristotelian 
teleology, since it is incapable of motivating morality from an 
understanding of pleasure. 
It is Maclntyre's argument that this two-part schema of the 
Enlightenment project-(l) uneducated human nature as the basis for 
(2) the rules of morality-cannot succeed without a shared 
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understanding of educated human nature, the third part in the 
Aristotelian structure. We can only understand the rules of ethics as 
necessary when we understand the contrast between "man-as-he- 
happens-to-be" and "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential- 
nature. " Morality is the necessary, rational link between the two. It is 
a scheme in which each part of the scheme necessarily implies the 
other two. It entails an account of potentiality and act, an account of 
man's rational essence, and especially an account of human teleology. 
In a theistic belief structure, he says, this scheme is supplemented but 
not changed. (53) 
In an earlier work, Maclntyre lays the blame for the departure from 
this formula squarely with Protestantism. (1966, pp. 121-127) And 
even in After Virtue he says that according to the Protestantism of the 
Reformation and Jansenist Catholicism, reason can provide "no 
genuine comprehension of man's true end; that power of reason was 
destroyed by the fall of man. " In the end, the contrast between 
uneducated and completed human nature remains and divine moral 
law "is still a schoolmaster to remove us from the former state to the 
latter, even if only grace enables us to respond to and obey its 
precepts. " (53f) Yet Pascal and the Reformers remain culpable for 
having made the paths straight and the ways smooth for Hume and 
Kant. The combined effect of the rejection of Protestant and Catholic 
theology and the scientific/philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism 
was the exclusion of any teleological view of the human. (MacIntyre's 
position on the abilities of unaided reason to discern human ends may 
be more conservative in later works. ) Working only from an 
understanding of untutored human nature and ethical rule, we face an 
insurmountable problem. The rules cannot be derived from the human 
nature as it is. (55) 
The Enlightenment project intended to ground morality in human 
nature. But it foreclosed any successful resolution of this effort when 
it rejected human teleology and adopted an increasingly broad 
application of a supposed general principle of logic. This purported 
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principle states that nothing can appear in a conclusion that 
does not 
first appear in the premises. And eventually, as Hume's query on the 
matter was vulgarized, the claim was advanced as having achieved 
acceptance: no "ought' 'can be derived from an "is. " That 
is, no valid 
prescriptive moral conclusions can be derived from entirely 
descriptive premises. (56ff. ) 
Maclntyre shows the inadequacy of the "no-'is'-from-'ought"' 
principle in the way in which some concepts are inseparably tied to 
their functions. If and only if we know the function of a watch or a 
farmer, for example, can we say what a good watch or a good farmer 
is. The Enlightenment project to reground morality had set aside all 
such functional understandings of "man. " The modem predicament of 
finding a basis for morality is due in large part to the assumption that 
an account of goodness can be derived apart from functionality. Man 
was previously understood as a composite of roles: "member of a 
family, citizen, soldier, philosopher, servant of God. " Only when 
"man" is conceived of as an individual, and prior to all such roles, 
does the functional conception of man disappear, and with it a critical 
link between nature and morality. (58) His account of the virtues- 
based on "practices, " the narrative unity of a life, and the context of a 
social tradition-will reestablish the place of function in a rational 
account of morality. 
To the modem mind, there may not appear to be any difference 
between Kierkegaard's position in Enten-Eller and the appeal to an 
authoritative tradition. In both instances, authority and reason appear 
to be disconnected. The difference, says Maclntyre, is this. Whereas in 
Kierkegaard the authority of a "principle" is finally arbitrary-for no 
reason-the appeal to tradition in pre-modem cultures is a reason. The 
shape of this reason will become clear in his positive account. 
In the Aristotelian construct, the person exists to fulfill a function and 
this function takes the form of roles. It is in these roles that the person 
has a telos. We understand the demands of morality as a necessary 
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bridge between the actual human condition and its realized potential in 
these three stages of human flourishing. Without such roles, there can 
be no rational support for morality. Instead of a bridge, ethics 
becomes a pier leading nowhere. Maclntyre's account is Aristotelian, 
not Aristotle's own. Aristotle's teleology depends on a metaphysical 
biology that Maclntyre finds unacceptable. Maclntyre claims that 
some objective personal characteristics, some acquired human 
excellences, are required to achieve each of the three stages of his 
positive account. He notes in particular the virtues of justice, courage, 
and honesty/truthfulness. These virtues are required to achieve 1) the 
goods internal to "practices, " 2) the unified narrative of a life, and 3) 
the maintenance of a communal tradition. We have a rational basis for 
ethics, Maclntyre says, because of the necessity of these acquired 
qualities, virtues common to all three sets of goods. 
My negative argument says that MacIntyre cannot build a successful 
Aristotelian argument unless he provides a substitute for Aristotle's 
metaphysical biology. He does not provide such a substitute in After 
Virtue. Therefore his account does not succeed. To see why, we must 
begin with Aristotle's metaphysical biology. 
The problem with Aristotle's metaphysical biology 
Aristotle's ethical teleology centers on the notion that all things, and 
specifically biological beings, are inclined toward the perfection of 
their being. He envisions everything as having an internal tendency 
toward a natural end that provided an explanation for its observable 
dynamic characteristics under unimpeded conditions. This in turn 
depends on his understanding of change in terms of motion. The 
Aristotelian framework posits four "causes" of any change: material, 
formal, efficient, and final. What the four meanings share is that each 
serves as a kind of explanation. Each is a "cause" or explanation 
(aition) in that it is an answer to the questions "Why? " or "Why this? " 
The standard exposition is usually something like this: 
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" The material cause of a table is what it is made out of. 
(wood, metal, screws... ) 
9 The formal cause of a table is what it is to be a table, or 
what makes it a table. (four legs, a surface... ) 
" The efficient cause of a table is what makes-in the sense 
of produces-the table. (a carpenter, a table-making 
machine... ) 
9 The final cause of a table is what a table is made for, its 
purpose. (dining, writing, holding clutter... ) (Adapted from' 
Cohen 2002. ) 
All four causes come together in the actualization of the table. 
The final cause of a table is a function of the carpenter's intention. But 
what is the final cause of an oak tree? For the purposes of the present 
discussion, it is Aristotle's biology as an explanation of morality that 
makes it controversial. Yet what is problematic in Aristotle's 
framework is not always clearly identified. 
For Aristotle and Aquinas, a thing has the nature of that thing because 
two states of affairs are the case. First, it shares in the form of the 
thing (its formal cause). Second, it shares the natural end or purpose 
appropriate to that thing (its final cause). The thing is a good thing, 
then, to the degree that it perfectly realizes its form, and fully realizes 
its natural end by realizing its form. 
For Aquinas the existence of natural ends entails the existence of God, 
because it entails the existence of a mind that orders things to these 
different ends. Aristotle's account, however, does not define final 
causes as a matter of immediate or efficient intentionality, either in the 
object itself or in, say, the mind of God. So the concept is not 
theological in any direct way. Rather, final causation is something 
internal to the tree or to the human, something resulting in a mature 
tree or a flourishing human being, because of the sequence of normal 
changes to which it is subject. The final cause is what moves the being 
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toward its fulfillment if it is "true to form. " (Cohen's expression, 
2002) 
For Aristotle, the final cause of a human being is the form (eidos) of a 
human being. It is therefore at this point, in the relationship of final 
causes to forms, that his theory steps beyond the bounds of the natural 
sciences in the modem paradigm. It is presumably because Aristotle's 
"metaphysical biology" is discredited as a scientific paradigm that 
Maclntyre rejects it in After Virtue. (162f. ) 
But while the description so far is accurate, to leave it there would be 
to miss something essential. For Aristotle, also, there is an 
indispensable theological component, though one less prominent than 
in Aquinas. 
Can Aristotle's theory remain coherent without either this 
metaphysical component or some metaphysical or theological 
substitute? Is there in Aristotle's theory a philosophical core 
independent of metaphysical or theistic commitments, a core that may 
be "complicated and added to, but not essentially changed" in theistic 
frameworks of later Christian, Jewish, and Islamic Aristotelianism? 
(53) No, I say, to both. 4 
In Part One I will show why Maclntyre's neo-Aristotelian account 
cannot succeed. In finishing this chapter, I simply want to show that 
Aristotle's account is irreducibly metaphysical. As in Aquinas, a 
theistic intelligence is necessary. 
4 In describing these subsequent traditions of Aristotelianism, 
Maclntyre says, "The precepts of ethics now have to be understood 
not only as teleological injunctions, but also as expressions of a divinely ordained law. The table of virtues and vices has to be 
amended and added to and a concept of sin is added to the 
Aristotelian concept of error. The law of God requires a new kind of 
respect and awe. The true end of man can no longer be completely 
achieved in this world, but only in another. Yet the threefold 
structure of untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human- 
nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos and the precepts of 
rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the other 
remains central to the theistic understanding of evaluative thought 
and judgment. " (53) Thus in the Aristotelianism of After Virtue, the 
philosophical encompasses the theological, rather than the reverse. 
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What is "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature" in 
Aristotle? Central to Aristotle's conception of the good is the 
contemplative life and the polis as the smallest self-sufficient unit 
necessary to support human life, and as the necessary structure to 
enable the smallest unit of the contemplative life, the contemplative 
man. It is well-known that this conception reflects Aristotle's notion 
of the Unmoved Mover in its self-sufficiency and contemplative 
existence. Rather than trying to exploit that link directly, however, I 
want to consider the relationship between final causality and nature in 
Aristotle. (My analysis of Aristotle's final causality is heavily 
dependent on Lloyd Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists (2005, 
pp. 122-130). ) 
Many commentators on Aristotle depict Aristotle's philosophy of 
nature as an attempt to show that we need not go beyond nature to 
explain nature, including human nature, satisfactorily. These 
interpreters draw on remarks such as Aristotle's statement that the 
final causation of nature is like a doctor who heals himself. (1941, p. 
251 (Physics 199b29-32)) Any "purpose" in nature is inherent, not to 
be conceived ab extra, in reference to external agency. Lloyd Gerson 
shows that nature is not as self-sufficiently conceived in Aristotle as 
this. Nature is self-sufficient as a final cause, but only if nature is 
construed apart from material causality: (2005, pp. 122-130) 
Aristotle frequently and consistently refers to final causation in two 
senses: 
1. "the result for the sake of which" 
2. "the person or thing for whom or for which something is 
done" (Gerson 2005, p. 123) 
In his use of (2), it is clear that Aristotle does not conceive of any god 
or gods or any transcendent entity as a final cause of natural change in 
this sense of final cause. Nothing external is required for the 
perfection of natural things. So nature is a final cause in the sense of 
(1). Natural processes act to achieve the benefit or goal or realization 
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of the potentiality of some natural thing within nature. Nature acts 
always and only "for the sake of" such a goal/benefit/actualization. 
But if this is the case, then what is the relationship between (1) and 
(2)? And does (2) have any place in natural explanation at all? 
(Gerson 2005, p. 123) What we will see is that (1) is ultimately 
explained in terms of (2). The Unmoved Mover is the explanation of 
natural final causes. 
An internal cause alone does not explain anything. Suppose that no 
other evidence for the tendency of acorns to become oak trees is 
provided, other than that acorns do become oak trees. Suppose also 
that the claim is put so that no other explanation is possible or 
necessary. In the critique of Aristotelianism offered by the modern 
scientific paradigm, the realization of actuality is not an explanation. 
An acorn acts in such a way as to realize its nature as an oak tree, and 
this is for its good, but this is not yet an explanation, in the modern 
sense emphasizing efficient causes. The explanation provides no 
further insight into how the natural processes are happening. The 
phenomenon is touted as an internal property, but is in fact just a re- 
description of the phenomenon. So the explanation qua explanation is 
vacuous. This is considered a fatal criticism of the Aristotelian 
paradigm, and rightly so... if the explanation of acorns becoming oak 
trees were left as such. But the criticism would not have escaped 
Aristotle. It was in order to complete the explanation that he resorted 
to the Unmoved Mover as the ultimate in efficient causation. 
The neo-Platonist Simplicius demonstrates that Aristotle is not saying 
that nature is completely self-explanatory. Although nature is a 
principle of motion and standstill, it is such a principle instrumentally. 
Nature is a moved mover, not an unmoved mover. Nature acts always 
and only to realize the potential of all natural beings, but its own 
action is not self-explanatory. We can most easily see this ultimate 
relationship of dependence with respect to the motion of the astral 
bodies. While the self-sufficiency of nature as described is true of all 
organic entities, this is not the case for the motion of the fixed stars. 
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Lacking the concept of inertia, Aristotle turns to the notion of the 
Unmoved Mover as an explanation for the origin of motion and for the 
continuous propulsion of the stars in the second book of Physics. 
(Kullman 1985, p. 126) 
As is widely recognized, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is the final 
cause of nature, Simplicius says. What is less widely recognized is 
that it is also the efficient cause of nature. Nature is a final cause, but 
it cannot be the final cause that encompasses nature itself. Nature is 
not the final cause of nature. And nature is an efficient cause, but 
cannot be the absolutely first efficient cause. Nature is not the efficient 
cause of nature. (Simplicius In Phys., pp. 16-29, cited in Gerson 2005, 
p. 126f. ) The Unmoved Mover is not anything like the personal deity 
of the biblical traditions, of course. But it is nonetheless an intellect 
separate from nature that acts as final and efficient cause of nature 
taken as a whole. 
If we drop Aristotle's metaphysical biology and his understanding of 
final causes with it, then how do we explain the fulfillment of human 
nature? To say what an acorn essentially is is to presuppose the oak 
tree as norm. We cannot know potentiality except with reference to 
actuality. For Aristotle or for any teleological explanation of morality, 
actuality must conceptually precede potentiality. This is the point of 
Maclntyre's critique of the Enlightenment project. It failed to argue 
from "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. " Yet 
how do we arrive at this norm? It will not do just to say that humans 
tend toward the fulfillment of their nature de facto. Many don't, even 
without external interference. And many tend toward ends quite 
different from those envisioned by Aristotle. We must recognize some 
end for the sake of which human beings function, such as a specific 
vision of their flourishing in community. What Maclntyre does not 
acknowledge in After Virtue is that in Aristotle, the form (eidos) of 
human nature that is a telos to be realized is ultimately and 
dependently linked to Aristotle's presuppositions both about the 
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Unmoved Mover as pure actuality and also about man as the center of 
the natural order. 
These metaphysical/theological commitments do not figure in the 
positive argument of After Virtue. In Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?, the sequel to After Virtue, it is Aquinas that emerges as 
exemplar of how a tradition of enquiry advances and supplants what 
went before, in a theologically-structured synthesis of the insights of 
Aristotle with those of Augustine. (MacIntyre 1988, pp. 164-208) The 
conclusions of practical rationality, from Aristotle through Aquinas, 
flow necessarily from their respective ends, in goods including but 
transcending the fulfillment of human nature. 
Now, Aquinas' account of morality in the Summa is theological from 
first to last. In his paradigmatic natural law theory, the natural law is, 
from a God's-eye perspective, a dimension of divine providence. The 
structure of the Summa makes this clear: the treatise on grace follows 
the treatise on law, grace in the supernatural following and building on 
grace in the natural. From the point of view of the human recipient, 
the natural law consists in the principles of practical rationality 
applied to human action. Thomas' theory is situated in the context of 
his theory of law, which is 
nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating 
from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now 
it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine 
Providence... that the whole community of the 
universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the 
very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler 
of the universe, has the nature of a law. (ST 1-2.91.1) 
Thomas conceives of law therefore as a function of divine providence. 
The moral force of natural law is derived from the given-ness of the 
conception of the good life, with God as final cause. There is nothing 
in the conclusions of practical rationality that is not in these premises. 
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"Good" is assumed to have both subjective and objective standing. 
The human good is partly constitutive of the good. 
How then should we understand the scarcity of the theological in 
some avowedly Thomistic natural lawyers? They have developed 
natural law justifications of moral behavior without a strong 
theological (or metaphysical) component, yet despite their differences, 
each places his/her theory in the tradition of Aquinas. (Compare for 
example Maclntyre 1984, pp. '181-225, and MacIntyre 2000. ) How 
can this dissimilarity with Aquinas be explained? 
Many Thomistic natural law theorists argue for the equivalence of the 
dictates of the Decalogue and the dictates of reason. On this 
understanding unaided human reason can produce an ethics in 
conformity to the Ten Commandments. From the Stoics to Spinoza 
the relationship between God and the natural order is so close that the 
two are often used interchangeably: deus sive natura. Less extremely, 
some natural lawyers who are also theists do not see the explicit 
reference to God as necessary to an adequate account of morality. 
They claim that unaided reason can adequately dictate both what 
human-flourishing-based-in-social-goods is and also how that 
flourishing is realized. Something like the following line of reasons, I 
think, is used in reaching this conclusion: 
1. Practical rationality participates in the theoretical rationality of 
the Eternal Law in the mind of God. 
2. Practical reasoning concerning human flourishing is therefore, 
indirectly, reasoning according to the Eternal Law in the divine 
mind. 
3. Humans flourish to the extent that they realize their 
inherent potentialities as self-sustaining substances. Such 
substances are initially created by God, but are 
subsequently self-perpetuating. So God's purposes are 
actualized in the normal functioning of the being. 
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4. The virtues are required for the realization of human 
s flourishing. Therefore an adequate account of the virtues 
is possible without bringing God's purposes into the 
foreground. (And in a pluralistic social context, it is 
therefore best to forego this reference. )6 
At least three assumptions remain unstated and unexamined here, and 
these assumptions are central to my negative argument. 
First, the flourishing life is conflated with the good life. To flourish 
according to our natural capacities just is to actualize God's purposes. 
Second, flourishing is assumed to be a good that the fully rational 
human subject cannot fail to will. Third, the particulars of what this 
flourishing entails are assumed to be wholly or largely known across 
fundamentally different cultural conceptions of ultimate reality. 
Because the particulars of flourishing are known, at least in large part, 
the particulars of the moral norms required to realize that end are 
thereby also known. I deny these assumptions and my objection is best 
seen in light of a subsequent version of them. 
In Dependent Rational Animals, Maclntyre explicitly reverts to 
biology in his explanation of morality. (1999, p. x) His argument there 
actually exacerbates the inadequacy to which I am pointing in After 
S Maclntyre argues-crucially and I think correctly-that the goods of flourishing are shared and cooperatively social. 
6I am indebted to Tim Stanton for clarification on pieces of this 
understanding. 
Maclntyre seems to recognize explicitly the need for the 
presuppositional framework that I say is necessary in "First 
Prince les, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues" 
(1998). He says that in each science there are first principles that 
provide premises for arguments, and that specify causal agencies- 
material, formal, efficient and final. "It follows also that, insofar as 
the perfected sciences are themselves hierarchically organized, the 
most fundamental of sciences [theology] will specify that in terms of 
which everything that can be understood is to be understood. And 
this, as Aquinas remarks in a number of places, we call God. There 
is then an ineliminable theological dimension-theological, that is, 
in the sense that makes Aristotle's metaphysics a theolo is-to 
enquiry conceived in an Aristotelian mode. " (1998,183f) His own 
presuppositions with regard to theology, however, do not appear in After Virtue or even in some arguments subsequent to this statement, 
such as Dependent Rational Animals. 
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Virtue, by basing morality on human biological flourishing. The shape 
of my problem with the After Virtue project as a whole is therefore 
more clearly seen with respect to the account of Dependent Rational 
Animals. 
Any picture of human flourishing has to address one way or another 
the needs and vulnerabilities of the human body. So the most obvious 
conditions and limits imposed by the flourishing of our nature are 
those based on the biological. Now, ex post facto my presuppositions 
about divine intentions for human flourishing, I am deeply 
sympathetic with an emphasis on human physicality in ethics. I am 
deeply skeptical, however, of any account of ethics based merely on 
biological considerations. Sociobiological accounts such as those of 
Arnhart (1998) and of Maclntyre in Dependent Rational Animals tend 
to minimize both the central role and the freedom of the divine and the 
human wills in morality. We cannot derive the criteria of normalcy in 
mature human nature just from, say, statistical norms. As Arnhart 
himself recognizes, there are many "natural" states of affairs that we 
believe to be unacceptable. (1998, pp. 137ff)7 
The attempt to establish the meaning of "flourishing" on a biological 
basis is misguided, both because many of the goods of human 
flourishing are higher in rank than human biological goods, and also 
because we can overcome our desire for the goods of our biological 
nature. There is almost nearly universal agreement that we should do 
so. The influences of biblical and other traditions in Western culture 
concerning what humans ought to be have prevented the brute 
application of many merely animalic considerations in human ends 
and flourishing. Human ends transcend the categories of their 
biological nature and indeed transcend any ends yet realized in 
history, or so claim the biblical traditions. The most excellent modes 
7I do not accept as normative, for example, either war or male dominance, both of which Arnhart finds unobjectionable, and rightly 
natural. 
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of life that have so far been realized only weakly anticipate those ends 
and are not conceivable apart from those ends. 
But if those ends are at all correct, and if they specifically require 
divine intervention, both for any degree of actualization in this life and 
in the life following and transcending this life, and if even our supra- 
natural biological ends are realized only in the realization of our 
comprehensive spiritual ends, then how can any account of ethics 
succeed without evoking those spiritual ends? If human beings can 
reach their ultimate end only in transcending the merely natural, as 
natural lawyers in the Thomist tradition believe, then they cannot base 
an adequate ethics on merely biological ends, without reference to 
ends that transcend the merely natural. The only ends dictated solely 
by biology are the material advantages that the most adaptive 
variations in a species possess and pass on to their descendents by 
their genetic code. No understanding of human flourishing based in 
biology alone can adequately account for the virtues Maclntyre, for 
one, wants to promote. Joseph Dunne (2002), drawing on Raimond 
Gaita (2000) and Charles Taylor (1996), shows how Maclntyre's neo- 
Aristotelian case in Dependent Rational Animals represents a step 
back from the Thomist position advanced in Whose Justice? and 
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. As Gaita says, "an ethics 
centred on the concept of human flourishing does not have the 
conceptual resources to keep fully among us... people who are 
severely and ineradicably afflicted. " (2000, p. 19) If flourishing is 
biologically based and rationally promoted, then how can, say, 
eugenics be morally tainted? Aristotle himself advocated infanticide in 
the case of birth defects. (Aristotle 1941, p. 1302 (NE 1335b20-1) In a 
society built on the biological basis of morality, why shouldn't we 
euthanize those unable ever to become "independent practical 
reasoners" (MacIntyre 1999, chap. 8) because of mental disabilities? If 
those with merely physical congenital deformities are allowed to live 
by the logic of reciprocity, why shouldn't they be sterilized? 
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The good life reduced to human biology-that's the point of my 
objection to Maclntyre exaggerated. I say that the good transcends 
biological flourishing in a way beyond the resources of sociobiology 
to explain. 8 
What is the relationship between human flourishing and the good? 
And are we capable of distinguishing the end of the flourishing life 
from the end of the good life in practical rationality? Consider two 
sorts of relationship conceivable between the fully flourishing life and 
the good: possible conflict and necessary harmony. Consider them 
with respect both to objective morality and to morality in the moral 
subject. 
Is it the case that harmony between the flourishing of human beings 
and the good is somehow a logical or metaphysical necessity? That is, 
is it impossible that the genuine flourishing of one being or species 
inhibit, or in any way limit, the flourishing of any other being/species? 
For example, is it impossible in a world of fully rational beings for the 
genuine flourishing of one individual, or of humans in society, to be 
threatened by the flourishing of any other species? 
Or, if the maximal realization of the potential of one being/species, in 
absolute terms, can possibly conflict with the maximal realization of 
another being/species, is the "flourishing" of the one necessarily in 
terms of the other flourishing of the other? That is, is it a metaphysical 
necessity, for example, that "flourishing" for all non-rational species 
8 Nothing in this claim should be read as positing the human as a non- 
material essence over against the physical body. In careful analysis, 
the ancient Hebrew "soul" (nephesh) refers both to the visible and to 
the invisible aspects of human life. Human beings are not essentially 
non-material. A soul is a spirit in a body. One or the other alone 
does not constitute a complete human. In the context of the Koine 
Greek of the New Testament as well, the meaning of "soul" (psyche) 
is often synonymous with the person viewed holistically. (See 
Romans 13.1) The central teaching of the New Testament about the 
future state of human life is not immortality, but the resurrection of 
body and soul reunited. (See Hoekema 1994, pp 86-91,239-252. ) 
This position has often been ignored in church history. Calvin could 
refer to the "prison-house" of the body. (1953, vol l., p. 160; (Inst. 
1.15.2)) On balance, Aquinas' view of the human is not dualistic. 
(See Lee and George 2005a; 2005b, and Maclntyre 1990, pp. 152ff. ) 
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be defined just in terms of whatever contributes to the flourishing of 
human beings? 
If the answer to any of these is no, then the good life for humans does 
not necessarily entail human flourishing. And so in a relationship of 
possible conflict, the flourishing life is not necessarily the good life. If 
a positive relationship of human flourishing to the good is not a 
metaphysical necessity, then it must be shown that the good life 
entails human flourishing. 
For non-rational beings, this distinction poses no problem, obviously. 
They do what they do without freedom of will. For rational beings, 
there is a question. The question is whether the human will can 
accommodate this distinction between the flourishing life and the 
good life. Suppose that there is a logical possibility of a conflict of 
maximal human flourishing, in absolute terms, either between 
individuals, or between humans and non-human entities. Are we free 
not to will our flourishing? If this conflict between the flourishing of 
species is possible, even though it is not actual, are humans free to 
will human flourishing for the sake of some greater good? Even if 
human flourishing should happen to be fully compatible with the 
good, that is, could we then will the good above our own flourishing? 
If so, then the pursuit of our flourishing is therefore not necessarily 
moral per se. 
What if a conflict between the flourishing life and the good life is not 
possible? This is a second sort of relationship conceivable between the 
flourishing life and the good, a relationship of necessary harmony. 
The question of morality in the subject remains. Even if the 
flourishing life is necessarily harmonious with the good, it seems 
unlikely that the good is reducible to, entirely constituted of, or 
coterminous with, human flourishing. Unless the good is purely a 
function of human will, I don't see how human flourishing can be the 
same thing as the good. So even if human flourishing and the good are 
necessarily harmonious, there is still the question of what we can will. 
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Can practical rationality distinguish between our flourishing and the 
good? That is, can we will our flourishing for the sake of a greater 
good? Can we will the good above our own flourishing? 
I say that we can and that we must. I say that the good transcends 
human flourishing in all its dimensions. In the biblical tradition that I 
will defend in Part Two, the ranking of the goods of our animalic 
nature and of our nature comprehensively are entailed in God's free 
decision (in creating the imago Dei, in the Incarnation, the 
Resurrection, and in the rest of the redemptive narrative) concerning 
the ends of human life. The relative importance of human flourishing 
rests on that free decision. Practical rationality can and must reflect 
this distinction. 
In the remainder of Part One, I will consider Maclntyre's account in 
After Virtue and argue that it does not succeed. The Enlightenment 
abandoned Aristotle. Maclntyre has abandoned Aristotle's 
metaphysical framework. No Aristotelian account of the virtues can 
succeed without the Unmoved Mover or some other explanatory agent 
distinct from empirical phenomena. 
With the preceding sketch of Maclntyre's neo-Aristotelian argument 
and of the issues to be discussed as roadmap, I move now to an 
examination of the first stage of his argument, his winsome concept of 
"practices. " In view of my larger argument, the critical relationship to 
track here will be the one between virtues and the goods they serve 
and make possible. I want to argue that no account of goods, practices, 
or virtues as ends, short of a comprehensive conception of the good 
life in pursuit of the good, can frame an adequate account of morality. 
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VIRTUES AND PRACTICES 
One of the most well-known, compelling, and appealing pieces of 
Maclntyre's positive argument in After Virtue is his theory of 
"practices. " Although the concept is complex, it is at once applicable 
to virtually every human endeavor and also elemental in its 
explanatory power. We can see its relevance to activities as varied as 
architecture, football, and family life. We can explain both to children 
and to CEO's why they must develop certain capacities of character. 
But it is perhaps because this theory is so broad and powerful that 
even Maclntyre underestimates the particularity and exclusivity of its 
precise application. By this I mean that if the concept of practices is 
applied to a robust conception of the good life in any given tradition, 
the virtues and goods of these practices will not have the universality 
that Maclntyre strongly implies that they have. Despite his 
acknowledgement of differences in lists of virtues across cultural 
contexts, Maclntyre claims that genuine virtues are required to sustain 
the cooperative activities he calls practices. Specifically, he has 
characterized "the virtues" as those acquired dispositions necessary to 
the realization of goods internal to practices. 
It is at the level of practices and the virtues they necessitate that I 
begin to develop my disagreements with Maclntyre's approach in the 
After Virtue project. The full significance of this disagreement will 
come to light only in chapter 9, where I argue that because the 
ultimate end of eudaimonism cannot adequately conceptualize our 
ultimate good as the good-God, on my understanding-it cannot 
present a coherent account of genuine virtues. To demonstrate that 
that part of my conclusion is accurate, I must necessarily call into 
question here Maclntyre's claim that only genuine virtues can sustain 
practices and make possible the attainment of the goods internal to 
practices. My interest is not to deny that apparently virtuous behavior 
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in the pursuit of sub-ultimate ends has any value. Rather, I want to 
stress the importance of the focus of moral psychology. Throughout 
Part One I will emphasize that the ends of virtues are determinative in 
the genuineness of those virtues, and that the ultimate end of the 
virtues is ultimately determinative. 
In the following I begin my case for an understanding of the virtues as 
being thoroughly tied to exclusive conceptions of the good life. The 
chapter is organized as follows. I outline Maclntyre's case that the 
virtues are necessary for sustaining practices. Only genuine virtues 
can realize the goods internal to what he calls "practices. " He defines 
the virtues circularly. They are required to realize certain goods, it 
turns out, because these virtues are defined first as those qualities 
necessary to attain those goods. He recognizes that the scope of 
practices is inadequate to the task of constructing an adequate account 
of the virtues as a whole. I think that practices are inadequate even to 
the task of identifying a genuine virtue. If this is correct, then it 
suggests that the dispositions necessary to sustain practices may not be 
genuine virtues for a given coherent conception of the good life. And 
if they are not genuine virtues for a given coherent conception of the 
good life, then they are not universal virtues. This suggestion will be 
confirmed in chapters 4 and 5, where I show that the identification of 
genuine virtues requires a much broader context than practices; it 
requires a robust conception of the good life. 
Definition of a practice 
The structure and conditions of "practices" form the first and most 
basic stage of a conceptual core of MacIntyre's account of the virtues. 
(186) What, then, is a practice? 
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By a `practice' I am going to mean any coherent and 
complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellences, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. (187) 
The concepts of cooperative activity and internal goods are at the 
heart of this definition. Cooperative activity raises no particular 
obstacle to comprehension, though its importance cannot be 
overstated; the smallest unit of moral analysis is not individual but 
social. "Internal goods" requires explanation. They are "internal" for 
two reasons. First, they are goods related to the particular practice 
itself. Second, they can only be identified and recognized "by the 
experience of participating in the practice in question. " (188-189) 
Only by participating at some level in a practice can anyone become 
capable of evaluating the internal goods of that practice. A person who 
had never read nor discussed any of the recognized classics of 
Western political philosophy, to invent an example, could not 
competently judge the merits of an essay on a question within that 
literature. 
Maclntyre identifies two principal kinds of goods internal to any 
practice: the excellence of production and participation in the life-of- 
the practitioner. (189f. ) In the first kind of good, production refers 
both to whole of the craft as exercised and to the product that results 
from that craft. He cites products of practices such as paintings, 
football passes, and experiments in physics. (187ff. ) A fine portrait 
stands as a good internal to portrait-making. It also represents one 
stage in the progress of the art of portrait-making as it evolved toward 
greater and greater realization of the purpose and meaning of the art. 
And it may represent a step in the transformation of the art's purpose 
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and meaning as these are extended toward previously unimagined 
directions and aspirations. 
The second sort of internal good of practices is participation in the- 
life-of-a-practitioner, to whatever extent that life constitutes the 
agent's life. MacIntyre gives few details here, but we might be 
justified in identifying this life with that unique configuration of 
constitutive goals, activities, and relationships without which such a 
life is not possible. In the case of a footballer, for example, this might 
include physical training, nutritional regimens, communication and 
understanding between coach and player and between the players, 
tactics and strategies before and during matches, and all of this 
realized synchronically. 
In identifying internal goods, MacIntyre draws a crucial contrast. 
Internal goods differ from external goods in that the latter are the 
objects of competition, rather than of cooperation. In the pursuit of 
money, prestige, or power, others cannot simultaneously share what 
one gains or wins. External goods are the objects of zero-sum games. 
Internal goods, by contrast, enrich the whole community of 
practitioners. When one excels, all others in the community benefit 
from the advancements made. (190f. ) 
There is another type of internal good that Maclntyre does not 
explicitly mention under that heading, but that can be found later in 
his constructive argument, the pleasures or enjoyments associated 
with practices. Not all pleasures qualify as internal goods; some 
pleasures and enjoyments are internal, some external. When a person 
achieves success in a practice, he typically enjoys the achievement, 
and this pleasure supervenes on the achievement as part of the state of 
being associated with the achievement. It is not pleasure or enjoyment 
that the person aims for, however, contra utilitarianism. In the 
Aristotelian model, enjoyment supervenes on achievements within the 
practice, what Maclntyre has previously called the products of 
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practices (1970. We might add that pleasure supervenes also on the 
other internal good previously mentioned, 'the life-of-a-practitioner. 
It is only through the practice in question that the goods internal to 
that practice can be obtained. So "the goods internal to the practice of 
chess cannot be had in any other way but by playing chess or some 
other game of that specific kind. " (188)9 This stands in contrast to 
external goods, which Maclntyre says can be procured without any 
particular practice. 
Standards of excellence and obedience to rules are also indispensable 
to practices. To learn a practice is in part to respect the authority of 
those standards and to recognize one's own inadequacies in the 
practice. It is to become teachable. Maclntyre juxtaposes the 
established authority of recognized practitioners with subjectivist and 
emotivist analyses of judgment. (190) 
As already mentioned, the conceptions of the goods and ends of a 
practice are transformed and enriched by the extension of human 
powers and of the internal goods that partially define the practice. The 
combined excellences demanded by a practice are such that they 
surpass complete mastery and call practitioners to grow in their 
accomplishments and abilities. With the realization of the internal 
goods of practices over history, our growing understanding of those 
goods enlarges and transforms our understanding of the goods and 
ends of a practice. We see new and different possibilities for those 
goods. (193f. ) 
Excellences, powers, abilities-all these prefigure MacIntyre's 
provisional definition of a virtue as a human excellence of a certain 
sort: 
9 Accomplished chess players might protest that there is not any other 
game like chess. Part of what they mean, I think, is that no other 
game delivers quite the same package of goods that chess does. The 
extent to which other practices can or cannot deliver the same 
goods, I will argue in the next chapter, is central to their 
individuation. 
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A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession 
and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve 
those goods which are internal to practices and the lack 
of which effectively prevents us from achieving any 
such goods. (191) 
Note that MacIntyre here defines the virtues as necessary, though not 
sufficient, means to an end, namely, to the achievement of internal 
goods. Without the key virtues, "the goods internal to practices are 
barred to us"; the lack of these virtues "bars us from achieving the 
standards of excellence or the goods internal to the practice" and "it 
renders the practice pointless except as a device for achieving external 
goods. " (191) The virtues are qualities that enable internal goods. 
An even closer connection exists between the virtues and the personal 
relationships of practices. Practices are cooperative and therefore 
relational. They require particular relationships between the 
practitioner and his/her fellow practitioners. Maclntyre has said that 
attaining the internal goods of practices requires "subordinating 
ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other practitioners. " 
Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship 
between those who participate in it. Now the virtues are 
those goods by reference to which, whether we like it 
or not, we define our relationships to those other people 
with whom we share the kinds of purposes and 
standards which inform practices. (190-191) 
It is the virtues then that actually define the relationships of practices. 
Here the virtues just are another sort of good inherent to practices that 
aggregately constitute our relationship with other practitioners. Nor 
are these relationships limited to our contemporaries. To become a 
practitioner, we must also learn from the past, so that our relationship 
to the received tradition of the practice requires truthfulness, courage, 
and justice, much as do our relationships with present-day 
practitioners. (194) 
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So Maclntyre has defined the virtues with respect to the goods 
internal to practices and the relationships forming the context of 
practices. This is the feature of the virtues that I wish to emphasize 
here, and in so doing, to emphasize the teleological shape of the 
virtues. I want to summarize this definitional circularity, then return to 
it later for elaboration. In this chapter and recurrently throughout Part 
One, it will become apparent that the goods served by virtues 
determinatively shape those virtues. 
Virtuously circular: the necessity of the virtues 
What are the virtues? As it turns out, the answer to this question is 
found in the answer to another: What must we do to attain these 
internal goods? "We have to learn to recognize what is due to whom 
[justice]; we have to be prepared to take whatever self-endangering 
risks are demanded along the way [courage]; and we have to listen 
carefully to what we are told about our own inadequacies and to reply 
with the same carefulness for the facts [honesty/truthfulness]. " (191) 
Each of the three cardinal virtues in Maclntyre's account is therefore 
defined with respect to the goods and relationships internal to 
practices. That is, the virtues are defined as just those qualities that 
enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices. But as we will 
see, he then goes on to claim that the virtues are required to attain the 
goods internal to practices. So his argument concerning the virtues is 
circular, virtuously circular. Far from denying this claim, I wish to 
make it a central feature of my own argument and do so even more 
rigorously than the argument of After Virtue does. But let's begin with 
the case made there. 
Consider the virtue of courage: "We hold courage to be a virtue, " 
Maclntyre says, "because the care and concern for individuals, 
communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in practices 
requires the existence of such a virtue. " (192, emphasis added) And 
little more is added to individuate this disposition. That is, an instance 
of courage just is whatever action is required of the actor in order to 
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protect individuals, communities, and causes, at the risk of the actor. 
The virtue of courage just is the disposition to so act to protect them. 
This can be seen more clearly in answer to this question: Is this a 
disposition to so act with respect to any individuals, communities or 
causes at all? The answer to this question depends on the scope of the 
practices in question. But in general, the answer is no. As defined so 
far, courage is a disposition to so act only toward those individuals, 
communities, and causes specified by some criteria of valuation 
relative to the goods of practices. The goods A, B, and C internal to 
practices are valued more highly than the constitutive aspects of 
oneself X, Y, and Z that are risked in the protection of those goods. So 
courage as described so far is not an incidental, or independent, 
human quality that just so happens to serve us in attaining the goods 
internal to practices. It is one quality among several qualities 
exclusively defined with respect to the attainment of those goods. 
To anticipate the argument of the next few chapters, take the example 
of courage in Aristotle's account. Aristotle's conception of the good 
life is wrapped up in his understanding of the polls as the full 
realization of human potential. His ultimate display of courage is the 
rational sacrifice of the soldier's life that he makes for his polis. It is 
most definitely not the willingness to sacrifice or even to risk his life 
for another human being regardless of whether this being is a kinsman 
or compatriot. Such an act would not be courageous, but foolish, 
precisely because of this relationship, or lack of relationship. His 
understanding of courage, on careful examination, follows necessarily 
from Aristotle's conception of the good life. 
Another of the qualities required to attain internal goods is 
honesty/truthfulness. Here again I will enlarge slightly on Maclntyre's 
comment. On his neo-Aristotelian view, friendship itself is defined 
with respect to the shared pursuit of goods. (191) A practitioner has an 
understanding of what the facts of a matter are, and takes that to be the 
truth. An instance of truthfulness just is the action of communicating 
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the essential details of those facts to another person in such a way as 
to enable that person to pursue the goods that they both share. The 
disposition to do this is the virtue of truthfulness. 
If, on a question of mutual importance to the practitioner and two 
other people, he lies to one of them and tells the truth to the other, he 
cannot claim to be in the same sort of relationship with both. (191) 
This is because, as has been noted, both relationships are defined with 
reference to shared goods. By not dealing truthfully with the first 
person, he has effectively acted so as to hinder the person from 
attaining those goods. They no longer share the pursuit of those goods, 
and therefore, unless the situation is corrected, they can no longer 
continue to be friends. 
Finally, justice is essential to attaining internal goods. 
If A, a professor, gives B and C the grades that their 
papers deserve, but grades D because he is attracted by 
D's blue eyes or is repelled by D's dandruff, he has 
defined his relationship to D differently from his 
relationship to the other members of the class, whether 
he wishes to or not. Justice requires that we treat others 
in respect of merit or desert according to uniform and 
impersonal standards.... (192) 
Maclntyre and his readers understand that some sort of academic 
practice is in question here. Unfortunately, the description of the case 
does not make this explicit, and therefore obscures the point I am 
making. What are the goods involved in the practice of, say, political 
studies at the undergraduate level? They would include familiarity 
with some area of the most basic body of knowledge in the discipline, 
with a view to applying those achievements in the lives of the 
students, and eventually expanding achievements in that discipline. 
The place of written work in this practice is to enable students to 
attain these and other goods by taking some first steps toward mastery 
of an aspect of the course of study and then by displaying it in the 
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discipline. The professor marks those papers with respect both to 
contemporary standards of mastery in the discipline and to the 
expected level of achievement for such students. The marks inform 
the students of their progress toward the goods in order to enable them 
better to reach them. 
So here again, the virtue is defined in terms of the goods it serves. 
Justice is giving to each his or her due; in this case, giving a mark that 
reflects the standards of the discipline for the quality of the paper 
written. The virtue of justice is a disposition to do so as a function of 
the goods pursued. In this case, justice is the ability to learn and to 
write on a given topic in political studies, among other things. In a 
practice with different internal goods-a school for training 
cosmeticians or fashion models, perhaps-eye coloring and personal 
hygiene could quite possibly be taken into consideration as factors for 
the mark on a paper, and justly so. Would these factors bear on the 
students' attainment of the goods of the practice? Not in political 
studies. There is no known instrumental connection between them and 
the goods internal to political studies. There might possibly be such a 
connection to the goods internal to the cosmetic and fashion 
industries. So the criteria for determining the justice of considering 
these factors in marking a paper depend on the goods pursued. What 
we have in this neo-Aristotelian account is not a demonstration of the 
necessity of a disposition toward justice in the abstract. It is not yet 
even the demonstration of the necessity of a disposition toward justice 
in the larger scope of a good life. What we have to this point in the 
argument of After Virtue is only the necessity of such a disposition for 
achieving a particular set of goods. 
The relationship of these dispositions-courage, honesty, and justice, 
at least-to the goods internal to practices and the relationships they 
entail, in sum, is the relationship between the second and third parts of 
the three-part structure of Aristotelian morality. The goods and 
relationships of practices, that is, are partly constitutive of 
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MacIntyre's neo-Aristotelian telos of human existence, a telos 
understood functionally. 
MacIntyre tells us that an account of practices alone would be 
inadequate. In the subsequent chapter of After Virtue he goes on to 
present two more stages of the human telos, the narrative unity of a 
life and a communal tradition. He does not link his three cardinal 
virtues to these two stages with anything like the specificity that they 
are given in the description of practices. As a result, the circular nature 
of the virtues is not fully demonstrated, nor are the implications that 
follow from this circularity made apparent. One such implication is 
that virtues cannot be universal in the way that MacIntyre strongly 
implies. 
As we have seen, it is his claim that practical rationality dictates these 
virtues as necessary means to specific ends. At other times he seems 
to refer to "the virtues" as if they represented a set of dispositions 
universally recognized across time and culture through universally 
recognized practices, integrated lives, and communal traditions. The 
implied universality of the virtues, despite important differences in 
traditions, makes the virtues independent of any specific and exclusive 
understanding of the human telos. So while the Enlightenment project 
attempted to do without a telos, at least at the point of development of 
his project in After Virtue, Maclntyre seems to be proposing a 
universal telos. 
This is unsatisfactory, because of course the Enlightenment was partly 
the result of the inability to settle on such a universal telos. Maclntyre 
ought to have dispelled any notion in After Virtue that a telos common 
to all conceptions of the good exists. This may be the position he takes 
in Whose Justice? But if it is, then he ought also to have recognized 
more explicitly there that the argument of After Virtue wrongly 
implies that the virtues are universal. As the two pieces of his project 
stand, he seems to have a two-homed problem. 
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Either After Virtue inadequately recognizes the impasse of moral 
philosophy before the Enlightenment and therefore Maclntyre should 
have placed his positive argument in the context of one such 
conception of the good life as the human telos. It will be my claim that 
the three-part Aristotelian structure is roughly correct, but that 
Maclntyre's account neither specifies the missing third part-"man- 
as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature"-nor proposes a 
framework that could constitute a reason for thinking that such a part 
even exists independently of human will. 
Or, second horn, his argument is asserting that "the virtues" have a 
status that is freestanding, and are not tied to mutually incompatible 
conceptions of the human telos. If virtues are not defined in reference 
to a particular telos, then his position is similar to the way the 
Enlightenment vainly tried to justify morality, in the following 
respect. It holds that differences in our ultimate end are not 
consequential to a successful account of "the virtues. " The argument 
below, through chapter 5, denies this conclusion. 
The achievement of the goods of practices is not sufficient even for 
establishing the existence of genuine virtues. To see why not, we need 
to look much more closely at the structure of genuine virtues, 
according to any one tradition's conception of the good life, as 
differentiated from simulacra. To understand which dispositions are 
necessary for achieving the goods of practices and which are not, we 
have to understand what distinguishes virtues from their simulacra. 
What I hope to show is that something less than genuine virtues, on 
any tradition's conception of the good life, are necessary to realize the 
goods of practices. This confirms the impossibility of basing an 
adequate account of the virtues in practices alone. 
Now, Maclntyre acknowledges the insufficiency of the account so far, 
although on other reasons. So questioning that the dispositions 
necessary to achieve the goods of practices might seem unnecessary. 
Let's look at his reasons. 
50 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
A life based only on the account of the virtues defined with respect to 
practices would be defective in three ways, MacIntyre says. First, it 
would be the subject of too many conflicts and too much arbitrariness. 
Given the conflicting claims of practices, the individual would be 
thrown back on a modem understanding of choice between conflicting 
allegiances, unless something beyond practices distinguishes better 
choices from poorer choices. (201 f. ) We need a more comprehensive 
understanding of our end in order to rank goods and reconcile tensions 
between them. 
"Secondly, without an overriding conception of the telos of a whole 
human life, conceived as a unity, our conception of certain individual 
virtues has to remain partial and incomplete. " We do not yet have a 
full picture of the virtues. Justice as desert, for example, requires an 
ordering of goods beyond practices. (202) Desert is determined by the 
ordering of goods and goes beyond the multiplicity of goods of 
practices. A telos, a rational ordering of goods, sets the limits of a 
virtue such as patience and delineates it from the excesses of anger 
and apathy/weakness. 
Third, at least one virtue requires reference to a whole life: integrity or 
constancy, singleness of purpose. "This notion of singleness of 
purpose in a whole life can have no application unless that of a whole 
life does. " (203) All three points of inadequacy, then, point to the need 
for a more comprehensive telos. MacIntyre continues his account of 
the virtues in the following chapter, chapter 15, "The Virtues, the 
Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition, " with the 
express purpose of completing what was lacking from the perspective 
of practices. 
A coherent account of morality requires an overarching telos to human 
life. MacIntyre recognizes this much. Nevertheless, despite the three 
inadequacies just noted, his account of practices is the most well- 
known feature of his positive argument, and it does seem to stand 
alone. And the reason that it seems to stand alone is because it claims 
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that the goods of practices cannot be achieved without practice-wide 
possession of genuine virtues. If this claim is correct, then there is 
broad societal possession of genuine virtues wherever the goods 
internal to practices are being produced. 
Moreover, Maclntyre's position about the place of practices in his 
larger argument is ambiguous. In presenting the second and third 
stages of his argument, his lack of specificity concerning our 
conception of the good life in chapter 15 of After Virtue suggests that 
the ordering of the goods of the three stages is much more aggregate 
and inductive than it is deductive or adductive. The ranking of those 
goods is not determined by a strong conception of the good life, not 
even by an evolving conception. Maclntyre implies that the good life 
is constituted by the goods of practices harmoniously ordered as a 
narrative, but not necessarily ordered to some comprehensive 
conception of the good. He says, for example, that tragic conflict 
between roles is ineliminable and irresolvable. (223f. ) This suggests, 
at least, that the goods of practices are not finally capable of being 
ordered in a unified narrative. This is turn suggests that the goods of 
practices, although irreconcilable, are somehow more fundamentally 
basic to our conception of the good life than the other two stages. He 
says of the three stages of his account that "each later stage 
presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa. " (187) And in After Virtue 
Maclntyre does not entertain the question of conflict between 
traditions, implying that the goods of practices are goods universally 
recognized across traditions. 
So for all these reasons, I need to confirm the insufficiency of 
practices not only for an adequate account of the virtues, but even for 
positively identifying virtues as genuine. 
Genuine virtues or semblances? 
The history of practices, Maclntyre says, is the history of the virtues 
and vices. (195f. ) Where the virtues flourish, practices will also 
52 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
flourish. Where vices reign, practices will be brought low. This much 
seems incontrovertible. What is problematic here, however, is the 
implication that the core of courage, honesty and justice are static 
across practices and lives and traditions. Maclntyre claims, even while 
noting cultural differences, that "the" virtues of courage, honesty, and 
justice are required to attain the goods of practices in any 
understanding of the good life. I think that this underestimates the 
differences between the virtues on one understanding of the good life 
and those of other traditions' understandings of the good life. While 
Maclntyre notes that the virtues are different on different accounts of 
well-being or flourishing, and that those tables of the virtues are 
incompatible (162f. ), he also seems to believe that there are genuinely 
universal virtues, and practices, that transcend any one tradition's 
conception of the good. So the following three claims are strongly 
implied, if not actually explicit in his argument: 
1. The genuine virtues of honesty/truthfulness, courage, and 
justice according to one tradition's conception of the good life 
are the genuine virtues of another tradition. The virtues are 
universal. 
2. Practices and their goods transcend conceptions of the good. 
3. In order to sustain practices, genuine and universal virtues 
must be broadly exemplified in society 
I deny all three claims. The importance of this denial for my overall 
argument is to underline the centrality of particular and exclusive ends 
to the definition of virtues. 10 MacIntyre has not yet given us a full 
account of the virtues. His historical chapters have given evolving 
10 It is not clear that Maclntyre maintains these claims subsequent to 
After Virtue, for considerations similar to those that I will present. 
His introduction to Whose Justice? recognizes the mistake in After 
Virtue of denying the unity of the virtues, for example. (1988, p. x) 
This recognition and the argument of Whose Justice? as a whole 
seem most clearly contrary to claim 1 above. So whether this part of 
my project amounts to a disagreement with Maclntyre or just a 
clanfication/development of his argument is debatable. 
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contexts in which the virtues were exercised. In his own positive 
argument he tells us that a virtue is a necessary quality for the 
attainment of the internal goods of practices. He has given us 
examples-the cardinal virtues of justice, courage, honesty-but we 
do not yet have enough information to identify the central subject of 
our discussion. This is in large part because, as he notes, the account is 
incomplete without the second and third stages of his account, the 
narrative unity of a life and traditions. But if we don't yet have a full 
account of the virtues, then how do we know that the dispositions 
maintaining practices are genuine virtues? My worry is that something 
short of genuine, universal virtues may allow us to attain the goods of 
practices. 
In the postscript to the second edition of After Virtue, Maclntyre 
responds to some early critics of his thesis. He says there that a virtue 
is only a virtue by his accounting if it is required to achieve the goods 
of all three stages. There are qualities required for some practices- 
ruthlessness and relentlessness in wilderness exploration is his 
example (275)-that are required for the first stage of his account, 
practices, but not for the second and third. Indeed, these qualities 
would actually undermine the second and third stages. They are 
therefore not to be counted as virtues. To be counted as a virtue, a 
quality must be required for all three. 
For closely related reasons, I contend that a person exhibiting a quality 
should not be considered to possess a genuine virtue until the person 
has demonstrated its possession in all three stages. If a person is 
genuinely courageous, for example, she will not only be courageous 
within the sphere of a practice, but also throughout her life and social 
world. In his chapter on practices Maclntyre has already mentioned 
that what looks like patience could turn out to be less than virtuous 
with a larger view than practices. (202) So I do not think that my 
claim here is especially controversial. Yet the consequences of this 
claim do raise problems for his claim that only genuine virtues can 
sustain practices. It follows from my point here that if a person does 
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not demonstrate the virtues in dimensions of her life beyond a 
particular practice, then the quality she is demonstrating in pursuing 
the goods of the practice is not quite a virtue. Or at least, it is not a 
virtue in the sense intended by his claim that we do not have the 
virtues if we do not have them constantly. (198) On the other hand, if 
the disposition is not a virtue, then what is it? 
Semblances and simulacra of virtues, Mactntyre says, will not suffice 
to achieve internal goods. Unfortunately, After Virtue does not say 
much about simulacra. In reviewing Aristotle's account of the virtues, 
Maclntyre emphasizes that it is the process of practical rationality that 
distinguishes genuine virtues from other dispositions. Less-than- 
genuinely-virtuous people may accomplish right actions. Some 
persons untrained in the virtues have natural traits and talents that 
fortuitously lead them to act in ways that resemble the virtues. But, he 
says, they are often subject to their own uneducated emotions and 
desires as well, such that frequently they do not desire the right 
actions and ends, and therefore do not achieve them. Virtuous people 
consistently act virtuously because they recognize that the actions in 
question are virtuous, and not for other reasons. 
Courage, to narrow our focus, is a rational disposition to pursue goods 
in the face of fears connected with this pursuit. A person might rescue 
another person from violence by a mob at risk to himself. By Aquinas' 
account, following Aristotle, this apparently courageous act might in 
reality be motivated by one of several semblances of courage. First, 
the person might surmount this difficulty as though it were not 
difficult: through ignorance of the danger, through irrational 
optimism, or through confidence in his ability to deal with such a 
situation. A well-trained soldier may act in a way that appears 
courageous, but in fact only displays a simulacrum of courage 
resulting from good training. Secondly, he might perform the act 
without genuine courage through the impulse of a passion, such as a 
fit of anger. Or thirdly, he might rescue the other person in pursuit of 
some motive such as publicity, the thrill of defying a crowd, or 
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monetary reward, on the one hand, or because he fears blame, 
punishment, or fears suffering some loss, such as dishonor, on the 
other hand. (ST 2-2.123.1) Thus the acts of persons in the pursuit of 
unworthy ends, remarkable as they may be, can turn out to be driven 
by ignoble passions or motives, or simply by mistaken reason. In each 
case, what appears to be a courageous act is only a semblance thereof. 
In each case, simulacra of the virtues are defective in their reasons for 
action. 
I want to leverage these observations against Maclntyre's claims 
relative to the universality of the virtues and the necessity that they be 
genuine in order to sustain practices. His claims concern primarily the 
possession of virtues in society as a whole, and before long I must 
address them at that level. But I will begin at the level of the 
individual, in order to highlight the ways in which simulacra can 
suffice to obtain goods internal to practices. 
Simulacra in individuals 
We do not have direct access to the information actually required to 
identify a genuine virtue. The only empirical criteria concerning 
virtuous dispositions that are available to persons other than the agent 
herself are behavioral-what the agent actually says and does. Yet 
identifying the possession of a genuine virtue in an individual requires 
knowledge beyond the observation of acts alone. In order to judge 
whether an action is virtuously motivated, we would have to answer 
questions concerning reasons for acting, counterfactuals, and the 
source of pleasure or pain taken in actions. (See Maclntyre 1991 on 
these criteria. ) Virtuous actions are expressed in affections, intentions, 
and motivations as well as in empirical behavior. Their authenticity is 
dependent upon intangibles: reasons, desires, and beliefs. Of course, 
they must come to ground in action, but genuine virtues cannot be 
identified through actions alone. The claim that any individual 
practitioner is genuinely virtuous is therefore problematic on empirical 
grounds. 
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Consider the example of a naturally talented young basketball player 
coming from a cultural context in which the virtues are seldom on 
display. His coach is a virtuous person pursuing the internal goods of 
basketball, one of which is the good of helping young players learn 
the practice of basketball. The coach requires certain habits and 
behavior of all his players. This player loves to play basketball, and is 
pursuing the goods of basketball. The identity of these goods is not 
clear. Some are internal, such as the goods of running a play that 
results in the opportunity to score, of making a talented move, of 
adapting to the opponent's changing moves and plays, and of being a 
basketball player generally. Some goods are external, such as favor 
with admiring fans, material benefits, self-aggrandizement, and fame 
in victory. 
The player learns quickly that in order to play in official games, which 
procure for him both internal and external goods in their purest form, 
he must please the coach by doing certain things. So he follows team 
rules concerning diet, curfews, exercise routines, and training 
sessions. He puts forth exemplary effort in drills, mastery of plays, 
and in giving verbal encouragement to his teammates. 
The cultivation of the disciplines necessary to appear virtuous, 
however, does not amount to possession of the virtues. The 
information just mentioned is insufficient to discern whether he is 
displaying moral virtues in the practice of basketball. This is because, 
as noted, the virtues cannot be understood in strictly behavioral terms 
but are based in practical reason. So is our player virtuous? 
A basketball player might be overly confident of his abilities, might be 
driven by angry rivalries to excel, or by irrational fears or desires. In 
actuality, of course, many of these conditions have been true for some 
of the best players of the game. If our player believed that he could be 
lazy in practice sessions and still both be permitted to play in official 
games and able to perform above average in his league, would he do 
so? Or, if he suddenly no longer enjoyed playing the game relative to 
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the pain he experienced in training, would he quit without further 
thought? If so, then what the player is displaying are not real virtues, 
despite appearances. But unless or until these problems arise, the 
simulacra of the virtues behind his actions would apparently suffice to 
participate in and contribute to a well-played game and the life of a 
hoopster. The appearance of the virtues suffices to produce for him 
personally the empirically verifiable internal goods of practices. 
Habits are not virtues. We can be trained to respond in certain ways to 
certain situations. We do not have to depend on overcoming less-than- 
virtuous desires and emotions at every point in our daily routine. This 
can be a very good thing. An American soldier who served in 
Mogadishu described his experience in battle there as almost identical 
to his training, until people began falling down dead around him. His 
training permitted him the luxury of not needing genuine bravery at all 
times. To be sure, most armies strive to cultivate an ethic of courage 
in their soldiers, but they also go to great lengths to remove the need 
for genuine courage, through the cultivation of rote reactions. Military 
trainers know that for a soldier to take the time necessary to make a 
reasoned decision in combat is to give an advantage to an enemy 
acting by rote. They want to avoid the risk of depending on a character 
trait where a habit will suffice. Mere habit probably accounts for far 
more correct behavior than is often recognized. Habits may partly 
constitute the virtues, if we cultivate habits in reasoned judgment in 
the pursuit of right ends, but they need not do so. To identify the part 
of habitual action in genuine virtue requires an explication of the 
agent's reasons for cultivating the habit. 
Natural dispositions are not moral virtues. As MacIntyre's own 
account of Aristotle mentions, the distinction between the results of 
moral disposition and those of natural disposition and talent is often a 
difficult distinction to make in practice. The qualities that we consider 
moral virtues are acquired, but people do not all start from the same 
baseline, it seems. Their backgrounds and even their genetic makeup 
seem to make some people more prone to act on good or bad reasons. 
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Certain physiological qualities lend themselves more to courage in 
some fields of endeavor than others. A soldier who is a talented 
athlete will usually have a higher baseline of confidence in single 
combat than a slow and awkward one, for example. 
Virtues are not acts, but dispositions, relative to the good life. We do 
not possess a genuine virtue, if we genuinely possess it at all, unless 
we possess consistently. Maclntyre says that it is not possible to 
possess the virtues and possess them only occasionally. (198) We 
cannot have a given virtue if we do not have it consistently because, as 
explicated, to have a virtue is to have a settled disposition to pursue 
rightly-ordered goods-internal goods before external goods, for 
example-and to have such a disposition entails such consistency. To 
lack such consistency is to lack the disposition and therefore also to 
lack the virtue. 
On the other hand, virtues are not dispositions held infallibly. 
Individuals display courage, justice, and honesty in degrees. I may not 
have displayed cowardice, or even mediocre levels of courage since, 
say, lunchtime yesterday. For me to claim to be a courageous person, 
however, is more problematic. We often have small failures in 
courage that have to be corrected after the fact, if they can be 
corrected at all. Our courage is also rarely tested in the extreme. And 
for important steps of courage, we speak of having to "summon our 
courage, " that is, of having to concentrate and carefully exercise the 
will to suppress our fears. We recognize that we could easily be other 
than courageous. No one is virtuous in an absolute sense. We know, 
for example, that even the bravest soldier will eventually break under 
torture and betray information. 
To frame the point somewhat differently, we might ask whether 
children can be courageous. Surely the answer is that they can be, and 
often are, courageous. But children often fail in courage, in the course 
of moral maturation. Whether we possess the virtues is therefore not a 
binary decision, but has to be understood comparatively. As the 
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etymology of the English equivalent-"excellence"-shows, virtue is 
understood relative to social norms. (And compare 1984, p. 189. ) In 
the land of the Ik, those who do not wantonly exploit their own 
children may seem morally outstanding. 
History has many examples, some of them cited in After Virtue, of 
persons having produced great work and having lived the life of a 
practitioner-the two internal goods mentioned by Maclntyre-while 
behaving swinishly in other spheres of life. It is not unusual to see 
people acting nobly in one context and non-virtuously in another. 
Such persons can enjoy some of the internal goods of practices-their 
products and something of the life-of-a-practitioner. MacIntyre 
recognizes that there are vicious virtuosi and chess players and 
therefore that fully developed virtue is not required of every 
practitioner in order to sustain practices. Individuals can attain many 
of the goods of practices without the virtues. His claim, rather, is that 
the maintenance of practices depends on the widespread possession of 
genuine virtues by other practitioners. (193) 
So in response to my worry, it might be claimed that Maclntyre's 
argument applies only to the achievement of goods internal to 
practices as socially cooperative activity. Do my criticisms speak to 
this claim? Can practices be sustained without genuine virtues in a 
society of practitioners as a whole? 
Simulacra in society 
My argument concerning the difference between genuine virtues and 
their simulacra in the individual agent can be enlarged to a society as a 
whole. It is fairly obviously impossible to sustain a practice if its 
practitioners engage in rampant dishonesty, cowardice, and injustice. 
But as in the case of the individual, so also at the societal level-vices 
are not the only alternative imaginable to virtues. Might not the goods 
internal to practices be realized without genuine virtues? 
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In order to answer these and related questions, we need to see the 
place of practices in a larger conception of the good, and then see how 
various understandings of the virtues are related to that larger 
conception. It is this interrelatedness and its implications for morality 
that I want to emphasize. In so doing I hope to turn a seemingly minor 
distinction, the identification of genuine virtues over against their 
simulacra, into a major difference over what constitutes a genuinely 
moral life. I offer the following by way of preliminary and 
overlapping theses for subsequent development. 
First, when practices are broadly defined, they already entail the other 
two stages of MacIntyre's argument-the narrative unity of a life and 
a social tradition. 
Second, the qualities required to sustain practices may not entail 
justice in social structures according to the conceptions of the good 
life of rival traditions. For example, practices need not necessarily 
render justice to slaves, women, foreigners, or to anyone outside the 
circle of practitioners, or indeed even to those within the practice on 
the perspective of a rival tradition. The internal goods of the 
contemplative life as this life was conceived in Athens, for example, 
actually required a slave population tending after the menial 
requirements of existence, just as the life of a plantation owner and the 
goods associated with plantation life in the antebellum southern states 
in America required a slave population. Both are widely recognized to 
be unjust by most Western traditions today. As long as practitioners 
distribute goods consistently, and according to some established 
standard, and as long as novices and master practitioners accept this 
distribution as "the way we do things, " then internal goods as defined 
are realized. The virtue of justice as defined so far does not require us 
to ascertain the demands of justice as distinct from this socio- 
historical context. It cannot do so, since it is defined with respect to 
this given understanding of the goods of practices. 
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Third, although Maclntyre does not make reference to external goods 
other than money, power, and fame, I think that other external goods 
exist. And they are less morally tainted and therefore more 
problematic for our discussion than those he lists. For example, a man 
may play a sport or embark on a career, or marry, and excel in any 
such practice related to these activities just in order to please his 
father. Most of us do many things, and do them well, because they are 
socially expected of us. This is not quite what we think of as 
"prestige" but neither is it fully internal to the practice, if the reasons 
for excelling in the practice are not directly tied to the goods internal 
to the practice itself. The distinction between goods internal and 
external practices is further blurred in the case of honor. The goods of 
fame can be realized through many activities other than practices. But 
most practitioners do not want recognition from just anyone. They 
want it from their fellow practitioners. 
On the other hand, and more positively, practices can and are 
practiced "for the sake of' goods more important than those of any 
one practice. And most virtuous practitioners understand that such a 
relationship is beneficial. At their best, the practice of football and 
chess, for example, contribute to a larger conception of the good. But 
if the goods internal to practices are achieved even partly for the sake 
of goods beyond practices, then the distinctions between internal and 
external goods, and therefore between dispositions defined with 
respect to them, are inadequate. 
The following chapters will remove any ambiguity about the adequacy 
of the goods of practices as sufficient for the identification of genuine 
virtues. Because conceptions of the good life differ, the goods 
attributed to practices differ. Because the goods of practices and the 
conceptions of the good life that they partly constitute differ, the 
dispositions required to realize those goods and that life also differ. 
So, providentially, simulacra can attain many of the goods of 
practices. More to the point of my overall argument, however, it is the 
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ultimate end pursued that is determinative in the identification of 
genuine virtues. 
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THE GOODS OF PRACTICES AND THE GOOD LIFE 
The rise and decline of practices, on Maclntyre's account so far, 
corresponds simply to the value in which the virtues are held. Left at 
this stage we would still not be able to resolve the kinds of 
incommensurable and interminable debates with which Maclntyre 
begins After Virtue. We could not resolve them even within a single 
practice. Rivalries and contending philosophies within practices have 
led one school or camp to de-legitimize the work of its rivals, calling 
into question the validity of the others' ends. I am not referring here to 
Maclntyre's later insight that a tradition is "an historically extended, 
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about 
the goods which constitute that tradition. " (222) Such an argument is 
only possible within a tradition, when both parties hold nearly all their 
basic presuppositions in common, including most of the details 
concerning the ends of their particular tradition. The question, rather, 
is the place of a practice within one conception of the good life as 
compared and contrasted to its place in a rival tradition. 
Maclntyre begins his account of virtue ethics with practices rather 
than a conception of the good life itself, he says, because he sees in 
practices the possibility of new ends and changing conceptions of 
ends. These discovered or rediscovered ends of practices will 
themselves partially define the good life. Our vision of the good life 
should be open to amendment. (2730 His point is well-taken and 
underlines the progressive and inductive aspect of our understanding 
of what the good life is on any account. My concern is that this 
scenario does not reflect the variety of outcomes possible from the 
encounter between practices and conceptions of the good life. 
Maclntyre makes the positive case from practices to the narrative 
integrity of a life, and the maintenance of a tradition. This could be 
misleading. We might conceive of practices narrowly and only with 
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regard to their own ends and excellences. We might view the ends of 
practices as contributing arbitrarily to the ends of life, such that the 
good life is defined as the sum of all those ends of practices that 
happen to be valued by humans. Reading his thesis today, we are 
given to think of theories of value pluralism written after After Virtue. 
(See Galston 1999 and Galston 2002. ) A neo-Aristotelian structure 
can accommodate such an aggregate conception of the good, as we 
will see. But on the account so far, there are yet no objective reasons 
for counting the excellences of practices as high-ranking goods. The 
pleasures we take from achieving the excellences of practices here are 
only a step removed from the arbitrary distinction of higher and lower 
pleasures in Millian utilitarianism. The virtues are necessary to 
achieve the excellences of practices, he says. The excellences of 
practices are those that virtuous people enjoy. The pleasures 
supervening on these excellences are those pleasures that only 
virtuous people can know. But why then are these pleasures superior 
to others? Why are the virtues that are required for these excellences 
superior to other qualities? Most importantly, why should we valuate 
the goods and excellences internal to this or that practice above goods 
external to it, or above goods internal to some other practice? 
Maclntyre's account of practices explains the difference between 
roulette and poker, but it cannot explain why some accounts of the 
virtues would not consider poker a legitimate practice, though it 
l otherwise meets all the criteria of his definition. " 
Without showing how they can contribute to a larger understanding of 
life, the ranking of those goods cannot be justified with criteria more 
sophisticated than utility. It is not just that without a comprehensive 
and coherent telos we are reduced to subjectivist choices between the 
conflicting allegiances of internal goods. (See pp. 201f. ) We cannot 
even make an objective claim for the superiority of internal goods 
over external goods without reference to the larger good. Internal 
Other examples of problematic practices might include animal breeding and fur-farming, the visual arts (for Hasidic Jews); and 
nearly all religious practices. 
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goods make reference to a conception of the good life beyond the 
scope of practices. In their fullest expressions they grasp and express a 
larger sense of purpose than the practice itself. Because the goods of 
practices are qualified goods, goods for very specific reasons, the 
understanding of the ends and excellences of practices can contract as 
well as expand. Unless we have a sense of how they contribute to the 
larger understanding of life, their status as goods is suspect. I contend 
that there is a much stronger deductive link between a larger vision of 
life and practices that follow from it than Maclntyre can be interpreted 
as saying. Different conceptions of the good determine what counts as 
a virtue, what counts as an internal good, and therefore what counts as 
a legitimate practice. This opens wider the possibility that practices 
may be sustained by qualities less than the genuine virtues of a 
particular conception of the good. More importantly, it shows yet 
again that the identification of virtues is dependent on ends. This is the 
thrust of what I want to demonstrate now. 
Specifically, the goods of practices cannot be rightly ranked or even 
individuated without reference to the comprehensive conception of the 
good in which they nest. Concentrating on medicine as my central 
example of a practice, I argue that it is the goods and excellences of 
practices that individuate them from other practices. It is the 
contribution of these goods and excellences to the realization of the 
good life that determines the ranking of the practice in that conception 
of the good life. The goods and excellences of a practice can be 
ranked so low that their goods, such as they are perceived to be, 
represent a constant threat to the realization of the good life because of 
their potential to interfere with all those goods of a higher rank. Or, on 
another tradition's ranking, they can lie at the very heart of the good 
life. For this and related reasons, it is probably more accurate to refer 
to the practices (plural) of, say, medicine. They are rival and 
incompatible practices, rather than a single practice, because they 
contribute variously to rival and incompatible conceptions of the good 
life. 
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We cannot have a coherent account of morality without a particular 
and exclusive conception of the good life. It will 
be part of the 
conclusion of Part One, however, that Maclntyre 
does not give one, 
nor does he give a theoretical structure constituting a reason 
for 
thinking that such a conception exists that is not solely the product of 
human will. 
Before continuing, I should say more about the relationships possible 
between goods and the good. 
The ultimate, not-necessarily-monolithic good 
For the purposes of simplicity, to this point I have emphasized the 
means-to-ends relationship of virtues to the practices they serve. In 
this chapter and the next I argue for a similar relationship between 
practices and their individuating goods and excellences, on the one 
hand, and the good on the other. In chapter 6I continue this argument 
for the relationship between virtues, integrated lives, and traditions 
and the good. Two objections to this relationship could be made. One 
frequent objection to the Aristotelian structure is that humans may 
rationally pursue many different ends as ends in themselves, rather 
than just a single ultimate end. (Anscombe 1957, sect. 21) And, 
second, I seem to be saying that virtues, goods, relationships, and 
practices are only instrumental. Both objections misinterpret my 
claims. 
Aristotle's ethics famously begins with the claim that every rational 
action is taken in view of some end, and that there is some one 
ultimate end for the sake of which a rational agent always acts. He 
later argues that this end turns out to be eudaimonia. The notion that 
all actions are taken in view of one ultimate end is controversial to 
modems. But Scott MacDonald (1990; 1991) has argued persuasively 
that most objections to Aquinas' account of rationality (and by 
inference, to Aristotle's account as well) misunderstand the 
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Aristotelian claim. I will adopt three of MacDonald's conclusions for 
my purposes. 
First, MacDonald shows, the Aristotelian claim is a purely formal 
argument concerning the structure of all rational morality. This claim 
is prior to a substantive view concerning the ultimate end of all things, 
including Aquinas' own view that that end is happiness (Aquinas's 
beatitudo/felicitas; or Aristotle's eudaimonia). It is not based in 
empirical claims: this is the structure of rational action, not 
necessarily every action observable in the world. Why should we 
believe this to be the case? 
Aquinas says that we only act in view of something that is desirable, 
either for itself or instrumentally. If every act pursues something 
either for itself or instrumentally, then there is at least one end to 
every chain of such things pursued. The chain cannot be infinitely 
long; otherwise nothing could provide an explanation of what moves 
rational desire. There is a stopping point to the motivation behind 
every action. Rational desire, or will, can only be explained by 
reference to something that is capable of moving the will in itself. The 
end cannot be, that is, something that is not desirable in itself. And so 
that stopping point cannot be just anywhere, either. The stopping point 
or end must be something that is desired without any further end in 
view. Any such end that is capable of moving the will in itself 
MacDonald calls a "weak ultimate end. " (1991, p. 45) But Aquinas 
says that all actions of a rational human being are ultimately 
subordinate to a single such ultimate end. (ST 1-2.1.5-6) How are all 
actions taken in view of one ultimate end? 
The second of the conclusions I take from MacDonald is that nothing 
in Aquinas (or Aristotle, by inference) commits Aquinas to the view 
that the ultimate end of a rational agent is monolithic, as the pleasure 
principle is monolithic in hedonistic utilitarianism, for example. The 
ultimate end of all action can be aggregate. When it comes to what 
they will later argue is the best candidate for that end-happiness, 
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Aquinas's beatitudo/felicitas or Aristotle's eudaimonia-this end can 
therefore be aggregate rather than monolithic. It is the view of 
Aquinas himself that the best candidate for the single ultimate end is 
in fact constituted of four weak ultimate ends together-pleasure, 
tranquility, primary natural goods, and virtue. (MacDonald 1991, p. 
48) In view of MacDonald's explication, it is obvious how the 
objection to the apparently monomaniacal focus of the Aristotelian 
model on the ultimate end actually misunderstands Aquinas/Aristotle. 
Eudaimonia can be aggregate. 
If an ultimate end, whether monolithic or aggregate, fulfills all a 
human being's rational desires, then MacDonald calls this the "strong 
ultimate end. " The difference between "weak" and "strong" ultimate 
ends is comprehensiveness. A weak ultimate end may not satisfy all 
rational desires. The strong ultimate end, by definition, does do so. 
(MacDonald 1991, p. 46f. ) The strong ultimate end need not be 
determinate in the way that, say, the hedonist conceives of it. It need 
not be a monolithic strong ultimate end. Those who argue for a 
monolithic end are saying that there is no weak ultimate end that is not 
also a strong ultimate end. As to the formal conception of the good on 
any rational account, Aquinas thinks that we might conceive of the 
strong ultimate end as an aggregate of weak ultimate ends. If the 
strong ultimate end turns out to be aggregate, the strong ultimate end 
is not reducible to weak ultimate ends however. The weak ends are 
desirable in themselves. Only the strong ultimate end satisfies all 
desires. (MacDonald 1991, p. 50) 
The third conclusion of MacDonald's explication of Aquinas that has 
immediate relevance to my argument concerns the nature of the 
relationship of weak ultimate ends to strong ultimate ends. 
MacDonald's exposition shows that there are at least three possible 
relationships of subordination. In addition to (1) merely instrumental 
subordination as a means to a desired end, there is (2) subordination as 
an end that is desired for itself (but also as a means to a further end), 
and (3) subordination-as-a-constitutive-part of the comprehensive 
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ultimate end, whether monolithic or aggregate. (MacDonald 1991, pp. 
51-53) 
In sum, MacDonald shows that the Aristotelian claim is a purely 
formal argument concerning the structure of morality, that the ultimate 
end is not necessarily monolithic, and therefore that the relationship of 
subordination of sub-ultimate ends need not be merely instrumental. 
MacDonald's insights into the Aristotelian ultimate end do not, 
however, weaken the need for a comprehensive conception of the 
good. The aggregate conception has the potential of conflict at every 
level. We cannot maximize every good. How do we combine them? 
Human flourishing, on any coherent account of the virtues, is more 
than a pastiche of practices moving toward an unknown end. It is only 
in a state of advanced cultural pluralism that a life seems little more 
than assemblages of discrete spheres of activity. Only from a larger 
frame of reference can these conflicts be resolved. And only by better 
defining a practice can we understand how practices are valuated from 
such a frame of reference. 
Maclntyre identifies two kinds of good internal to any practice, 
recall-the excellences of production and participation in the life-of- 
the-practitioner. I will consider in turn the relationship of each to a 
given tradition's conception of the good life and show that it is their 
contribution to this life that makes them goods and gives them their 
rank in that conception. The first step in this demonstration is to show 
that it is these goods that individuate practices. 
Practices: individuated by goods and excellences 
The excellences of production of a practice refer both to the whole of 
the craft as exercised and also to the products that result from that 
craft. A fine portrait is a good internal to portrait-making. It also 
represents one stage in the progress of the art of portrait making as it 
evolves toward greater and greater realization of the purpose and 
meaning of the art, Maclntyre says. And it may represent a step in the 
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transformation of the art's purpose and meaning as these are extended 
in previously unimagined directions and toward enlarged aspirations. 
The second kind of good internal to practices is participation in the- 
life-of-a-practitioner, to whatever extent that life constitutes the 
agent's life. (189f. ) 
MacIntyre does not address the question of individuating practices, 
but we can reasonably conclude that it is their internal goods and 
excellences that differentiate one practice from another. The products 
of practices distinguish painting from sculpture, but also portrait- 
making from iconography, interior design from architecture, 
psychiatry from neurology, hunting from fishing, and chess from 
poker. Likewise, the life-of-the-practitioner distinguishes an actor 
from a circus performer, but also a therapist from a pastor, a naval 
captain from a privateer, and an elementary-school teacher from a 
parent of young children, in spite of the similarities in each pairing. 
Obversely, these practices do resemble each other because some of the 
products and some aspects of the life-of-the-practitioner are common 
to both practices in each pairing. 
It is an important part of his argument that the goods of practices are 
not subjective; they rely on recognized standards of excellence. There 
is accounting for taste. Those who know, know. (190) Maclntyre may 
only mean here that a practitioner's subjective evaluation of the goods 
internal to practices will coincide with those of other practitioners, 
since he says that internal goods can only be appreciated by those 
initiated into practices. He may not be affirming that the goods of 
practices reflect a standard that transcends subjectivity, that is. In any 
case, I say to the contrary that the goods of practices are not 
universally recognized in their particulars and are variously valuated 
in general. It is not just that there have always been rival schools of 
painting, philosophy, medicine, family life, and football. For all 
honest practitioners must admire technical proficiency in the products 
of their rivals, and all participate indisputably in the life-of-the- 
practitioner. Rather, it is that there is disagreement about what 
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constitutes excellence and why these are goods. To develop this 
observation, I have to say more about the two sorts of goods internal 
to practices. 
The term "products" is too susceptible to narrow interpretation. It does 
not sufficiently distinguish internal goods from instances of technical 
proficiency. "Products" may misdirect our understanding by 
restricting what counts as internal goods. On the other hand, 
Maclntyre's examples of products do seem to draw this distinction: 
portraits can reveal moral character, for example, and chess cultivates 
"analytic skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity.... " 
(188) 
The other kind of internal goods Maclntyre identifies, what I am 
calling the "life-of-a-practitioner, " requires definition. While we know 
the difference between the life of a parent of young children and a 
schoolteacher, based on our experiences with the lives of these 
practitioners, what differentiates "life-of-a-practitioner" from "life-of- 
a-practitioner" within one person's lifespan is not yet clear. The rest of 
this chapter will consider the example of medicine as a practice and 
the life-of-a-practitioner of a doctor. 
The life of a doctor includes her experience of being a student and an 
intern; her relationships with patients, nurses, and administrators; the 
honor and place she occupies in society due to this profession and to 
the income that medicine provides; and. the social and practical 
implications of the natural abilities necessary to meet the standards for 
becoming a physician (as compared and contrasted with those of a 
poet, a military officer, a jockey, or a mathematician). The 
experiences of each of these will also shape how the physician views 
life. The mental images we form of all these will necessarily include 
references to culture and history and geography. This all suggests a 
role rather than a life, with all the implications concerning a narrative 
and a telos that Maclntyre suggests from the concept of role in chapter 
15 of After Virtue. To anticipate my conclusion, the story implied in 
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such a social role is not just a personal story or drama. Nor is 
it only a 
generalized role that can be understood as interchangeable between all 
cultures and societies, for it will not be possible to say enough about 
such ageneralized role to resolve specific moral questions. Rather, 
the role must be understood within the context of a meta-narrative that 
shapes how we understand the personalized stories of Dr. Smith or 
Dr. 
Ammal. 
What are the internal goods of the practice of medicine? The goods 
achieved by a health care professional might include a successful 
surgical operation, or a plaster cast that flawlessly aligns broken 
bones, or having comforted a distressed patient. Or they might include 
facing and overcoming difficulties or doing something that is difficult 
and rare and therefore valuable. Or advancing knowledge in medicine. 
Or they might include respect earned and participation in the 
professional community and beyond. Or helping a patient rethink 
his/her priorities. Or participating in the restoration of a patient to a 
productive life. Most practitioners seem to think that the latter goods 
are the more important goods of medicine. They contribute more to 
the purpose and ends of medicine. 
What these generalizations obscure is the very important differences 
in why a good is a good, and even what counts as a good. The goods 
of practices are not in reality the same for practitioners across schools 
of what we might generally call medicine. Particular conceptions of 
the good life in a tradition shape what counts as a good in practices. 
Goods and the ends they serve 
By defining and individuating practices in terms of internal goods we 
can see that the ranking of the goods of practices is open to dispute. 
Why are internal goods ranked higher than external goods? Following 
on MacDonald's explication, it turns out that they are superior to 
external goods because of their relative contribution to ends. External 
goods are goods. When pursued above internal goods, however, they 
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tend to undermine internal goods. Internal goods are instrumental 
(plaster casts, pharmaceuticals) or ends-in-themselves (doctor-patient 
relationships, normal bodily functions) that are also partly constitutive 
of the ultimate end. The ends of medicine include notions concerning 
the health of individuals and of society aggregately. We cannot do 
without an ever-widening context within which to assess our 
decisions. 12 They are internal goods because of their supposed 
contribution to the good life, and will be valued according to their 
relative contribution to that life. 
Goods are not intrinsically valuable. To say that something has value 
necessarily implies that it has a valuer. We cannot do without 
evaluation. The objection that all humans value statistically normal 
bodily functions and freedom from pain begs the question of what 
constitutes normalcy. There are systems of thought that regard the 
body as largely irrelevant to human ends. I will touch on some of 
these. It is typical of cultural advancement and maturity to give 
sophisticated reasons, relative to the perceptions of the ends of life in 
that culture, for valuing internal goods. We have a rational desire for 
goods because we understand them as contributing more or less to our 
sense of the good life. 
Some practices encompass a much broader portion of human life. To 
be a good parent, I think, implies most of what it means to be a good 
person. The goods of community life involve many types of 
relationships, and a harmonization of diverse personal ends, as well as 
the incorporation of many other practices. On Aristotle's account it is 
because the self-sufficient life of the polls just is the fulfilled vision of 
human flourishing that courage is fully exemplified in the act of the 
citizen soldier facing death for his country. Yet in every case, 
including this one, the criteria of virtue look to reasons beyond acts. 
Every constitutive element of a practice looks beyond the practice to 
larger ends. This would explain why, on Maclntyre's evaluation, some 
12 Charles Taylor introduces the concept of "hypergoods" for related 
reasons. (1989, pp. ME) 
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practices flourish in the context of modernity (chess, farming) and 
others do not (politics, philosophy, social culture). It is because of 
their contribution to the good. The former constitute a small part of 
what human flourishing on any account entails, and so provoke less 
controversy concerning what a virtue looks like in action. The latter 
imply a much more specific and "thick" vision of life. A 
comprehensive telos is therefore necessary, even to validate virtues, 
goods, and practices. It is nothing less than a comprehensive 
conception of the good life that can identify and identify what are 
genuine virtues on that conception, as I will show in the next chapter. 
At present I want to look at examples of medicine to demonstrate that, 
beyond the technical proficiencies that Maclntyre rightly says are not 
fully practices, goods are not the same across practices. 13 
The historical and cultural examples I give below and have given to 
this point are not intended to point to necessary empirical facts of 
human behavior relative to goods, virtues, and practices as they relate 
to a particular conception of the good, as if to say that it is ever thus in 
historical traditions. I have no illusions that this is the case. Rather, I 
want to point to structural relationships in historical examples as a 
way of illustrating the formal criteria of cogent practical reasoning 
toward a given conception of the good life. 
The products of medicine as goods 
The examples of early Chinese medicine illustrate why the goods of 
medicine cannot be considered goods just with reference to practices 
alone. 14 The goods of the practice of medicine may turn out to conflict 
13 In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Maclntyre explicitly makes 
the point I am making here, and attributes it to the tradition he seeks 
to defend there: "Aquinas too recognized the variety and 
heterogeneity of goods and, no more and no less than Aristotle, 
understood them as goods insofar as they were and in virtue of their 
constituents of the kind of life directed to the good and the bein'(1988, 
p. 165) best. 
14 A disclaimer is necessary here. One problem we face in comparing 
"medicine" as practices in one understanding of the world versus 
another is the question of what counts as a valid representation of 
the religion/philosophy. Since I have not "indwelt, " in the Polanyian 
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with the perceived higher-ranking goods of the culture in which the 
practice nests. 
In China, the Three Teachings-Confucianism, Buddhism, and 
Taoism-have had a determinate role on their respective 
understanding of the goods of medicine. In the Confucian classic The 
Great Learning, Confucianism is presented as a series of eight 
interdependent steps that Peimin Ni translates as: "investigate things, 
extend knowledge, make the will sincere, rectify the heart-mind, 
cultivate the person, regulate the family, govern the state well, and 
bring peace to the world. " Each step is contingent on the preceding 
step, and each step necessarily follows from the preceding step. The 
fifth step, the cultivation of the person (xiu shen), functions as a 
transition between the internal/personal and the external/social. 
Viewed from a proper understanding of xiu shen, Confucianism is a 
system of health care. (Ni 1999, p. 28) The "heart-mind" (xin) of the 
fourth step and the "person" (shen) of the fifth both imply both the 
corporeal and the immaterial. The human being in Confucianism is 
embodied, not a mind or spirit in a shell. In contrast to the mind-body 
dualism Ni sees in the "Cartesian" (Western) approach to medicine, an 
approach tending to reduce health care to questions of the physio- 
chemical body, Confucianism views health holistically. The 
physiological, psychological, moral and social cannot be 
compartmentalized. (Ni 1999, pp. 29f. ) And this does not only mean 
that the person is more than just physical, but that Confucian medicine 
concerns more than just the individual or the relationships between 
individuals. As Sun Si Miao said, "A superior doctor takes care of the 
state [nation], a mediocre doctor takes care of the person, an inferior 
doctor takes care of the disease. " (Bei Ji Quian Jin Yao Fang, vol. 1, 
cited in Ni 1999, pp. 3 Of. ) 
sense, any of the religions superficially treated here (Polanyi & 
Prosch 1975, p. 44), I am not competent to decide that question. 
Rather, my purpose here is simply to offer an explanation for how at least one social embodiment of each of these worldviews shapes the 
practice of medicine within that worldview. 
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When Confucianism emerged as the imperially-sanctioned ideology in 
the last two centuries BCE, it presented obstacles to the development 
of medicine. Confucianism orders society and the distribution of 
resources according to a set pattern. The open distribution of medical 
resources was perceived to threaten the social order in empowering 
non-traditional social structures. (Unschuld 1979, pp. 16f. ) As a result, 
Confucianism long acted as a barrier to the advancement of excellence 
in medicine, at least by rival evaluations. 
During this time, Confucians belittled the intellectual competence of 
medical practitioners. Confucianism places great value on 
scholarship. '5 In this scheme medicine was a vocational recourse to 
those who could not pass the exams required to become a civil 
servant. Therefore to be a doctor was a position of inferior status. 
Those Confucians who had devoted themselves to the rigorous study 
of ancient literature and contemporary best practices of medicine 
found themselves culturally stranded. (Unschuld 1979, pp. 39-43) 
Additionally, the practice of medicine was shaped by the Confucian 
ambivalence towards science. Here two basic tendencies stood in 
conflict. Confucianism was steadfastly rationalistic and opposed to 
superstition and all preternatural religion. While it actively endorsed 
traditional rites and ceremonies, it was dogmatically skeptical toward 
supernaturalism. Its doctrine was that of a cooperative society. 
People's true interests did not conflict but complemented one another. 
Social harmony was conceived in terms of a larger view of Nature and 
of harmony with the highest cosmological powers. By the time of 
Confucius, these powers no longer had the personal connotations they 
possessed in ancient times, and were reverently referred to simply as 
Thien (usually translated "Heaven"). In a context of demonological 
capriciousness, this conceptual scheme could have worked to the 
advantage of empirical science and medicine. Another tendency 
15 "Confucianism" and "Confucians" are Westernisms. The self- designationju simply means "scholar, " and the followers of Confucius understood themselves as examples of scholarship. (Needham (1962, p. 1) 
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prevented this. Confucianism's focus on human affairs and society, 
rather than the non-human left natural science without 
intellectual 
patronage. Confucius fastidiously avoided the study of all natural 
phenomena such as comets, earthquakes, geysers, and tidal waves as 
having no bearing on issues of human society. Only man in his social 
dimension merited investigation. To the deep chagrin of scientists and 
Taoists, his disciples followed him in this prejudice for the next two 
thousand years. (Needham 1962, pp. 11-15) So the Confucian context 
of medicine minimized the goods of medicine understood on their 
own terms. 
Though Confucianism subordinated the goods of medicine to those of 
social structure, it nevertheless integrated body and self holistically. 
This was not the case in the context of India. Indian philosophical and 
religious traditions generally view the human body and mind as 
fundamentally different from the true self in pursuit of its liberation. 
While we should not oversimplify this dualism, it does pose a problem 
for medicine. The care of the body simply does not carry the same 
meaning in Hinduism as in other understandings. Gregory Field 
argues that the health of body and mind are related to the self in a 
much different way than in monotheistic and materialistic 
conceptions, with their linear understandings of the self and human 
life. Moreover, the primacy of the virtue of spiritual purity in 
Hinduism prevented health care providers from crossing caste lines. 
Concern for spiritual integrity limited the scope of patients that the 
physician could serve. "Hinduism has a strong inclination to conceive 
of spiritual Self-realization or God-realization as entailing 
transcendence of physicality. " (Field 2001, pp. 1,5f. )16 
16 Because Yoga, Ayurveda, and Tantra emphasize physicality, they 
are unusual in the Hindu context. It is not surprising that these three 
traditions of medicine are all "iconoclastic" within the larger Hindu 
conception of the body. (Field 2001, p. 8) Kenneth Zysk has argued 
that ayurvedic medicine owes its emergence to heterodox wandering 
ascetics living outside Brahmin society who could maintain 
relationships with all castes. In collaboration with Buddhist monks, 
they developed Ayurveda as a system of preventative health care. (Asceticism and Healing in Ancient India in Jonson 2000, p. 31) 
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practiced. From a Western perspective, the social environment stifled 
the practice of medicine in these instances. Their conceptions of 
human flourishing or "health" in the broadest possible sense put a 
lower value on certain goods of medicine in a narrow sense. In 
Confucianism, the goods of corporeal well-being were inferior to the 
goods of traditional social stability and harmony, and so had to be 
sacrificed when the two sets of goods clashed. In Hinduism, the caste 
system and the understanding of spirituality and physicality combined 
to push medicine to the social margins. 
For the same sorts of reasons, the ultimate commitments of a 
particular community may also promote the development of goods 
associated with medicine. Taoism offers an example. Joseph Needham 
credits iatro-chemical advances in Chinese medicine to Taoism's 
belief in a material immortality as the ideal end of the human being. 
The ghostlike images flitting along valleys and woods in many 
paintings of Chinese landscapes portray persons having achieved this 
state, perpetually enjoying the beauties of nature on earth in ethereal 
form. One arrives at this state through exercises, sexual practices and 
exposure to the wind and the sun. Because of their philosophical and 
Vedic religion, as Albert Jonsen explains, designates three social 
classes in strict segregation from each other: the priestly class of the Brahmans; the secular ruling class of the Ksatriyas; and the Vaisyes 
occupying the roles of artisans, herders and fanners. Below these 
three classes are the Shudras, servants of the upper classes, and finally the impure or untouchables. These classes are subdivided into castes based on their origin, work, and religious practices. A 
whole system of rules governs relations between these castes, and infraction of these rules constitutes spiritual pollution. Early Vedic 
texts prohibited Brahmans from practicing medicine. Eventually 
persons from every caste were allowed to become physicians, but 
Brahman physicians could not come into contact with the dead or 
with bodily excretions even then. Nor could doctors from one class 
take patients belonging to a class or caste with which interaction 
was prohibited. Physicians eventually became a caste unto 
themselves in which medicine as a practice was passed down 
through families. (Jonsen 2000, p. 31) 
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What the development of medicine in the cultural environments of 
early Confucianism and Hinduism illustrates is that a given 
conception of human flourishing can have a negative influence on the 
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magical/scientific attitudes towards sex in particular, we find 
references dating from the third century BCE of the effects of 
ingesting urine on sexual health and activity. In texts from the 
eleventh to the sixteenth century CE an entire field of pharmacology 
developed around the processing of urine. There can be no doubt that 
these advances in urine therapy were closely tied to the ends of 
Taoism. (Needham 1970, p. 285) 
While it is probably true that "everyone wants health, " it is not the 
case that all cultures put the same value on "health" relative to other 
goods, and this is ultimately due to differences in understanding about 
what "health" means. Not every tradition can provide the practice of 
medicine with the social capital necessary to develop as it will 
elsewhere. 
The ends of medicine therefore imply highly particular understandings 
of what "health" means in the larger society and how health is 
procured. The Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization states, "Health is a state of complete physical, mental, 
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity. " (Field 2001, p. 47) Gregory Field has emphasized that an 
adequate understanding of health must include a broad range of 
determinants: biological and ecological determinants (such as life, 
development, and longevity, equilibrium, environmental adaptation, 
non-susceptibility/resistance/immunity, vitality, endurance, 
relaxation); medical and psychological determinants (normality 
including social values such as whether homosexuality is normal, 
freedom from pain, wholeness and integration, awareness and mental 
clarity), socio-cultural and aesthetic determinants (relationality, 
creativity, and the ability to produce offspring, enjoyment); and 
metaphysical and religious determinants (such as self-identity, 
freedom). (Field 2001, pp. 50-77) The understanding of health can be 
further complicated by the ways in which humans have adapted to 
statistical abnormalities, such that some without the sense of hearing, 
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for example, can contend that this condition is not in fact a disability. 
"Health" therefore has a particular, culture-specific meaning. 
For this reason Nietzsche declared that the concept of normal health 
should be abandoned, because health for the body, not to mention the 
soul, "depends on your goal, your horizon, your energies, your 
impulses, your errors, and above all on the ideals and phantasms of 
your soul. " (Gay Science, 177, cited in Field 2001, p. 61) We can 
refuse to abandon a conception of normal health, albeit a conception 
open to amendment; we cannot avoid `recognizing that health has to be 
considered as a function of our larger understanding of life. The 
meaning of the material and the body, the meaning of the social, and 
the relative understanding of excellence all constrain the development 
of the practice of medicine. Different conceptions of the good lead to 
differences in the ends of practices, and at just those points in which 
the vision of the good life is most different, the practice of medicine 
also will be most different. 
In sum, the status of the products of practices as goods depends on the 
contribution of those products to the good life. The same is true of the 
second sort of goods internal to practices, the life-of-a-practitioner. 
The life-of-a-practitioner as a good 
Just as the products of medicine proper were held in low esteem in 
Confucianism, so also was the life-of-a-medical-practitioner as such. 
Confucianism emphasizes social stability, the family and the virtue of 
filial piety. It is the obligation of the family to care for its own, and 
especially to care for the elderly. In 1522, Yü Pien quoted the 
Confucian scholars of the Sung time: 
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Whoever leaves the cure of diseases to common 
physicians [yung-i] neither possesses compassion, nor 
does he fulfill his duties toward his parents. The 
knowledge of medicine is indispensable in the 
assistance of one's relatives [shih-ch 7n]! All the 
renowned physicians of former times started practicing 
medicine because their mothers fell ill. (Cited in 
Unschuld 1979, p. 57) 
Some rudimentary medical knowledge was part of the general 
education of any good Confucian. (Unschuld 1979, pp. 17f) The 
professionalization of medicine threatened to undermine the bonds 
between family members. 
The Confucians also saw the professionalization of medical 
practitioners as a destabilizing force in society at large. One historical 
precedent especially worried them. Movements based on the 
philosophy of Lao-tzu (604-? BCE), later evolving into Taoism, began 
in the second century BCE. Their social foundation and economic 
strength were centered in medical resources considered unorthodox by 
Confucians. Curing patients by spiritualistic rituals, they took payment 
in pounds of rice per year. The influence of these movements spread 
to the point of becoming a theocratic state-within-the-state of China. 
Confucian historians believed that this phenomenon had led to the fall 
of the Han dynasty (25-220 CE) and this incident formed the basis for 
the Confucian misgivings concerning the legitimacy of a distinct body 
of physicians within society. Confucian officials concluded that they 
must gain control over medical resources in order to maintain control 
over the material and non-material goods produced by those medical 
resources. One means of so doing was to assimilate the best 
physicians. Successful treatments at the imperial court were followed 
by the elevation of the physician to the status of civil servant, thus 
politically co-opting his professional group of origin, which would 
otherwise have gained status from his success. (Unschuld 1979, pp. 
18-21) Thus the life-of-a-doctor, as such, was held in low regard. 
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Buddhism offers a contrasting example. Medicine had a favored status 
in Buddhism from its beginnings, also for reasons relating to larger 
questions of the meaning of life. The Nepalese prince in the sixth 
century BCE who founded Buddhism, Siddartha Gautama, was also 
know as the "Great Physician. " In a philosophy/religion in which all 
of life is perceived to be suffering, compassion for the sufferer is seen 
as the highest virtue. In Mahayanist Buddhism, wisdom and duty 
actually pushes the enlightened, the bodhisattvas, who have achieved 
perfection, to delay their own elevation in order to alleviate the 
suffering of others. (Jonsen 2000, p. 31) 
The ranking of a life-of-a-medical-practitioner, too, as a good is 
therefore a function of how much this good is perceived to contribute 
to whatever we understand of a good life taken as a whole. And, 
specifically, it is a function of how much the life-of-a-practitioner 
contributes to the good life for the individual. 
Good doctor, good human? 
Another way to approach these questions is by asking about the 
relationship between what it is to be a good doctor and what it is to be 
a good person. A good person who dabbles in medicine, for example, 
may not be particularly competent at it. But can a person be a good 
doctor without being a good person? The answer to this question is 
complex and will lead us into the next chapter and a more careful 
consideration of the identification of the virtues. While being a good 
practitioner and being a good man are not coterminous, I will argue 
that the valuation of both will be decided with reference to a particular 
tradition's understanding of the good life. Consequently, a doctor can 
only be a good doctor to the extent that s/he functions in accord with 
that tradition's particular vision of the good and to the extent that that 
vision of the good can be realized in the practice of medicine. 
The criteria for deeming a practitioner to be good originate partly 
from the practice itself and partly from outside the practice. Within 
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any practice there are current standards of excellence and a doctor 
must meet them. Research in science comes to provisional conclusions 
and experience suggests that some technologies as more effective than 
others. Excellent practitioners will apply this knowledge. Decisions 
about bioethics and the ends of medicine do not generally come from 
practitioners, however, but from the surrounding culture and, 
systematically, from philosophers and theologians who articulate the 
philosophies and religions at the heart of culture. A practice itself 
provides limited resources for discerning its own ends; practitioners 
work with the ends they are given. It is for this reason that prior to the 
eighteenth century, theology was known as the "queen of the 
sciences" in the West. (This title is now apparently claimed by 
mathematics, or sometimes physics, if it is claimed at all, and for very 
different reasons. ) 
How much difference is there really, between, say, a good Muslim 
doctor and a good liberal doctor? The difference is great, and it turns 
on their difference over what constitutes a good life. 
Hassan Hathout explains how medicine is understood within the 
context of Islam: "The overall goal of the Shari d is the fulfillment of 
the welfare of the people by ensuring the satisfaction of their needs, 
which are technically categorized as indispensable needs, basic needs, 
and complementary needs, in that order of significance. " (Hathout 
1992, pp. 59f, 62) 
Those "indispensable needs" include many things directly related to 
Islamic beliefs. '7 Because they are indispensable, medicine is 
17 Indispensable needs are those without which human life would be 
unbearable or chaotic. There are five indispensable needs, namely, 
the, preservation of self (life, health, procreation, nourishment, 
curing illness, hygiene, etc. ); mind (psychological health, relief from 
stress, avoiding alcohol and drugs, etc. ); religion (faith, worship, 
prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, almsgivin&, morality and ethics, etc. ); 
ownership (sanctity of private ownership, legitimate pursuits of 
wealth, contracts, legitimate commercial relationships, prohibition 
of stealth, fraud and usury, social functions of capital, etc. ); and honor (chastity, prohibition of adultery and sexual offense, marriage 
and family laws, social conduct, combating moral pollution, etc. ). 
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therefore concerned with satisfying these needs, and a doctor is not 
free, in an Islamic society, just to leave these to individual 
discretion. 18 The Islamic Code of Medical Ethics (ICME), adopted at 
the First International Conference on Islamic Medicine held in Kuwait 
in January 1981, engages the doctor in larger issues of social welfare 
and demands governmental involvement in the formation of social 
morals: 
The Doctor's mission exceeds the treatment of disease 
to taking all measures to prevent its occurrence.... 
The Medical Profession shall take it as duty to combat 
such health-destructive habits as smoking, 
uncleanliness, etc. Apart from mass education and 
advertence, the Medical Profession should 
unrelentlessly [sic] pressurize the judiciary to issue 
necessary legislation. 
The combat and prevention of environmental pollution 
falls under this category. 
Each of these is covered by a complete set of moral injunctions as 
well as prescribed laws. (Hathout 1992, p. 62) 
18 According to Hassan Hathout, a number of principles guide Muslim 
medical ethics as a sub-discipline of Shari 'a, of which I will 
mention the most important in order to sharpen the simplistic picture 
of Muslim bioethics I am forced to draw here. First, necessities 
overrule prohibitions. "If something is prohibited by Shari 'a but 
under certain conditions it becomes necessary, for example to 
preserve life or cure illness, then the prohibition is waived for as 
long as necessary. " The starving may eat pork, the sick are 
exempted from fasting, but only as long as it is a necessity. (1992, p. 
64) In addition, the lesser of two harms should be chosen: "Taking a 
heart from a cadaver for transplantation is better than leaving the 
recipient to die. Sacrificing a pregnancy by abortion becomes lawful 
if the continuation of pregnancy threatens the life of the mother. " 
(1992, p. 64) And "The Summary Rule: Wherever Welfare Goes, 
There Goes the Law of God. " "This is the summary rule for issues 
not mentioned in the Quran or Sunna [Tradition of the Prophet] and 
which do not lend themselves easily to intelligent reasoning by 
analogy or the unanimity of all scholars of the Muslim nation in a 
certain era. Whatever is found to be in the best interests of the 
nation, provided it does not conflict with the essence of religion or 
the statutes of the Shari 'a, can confidently be legislated. " (1992, p. 
64) 
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The natural prophylaxis against venereal diseases and 
the other complications ensuing upon sexual license 
lies in revival of the human values of chastity, purity, 
self-restraint and refraining from advertently or 
inadvertently inflicting harm on self or others. To 
preach these religious values is `Preventive Medicine' 
and therefore lies within the jurisdiction and obligation 
of the medical profession. " [Emphasis added. ] (Islamic 
Code of Medical Ethics 2006) 
The practice of medicine must conform to the demands of Shari 'a. 
The ICME laments the contrast between medical opposition to 
smoking, saccharine, fat, and so forth, and the liberal attitude that in 
sexual matters, "a doctor should not moralize but just treat. " (2006) 
On this interpretation of Islam, it follows necessarily then that if a 
Muslim doctor limits his efforts in the prevention of venereal disease, 
for example, to promoting prudential measures such as condoms, 
dental dams, and encouraging his patients to know the relevant 
information about their sexual partners, he is not a good doctor in this 
respect. He is preventing disease, or at least offering measures for the 
prevention of disease given his patients' ends as they perceive them. 
He is not directing his patients toward health in the broadest sense. A 
sexually promiscuous man cannot be a healthy (Muslim) man, and 
therefore cannot be a good (Muslim) man in this respect. A doctor 
who enables, rather than discourages, promiscuity may be technically 
competent, but is not good. 19 
These ends will be partially defined by the correlative conception of 
the good life, the submission of human life to the law of Allah. We 
might conclude that a good doctor is one in service of what one 
Islamic theologian calls "homo Islamicus. " (Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
19 Of course a technically incompetent doctor is not a good doctor 
either. He may be incapable even of taking effective measures for 
promoting proper biological functioning of the body according to 
current levels of health care. So neither is he moving his clients 
toward the proper ends. 
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[undated]) While the Muslim doctor must treat anybody in need, the 
idea of facilitating the life of an autonomous person in the tradition of 
liberalism is positively repulsive to the good Muslim of many Islamic 
traditions. Therefore, while a good doctor may not be a good Muslim 
in the fullest sense, a doctor is only a good doctor to the extent that he 
is a good Muslim with regard to the ends of the practice of medicine. 
What this example illustrates is that the evaluation of whether a doctor 
is a good doctor is subordinate to the evaluation of what it is to be a 
good human for that tradition. A good doctor may not be a good 
human in the fullest sense, but a doctor is only a good doctor to the 
extent that s/he is a good human with regard to the ends of the practice 
of medicine. If the goods and ends achieved by a doctor are not 
compatible with our understanding of the good life, then we cannot 
judge that person to be a good doctor. S/he does not fulfill the role of a 
doctor in society. 
Why is this necessarily, rather than just frequently, the case? Why is it 
necessarily, rather than just coincidentally, the case that the products 
of practices are ranked with respect to a comprehensive understanding 
of the good life? Ultimately, it is necessarily the case for both for the 
same sort of reason that the three-part Aristotelian structure identified 
by Maclntyre is necessary for a coherent account of the virtues. That 
is, just as virtues are virtues because they enable the realization of a 
telos-goods internal to practices-so too the goods internal to 
practices are goods because they enable the realization of a broader 
telos, what it is to be a good person. What it is to be a good person, in 
turn, is a function of our understanding of the good life from the 
perspective of the community. 
Now, this conception of what life ought to be cannot be merely the 
cumulative total of all the goods internal to practices, for the same sort 
of reason that distinguishes goods internal to practices from goods 
external to them. We can rightly be indiscriminate in assignation of 
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goodness. All are goods. 20 All do not contribute equally to the good 
life. In a finite and temporal world, not all goods can or should be 
maximized. Goods conflict with goods for scarce resources of time 
and priority. In this sense, even the realization of internal goods is a 
zero-sum game. Goods have to be ranked, and to rank them wrongly is 
to cause evils by realizing lesser goods at the cost of diminishing 
higher goods. 
Consider, for example, the difference in the value of life in Roman 
Catholic and Jewish thinking and its impact on medical ethics. 
Though the two systems of thought have a common biblical heritage, 
and the Christian scriptures portray life as a gift from God, the 
Christian tradition does not set the preservation of human life at the 
highest level of moral obligation. Writing particularly on the issue of 
the prolongation of life, Pius XII drew on the overarching principle 
that "all temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ones. " 
("The Prolongation of Life" The Pope Speaks, N, 395, cited in Bleich 
1979, p. 12) Since life is not an overriding value, Catholic moralists 
teach that only ordinary means of saving life are obligatory: those 
"that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. " (Bleich 
1979, p. 12) Nevertheless, sacrificing oneself for another represents an 
ideal, an expression of supererogatory saintliness and in particular of 
the virtue of love. 
Jewish cosmology, in contrast, sees the value of every life as 
immeasurable and this difference has practical implications for 
medical ethics. Mishna Sanhedrin, commenting on Genesis 4.10, 
renders the following exegetical observation, which has become 
foundational to Jewish ethics: 
20 A more complete account would follow Augustine and his heirs in 
arguing that, at some level, everything that is should be understood 
as good in one sense. I assert this position more explicitly later in 
my surveys of Anselm and Duns Scotus. 
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It says not `the blood of thy brother, ' but The bloods of 
thy brother-his blood and the blood of his 
posterity.... Therefore but a single man was created in 
the world, to teach that if any man has caused a single 
soul to perish from Israel Scripture imputes it to him as 
though he had caused a whole world to perish; and if 
any man saves alive a single soul from Israel Scripture 
imputes it to him as though he had saved alive a whole 
world. (Mishnah 4: 5, cited in Green 1982, p. 113) 
Jewish ethics puts an obligation on every Jew to help those in need. 
Charitable financial giving to the point of sacrifice is mandatory. But 
rabbinic teaching expresses doubts that it is even permissible for one 
person to risk his or her life for another. At the limit a person may 
sacrifice a limb for another person, though this is not required, and is 
viewed as saintly behavior. One who risks his or her life for another is 
a "foolish saint" who "brings destruction on the world" and 
"dangerous heroic acts are largely discouraged by the mainstream of 
Jewish teaching. " A person who lays down her life for another is not a 
model of saintly behavior. (Green 1982, pp. 113-117) 
Both the Jewish and Catholic positions differ from the Confucian 
understanding of sacrifice. Because Confucians see the care of one's 
parents as among the highest goods, children have donated kidneys for 
transplant to their aging parents in poor health, and those parents have 
accepted the arrangement as proper and noble. Both Jewish and 
Christian understandings of medicine, I suspect, would recoil from 
this reasoning. What Jewish, Catholic, and Confucian doctors and 
patients consider right in the matter of organ donation correlates to 
their respective ranking of goods. The ranking of goods is the most 
basic difference between rival conceptions of the good life. It is also 
the factor distinguishing practice of medicine from practice of 
medicine. 
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Schmoctoring and rival practices of doctoring 
How great are the differences between conceptions of medicine? To 
this point I have been highlighting differences in practices, trying to 
make the case that what we commonly call "the practice of medicine" 
is actually quite different across cultural boundaries. These differences 
are limited, it might be objected, by what humans share. We are 
neither Venusians nor Borg nor angels. Our common needs include 
oxygen, water, nutrition, and minerals in quantities with very small 
tolerances. We are carbon-based life forms, mammals, homo sapiens. 
There seems to be no basis in biology for racial distinctions. We are 
born, mature, reproduce, and gestate under a set range of variables. 
We are adapted to and dependent upon the conditions of life on the 
planet Earth. We have a rather rigid upper limit to our lifespan. We are 
vulnerable in nearly identical ways. Many surgical procedures, 
techniques, and treatments followed in practicing medicine will be 
nearly identical, if attitudes toward the physical are comparable. 
Practices originate and develop between the world of the practical and 
some larger understanding that imposes patterns on the practical. 
There is a limit to how medicine can practicably evolve. 
My response, given the range of attitudes toward physical flourishing 
cited in the examples above, is that there might as well be no such 
practical limits. 
The differences are important enough to suggest that there is not just 
the practice of medicine across cultural contexts. If it is their goods 
and excellences that individuate practice from practice; if the ends of 
medicine differ by cultural context; if the host culture shapes and 
encourages, or thwarts and stifles the practice; and if health care can 
be a conception of the good life writ small, then are we discussing the 
practice (singular) of medicine? No, we are discussing practices 
(plural) of medicine. Or practices that have similarities to the practice 
of medicine, as the practice of rugby and American football have 
similarities. 
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In a footnote of Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick introduces 
the concept of "schmoctoring. " If the practice of doctoring implies 
exclusive rules and ends, then call "schmoctoring" the practice of 
medicine in which the end is making money. (Nozick 1974, p. 235n) 
Refining the distinctions, Arthur Applbaum has called attention to the 
fact that the ends of many vocations filled by professionally-trained 
physicians-insurance company examiner, expert witness, company 
doctor-conflict with the obligations traditionally associated with the 
role of a doctor. 
For example, in 1956 John Zimmerman was responsible for an auto 
accident in which David Spaulding was seriously injured. In the 
course of a subsequent lawsuit, Zimmerman's company sent Spalding 
to their doctor for examination. This doctor discovered an aortic 
aneurysm, perhaps related to the accident, but unknown to Spalding 
and his doctors. Both the doctor and the lawyer working for 
Zimmerman's side in the case had hidden Spalding's condition from 
him. Spalding settled the lawsuit involving the auto accident out of 
court for $6,500. His condition was later discovered. Spalding 
petitioned to have the earlier settlement set aside, suing that the lawyer 
had improperly withheld information. The settlement was set aside, 
but no impropriety was found in the company doctor or the lawyer, 
because of their adversarial position in the case. Applbaum argues that 
the doctor in the case had a moral obligation to inform Spalding of his 
condition. On the other hand, Applbaum also says that if a physician 
working in these non-traditional roles does not lie, cheat, steal, coerce 
or otherwise violate her "pre-professional" moral obligations, and if 
she informs her clients that she is not "doctoring, " then she is 
ethically free to pursue other ends than those of the traditional doctor. 
(Applbaum 1999) 
Nozick's and Applbaum's distinctions between doctors with differing 
ends are similar to my conclusions. The practices-plural-of 
medicine described so far will look to persons from rival conceptions 
of the good life much as a schmoctor looks to a person needing a 
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doctor. But the disconnect will actually be much greater. For a 
schmoctor has a role to fill in the practice of schmoctoring within a 
tradition's conception of the good, and can well fulfill that role as long 
as she does not assume the role of doctoring. A schmoctor may be a 
good schmoctor on any tradition's conception of the good. But the 
doctor of one practice of medicine cannot be a good doctor, without 
qualifiers, according to a rival practice of medicine. A liberal doctor, 
for example, will treat a patient with a view to a much broader range 
of personal autonomy than a doctor holding conservative Islamic 
beliefs. The beliefs of the liberal doctor will, I think, reflect rather the 
approach to medical ethics by Pellegrino and Thomasma: 
A right and good healing action is the aim of both the 
doctor and the patient. The right or correct action is 
what is scientifically and technically appropriate. But 
the action also must be morally good, that is, it should 
be in the interests of the patient. `Interests' include not 
only the medical good, that which medical knowledge 
dictates, but also the good as interpreted by the patient 
in terms of his own values, lifestyle, aspirations, 
religious beliefs, and so on. (1993, p. 86; emphasis 
added) 
I examine this approach more closely in the next chapter. Pellegrino 
and Thomasma cheerfully assume here that if this individual doctor 
and this individual patient concur on the patient's interests, then an 
ethical outcome is assured. That is, they assume that the ends of 
medicine can be adequately understood as the treatment of perceived 
dysfunction on a purely contractual understanding of the relationship 
between patient and doctor. Rather than the attainment of health on 
any objective and comprehensive understanding, medicine in this 
conception would only concern itself with uniting technical 
competence and a health-related obstacle to whatever the patient 
perceives as his good. This is not in fact what is intended by the 
authors, as we can infer from objective limits they import elsewhere, 
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but they are ignoring the cases of conflicting goods for which medical 
ethics are required if they assume that the patient's understanding of 
his ends are compatible with the ends of medicine as the doctor 
understands them. 
On every previous conception of medicine considered above- 
Confucian, Taoist, Hindu, Christian, Jewish-the patient and doctor 
are not the sole determinants of the patient's interests. And the same is 
true even for a liberal understanding of medicine. A liberal doctor is in 
the position of being able to embrace a broader range of ends than 
many others, and in a context of plural society, this gives the doctor a 
distinct advantage in forming political alliances concerning acceptable 
medical ethics. Yet even so, a patient might wish a liberal doctor to 
take some action that the doctor cannot accept, on a liberal 
understanding of the ends of life and therefore of medicine-a 
circumcision or clitorectomy, for example, in some forms of Islam, or 
the amputation of a healthy limb-even should the patient believe that 
such a measure will help him/her realize her true self. (See Elliot 2000 
on apotemnophilia. ) 
Or on the Aristotelian model, an immature or otherwise less-than-fully 
virtuous patient may come to believe later that her prioritization of 
goods at the time of her interaction with the doctor were not what they 
should have been and so that the doctor did not in fact serve her true 
interests, but only her desires and perceived interests at the time. A 
mature patient may understand her interests in relationship with the 
interests of community interests and not as a decision to be made 
autonomously, as the Pellegrino/Thomasma model would encourage 
her to do. She may believe that the doctor's role ought to have been to 
advise her within the context of her modified understanding of the 
good life. In such situations, the doctor was not a good doctor. The 
practice of medicine is not the same for doctor and the patient on her 
revised understanding. My interest here is not how to resolve such a 
problem. I want to point to its existence and inevitability in contexts 
of cultural plurality, and to note that only the comprehensive frame of 
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reference provided by an understanding of the good 
life can arbitrate 
such a conflict between doctor and patient. 
What does a practice look like without a coherent understanding of the 
good life? If the goods of practices are not understood relative 
to their 
contribution to the good life in the ways that I 
have described, then 
those goods cannot be ranked relative to other goods. As a result those 
goods can easily become hegemonic in the lives of practitioners. 
They 
can eclipse or supplant other ends of life. 
21 
Practices produce goods. A tradition will evaluate those goods based 
on prevailing religious, philosophical, or ideological conceptions of 
the good life. As a result, the practice develops and flourishes, or 
struggles and languishes, through the goods it produces in dynamic 
relationship to the good. A cultural "feedback loop" is established. 
Valued goods are rewarded materially and socially. Lowly-ranked 
goods are greeted negatively, ensuring the inferior status of the 
practice socially. When a practice is not perceived as contributing 
significantly to human flourishing, it cannot easily excel and therefore 
cannot easily produce goods that can be appreciated outside the 
narrow bounds of the practitioners. As the goods and excellences of 
the practice develop, the products and the practitioner herself will 
21 Take the example of the goods of medicine yet again. Patient X has 
conditions a, b, c, d, and e. Medical technology can competently 
treat each of these conditions, if they are seen as pathologies. 
Because the techniques of medicine can provide certain goods, 
doctors often assume that they should do so. Eric Cassell says that 
physicians are "a pragmatic group devoted to action" who tend to 
view patients as bundles of problems to address. (Cassell 1994) 
Pellegrino and Thomasma add, "Oftentimes the technological 
imperative leads physicians to equate the patient's best interest 
solely with the medically indicated course of action in such cases, 
rather than with values the patient may profess. " (1988, p. 93) 
Without a large view of the good life, other goods and excellences 
cannot compete with internal goods in the context of practices. 
Where a practice such as medicine is not suborned to the ends of a 
larger understanding of the good, the practice eventually supplants 
those ends, becoming a vision of the good in itself. More than one 
observer has remarked on the ways in which the secularization of 
medicine has coincided with an elevation of medicine in the West, 
and particularly psychiatry, to the role of religion. Paul Vitz 
(1977/1994)m akes a plausible case that secularized psychology 
constitutes another religion altogether, replacing sin with 
psychological dysfunction, mental health with salvation and God 
with self. See also Roy Branson (1973). 
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assume a place and meaning in society based on considerations far 
beyond the practice. 
Practices develop in social contexts. Social cohesion is only possible 
within some shared understanding of common ends. So these social 
contexts embody understandings of the good life, each with a matrix 
of valuations. While this ordering of goods changes over time, the 
stability of a society is a function of the stability of its priorities and 
pattern of valuations. Sports, games, crafts, sciences, and literature all 
have a history, and that history is, among other things, the record of 
the interaction of the practice with the broader culture, or cultures. 
The practice of medicine therefore must be understood within the 
framework of the good life. In any such structure of thought, the 
physical flourishing of the human body is understood as having a 
meaning, a role, and a value relative to the whole and to the 
constitutive parts of the whole. Understandings of this meaning and 
role and value differ widely. 
Goods, practices, and even, as we will see next, the virtues themselves 
should not be conceived of as freestanding. An account of the virtues 
reflects a specific and comprehensive understanding of the good life 
and of the good. And we are a step closer to the inescapable question 
of whether there is any substance to the formal conception of the good 
that is independent of human will. 
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VIRTUES AND THE GOOD LIFE 
In the last chapter I said that the ranking of goods internal to practices 
is a matter of their relationship and contribution to the good. If actions 
and dispositions to act are defined with respect to the ends of practices 
that they enable22, such that the virtues are the qualities necessary for 
attaining goods internal to practices, then we should ask how it is that 
some of these same virtues have a parallel relationship to the good life 
taken as a whole. Virtues are not powers that can serve all ends 
equally-external ends as well as internal ends-because genuine 
virtues, as contrasted with their simulacra, are partially defined as 
those powers that aim at internal goods. Genuine virtues, on any 
conception, have to do with exclusive motivations and dispositions. It 
just so happens that those personal qualities that enable the 
excellences of practices within a tradition are also those that enable an 
integrated life and the maintenance of a tradition. How is it that the 
same quality of character, the necessary means to the excellences of 
practices, excellences defined exclusively, also contribute to an 
exclusive understanding of an integrated life, as well as to a particular 
and exclusive tradition? What accounts for this coincidence? Why do 
genuine virtues necessarily, rather than fortuitously, enable both 
practices and also the good life as a whole? 
My aim here is to show how the virtues relate to the good life, and to 
argue that an account of the virtues thus understood is more coherent 
and less susceptible to contradiction than the composite we have if we 
start with practices. But because of this relationship, virtues cannot be 
transferred from one conception of the good to another. And one 
conception of the good life will require virtues that are gravely 
defective on other understandings. 
22 See chapter 4 above on the not-necessarily-monolithic-good. 
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Looking down the road in the development of my argument, the 
concepts necessary to understand how a genuine excellence (virtue) on 
one conception could be a mere simulacrum on another will open up a 
crucial distinction. It is the distinction between what is natural and 
necessary in human acts and dispositions, over against what is 
accidental/contingent. Moving forward into Part Two, it is a 
distinction that, coupled with a corresponding distinction in the ends 
of human life, is going to give us a better account of morality than the 
anthropocentric model considered thus far. 
I begin by showing, in the following example, that the practice of 
medicine must draw on ends external to that practice in order to 
specify the shape of the dispositions associated with the ends of 
medicine. 
The virtues of practices and ends beyond practices 
In The Virtues in Medical Practice, Edmund Pellegrino and David 
Thomasma take a teleological approach to bioethics, tying the virtues 
of medicine "as a practice" to the ends of medicine. They explicitly 
refer to the thinking of Anscombe and Maclntyre as antecedents to 
their project. They avoid adopting a particular conception of the good 
for humankind as a point of reference, however, but instead consider 
those virtues necessary for "the special relationship that sickness and 
the response to illness creates between healer and patient. " (1993, p. 
xii) Their project is an attempt, in part, to exemplify how "the virtues 
of medicine are derivable from the nature of medicine as a human 
activity" and "that the derivation of the physician's virtues from the 
ends of medicine helps us to escape some of the difficulties inherent in 
a `free-standing' virtue ethic. " (1993, p. xiii) They want to tie virtues 
to the ends of medicine, rather than trying to argue for the virtues as 
independent of such ends. But they do not want to tie them to a larger 
conception of the good. Thus, they provide an ideal case study for the 
theoretical inadequacies that I am considering in this chapter and the 
next. 
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Pellegrino and Thomasma give two reasons for not taking a position 
on the particularities of the good life. First, they say, medicine should 
not be subject to the whims of the society in which it is found. Second, 
when a culture becomes pluralistic, the moral basis erodes, and so an 
independent basis for bioethics must be found. As rival traditions 
intersect in the moral community of medicine, it becomes difficult for 
the profession to police itself. Rather than abandoning the medical 
ethics to the larger and less understanding society, the profession 
should find ends of medicine that function as the telos of modem 
medicine. Specifically in looking at the doctor-patent relationship and 
the virtues that this relationship requires for healing to occur, they 
hope to define "the internal morality of medicine. " (1993, pp. 51-52) 
"We can define, with some hope of agreement, what the ends of 
medicine are. The ultimate end is the health of individuals and society, 
while the more proximate end is a right and good healing action for a 
specific patient. " (1993, p. 86) Thus the virtues necessary for the 
successful practices of medicine look only to the ends of medicine. 
I think this project fails. Despite their many insights, the authors do 
not make a case for the moral virtues as necessary for the practice of 
medicine that is separable from a particular conception of the good 
life. It is not clear that Maclntyre should be blamed for the failure, 
since the argument runs counter to many of his conclusions. In more 
than one essay, Maclntyre refers explicitly to the field of medicine to 
exemplify the impasse of modem ethics. (1975; 1979) On the other 
hand, he might possibly be responsible for the misguided attempt by 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, since it is not always clear in Maclntyre's 
critique of modem medicine that a conception of the good life is 
necessary to a solution to the impasse. In any case, what the 
Pellegrino/Thomasma project attempts to do is precisely what I say is 
not possible. We cannot come to conclusions about correct moral 
dispositions in practices by reference to practices alone. 
The authors explicitly try to sidestep questions of what makes a 
person good as a person, and instead work only from the ends of 
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medicine. In fact, however, they cannot avoid linking those ends to the 
ends of a person qua person on his own interpretation: 
A right and good healing action is the aim of both the 
doctor and the patient. The right or correct action is 
what is scientifically and technically appropriate. But 
the action also must be morally good, that is, it should 
be in the interests of the patient. `Interests' include not 
only the medical good, that which medical knowledge 
dictates, but also the good as interpreted by the patient 
in terms of his own values, lifestyle, aspirations, 
religious beliefs, and so on. (1993, p. 86) 
The "interests of the patient" here obviously include references to 
particular and exclusive understandings of life. How then can the 
authors claim to establish the ends of medicine independently of a 
conception of the good life? Although the apparent inconsistency is 
not addressed, the implication is that "a right and good healing action" 
can be universally applied to the interests of any patient. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma imply also that the virtues they infer from 
the ends of medicine are applicable to any particular understanding of 
the good for the person. Beneficence, for example, is the first virtue 
and primary obligation that they say is required of the physician 
seeking the ends of medicine. While those arguing for autonomy as a 
good in medicine have usually set autonomy in conflict with 
beneficence, the authors insist that beneficence is not paternalism, but 
seeks the good of the patient. 
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That good [the good of the patient] is a compound idea 
consisting of an ascending hierarchy: (1) what is 
medically good, that is, restoration of physiological 
functioning and emotional balance; (2) what is defined 
as good by the patient in terms of his perception of his 
own good; (3) what is good for humans as humans and 
members of the human community; and (4) what is 
good for humans as spiritual beings. (1993, p. 58) 
So here again the ends of persons-in-community are imported into 
judgment. Pellegrino and Thomasma go on to place the good of 
autonomy in this ranking at (3): what is good for humans as humans. 
They conclude that beneficence is foundational to autonomy. (1993, 
pp. 57-58) 
But the problem here is that although autonomy does depend on 
beneficent oversight for its development, such oversight must 
necessarily limit both the range of autonomy and also the possible 
conceptions of the good for the autonomous individual. (See Mendus 
1986; 1989) The range of acceptable autonomy is a function of what 
we think is good for humans. This will lead to potential conflicts in 
our understandings of what beneficence entails. Prudence, the virtue 
necessary for the resolution of conflicts arising from the autonomy of 
the patient, say Pellegrino and Thomasma, looks to an intuitive 
understanding of the good. For example, the authors consider the 
proper use of the therapeutic privilege-the prerogative of the 
caregiver to set aside the rule of informed consent in emergencies and 
cases of mental incompetence or psychological instability/depression, 
or where disclosure to the patient of his condition could lead to harm. 
In this decision the authors elicit the need for "moral insight, for that 
combination of intuitive grasp by natural inclination of what is right 
and good here, and how in this decision we call prudence to resolve 
these conflicts in ways no formula can guarantee. " (1993, pp. 88-89) 
In sum, they fail to see that the virtues required for achieving the ends 
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of medicine are tied to ends beyond medicine. Indeed, it is our 
conception of the good life taken as a whole that defines the virtues. 
Virtues shaped by the conception of the good life 
My central example of a virtue is courage. Contrary to some 
Aristotelian models, courage is not found as a middle course between 
fear and rashness. To view the virtues as a means between extremes is 
to give primary attention to what should be secondary in the 
discussion. We do not become courageous by setting out to overcome 
fear and rashness. For we cannot distinguish between proper caution 
and cowardice, on the one hand, and laudable boldness and improper 
rashness, on the other, without reference to the goods we seek and 
their place in a larger scheme. 
To define the virtue first as a mean is to use other criteria implicitly to 
decide where the mean lies between extremes. The conceptual 
connection between a golden mean and the good or the moral is not 
evident, as critics of Aristotle's account have noted. 
Although Aquinas, by contrast, says that fortitude is about curbing 
fear and moderating daring (ST 2-2.123.3), it is not the focus of his 
account. In Aquinas's account it is not the subjective experience of 
agents' actual fears and areas of confidence that guides them in 
identifying virtuous acts, but what right reason dictates with respect to 
ends. As we saw in analyzing MacIntyre's argument concerning 
practices in chapter 3, goods shape the virtues. Only consequently, 
and as a matter of overcoming obstacles to goods, do we define 
deviations from courage in fear or rashness. 
Practical reason works from an understanding of what human 
flourishing and corruption entail, but it also specifies where normal 
aversions lie. We should naturally fear some things, Aquinas believes, 
just as we should have confidence with respect to others. The potential 
gains and losses are largely known, at least in theory, because the end 
is largely defined. Virtues are qualities that cannot be precisely 
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identified and evaluated apart from a particular understanding of the 
ends that they enable. An acquired human quality is a virtue because 
of its relationship to goods and especially to the good life. It is each 
community's conception of the good that determines what counts as a 
virtue for that community. 
This raises an obvious problem. If the virtues are a function of specific 
and exclusive versions of the good life, then it seems to follow that the 
"virtues" of one version of the good life might be very different 
indeed from the virtues of its rivals. A courageous person on one 
account cannot in any unqualified way be considered a courageous 
person on a rival account. This is indeed the case. We can more easily 
see why through specific examples. 
If we go behind a particular act to find not only the immediate purpose 
for rescuing a person from a mob, for example, but the reasons such 
an act is counted valuable, we discover a final end or ends orienting 
this life. It is not in a loose or arbitrary aggregation of goods that the 
virtues can be clearly defined. It is a particular end, contrary to 
others, that determines what counts as a virtue. In Aquinas, the moral 
virtues are interconnected both by prudence and charity and have to 
do with the agent's relationship to God in Christ. A coherent argument 
for a coherent set of virtues has to focus on these two virtues first- 
what do I love, above all, comprehensively, and how do I attain or 
actualize the object of my affection? Practical wisdom knits a web of 
dispositions and cultivated responses at the center of which is, in 
Aquinas, a Christian understanding of the person's purpose in living. 
Genuine charity toward God and one's fellows orients one's actions 
and beliefs to produce all the moral virtues. Aquinas follows 
Augustine here in the claim that charity encompasses the cardinal 
virtues, which in turn regroup the other virtues. 
In the pre-Christian and non-Christian West, to consider other 
examples, courage has often entailed conditions of physicality, social 
nobility and magnanimity, as well as public and civic honor that do 
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not resonate with Christian concepts of virtue. The citizen soldier 
facing death in defense of the polls best exemplifies courage for 
Aristotle. He did not believe that a woman could model courage for 
men, nor that slaves were capable of the cardinal virtues at all. Virgil's 
Aeneas is a man of courage, but as John Casey has underlined, that 
courage is unintelligible apart from the ends to which he was 
committed, his loyalties to his father, his wife, his gods, and his city 
(Casey 1990, pp. 51-103 and especially p. 63). Especially his city. The 
religion of Rome was Rome; the end of Rome was Rome. This clash 
of ends pitted Roman virtue against Christian virtue and produced an 
ideal of Christian courage, the martyr. 
Islam has traditionally viewed culture as monistic, and subsequently 
identifies persons and institutions and countries with either the house 
of Islam (the dar al-Islam), or the house of war (dar al-harb). As a 
virtue, courage advances Islam on earth and improves one's lot in a 
particular understanding of paradise. Martyrdom is the surest route to 
both. While paradise is unsure for even the most devout Muslim living 
an ordinary life, and depends upon the balance of one's good and evil 
deeds, the man dying in a legitimate jihad has the assurance of eternal 
bliss. The martyr is an exemplar of courage here, on a very different 
understanding than that of Christian martyrdom. 
In the comparison of any two comprehensive accounts of the virtues, 
therefore, we have a problem of commensurability. To define a virtue 
in terms of an end is to call into question virtues defined with respect 
to another end. Genuine courage in one account will always be, to 
varying degrees, a semblance of courage for a rival version. 
This conclusion is frequently explicit, even in the rival understandings 
already cited. The Confucian philosopher Mencius actually illustrates 
genuine courage by condemning several widespread notions of 
courage based on rival versions of self-respect. One such view held a 
military ideal of courage and considered resistance to real or perceived 
insults as more important than life itself. Another associated self- 
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respect with praise and positions accorded by the ruling powers, and 
saw courage as the valiant pursuit of these honors. In still another 
view, traditional moralists preserved the status quo in social 
conventions at all costs. These three were prone to endanger 
themselves to achieve their vision of unsophisticated views of human 
flourishing. Two other, more philosophical, positions nonetheless also 
proposed mistaken notions of courage, for Mencius. Some forms of 
Mohism based self-respect on the human excellence resulting from the 
rational deliberation that produced rules. Courage was that virtue that 
protected such deliberation and helped people follow the rules so 
produced. In the position of some strands of Taoism, it was argued 
that people should strive only to protect themselves, a "refined 
cowardliness" by rival lights. Almost nothing was so valuable as to 
merit risk of death or even serious danger, and courage entailed 
resistance to the demands for sacrifice by religious, social or ethical 
leaders, unless such resistance might itself endanger the individual. 
(Yearley 1990, p. 148)23 
The virtues of one conception are simulacra to other conceptions. But 
because of the non-empirical criteria of virtues, rival versions of the 
virtues can appropriate acts and stories of courage from other 
versions. We can often see how such acts could serve other ends, or 
we unconsciously interpret them as so doing. As persons influenced 
by a particular tradition, we have conflicted intuitions in commending 
the apparently courageous acts of adherents of a rival tradition. We 
correctly see that the actions resemble in many ways the noble actions 
we can commend on our own understanding of the world. On the 
other hand, their ends may repulse us. 
Semblances of courage can teach us something about courage. We can 
admire acts or tales of courage in rival traditions, past and 
contemporary. (See G. Murphy 2000. ) But to do so will always 
23 Despite an evident desire to find points of similarity, Lee Yearley's 
(1990) careful comparison of virtues in Aquinas and Mencius finally 
resorts to the component parts of virtues in order to find points of 
genuine commonality between the two versions. 
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require the imagination to interpret these acts and stories in light of 
our own reasons and understanding of the ends of life. 24 In this 
respect, it is often to our advantage not to know the precise 
motivations and intentions behind apparently virtuous dispositions and 
acts. 
If the virtues are partly defined with respect to practices (chapter 2), 
but if there is not a single practice of medicine, but rather contrary 
practices (pl. ) of medicine (chapter 4), and if the virtues are not 
freestanding dispositions, but instead are comprehensively defined 
with respect to contrary conceptions of the good, then how do the 
virtues defined with respect to practices relate to the virtues defined 
with respect to the good life? Do they stand in tension? They do not, 
on a coherent account. If the goods of practices relate to the good life 
as I argued that they do in the last chapter, then the virtues of the good 
life turn out to be the virtues of practices. 
The virtues of the good life as the virtues of practices 
The virtues of the good life, broadly speaking, will also be the virtues 
of health and medicine. Why? How is it that virtues defined with 
reference to a variety of goods internal to practices can be reconciled 
and not lead to conflict and chaos in moral reasoning? The virtues 
necessarily, rather than fortuitously, enable both practices and a larger 
understanding of the good because they stand in the same sort of 
relationship of dependence to the good life as do the goods of 
practices. The practical rationality that orders goods relative to the 
good also orders the qualities and dispositions necessary to attain 
those goods thus ordered. Genuine virtues on any one account serve 
both practices and the good life because both the goods of practices 
and genuine virtues are defined with relationship to that life. So the 
24 This is also how I understand the popularity of,. for example, William Bennett's eclectic anthologies on the virtues among people 
adhering to mutually exclusive conceptions of the good. (Bennett 1993; Bennett 1995) 
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overarching virtues of the good life just are the overarching virtues of 
practices. 25 
All goods are not equal in their contribution to the good life. As we 
saw in the last chapter, the more the goods of a practice contribute to 
the good life, the more highly esteemed those goods will be. The more 
of the good life that a practice encompasses, the more full-orbed the 
virtues associated with that practice will be. So closely linked is the 
practice of medicine to the human good that the virtues cultivated by 
Confucians simply are the means to personal health, says Peimin Ni. 
"Confucian moral virtues can be understood as qualities that define a 
healthy person. " (Ni 1999, p. 27) The Confucian virtue of ren, for 
example, is the most central of the virtues, variously translated as 
humaneness, compassion, or love. Confucius linked ren and personal 
health in the Analects by asserting, "[T]hose who have ren have 
longevity. " (6: 21, cited in Ni 1999, p. 31) In the Confucian 
understanding, vices such as lust, strife, and avarice are not simply 
moral failings, in the narrow sense in which morality has come to be 
used in the modem West. When indulged, the vices destroy the person 
from the inside out. What begins as a deviation from mores will 
inevitably lead to physical ailments and premature death. Positively 
stated, by learning to desire the best and eliminating unnecessary 
desires, the person preserves rather than vitiates her energy and 
vitality, and consequently experiences longevity and good health in 
corporeal terms. (Ni 1999, p. 31) So Wang Yang Ming can conclude, 
"[R]oughly speaking, care for moral virtue and care for the person are 
25 Maclntyre's description of a virtue relative to practices says that a 
virtue is a quality that "tends" to enable us to achieve internal goods. 
Why only "tends"? Were the virtues defined with reference only to 
the internal goods of practices, they should necessarily produce the 
goods of those practices, barring countervailing contingencies. 
Maclntyre says this is because of the contingent nature of a world 
imperfectly attuned to the virtues. (191,198) Other persons may not 
exhibit such qualities, for example, thus compromising the 
achievement of these goods even for those who do exhibit the 
virtues. This is no doubt the case, but there is another reason why 
the virtues only tend to promote practices. It is not based first of all 
in the contingency of the persons historical circumstances, but in 
the reason I give, that the ultimate end determinatively shapes the 
virtues. 
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one and the same thing" (Wang Wen Cheng Gong Quan Shu, vol. 5) 
(Ni 1999, pp. 32f) Zhong yong, balance or temperance or equilibrium, 
is a related virtue. The Doctrine of the Mean, one of the four major 
Confucian classics, states: "When equilibrium and harmony are 
realized to the highest degree, Heaven and Earth will attain their 
proper order and all things will flourish. " (Chapter 1, cited in Ni 1999, 
pp. 33f) The respect for rites and ceremony, Ii, gives the person very 
specific guidelines for the behavioral manifestation of well-being. (Ni 
1999, p. 36) And so it is with all the Confucian virtues. 
The Confucian view of healthcare is therefore fundamentally different 
from the scientific and social atomism of much modem Western 
science. The human is social and this sociality is irreducible. 
Reciprocity in relations is therefore not simply a cultural imperative 
but is a law of science. To interact with others properly is to create a 
salubrious "qi field" for oneself. - Ni relates the case in which a grand 
qigong master was asked how to relieve nervousness and fearfulness. 
In reply he exhorted the person to greater filial piety toward his 
parents, and he argued convincingly for the effectiveness of this 
remedy. (Ni 1999, p. 39) 
It is not just that good morals lead to good health. We might be 
tempted to draw simplistic analogies with the conditions stipulated by 
the Hippocratic oath and the exhortations of Poor Richard's Almanac. 
Ni emphasizes that it is not just that the virtues create the necessary 
conditions for health. Confucian virtues are "intrinsic" to health care: 
"They are health care itself, like eating nutritious food, or doing 
physical exercises. In this sense, the practice of Confucian virtues is 
the practice of health care, and the possession of these virtues is the 
possession of health. " (Ni 1999, p. 40) 
Just as the virtues of health are the virtues of a good human being, so 
too are the virtues of the practice of Confucian medicine. Human 
experimentation is permissible only within the bounds of yi' 
(righteousness) and according to ren (humanity)(Chen 1999, pp. 
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211 ff. ); legitimate "human drugs" (blood, urine) are those that respect 
Confucian understandings of ren, yiz, and filial piety (Ni 1999, p. 40); 
and the justice of suicide and assisted euthanasia are decided within 
the Confucian understanding of qi as the beginning and termination of 
life. (Khushf 1999, pp. 103ff. ) This alignment of the virtues and goods 
of health and those of the practice of medicine is not accidental. The 
virtues and goods of health and the virtues and goods of practices are 
the same because the concerns of medicine and of health are 
inseparable from the larger questions of the good life in 
Confucianism. 
Whether this account of healthcare is ultimately successful is beside 
the point. It is the best account so far within the Confucian conception 
of the good life. It is the most error- and conflict-reducing theory 
produced to date. So it will be with any reasonably coherent account 
of the good life. The exact nature of the relationship between the 
virtues of practices and the virtues of the good life will vary by 
accounts and may not always be as close as they are in the Confucian 
conception of medicine. Nevertheless, this is the structure of moral 
reasoning. 
Because the goods internal to practices are ordered according to a 
comprehensive understanding of the good life, so too are the virtues 
that make them possible. If upon analysis that contribution is shown 
wanting, practices and their internal goods are called into question. 
The internal goods of practices may not turn out to be important 
goods, relative to the good. Because the goods of practices are thus 
ordered, the understanding of the ends and excellences of practices 
can contract as well as expand, as we saw in the last chapter. If it were 
discovered that the contribution of the practice to the larger vision of 
life was less than previously estimated, the practice would change or 
die out, as have Western practices associated with cock fighting, 
tobacco, equestrianism, and firearms. A coherent account of the 
virtues does not tie virtues most basically to practices or to the internal 
goods of practices, but to an overarching understanding of the good. 
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Virtues aligned to an overall conception of the good life will 
occasionally subordinate even the internal goods of one practice to the 
more important goods of another practice, to the point that the goods 
of the first are barely realized, if at all. Good parents may see their 
tennis game suffer. 
In the abstract, powers are morally neutral and ambivalent, but this is 
not the case in practice. The complex fabric of threads tying a power 
to one particular end cannot always just be severed and reattached to 
another. The virtues of one tradition cannot simply be imported into 
another. 
Virtues non-transferable 
Maclntyre's own position on these questions in After Virtue is 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, he acknowledges the 
differences in honesty, for example, across Kantian, Bantu, and 
modem contexts. (192f. ) He also recognizes that tables of the virtues 
are different on different accounts of well-being or flourishing, and 
that this is because those accounts are incompatible. 26 
On the other hand, After Virtue seems to suggest that each of his 
central virtues justice, courage, and honesty-has a core content that 
is interchangeable from tradition to tradition. A virtue is a quality that 
tends to enable the realization of internal goods proper to a practice. 
26 "Some modem moral philosophers who are deeply sympathetic to 
Aristotle's account of the virtues have seen no problem here. It has 
been argued that all we need to provide in order to justify an account 
of the virtues and vices is some very general account of what human 
flourishing and well-being consists in. The virtues can then be 
adequately characterized as those qualities necessary to promote 
such flourishing and well-being, because, whatever our 
disagreements in detail on that subject, we ought to be able to agree 
rationally on what is a virtue and what is a vice. This view ignores 
the place in our cultural history of deep conflicts over what human 
flourishing and well-being do consist in and the way in which rival 
and incompatible beliefs on that topic beget rival and incompatible 
tables of the virtues. Aristotle and Nietzsche, Hume and the New 
Testament are names which represent polar oppositions in these 
matters. Hence any adequate teleological account must provide us 
with some clear and defensible account of the telos; and any 
adequate generally Aristotelian account must supply a teleological 
account which can replace Aristotle's metaphysical biology. " (162f) 
109 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
His description of courage states: "We hold courage to be a virtue 
because the care and concern for individuals, communities and causes 
which is so crucial to so much in practices requires the existence of 
such a virtue. " (192) We could take this to mean that our courage is 
fundamentally the same across differing conceptions of the care of 
individuals, communities, and causes. Although the understanding of 
the virtues will vary from tradition to tradition, the core of these 
virtues is effectively the same. In his recounting of Aquinas' theory, 
additionally, he questions the necessary unity of the virtues. 27 
Whatever moral re-education might be required to reform a Nazi, such 
a person would not, Maclntyre believes, have to "unlearn or relearn 
what he knew about avoiding both cowardice and intemperate 
rashness in the face of harm and danger. " A "good" Nazi already has 
the virtue of courage, even if he lacks the virtues of humility and 
charity. (180) Maclntyre specifically rejects P. T. Geach's position that 
either it is not courage that an unreformed Nazi possesses, or that the 
courage he possesses is not a virtue. (Geach 1977, cited in Maclntyre 
1984, p. 179) 
Is a "courageous Nazi" genuinely courageous on the accounts of non- 
Nazis? My argument to this point says no. Maclntyre has rephrased 
the question to ask, in effect, Could a courageous Nazi transfer his 
understanding of courage to another conception of the good life 
without significant educational "interference"-without "the negative 
or distorting effect that new learning can have on previous learning or 
that previous learning can have on new learning"? (American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Ed. ) His 
insistence that such a transfer is possible poses an objection to the 
sorts of conclusions that I have been drawing. 
In response, not that much depends here on what we mean by a "good 
Nazi. " There were many Germans caught up in World War II who 
27 The introduction to Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, the 
succeeding work in the After Virtue project, explicitly acknowledges 
the error of his disagreement with Aquinas on the unity of the 
virtues. (1988, p. x) 
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served as soldiers, for example, without any particular allegiance to 
the Nazi party, good Lutheran farm boys perhaps rationalizing their 
involvement with an eye to the injustices following the previous war. 
To call them courageous seems plausible. But such examples miss the 
reason why thinking about a "courageous Nazi" is interesting. Better 
to consider the case of a committed neo-pagan, fascist S. S. storm 
trooper who later sincerely wishes to be re-educated for service as, 
say, an orthodox Lutheran soldier in a republican political structure. 
And when we think about the sort of person a "good Nazi" must have 
been in the historical context of Nazi Germany, questions arise. This 
was a man who violently defended a form of government defined by 
the centralization of power under a dictator, strict social and economic 
controls, suppression of the opposition by terror and censorship, and a 
policy of militant nationalism and racism. While a Nazi could do 
many good things with the disposition of character in question, it 
seems suspect to call it courage without qualification. MacIntyre's 
own larger argument gives reasons to doubt whether such a social 
system is conducive to cultivating genuine virtues at all. The best way 
to avoid begging the question of whether the soldier's character is 
genuinely courageous, or not, is to dissect the reasoning behind the 
dispositions he formerly cultivated, and then to ask if those 
dispositions conform to a Lutheran understanding of courage. They do 
not. 
If we apply Maclntyre's claim more broadly, we see one reason for 
thinking that there will be interference. If we say that the Nazi is 
courageous, then it seems that we would have to say that by his lights 
he is also just, honest, and a person of integrity. We finish by 
concluding that a Nazi is virtuous. This seems unacceptable. We 
would then want to qualify our judgment at least by declaring that he 
is, well, a virtuous Nazi. This qualification actually reinforces the 
difference in disposition that I am underlining. Nazis, misguided 
politicians, and gifted juvenile delinquents may eventually learn to 
turn their powers to noble ends with above-average results, just as, 
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corrupted-but-gifted entrepreneurs, public officials, scholars, and 
clergy can use their qualities to do exceptional harm. But the question 
is how much re-education is necessary. A great deal, I say, for two 
reasons. The behavior of a "good" Nazi and a good Lutheran 
republican is very different, first. Second, even where the behavior is 
similar, the practical reasoning underlying every decision and every 
disposition must be rethought and realigned to a very different set of 
ends comprising the ultimate end of this person's life. Because of the 
"courageous" Nazi's ultimate commitments, his courage turns out to 
be a simulacrum of courage, at best, on other accounts. 
This conclusion is reinforced and explicated by considering a simpler 
virtue, the disposition toward truthfulness. Human dispositions with 
regard to truth seem to draw clearer distinctions over what counts as a 
virtue than those with regard to self-sacrifice. As in the case of 
courage, it is a society's conception of the good life that shapes our 
dispositions of truth-telling. Some understandings of the good life 
objectively require lying, if not a disposition toward dishonesty. 
More importantly, seeing why this is the case will better enable us to 
identify the critical difference between simulacra and genuine virtues. 
It is the difference between the natural/necessary features of any act or 
excellence, and the accidental/contingent uses to which the act or 
excellence is put. 
Truthfulness and the good life 
The social good of honor and its ordering are the subject of discussion 
in this section. I take honor conferred by one's fellow practitioners to 
be a good internal to many or all Maclntyrean "practices" as a feature 
of the life-of-a-practitioner. Since the subject of this argument is not 
practices as such, however, my conclusions would still have broad 
application even if that assumption were not warranted. 
Working with the standard understanding of toleration and applying it 
to the evil of lying, I consider the example of slavery in the 
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antebellum American South. I show how a social institution widely 
recognized today as unjust-and unjust because built on the falsehood 
of white superiority-led to a distorted understanding of the virtue of 
honesty. The purpose of this example is primarily to illustrate the 
mechanics of the relationship between honesty/truthfulness and the 
good of honor as it was wrongly ordered in that society. I then 
broaden the discussion to show how all social contexts face similar 
problems. 
Virtues, or at least something like them, are required to attain goods of 
practices, defined relative to the good life. By "something like, " I 
mean again that the virtues of one conception of the good life often do 
not count as virtues on another conception of the good life. Virtues are 
not freestanding, but must be understood with respect to the good life, 
with respect to the goods that are derived from that conception of the 
good life and that partially constitute that good life, and especially 
with respect to their ranking within that conception of the good life. 
The application of a virtue therefore will always depend on the 
ranking of the goods that it enables. I deny Maclntyre's assumption 
that even the most basic virtues can be identified independently of the 
particular and exclusive ends they enable. 
This denial might appear to face an insurmountable difficulty in the 
virtue of truthfulness. For while truth/Truth/"truth" is the subject of 
endless controversy in the larger sense, the requirements of 
truthfulness seem incontestable. Truthfulness is indispensable to the 
achievement of certain social goods. Shared social goods of any kind, 
and especially language itself, require a near-perfect level of truth- 
telling. So much so, as has often been noted, that lying is not even 
possible without a strong social norm of verbal honesty. How then can 
truthfulness vary by conception of the good? 
Every society has an understanding of what it takes to be the case, 
from the small and incontestable to the grand and transcendent, and 
every society knows what it looks like to deviate from that 
113 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
understanding. That is, every society knows what it is to lie. Lying 
obscures and blocks the knowledge of what is understood as the truth. 
As such it is an evil. It causes objective harms. Nevertheless, there are 
tensions in every society's understanding of what-is-actually-the case 
on the one hand, and the value accorded to other goods in society on 
the other hand. 
Relationships are an integral part of what Maclntyre intends by the 
life-of-a-practitioner. He claims that the goods of a practice "can only 
be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our 
relationship to other practitioners" in the form of justice, courage, and 
honesty as they relate to the practice. (191) It might even be argued 
that those relationships themselves are goods internal to the practice. 
Clearly the form and content of justice, courage, and honesty here 
define and are defined by the relationships we have with others such 
that they cannot be understood apart from those relationships. I 
confide information to some, but not to others. If I tell the truth to this 
person but lie to that one about the matter, I cannot claim to have the 
same type of relationship with both. If I lie to the second person, our 
"allegiance to each other in the pursuit of common goods has been put 
in question. " (191f) 
So social patterns of truth-telling tell their own true tale of the goods 
of a society. We can know a culture in part by what passes for honesty 
in it. If we know when, about what, and most importantly why it is 
considered permissible or even commendable to fib to Auntie, then we 
can also know something about the value of our relationship with 
Auntie relative to the value of other goods. The value of the truth and 
the value of other goods can conflict. 
The most basic index of standards in truthfulness is membership and 
exclusion from some group. We are not in the same relationship with 
people to whom we tell the truth as with those to whom we do not. 
(See Maclntyre 1984, pp. 191 f. ) It is also the case that applying 
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different standards of truth-telling can purposefully reinforce who's 
"in" and who's "out" of our group. By virtue of that identity and its 
attendant commitments, people inside and outside the group will not 
be treated identically. We do not owe quite the same debts of truth- 
telling to those inside as to those outside and this is due to the 
relationship of others to the good life and its goods. That is not to say 
that we are therefore permitted to deceive those outside the group. We 
may be so permitted on certain understandings, under certain 
circumstances. Deception is integral to success in warfare and if war is 
permissible, some form of deception or at least misdirection often 
ensues in the course of successful battle. Our mortal enemies, engaged 
in pursuing the destruction of our lives and goods, do not have a right 
to information that they will use against us. More commonly, those 
outside the group are simply not privy to the intimacy of those inside, 
whether the group in question is a family, a guild, a religious order, or 
a business. And on certain understandings of the good life, concrete 
examples will show, we are permitted and even encouraged to deceive 
those outside. If a group disdains those outside and perceives itself as 
having only a narrow need of outsiders, then it may see deceit of 
outsiders as a positive good having little downside. Some isolated 
ethnic groups make the pillaging or deception of outsiders a 
requirement of initiation into manhood (e. g., the Serer of Senegal). 
This effectively cuts the group off from sharing social goods with 
those outsiders. 
We tolerate lying, if we tolerate lying, in view of some good. To 
tolerate is to refuse to suppress an evil. Since an evil is, by definition, 
something we seek to avoid, we only tolerate evils if we believe that 
such toleration will result in the protection of goods. (See 
Budziszewski 1992, p. 269. ) Lying will not be tolerated, let alone 
encouraged, if it is believed that goods can be protected less 
harmfully. It is rational to refuse to suppress an evil if and only if it is 
believed that by tolerating that evil we are thereby protecting some 
good. On the other hand, a society will tolerate, or even encourage, 
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lying if it is believed that the harm caused by such lying is required to 
achieve or to protect greater goods, that is, if it is believed that the 
security of important goods will compensate for the evils of lying. 
An entire social structure will engage in collective deceit within its 
own bounds only if it is believed that open proclamation of the truth 
will put the structure's understanding of the good at risk. This 
evaluation of goods protected and harms caused by lying within the 
society does not occur in the open air of public deliberation. In fact, it 
cannot do so without betraying lies to the truth from which those lies 
must be protected. So the processes of mutual deception and self- 
deception are half-hidden and even half-thought, and therefore not 
always consistent. These processes will often have the character of 
rationalization rather than of reason. Our own abilities of reasoning 
may betray us. To admit to the truth is to see immediately both that 
the social structure and our interest in it depend on the validity of what 
the truth contradicts and also that to recognize the truth openly means 
the collapse of that social structure, including our interest in it. Reason 
grasps any straw that our own sense of integrity and the standards of 
our peers will accommodate. 
The history of slavery and of other systematic abuses of humanity 
show that humans are more than capable of rationalizing falsehood, 
and of refusing to acknowledge truths obvious to others. In the years 
leading up to the Civil War, the American South was in transition 
from one form to rationalization to another. In the first, we do not 
know the ultimate truth but believe something else, and we conform 
our data to that understanding, unconsciously bending the data to fit 
the theory. In the second, we know that we are in error, yet willfully 
collude in bending the truth. 
Slavery in the South 
Slavery in the antebellum South required lying and dishonesty. This 
institution, and the larger society built upon it, necessitated 
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untruthfulness for its maintenance. Honor was a good protected by 
this dishonesty. 
The justification of slavery is based on the assumption of superiority. 
One culture/religion/ethnicity/nation/sex sees itself as better than 
another in one or several criteria of social ordering. In the 
Christianized West, there were several arguments for this superiority. 
Blacks were mentally inferior. Blacks were a different and inferior 
species than whites. Slavery was a means of civilizing a savage 
culture and of introducing them to a superior religion. Slaves were 
materially better off than their kind in their places of origin. Africans 
captured and sold as slaves by other Africans were originally prisoners 
of war or criminals, with in implicit inferiority resulting from that 
status. 
There were other arguments for slavery. And many arguments were 
based purely on pragmatic terms. The southern economy depended on 
slaves. But the claim of superiority was the most important in 
arguments that openly recognized slavery as slavery. 
The system reinforced these assessments at several levels. Since 
formal intellectual education was considered a waste on them, slaves 
received little or no education. They received no socialization into the 
dominant culture as such. They therefore displayed neither formal 
education nor socialization, making the circle of rationalization 
complete. Moreover, slaves learned not to make their plight worse by 
directly challenging this stratification. 
Yet by the late eighteenth century it was increasingly recognized that 
at a fundamental level, the slaves were the equals of the masters, 
either individually or collectively. In the southern United States, few 
proslavery arguments could sustain the claim that Africans were 
another species or were not made in God's image. Eventually these 
concessions and others proved fatal to the proslavery position. Many 
even recognized that these arguments for slavery could not long stand. 
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Slaves would eventually become civilized or Christianized or in some 
other way remove the reasons for their enslavement. No doubt the 
mixed parentage of later generations of slaves also clouded the 
original distinctions still more. But for some time this equality could 
be overlooked in view of the other factors just mentioned. At the 
relevant level, whites were superior. 
The southern white male's claim to superiority was increasingly 
difficult to uphold on any rational grounds. That is, it was difficult to 
support on the grounds of commonly recognized truth or in reasoning 
based on that truth. The claim had to be sustained on the basis of 
socially constructed values, where this superiority was inherent to an 
understanding of social goods and the good life. To put this 
conclusion another way, these goods and this life could only be 
sustained with an understanding of the virtue of truthfulness that was 
shaped by, and we would say distorted by, the values it had to defend. 
The criteria of truth were subjugated to a way of life and its peculiar 
institution. A whole society can engage in a collective lie and the 
antebellum southern United States is a clear example. The South was 
uniformly Christianized as a culture, though only one-fifth to one- 
third of the population attended church regularly. (Wyatt-Brown 1982, 
p. 28) Despite the theological affirmation that all men were created in 
God's image; despite living under the philosophical affirmation that 
all men were created equal and endowed with the unalienable right of 
liberty; despite the experience of shared living over several 
generations, the dominant culture upheld the lie that for the common 
good, persons of one ethnicity could own persons of another. 
How so? What were the manifestations of this subjugation of the 
truth? What does honesty look like in such a context? The scope of 
this treatment will only allow the consideration a few examples: legal 
structures, master-slave communication, and the slaves' 
communication with outside observers. 
118 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
Truthfulness is of first importance in questions of law and justice. 
Social relationships cannot be maintained without truth-telling. The 
relationship of citizens of the commonwealth to one another must 
meet a minimal standard of truthfulness in order to maintain a 
minimal level of civil peace and order. To enforce a minimal level of 
justice, civil governments require a high level of truthfulness from 
public witnesses in legal disputes. For this reason, penalties for 
perjury can be greater than the penalties for the crimes being tried and 
for which a potential perjurer is a witness. 
In the South, slaves were never allowed to give testimony in court 
cases involving whites, unless their testimony confirmed that of white 
witnesses. There are of course two ways to interpret this cultural 
codification. Was it the case that slaves could not be trusted to tell the 
truth? Or was it the case that slaves could not be allowed to speak the 
truth? In reality, both conclusions are correct. 
In a system constructed so as to deprive them of the most basic human 
goods in order to procure goods for their masters, slaves had little 
interest in any virtue that protected that system, including the virtue of 
truthfulness. Slaves were indeed quite frequently liars, as well as 
thieves and cheats. 28 
Lying was not limited to the courtroom. As the runaway Henry Bibb 
stated it, "The only weapon of self defense I could use successfully, 
was that of deception. It is useless for a poor slave to resist the white 
man in a slaveholding State. Public opinion and the law is against 
him; and resistance in many cases is death to the slave, while the law 
28 They often stole food to satisfy the nutritional needs lacking in slave diet. Osofsky notes a parallel instance. During World War II, 
Japanese Americans had the lowest crime rate of any ethnic group in America. But after they were moved en masse to relocation camps, 
they stole with no compunction, and more so the longer they were interred. (Osofsky 1969, pp 24-27) It was common for slaves to break tools as a means of protest, for particular grievances or at a 
matter of response to their unjust circumstances in general. Remarkably, slaves often expressed regrets over dishonesty in their 
subsequent accounts of these events. 
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declares, that he shall submit or die. " (Bibb 1849, p. 17, cited in 
Osofsky 1969, pp. 26f)29 
Conversely, slave-holders often refused to give the lie to patently false 
statements against slaves by the worst of white men. "Patrollers" were 
white thugs working for bounty. Slave masters hired them to retrieve 
runaway slaves or otherwise enforce the slave codes. The runaway 
slave Lewis Clarke mentions that patrollers were capable of ripping up 
a slave's written pass and then accusing him of circulating without 
one. If contradicted, they swore he lied. Yet the masters would not 
take the slave's side, because it would not do to have slaves think they 
could contradict a patroller. (Blassingame 1977, p. 157) 
Kenneth Greenberg has analyzed the paradox of a culture both fiercely 
republican and also slaveholding. Although he may overstate the case, 
it is true that many of the pro-slavery arguments were actually framed 
as anti-slavery arguments. The culture of the South engaged in 
collective self-deception. In the period leading up to the Civil War, the 
apologists of slavery contended that the Southern slave culture was 
vastly superior to that of the northern states and Europe. In contrast to 
the wage-slavery, the real slavery, of modern industrial Europe and 
the North, it was argued, the agricultural South retained a culture that 
benefited all and reveled in a common understanding of the good life 
in a traditional honor society. (Greenberg 1985) 
Maintaining the fiction of the common good required the participation 
of the slaves. Slaves had to appear unaffected in their willingness to 
give honor to all whites. Mere submission through coercion was not 
adequate. If they only feigned respect, honor suffered. Wyatt-Brown 
notes that the slave codes had heavy penalties for failure in deference, 
yet also limited excessive force in achieving compliance, at least 
29 Christianity was often a weapon of oppression in the antebellum 
South. Nevertheless, the exception of the honest slave recorded in 
slave history and testimony nearly always had some root in an 
understanding of the spiritual goods of Christianity that transcended 
the antebellum social order. 
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officially. (Wyatt-Brown 1982, p. 363) After all, the codes were 
supposedly enforcing an inherent superiority. 
The nature of the slave culture was such that slaves could not openly 
give an accurate account of their true condition or of their own attitude 
toward it. In reality, their share of social goods was of course 
inhumanely inferior to that of the master culture in every respect. Yet 
to decry this openly, in a system entirely skewed in favor of whites, 
and maintained ultimately by coercion alone, was to threaten even that 
small share of goods. Lewis Clarke explains how misguided outsiders 
mistakenly gave a positive report on the lives of those privileged 
slaves working as household servants. In fact these were "most to be 
pitied of all" because they had to please their masters in everything. 
This entailed constant disingenuousness. "The brighter [in skin color] 
a slave is, the more he has to lie; for the more the master is jealous of 
what's working in his mind, and the harder he has to try to hide it. " 
(Blassingame 1977, p. 154) As a result, the most frank descriptions 
and evaluations of slaveholding society by former slaves come to us 
from testimony given safely beyond the Canadian border. 
(Blassingame 1977, p. lx) 
The effects of this pervasive dishonesty did not immediately stop after 
the Emancipation Proclamation, of course. Because former slaves 
were dependent on whites for pensions and other needs, and because 
white interviewers were often grandsons of slaveholders, blacks were 
often guarded in their testimony about their condition as slaves. 
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Lots of old slaves closes the door before they tell the 
truth about their days of slavery. When the door is 
open, they tell how kind their masters was and how 
rosy it all was. You can't blame them for this, because 
they had plenty of early discipline, making them 
cautious about saying anything uncomplimentary about 
their masters. I, myself, was in a little different position 
than most slaves and, as a consequence, have no 
grudges or resentment. However, I can tell you the life 
of the average slave was not rosy. They were dealt out 
plenty of cruel suffering. (Rewick (ed. ), The American 
Slave, IV, Pt. 2, p. 189, cited in Blassingame 1977, p. 
xlv) 
The following is excerpted from a speech given by Lewis Clarke, a 
runaway slave, in Brooklyn, New York, and recorded by an auditor 
there. He begins by downplaying the physical mistreatment of slave in 
order to speak of their moral degradation, and particularly the damage 
to truth-telling. It is an articulate and powerful summary of my 
comments thus far. 
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But what I want to make you understand is, that A 
SLAVE CAN'T BE A MAN! Slavery makes a brute of 
man; I don't mean that he is a brute, neither. But a 
horse can't speak; and he [the slave] daren't. He 
daren't tell what's in him; it wouldn't do. The worse 
he's treated, the more he must smile; the more he's 
kicked the lower he must crawl. For you see the master 
knows when he's treated his slave too bad for human 
nature; and he suspects the slave will resent; and he 
watches him the closer, and so the slave has to be more 
deceitful. Folks from hereabouts go down to Kentucky, 
and they send you word that the slaves say they don't 
want their freedom. -Well, I suppose they do. I daren't 
swear I han't done that thing myself. I had the privilege 
of letting myself out, and sending my master twelve 
dollars a month. -This was a sort of taste of freedom; 
for I went round about, and made my own little 
contracts, and so on. -Now, if some Yankee had come 
along and said, `Do you want to be free? ' what do you 
supposed I'd have told him? Now what do you suppose 
I'd tell him? Why, I'd tell him, to be sure, that I didn't 
want to be free; that I was very well off as I was. If I 
didn't, its precious few contracts I should be allowed to 
make, I'm thinking. And if a woman slave had a 
husband and children, and somebody asked her if she 
would like her freedom? Would she tell `em, yes? If 
she did, she'd be down the river to Louisiana, in no 
time; and her husband and children never know their 
minds about freedom; for they know what'll come of it, 
if they do. I said a slave was like a brute; and so he is, 
in many things; but he ain't altogether that much like a 
brute, neither. The fact is, slavery's the father of lies. 
The slave knows he ought to have his freedom; and his 
master knows it, jest as well as he does; but they both 
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say they don't; and they tell me some folks this way 
believe `em. The master says the slave don't want his 
freedom, and the slave says he don't want it; but they 
both of `em lie, and know it. There never was anything 
beat slavery for lying; and of all folks in the world, 
there's nobody deceived quite so bad, as the masters 
down South; for the slaves deceive them, and they 
deceive themselves. Some have thought their slaves 
were so much attached to them, that nobody could coax 
them away; and them very slaves now reside in 
Canada. Others think the slaves are too brutified to 
think or care anything about freedom; and them's the 
worst deceived of any. The masters say the slaves are a 
lying and thieving set; and so they are; for slavery 
makes a man lie and steal. It won't let him be honest, if 
he would. (Blassingame 1977, pp. 152f., emphasis in 
original) 
Why did this happen? What was it that made such society-wide 
mendacity necessary? What were this lying and dishonesty protecting? 
Having illustrated that lying was required in the slaveholding South, I 
need to reiterate my intention in using the example. The most 
important feature for this discussion is not the institution of slave- 
holding as such, but the system of ascribed honor and honorific goods 
inherent to slavery. Whites had a good life, at many levels. Many 
honorific goods inherent to that life depended on slavery. But if we 
stepped back from the question of slavery, we could see the same 
dynamic between honor and truth-telling in other dimensions of any 
society that values honor above the goods of truthfulness. Truth and 
truthfulness are necessarily sacrificed to the goods of honor. (See 
Bowman 2002b. ) 
The virtues just are those dispositions that enable the good life. 
Truthfulness can be understood with reference merely to a human 
power, such as the power to convey meaning in complete thoughts, or 
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to the power to overcome fear and to sacrifice something of self in the 
pursuit of an end. This is how Maclntyre sometimes seems to describe 
virtues, as freestanding dispositions. Yet he also has defined virtues in 
terms of the goods of the good life, and it is this understanding that I 
have emphasized. It is time now to make explicit and to explain this 
difference. Tracing the concept to Anselm, I want to begin to show 
that for any contingent entity, there is a difference between natural 
goodness and truth, on the one hand, and contingent or accidental 
goodness and truth according to the uses of the thing, on the other. 
The difference is, I think, central to morality. In the examples above, 
the difference is used for evil, to subordinate superior goods 
(knowledge of what is the case, human dignity) to inferior goods 
(personal advantage, unmerited honor). Understanding the distinction 
will, however, eventuate in new insights into how morality is and how 
it is not grounded in nature. Anselm's theory of natural and contingent 
goodness can explain why the perfection of our natural dispositions 
alone is not an adequate guide to morality. 
Anselm and the debt of rightness to truth30 
The point of commonality between telling the truth and "doing" the 
truth in Anselm's De Veritate is the rightness demanded of us in 
signifying, by word or act, both what is and what ought to be. 
Anselm's insight into the distinction between the two ways in which a 
sentence can be true has application to acts and dispositions beyond 
speech-acts. 
Anselm notes that there are two senses in which a statement is true. 
The first is the most common sense, that the statement fulfills a 
debitum toward the thing signified. In this sense truth is just rightness 
(rectitudo) in signifying some aspect of what is the case beyond itself. 
30 I am largely dependent here on T. F. Torrance's interpretation of De Veritate. (Torrance 1968) 
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The other sense in which a statement can be true, Anselm says, is if it 
fulfills its function syntactically, if it says what is intended without 
self-contradiction. This is not the usual sense of the term, Anselm 
recognizes, but it too conveys a sense of rightness. It is "true" with 
respect to its function as a sentence, in that it is not lacking anything 
with respect to syntax, diction, etc. In this sense, a true sentence (one 
fulfilling the function of a sentence) could be a lie (one not fulfilling 
its function of signification). 
Of these two senses in which a sentence does what it ought and has 
rightness, one is "accidental" and contingent (the use to which it is 
put), one is "natural" and necessary (that it is a meaningful sentence). 
(In Torrance 1968, p. 309f) This distinction will be developed later by 
Scotus to show how "nature, " including human nature, is separable 
from its contingent ends. Using this distinction with reference to non- 
rational beings can show why their flourishing is not determinate in 
their relationship to rational beings. Using this distinction with 
reference to rational beings, coupled with another distinction in the 
will, can show why the pursuit of human flourishing alone is not 
determinative of morality. In chapters 7 and 9I will use this 
distinction to argue against eudaimonism. For now, I simply want to 
reaffirm the dependence of the virtues on the ends they serve. 
An action, as well as a sentence, can represent the truth, and this 
relationship has relevance for ethics. Actions are more considered than 
words. Not to do what one ought is to tell a lie by one's actions. We 
can speak, obversely, of doing the truth. To do what one ought is to 
tell the truth through actions. (Recall VAclev Havel's expression 
"living in the truth" and Jesus' reference to "the one who does the 
truth" (ö SE TroLcv Tily aln'OELav). (John 3.21)) Doing the truth 
follows the same structure as speaking the truth. According to 
Anselm, the truth of an action, so to speak, is also twofold. An action 
can be said to be true when it is complete. In this sense a painting half- 
finished is not a true painting. 
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As in speech, there is also a second sense in which actions are true: if 
they are true to what is the case. The truth of an action is its rightness. 
For Anselm, "doing the truth" is equivalent to "doing good. " To do 
what one ought is to do good and to do rightness. To do the truth is to 
do good, and to do good is to do rightness. (In Torrance 1968, pp. 
314f. ) 
To illustrate Torrance's observations on Anselm, consider the realm of 
art. When an artist represents something in his art-say an idea or a 
feeling-he communicates something. An author/artist is usually an 
authority concerning what is represented in his art. Yet we usually do 
not say that the author/artist is the ultimate authority, even of his own 
art, for two reasons. The artist/author may truthfully but 
unintentionally represent that which he represents in ways of which he 
is not aware, or at least not conceptually cognizant. ("Yes, I see what 
you mean. Those two characters in my play do mirror the relationship 
that the protagonist has with her mother. ") Or, secondly, he may 
inaccurately represent what is the case. (Consider the technical 
virtuosity in some propaganda. ) Even if his intention is adequately 
realized, his signification is false. 
But in the case of false representation, isn't he at least the final 
authority on his art, on the artifice he has crafted? Cannot he alone 
specify what is signified? I say no. Strictly speaking, a false 
signification, just to the extent that it is false, does not attest to 
anything. Anything to which the art/artist accurately attests is 
something that exists. However partially, it is only to that which is the 
case that he can accurately attest. The truth or falsity of the art is more 
evident over the course of a life's work than in any one piece, of 
course. And too much attempted deception effectively precludes 
communication of anything at all, since lying and falsehood are 
dependent and parasitical on the truth for their deceptive effect. 
Massive error renders communication impossible. (Davidson 1984, 
pp. 168ff. ) Yet what is the case determines, or "causes", the shape of 
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true representation, even if we recognize that artifice always 
represents it from some perspective. 31 
The actions of an architect, an engineer, an athlete, or a business 
executive all have the same bipartite structure. By extension, a 
person's life, or the life of an entire communal tradition, can represent 
and misrepresent what is actually the case, as in the case of the 
antebellum South, noted earlier. In each case there is an object (a 
"what") and an end (a "why"). Actions and dispositions are right not 
primarily by being naturally complete or actualized on their own 
terms, but by being realized for the right reason, in view of the proper 
end. "If there were only natural truth in which a thing is what it 
already is by sheer necessity, " Torrance comments, "then there would 
be no freedom or room for moral obligation. " But truth is accidental 
and things can be in the right with truth only if they do what they 
ought. In the actions of rational beings, this difference will create 
room for morality. (1968, p. 314) 
The relationship of an assertion to what it signifies is the same as the 
relationship of an efficient cause to its effect. "[T]he truth of 
signification follows as the effect of a rightness in the thing 
signified-this is what Anselm calls the truth of the essence or 
existence of things. " (Torrance 1968, p. 310) Truth in signification is 
dependent, note, on the truth or rightness of that to which it refers. 
("[J]ust as the truth of signification fulfils a debitum exacted from it 
by a rightness in the thing signified and can thus be spoken of as its 
`effect' (190.8ff in Torrance 1968, p. 310), so the truth or rightness of 
being in the things signified arises out of the fact that they are what 
they ought to be in relation to the Supreme Truth and is thus to be 
regarded as the `effect' caused by the Supreme Truth in the nature of 
created things. " (177.18; 190,6ff. in Torrance 1968, p. 311) The 
ultimate truth (God) is the "cause" (in the sense alluded to in final 
31 The realism I am asserting here is not stylistic realism, over against 
other stylistic approaches, but at least a weak philosophical realism 
that can ascribe error to representational artifice. 
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causation, not as efficient causation) therefore of the "effect! 'of 
created things. ) Just as a true sentence must give a right account of 
what is the case, Anselm says, what is the case in turn has a similar 
relationship, a similar debt, to what a thing ought to be. Things are 
true only if they participate in truth, a truth conceptually independent 
of these things. The universal obligation for things to be true derives 
from this ultimate sense of truth. 
The same structure holds for dispositions and acts. An act could be 
said to be courageous in the natural sense if it entails consciously 
risking something of oneself in the pursuit of some good, as in the 
case of our courageous Nazi. All the elements of the virtue of courage 
are present and correctly configured. All, that is, except the good(s) 
pursued. The Nazi's will is not rightly aligned to the right ranking of 
goods. The debt to the truth is fulfilled in rightness: of a sentence to 
what it signifies, of an act to what it signifies, of thought to what is the 
case, and of the rightness of the will to what ought to be the case. 
Morality is of the will, and actions of the will also follow this bipartite 
structure. A will that is true in the natural or necessary sense is a will 
that acts as any functioning will acts, whether good or evil. But a true 
will is also, secondly and accidentally/contingently, a will that wills as 
it ought, that wills what is right, and why, for the sake of a rightness 
that transcends the will. This is all clearly headed toward the 
grounding of everything in God as transcendent source and ground of 
truth. And clearly the rectitude of a human's intention in an action for 
Anselm depends on divine intention. 
Could God without contradiction will against the perfection of a being 
by thwarting its natural dispositions? Surely the mendacity inherent in 
slavery and other abuses of the antebellum honor society show that the 
two must go together, do they not? Isn't deception wrong by nature? I 
say that it is nearly always wrong, but only contingently, and because 
of the contingent ends served by truthfulness. Consider briefly a 
counter-example foreshadowing my argument. A fly fisher crafts an 
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artificial fly and deceives a trout with it. The fisher is exploiting the 
natural dispositions of the trout for his own purposes. He is at least 
partly frustrating the natural good of the trout, whether he releases the 
fish safely or consumes it. Whether we judge this action wrong or not 
will depend on our judgment about what the ends of life are. 32 
Before setting out this case more fully in the following chapters, I 
have unfinished business. I have to consider the consequences of 
Maclntyre's refusal to establish the parameters of a telos in the second 
and third stages of his explication, the narrative unity of a life and a 
communal tradition. And before I do that I want to summarize my 
answer to the questions first asked in chapter 2. Are genuine virtues 
necessary to sustain practices? Can the goods internal to practices be 
achieved without genuine virtues? The answers are complex. They can 
be broken down as follows. 
Can a practice produce goods internal to practices-the products of 
practices and the life-of-a-practitioner-without genuine virtues, 
without being a good person? Can the Confucian practice of medicine, 
for example, produce goods internal to practices that can be counted 
as goods by a Muslim society? Yes, in many instances. Genuine 
virtues are not required to produce many goods of practices that can 
be empirically counted as goods by the host society. Thus, even in the 
modern context of coexisting, rival conceptions of the good, many 
goods internal to practices can be shared. 
Does one practice of medicine produce goods internal to practices for 
the right reasons according to a rival practice of medicine? No. The 
reasons why these goods are counted as goods to Muslims, for 
example, will be different from the reasons why they are counted as 
goods in a liberal society. 
32 It was because of the inherent deception involved that some early 
Christians apparently made a moral distinction between fishing with 
baited hooks and fishing with nets. 
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Even to the extent that liberal doctors produce goods internal to 
practices, they do not do so for the right reasons, for the purpose of 
contributing to the achievement of the good life on the Muslim 
conception. Moreover, there will inevitably be conflicting rankings of 
goods on rival practices of medicine. Are good liberal doctors good 
Muslim doctors? No, not without qualifiers. 
Genuine Muslim (or whatever) virtues are necessary to sustain the 
Muslim practice of medicine. They are necessary to produce the goods 
internal to that practice for the reasons that they are considered goods. 
MacIntyre distinguishes internal from external goods in that they can 
be shared by the whole community of a practice, and benefit all who 
participate. His account of practices does not distinguish these 
relationships from contractual arrangements of mutual benefit. 
Internal goods are open to any person prepared to conform to the 
practice's demands. Cooperation, defined just with respect to the 
goods of practices, is conditional and contractual. This is, in part, why 
practices, narrowly considered, can be sustained by simulacra of 
virtues according to a given tradition. 33 
Social cooperation requiring a shared conception of the good, 
however, will require virtues defined with respect to that conception. 
On a teleologically integrated view of practices, it is not just that 
internal goods require relationships with minimal standards of justice, 
honesty, courage, and other virtues. Particular sets of relationships are 
goods that transcend the goods internal to practices. A sense of 
significance, belonging, friendship, order, propriety, community, and 
honor are wrapped up in relationships to such an extent that those 
particular relationships are ends in themselves rather than just the 
context for realizing internal goods distinct from those relationships. 
Goods are objective, in at least the Augustinian sense that evil can 
33 This then points to the prospects for cooperation and conflict in the 
modem, plural context. These prospects, I think, amount to a modus 
vivendi approach to our common life together. So be it. Things 
could be a lot worse. 
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only coherently be understood as a diminution of good. But this tells 
us nothing about their ranking as goods. That ranking is a function of 
the shared sense of how they contribute to a larger shared conception 
of what life is beyond a particular practice. 
It is for the purpose of explaining this conception beyond practices 
that Maclniyre introduces the second and third stages of his account. I 
do not think that this explanation succeeds. 
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TELOS AND TRANSCENDENCE 
After Virtue is a response to the failure of the Enlightenment project as 
a coherent structure of moral reasoning. Maclntyre has proposed a 
return to the Aristotelian three-part structure-human-nature-as-it- 
happens-to-be, the development of the virtues as the means to human- 
nature-as-it-is-if-it-realizes-its-potential. Forgoing Aristotelian 
metaphysical biology, he induces a neo-Aristotelian teleology in three 
stages, beginning with practices. In the preceding chapters I have 
showed how the goods of practices and the virtues are tied to a 
broader understanding of the human good. Viewed negatively, my 
argument to this point has excluded the possibility of stopping short of 
a comprehensive conception of the good life. Positively, I have shown 
how the virtues are shaped by that conception. In this chapter, I 
continue the direction of this argument by considering Maclntyre's 
case for the necessity of the virtues of integrity and constancy for the 
narrative unity of a life. After surveying the second and third stages of 
Maclntyre's argument for the virtues, I argue that this argument does 
not supply an adequate understanding of the human telos transcending 
practices in explaining the narrative unity of a life and the 
maintenance of a tradition. Since Maclntyre contends that the good 
life is never adequately characterized, the human end to which these 
virtues are subordinate is therefore inadequate as a telos. Similarly, his 
argument concerning a communal tradition inadequately answers the 
ultimate questions required to unite and sustain such a tradition. I 
argue that such unity would require much more clarity in our 
understanding of the human telos than Maclntyre supplies. Without 
such an understanding, integrity is not possible. 
More importantly, I argue that the three-part schematic of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics presupposes a frame of reference transcending and giving 
context to the end(s) of human life. In all the historical accounts 
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MacIntyre describes as using this scheme, that frame of reference is in 
turn explained in terms of a larger teleological frame of reference, and 
so on, terminating in a transcendent and self-referential frame of 
reference. Without such a transcendent frame of reference, 
Nietzscheanism is not just the other choice to neo-Aristotelianism 
before us, but wins the confrontation by forfeit. For Nietzsche's 
"virtues, " too, derive from his conception of the ends of life, which is 
in turn derived from his premises about such a transcendent frame of 
reference. Without God, human ends are the construct of a superior 
human will. 
The narrative unity of a life and a communal tradition 
In chapter 4I showed that the ends of practices are given from outside 
practices. This is important because Maclntyre's argument and 
insights about practices might lead us to believe that they are 
somehow self-contained, self-defined, or self-directed. I showed that 
practices always take their ends and meaning from a larger 
understanding of life as a whole. Indeed the goods internal to practices 
are high-ranking goods because of the ways in which they contribute 
to the good life. Particularly the good of the "life-of-a-practitioner" 
can only be adequately understood as a role within a larger view of 
society and of life as a whole. 
Whereas most versions of Aristotelian ethics begin with an 
understanding of the good life, and deduce other goods from that 
understanding, MacIntyre has made practices the most basic stage of 
his teleology. The later stages build on the earlier, such that "each 
later stage presupposes the earlier, but not vice versa. " (187) This sets 
the three stages in an unusual relationship to each other. Most 
teleological understandings of human flourishing would order the 
goods of something like practices at a lower rank than the goods of a 
tradition, which would in turn be lower than the narrative unity 
pointing to the good life individually and collectively. And the first 
two stages, practices and the narrative unity of lives, would be 
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deduced from a communal tradition, which in turn would have the 
same relationship to the good. 34 Aristotle's premises concerning the 
good of the contemplative life and its relationship to the life of the 
polis decisively shape his view of lesser goods and lesser lives. My 
argument to this point has followed this pattern. I have shown how the 
goods of practices and the lives of practitioners are shaped by various 
conceptions of the good. 35 
It is possible that Maclntyre's structure of the three stages reflects the 
inductive apprenticeship of the young subject into the life of the 
virtues, rather than the structure of developed theory. This fits well 
with many of his examples and with some interpretations of the 
arrangement of argumentation in Aristotle and Aquinas. But the 
success of such an approach for both Aristotle and Aquinas depends 
on their belief in logically-deducible final causes. These final causes 
are logically deducible because they are necessary, in keeping with the 
presuppositions of metaphysical biology. We can deduce the 
actualization of human nature, just as we can deduce the actualization 
of other natures, because that nature could not be otherwise in a fully 
rational kosmos. So the inductive path taken by the apprentice, and the 
deductive path taken by the wise necessarily converge. Conventional 
Aristotelian structures place ultimate importance on ultimate or 
transcendent premises. Maclntyre's ordering of the three stages in the 
neo-Aristotelian structure of After Virtue avoids such metaphysical 
questions. But it does so at the cost of a completed teleology. I wish to 
foreclose the possibility of recourse to anything narrower in scope 
than a particular and exclusive comprehensive conception of the good 
for an adequate account of morality. 
34 Maclntyre says that he does not take this approach because he wants 
to leave the good open to modification upon further discovery. I say, 
and I think that he later confirms (1990), that we have to work from 
our best account at any given point, though of course it is open to 
modification. 
35 In a more developed argument I would argue for a radically "flatter" 
default hierarchy under God than that of the Aristotelian chain-of- 
being (see Kuyper 1932, pg. 164ff; Skillen 1991, pp. 229ff. ), but the 
basic relationship of rank is the same. 
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As Maclntyre moves from practices to the second and third stages, he 
notes that the virtue of integrity operates within a larger frame of 
reference. It requires objectifying one's own life and applying to it 
criteria that transcend practices. Maclntyre's purpose in the second 
stage of his argument is to demonstrate how the narrative unity of a 
life requires the virtues of integrity and constancy. Both the culture of 
modernization and philosophical practice tend to make us see life as 
an unrelated series of episodes. The attempt to do ethics only by 
considering isolated acts is futile. We must know beliefs and 
intentions if we are to say what a person is doing in a particular 
setting. No separation is possible between the meaning of overt acts or 
behavior, on one hand, and intentions, motivations, beliefs, and so 
forth, on the other. Narrative is essential for characterizing human 
action, because actions are only intelligible in light of a larger story. 
Maclntyre's central thesis in this stage of his argument is that "man is 
in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a 
story-telling animal. " The narrative character of life is determinative 
for ethics, since we can only answer the question "What am Ito do? " 
if we know: "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part? " 
"Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things. " (216) The 
unity of a single life consists in the narrative of that life. 
Contrary to modem or postmodern fictions of the self, the stories of 
lives in actual social settings are not primarily of our own making. We 
are not the sole authors, but have been drafted into roles. A person 
may be the hero of the play, but is constrained to play within the 
parameters set by other characters and circumstances, and will be held 
accountable by them for his role. 
Anticipating my conclusion, it is at this point in his argument that 
MacIntyre's naturalistic sociology begins to falter as a teleological 
basis for morality. My reasons for this conclusion stem from a simple 
observation about the three-part scheme MacIntyre rightly holds as 
necessary for successful ethics: "man-as-he-happens-to-be, " "man-as- 
he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature, " and the rules of 
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morality as the link between the two. The scheme includes the three 
parts and the frame of reference in which we consider the three parts. 
A good bolt is one that fastens the oil pan securely to the engine. A 
good engine is one that smoothly drives a car. A good car is one... and 
so forth. At each step the telos of an object is given to the part by the 
whole, which takes its end from a yet more comprehensive whole. The 
project before us is one of deriving morality from an ever-widening 
understanding of what a good man is. But Maclntyre will not take a 
position that such an end actually exists. Before arriving there, I must 
note briefly the third stage of his account. 
Because none of us pursues the good in isolation, Maclntyre says, a 
third stage in his account of the virtues is required. In addition to 
practices and the narrative unity of a life, the virtues are required for 
the maintenance of a tradition. The good life varies by circumstances, 
and even within a common understanding of the good life our roles 
differ by familial ties, social station, history, experience, and 
attributes. It is from these that we take our social identity. Moreover, 
there is a given-ness to this identity. Contrary to the liberal 
individualistic understanding of the person, who we are is not an open 
question. Even though we grow and change and move beyond our 
point of origin, our past goes with us, partially defining the person we 
are, shaping even the ostensibly free decisions we make. We are not 
wholly determined by our beginnings, but we are each bearers of a 
tradition. 
This tradition is neither static nor free of conflict. "A living 
tradition... is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, 
and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute 
that tradition. " (222) It is through a tradition or traditions that goods 
are sought over time. Traditions provide the context for pursuing the 
goods internal to practices and for the pursuit of the good of an 
individual life. 
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Traditions are strengthened or weakened in large part due to the 
exercise or the atrophy of the virtues. Among the required virtues are 
those already mentioned-honesty, justice, courage, as well as the 
intellectual virtues. Additionally, a sense of tradition itself is a 
necessary virtue, Macintyre says. This last is partly defined by the 
ability to appropriate to the present the stock of maxims developed 
over time within the tradition. 
The frame of reference transcending the three-part structure 
In developing the teleological nature of his second stage, the unity of a 
human life, MacIntyre introduces an analogy, the narrative quest. The 
medieval conception of the quest has two characteristics. First, a quest 
requires some notion of the good: "without some at least partly 
determinate conception of the final telos there could not be any 
beginning to a quest. Some conception of the good for man is 
required. " We must have some notion of the end of human existence. 
At this point MacIntyre shifts focus. He does not say anything more 
substantive about the final telos, nor does anything we know of the 
good life shape what follows in his argument. Instead he abruptly 
turns his attention to the process of conceptualizing the ultimate end 
of human life and this conceptualization takes the place of the end 
itself. What MacIntyre says here is not that it is our conception of the 
good life, but rather looking for a conception of the good, that enables 
us to order other goods. The origin of the conception of the good is in 
138 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
those questions which led us to attempt to transcend 
that limited conception of the virtues which is available 
in and through practices. It is in looking for a 
conception of the good which will enable us to order 
other goods, for a conception of the good which will 
enable us to extend our understanding of the purpose 
and content of the virtues, for a conception of the good 
which will enable us to understand the place of 
integrity and constancy in life, that we initially define 
the kind of life which is a quest for the good. (219) 
(Emphasis in original) 
Thus it is not the good, but rather the search for an adequate 
conception of the good, that orders all subordinate goods. And it is this 
search for the conception, not the realization, of the good that requires 
the virtues. This shift of focus from the ultimate good to the process of 
its conceptualization continues in the second point of his analogy. 
Another similarity between the unity of a life and the medieval quest, 
he says, is the indeterminacy of both: "It is clear the medieval 
conception of a quest is not at all that of a search for something 
already adequately characterized, as miners search for gold or 
geologists for oil. " (219) 
Now the word on which this analogy hinges is "adequately. " If his 
claim here were that no one completes the task of defining the ultimate 
end of his or her life, then the point made would be uncontroversial. 
We rarely know what comes next in life, to say nothing of what the 
rest of life holds. In any philosophy or religion or ideology there is 
always more to be learned, not least because as historical 
circumstances change, so too do the implications of our commitments. 
But this observation is hardly significant enough to warrant mention. 
Rather, in a thought closely tied to the first point of analogy, 
Maclntyre seems to be claiming that the definition of the telos 
becomes the end of human existence. It is what we do not know, and 
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the striving to know the unknown, that gives purpose to human 
existence. He then offers this conclusion: 
We have then arrived at a provisional conclusion about 
the good life for man: the good life for man is the life 
spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the 
virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will 
enable us to understand what more and what else the 
good life for man is. (219) 
We might take Maclntyre to mean here that the search really is the 
telos of life. The implication could be that the intellectual seeker 
knows that there is not an adequate understanding of the good life to 
be found. The seeker is committed to seeking, not finding. The good 
life on this view is the life of studying and cataloguing various 
understandings of the good life and the virtues they entail, while 
carefully avoiding any final conclusions. The "provisional" status of 
the conclusion is left indefinite. 
But this interpretation is highly problematic for his argument as a 
whole. The perceptive and sweeping adage quoted above is applicable 
to many a phase in life's journey. It is not an acceptable reference to 
the good life as a whole, I say, partly because it evokes the liberalism 
he so strongly criticizes. In the emphasis on seeking rather than the 
end sought, it recalls the liberal priority of procedure over exclusive 
ends. His argument does not place any such bounds on the good life. It 
implies, unintentionally perhaps, that the conclusions concerning the 
good life can be served by any tradition. If there are legitimate 
aspirations in human existence not tied to a determinate end, they do 
not fit well with the picture Maclntyre has previously drawn of a 
rational scheme of morality. To the extent that our conception of 
human-nature-as-it-can-be-if-it-reaches-its-potential is insufficiently 
specified, just to that extent his argument recalls that of the failed 
Enlightenment project. Maclntyre has shown us, and I have 
reconfirmed, that the virtues are ends in themselves, yet not, as the 
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Stoics believed, their own reward. Virtues are subordinate to ends, and 
are so linked that neither the means nor the ends can be adequately 
defined independently of the other. As he correctly says earlier, "any 
adequate teleological account must provide us with some clear and 
defensible account of the telos. " (163) To have a degree of specificity 
about the good life is to have a basis for rules of morality. Lack of 
resolution about the ultimate end of one's life is the lack of the third 
element of the Aristotelian scheme, the element missing in modem 
philosophy, and the purported object of MacIntyre's positive 
argument. Consequently, the argument seems to fall short of his aim 
to replace the Enlightenment project with a neo-Aristotelian one. Even 
as a provisional conclusion to a very long argument for a teleological 
basis for rational morality, this is frustratingly abstruse and 
noncommittal. Whatever his meaning, the argument falls short of its 
stated aim. 
On its face, the affirmation that "the good life for man is the life spent 
in seeking for the good life for man" is nonsensical. The good life 
cannot literally be the search for the good life. To seek for something 
implies that one does not have it, or that one does not have it fully. So 
the analogy of the quest is not properly applied here, it seems to me. A 
quest is never for what one already has, or has partially, but for what 
one lacks, or does not yet have fully. The quest is always undertaken 
on the basis of what is known or believed about the object of the 
quest, not of what we do not know or doubt about the object. These 
are among its essential characteristics. To be sure, much of the good 
life is experienced in the course of pursuing the good life. And the 
object of the medieval quest was mysterious and distant. While the 
fullest understanding of the object of a quest is not known, however, 
there are some basic criteria specifying what it means to fail or to 
succeed. Either the grail is found or it is not. 
The analogy is not only misapplied, it is incorrect in one important 
respect. The quest can stand for the good life just to the extent that the 
medieval quest itself is understood from a larger view of the good life 
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within which it figures. The medieval quest was one vocation believed 
to be incumbent on a person or people with a robust understanding of 
the good life. Specifically, it was a mission in service of God and 
king, God and church, God and country, or other similar 
combinations. It was an understanding uniquely isolated from rival 
understandings, not universalizable. And it is this framework, or even 
the claim that something like this framework exists, that Maclntyre 
has failed to posit. In view of its costs and without a point of reference 
external to the life of the person on the quest, the quest is vainly 
absurd and quixotically self-destructive. If "the grail" is a canard, or 
if the Weltanschauung in which it is located is false, then Monty 
Python provides us a better interpretation of the meaning of the quest 
than does Robert de Boron. 
The narrative unity of a human life requires adequate particularity 
concerning the human telos. Without an adequate understanding of the 
human telos, integrity has no grounding as a virtue. To show better 
why this is the case, we should look at the meaning of integrity. 
In popular usage integrity often means just "morality" generally, or 
"honesty" or "sincerity" or "uprightness. " These are the qualities we 
generally associate with a "person of integrity. " Somewhat less 
frequently it can mean "soundness, " referring to an "unimpaired" or 
"uncorrupted" condition. But as MacIntyre seems to use it, integrity 
primarily means "wholeness" or "completeness, " an "undivided" 
condition. (Oxford English Dictionary) A person with integrity is 
honest, sincere, morally upright, and uncorrupted. But he or she also 
displays these characteristics consistently. There is a continuity of 
character across social boundaries. There is also continuity of 
character across time. The Greek root of the word is integer. In 
English this cognate retains some of the original meaning: a whole 
number, a unit and not a fraction. 
Now the unity of a life, its integrity, derives from an orienting purpose 
that transcends the individual practices and roles and episodes of a 
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life. This purpose stands outside those elements. It is both common to 
them and yet independent of them. And it is only in its specificity and 
wholeness, in its own integrity, that the telos unifies a life. It is 
precisely the undivided nature of the human telos that provides the 
criteria for ordering and reconciling the variegated goods of life. 
Again, the virtues-integrity and constancy in the case of the narrative 
unity of a life-are not freestanding. They are subordinate to a given 
end. They are tied to a specific understanding of the end of human life 
and have content only with reference to that given end, an end that is 
unified, even singular, and therefore identified and known with some 
adequacy. To have integrity is to be undivided, ultimately, in one's 
loyalties and commitments, and to be able to order and reconcile life's 
goods in a coherent scheme toward that end. 
To be sure, a distinction must be made here between certainty about 
how one should fulfill the ultimate end of one's life, and adequate 
clarity concerning what that end is. Within the Reformed tradition of 
Christianity, theologians draw a distinction between the believer's 
"primary" calling (or "general" calling) and his or her "secondary" (or 
"particular") calling(s). The first questions of any Reformed catechism 
concerned the human raison d'etre: 
Master. - What is the chief end of human life? 
Scholar. - To know God by whom men were created. 
M. What reason have you for saying so? 
S. Because he created us and placed us in this world to 
be glorified in us. And it is indeed right that our life, of 
which he himself is the beginning, should be devoted to 
his glory. 
M. What is the highest good of man? 
S. The very same thing. (Calvin 1541) 
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In this construct, the human end and greatest good for humankind is 
known by faith and orders all other goods. Yet the complex 
manifestation of this primary calling in practice cannot be reduced. In 
a period of radical social change, the Reformers show how that 
primary and singular calling can and must be realized in the kind of 
multiplicity of roles and practices so central to Maclntyre's case, what 
they came to call the secondary calling(s). This did not leave each one 
to their own devices, but made each accountable to God. 36 
The unknown here is how to reach one's end, not in what the nature of 
that end essentially consists. Maclntyre's brief references to the good 
life do not provide such a coherent set of concepts enabling an 
integrated life. To the contrary, his picture of the good life includes a 
strong form of the tragic protagonist who "cannot do everything that 
he or she ought to do" because "ex hypothesi he or she has no right 
choice to make. " (224) To realize one good or duty is to fail to 
accomplish the other. Moral failure is certain, by definition, regardless 
of the course of action chosen. Examples of such are taken as evidence 
against the possibility of a single, coherent vision of the good life. His 
open-ended conception of the good life does not resolve these 
tragedies. Can they be otherwise incorporated into his account? 
A person facing a tragic dilemma perceives herself as being morally 
required to perform both of two actions that are mutually exclusive. 
Yet Maclntyre denies as a false dilemma J. L. Austin's choice between 
"rival and contingently incompatible goods making incompatible 
claims on us" or "some determinate conception of the good life for 
36 Luther constantly argues that any occupation or station is as 
spiritually elevated as a religious vocation. He points, for example, 
to a crisis in the life of St. Anthony. Wondering about the worth of his desert existence in Egypt and "whose equal he would be in the kingdom of heaven", Anthony's encounter with an Alexandrian 
cobbler re-orients the monk's thinking: "... so St. Anthony comes 
to the cobbler and asks him what he is doing. The cobbler replies: I, 
a poor citizen, ply my handicraft; I daily pray that all might be saved 
and that I, too, poor and unworthy sinner, may gain eternal life 
through Christ. Hearing that, St. Anthony blushed; he was ashamed 
to realize that he had not come as far in his monkery as this 
cobbler. " (Works 47, pp. 599f. as cited in Kallas 1982) 
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man. " These are not the only two alternatives. Instead, the good life 
entails knowing how to choose between better and worse ways to face 
such tragic confrontations. Faced with the unavoidable necessity of 
choosing between goods that are both genuinely good and 
contingently incompatible, to live an integrated life just means making 
tragic choices "heroically or unheroically, generously or 
ungenerously, gracefully or gracelessly, prudently or imprudently. " 
(224) 
Will this suffice as an alternative to the morass of value pluralism on 
the one hand and the constricting rigidity of a single telos on the 
other? No. This proposal does not resolve the problem I have 
underlined. In this context I can only mention one objection to it, by 
way of underlining the need for an overarching and particular 
conception of the good. Moral dilemmas are constructs. 
Dilemmas are interpretations of actual events, or more often, of purely 
hypothetical situations. Their force depends on their being construed 
as dilemmas. Hypothetical circumstances are therefore nearly always 
preferred as examples, over against actual events, because to consider 
real cases is to risk the introduction of any number of actual factors 
that could weaken the force of the dilemma. If the initial description 
of the hypothetical case proves solvable, it can always be modified so 
as to close every exit. 
A callous person, or a person from a different tradition with a clear 
sense that there is a better choice among the possible options, will not 
see it as truly tragic choice as do those for whom the story has been 
constructed. Unless the goods or duties are as balanced for her as they 
have so carefully been calculated to be for others, she will not yet be 
facing a dilemma. If such a person perceives one of the mutually 
exclusive obligations on her as clearly dominant, then she has a basis 
for making a decision, however costly. Only as controlled constructs 
can their offsetting obligations be so carefully balanced as to ensure 
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that it is a prima facie dilemma, rather than a potential example of 
sacrifice and courage. 
Every real-life moral problem has consequences that are open to the 
unforeseeable. In the real world the past is more subject to the agent's 
control, and the future less subject to the agent's control, than they are 
in hypothetical moral constructs. We do not enter actual moral combat 
on a level field of battle, where each moral decision can be weighed in 
absolute terms. Every person enters every moral encounter with the 
residual effects of previous moral failures, her own and those of 
others. Every real-life moral problem has a personal and social 
history. We should not approach any real-life situation with the 
expectation that such consequences can be completely avoided. Under 
the circumstances, we make do. But the situation can be viewed as 
having possibly been otherwise. And we hope for grace. 
To posit the essential and unavoidable tragedy of life "ex hypothesi ", 
as Maclntyre does, is to assume the incoherence and irreconcilability 
of the ends of life. It is to suggest that a unified good life was never a 
possibility, that there is no life that can rationally incorporate its 
various constitutive goods particular to, for example, the limited frame 
of reference of practices. On this view, the good for man finally does 
not necessitate a unified set of virtues defined with reference to that 
good. Instead, it is the virtues that hold together the otherwise- 
incompatible goods that constitute the good life. Maclntyre's 
introduction of received notions of "better" and "worse" responses to 
conflict only begs the prior question of the criteria we use for deciding 
what constitutes better or worse responses. He has not provided any 
such criteria or scheme of interpretation such as pagan cyclicalism or 
the biblical Creation, fall, Redemption, and Restoration. Maclntyre 
had pledged the virtue of integrity as the way to reduce the conflict 
and arbitrariness of a life viewed only from the perspective of 
practices. (2010 He has not made good on that pledge and it is for 
structural reasons in his argument that the debt is outstanding. 
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What MacIntyre calls the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues always 
assumed a transcendent frame of reference as context for the three- 
part scheme of "man-as-he-happens-to-be, " the rules of ethics, leading 
to "man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. " A telos or 
purpose always implied a larger frame of reference. Unless that 
frame 
of reference extends beyond the particularity of our own historical 
circumstances, however, it remains subject to challenge by any other 
cultural construct. The transcendent frame of reference implied in 
teleological accounts has included variously metaphysics, Yahweh, 
Allah, God, Fate and the gods, or spirits. 
Consider Maclntyre's description of the virtues in heroic society, for 
example. An accurate telling, he says, requires an account of the 
context of social structure and vice versa. But it also requires 
reference to powers beyond human control-the passions, the gods, 
and fate. The end of life toward which one is moving inexorably is 
defeat and death. To understand this truth, to recognize it intellectually 
and to order one's life in accordance, is a virtue, specifically a type of 
courage. It is because of the importance of fate that seers and prophets 
occupy an important role in heroic society. Life is represented in epic 
and saga because life is an epic or saga in its structure and direction. 
Maclntyre compares the moral situation of men and women in heroic 
society to a chess game. Just as good and bad moves in chess are 
matters of objective fact, so too the characters in heroic societies have 
no trouble knowing what is right. The game itself, heroic society, is 
rarely a matter of preference. The purpose of life is given and one acts 
accordingly. The moral structure of heroic society, Maclntyre 
therefore argues, is one composed of social roles, requiring certain 
excellences for their fulfillment. Life is seen as fragile and vulnerable, 
moving inexorably toward one's destiny and death. In this context, the 
self is a social creation, not an individual one. (123-129) 
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The characteristics of the transcendent source of the telos varied 
widely of course and the Greek understanding of fate cannot be 
understood in the same terms as the Unmoved Mover, which cannot 
be understood in the same terms as Yahweh. Maclntyre mentions the 
gods and fate and they figure in his explanation, but his emphasis rests 
rather more heavily on the social than the socially transcendent, be it 
divine or metaphysical. Nevertheless, I object, one can scarcely turn a 
page in Homer without seeing a reference to or an encounter between 
some divinity and a principle character. Indeed, the gods themselves 
are social actors and anthropomorphic personages, with a limited 
range of virtues and a narrative of their own intertwined with the 
human story at multiple levels. In contrast with the personal and 
immanent presence of the gods, fate is impersonal, implacable, 
certain, but largely unknown. Those few times when prophets and 
seers revealed one's destiny, this revelation functionally served to 
confirm its inevitability, however permuted might be the details in the 
actual realization of one's fate. 
The virtues therefore reflected this reality. Courage, as noted, means 
embracing this reality without wavering. Why couldn't courage be the 
noble fight to resist such a fate, however futile, in a display of one's 
own merit? The reason is not just that such resistance is socially 
unacceptable, although it is. Such resistance is socially unacceptable 
primarily because it is contrary to the ultimate order of things. To 
resist is to deny the unalterable truths of the kosmos. 
The same is true for every version of ethics in MacIntyre's historical 
treatment. Maclntyre rejects Aristotelian metaphysical biology. The 
basis of the Aristotelian metaphysical biology he correctly rejects is, 
of course, Aristotelian metaphysics. Aristotle's entelechy is closely 
tied to a chain-of-being cosmology terminating in a transcendent 
impersonal deity. A different understanding of the transcendent (and 
one incommensurable with Aristotle) yields a different understanding 
the good life in Judaism. And so also in Christianity, and Islam. 
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In each historical instance, the three-part schematic of ethics 
presupposes a frame of reference transcending and defining the end or 
ends of human social life. In all the accounts Maclntyre describes as 
following this scheme, that frame of reference is in turn explained in 
terms of a larger teleological frame of reference, and so on, to a 
transcendent frame of reference. Note that the ultimate frame of 
reference in each instance is self-referential. For Aristotle the final end 
in a rational universe is thought-thinking-itself. The biblical God has 
God's own glory as highest end. Maclntyre fails to take a position 
concerning whether there is a substitute for the relationship that those 
religious or metaphysical elements have to the moral structure of 
Greek societies. On his account, this final reference is not to any 
transcendent entity, however, but to a social one. As such, it cannot 
take the place of Aristotelian eudaimonism. A unified view of the 
human good implies a purpose transcending human life. To call into 
question the possibility of a unified good is to call into question the 
project of justifying the virtues. It is only a definite understanding of 
the good for man, as Maclntyre has so compellingly argued, that 
anchors the rules of morality. 
Surely, it will be objected, there is another possibility. Rather than 
looking to indemonstrable notions such as God or the Unmoved 
Mover or Nature, why not look simply to human nature alone, 
justifying morality with the tools of science and reason? And now that 
the sacred canopy has been rent asunder, the objection continues, isn't 
this the position of vulnerability and freedom in which we find 
ourselves, after all? Can't we do without transcendent meaning 
altogether? 37 
Whether the attempt is made by ethical naturalists, or by theists 
making their case before ethical naturalists, it is subject to 
37 I can't undertake here an analysis of the presuppositions behind this 
obJ'ection, other than to point out that those presuppositions are as indemonstrable and as susceptible to the same sort of sociological deconstruction as those to which the objection objects. (See Berger 1970; Milbank 1990) 
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Maclntyre's original critique of the Enlightenment. Human nature in 
its uneducated condition does not point us to any particular position 
concerning social cooperation. Unless we smuggle into the argument 
our notions about what human nature ought to be when it realizes its 
potential, then uneducated reason does not point us toward 
conventional notions of moral behavior. Contrary to the 
Enlightenment approach, it is our understanding of the good life that 
adjudicates life's conflicts. 
That understanding might be groundless. Maybe there is no actual 
transcendent point of reference. But the need to take a theological or 
metaphysical stand cannot be avoided simply by waving at Nietzsche 
as a threat. Indeed, not to present or allude to such a framework makes 
the project vulnerable to someone like Nietzsche who is prepared to 
forego internal goods, integrity, and tradition for a life constructed on 
its own terms. Conventional notions of human happiness are not a 
defense against Nietzsche. 
The problem with happiness 
Terms such as the "human good" or "the good for humans" or "our 
true good" or "the common good" are ambiguous. They might refer to 
full human flourishing, the realization of human potential in 
excellences and goods internal to human "practices, " human lives as 
unified narratives, and social traditions, for example. This is the 
meaning I attribute to the theories of Maclntyre and of other Thomists, 
and to eudaimonism generally. But the human good could also refer to 
a good that does not look first to human nature, even collectively, but 
that takes a supra-social perspective that asks about the proper 
relationship of humans to everything else, about their place in the 
cosmos. It views the (comprehensive) good as determinative of what 
humans should consider good and doesn't presume that human 
flourishing is the ultimate good. This second perspective is the 
perspective from which I am arguing. But to avoid confusion, I will 
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refer to this second perspective as the perspective of "the good" rather 
than as "the human good" or terms of the sort. 
Eudaimonia is usually translated as "happiness" or "flourishing. " For 
Aristotle and much of the ancient world, eudaimonia was primarily an 
objective state conforming to objective criteria. To modem ears, 
"happiness" is generally a subjective state. The subject is considered 
the final authority on his or her happiness. This is only generally the 
case because most would question that a perfectly contented drug 
addict, with all the resources necessary to satisfy her addiction, is truly 
happy. For this reason, the subjective understanding is inadequate. 
"Flourishing" carries the required objective status, but can apply to 
non-human life forms-plants and animals. Maclntyre, as noted in my 
first chapter, wants to emphasize this continuity in the development of 
distinctively human goods and excellences. (I will emphasize the 
discontinuity introduced by a Scotist structure of the human will. ) In 
any case, "flourishing" is probably the best translation in English and 
is primarily the one I use in this chapter and the next. Many of the 
scholastics followed Aristotle in emphasizing the perfection of a 
being's nature as its end. As I understand it, Maclntyre's argument 
joins others as a eudaimonistic justification of moral behavior based in 
the social goods of human flourishing. 
Now my question is the following. Why should we consider the 
flourishing of our particular nature to be normative? To question what 
contemporary eudaimonists merely assume to be the case, what makes 
flourishing normative in the metaethical sense? What makes our good 
even partly constitutive of the good? 
For an Aristotelian account to be complete, it must be shown that what 
is good for our well-being is correctly understood in relation to the 
good, that the demands of our good, subjectively understood from a 
narrowly human perspective, are the demands of justice. We have 
seen in my chapters up to this point that Aristotelian practical 
rationality binds only contingently to the subordinate ends that it 
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names in the context of a larger conception of the good. It requires a 
concept of goods as the requirements of justice. I question how these 
demands on us can be objectively understood, from outside or 
"above" the perspective of the human race, from beyond the 
perspective of Homo sapiens. My comments are directed primarily to 
natural lawyers who also have theistic commitments. Nevertheless, the 
question must be answered by non-theists as well: Why human 
flourishing? Is there a basis for viewing human flourishing as good 
that is not merely anthropocentric bias? 
Parasites and predators 
Many natural-law-cum-eudaimonistic theories, including Maclntyre's, 
take as a premise that the common good, a good that is objective from 
the standpoint of any one individual or group, is objectively good 
from a supra-human, or cosmic, perspective. I think that the premise is 
correct, but only contingently, not necessarily, correct. In referring to 
the objectively good from "a supra-human perspective, " I have God in 
mind principally. But to illustrate the problem generally, consider a 
context inhabited by entities other than humans, both real and 
hypothetical, whose flourishing is incompatible with the flourishing of 
humankind-guinea worms and extra-terrestrials. 
The guinea worm is a parasite found in the African and Asian tropics. 
The mature worm can grow to 120 cm (48 inches) in length living in 
the host body's organs. At maturity, it bores close to the skin's surface 
forming a blister that bursts and releases millions of larvae. If the host 
is standing in water, to relieve the discomfort of the blisters for 
example, the larvae are released into the water, and are eaten by water 
fleas. Other humans are infected when they drink unfiltered water 
containing these tiny aquatic crustaceans, and the cycle begins again. 
When the worm emerges at the surface of the skin, human hosts 
typically extract it over a period of days by wrapping it around a stick. 
If the extraction is too rapid and the body of the worm is broken, the 
host usually dies from infection. 
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The flourishing of the guinea worm is incompatible with human 
flourishing. Several international development organizations therefore 
have the eradication/extinction of the species Dracunculus medinensis 
as a stated goal. Is there a justification of this aim from a position that 
transcends the human common good? The issue is the same one raised 
by some environmentalists and some animal rights activists in 
questioning the goodness of human flourishing. Responses from a 
range of traditions might invoke some form of human superiority as 
one element of such a justification. It might be claimed that the 
excellences of human flourishing are superior to those of the guinea 
worm, for example. 
What happens in a scenario where humans do not have a position of 
superiority? The invasion of the earth by hostile non-human aliens is a 
standard of popular science fiction. The narrative point of view is 
always human, understandably, and the humans inevitably triumph, 
demonstrating their superiority, in martial matters at least. Consider, 
however, the possibility of an alien invasion by a species superior to 
Homo sapiens in every way, including martially, and whose 
flourishing is incompatible with human flourishing due to scarcity of 
resources. How could a eudaimonistic philosopher facing this scenario 
and forewarned of our impending doom give a rational explanation of 
this outcome? Or is there an objective justification for human 
flourishing from a non-human standpoint when humans are not 
intellectually/physically/socially superior? 
Hobbes, Hume, Gauthier, Hart and others do not think so. Their ethics 
are posited on the approximately equal strength and vulnerability of 
the concerned agents. On these grounds they attempt to argue that 
moral behavior is in the individual's rational self-interest. Maclntyre 
has demonstrated, successfully I think, that these accounts of 
conventional moral behavior, based on an individualistic and 
supposedly ahistorical understanding of uneducated human nature, do 
not succeed. He has argued instead from the basis of shared social 
goals. If the question is raised to the supra-social, however, how does 
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a "common-good" ethics make a rational objection on moral grounds, 
on grounds of justice, to the loss of human flourishing in this 
scenario? What makes the human good right? What is the larger good 
of which the human good is a necessarily constitutive element? The 
common human good cannot be considered a good in absolute terms 
without a demonstration of how human flourishing justly relates to the 
good that is not based in mere anthropocentric bias. One such 
perspective is that of divine sovereignty. But Maclntyre has not 
posited that basis or any other for believing that our conception of the 
good is more than an assertion of human will. 
Now it might be objected at this point that I am in the grips of a 
colossal misunderstanding of what Maclntyre is trying to do in After 
Virtue. What I am misunderstanding is that Maclntyre is arguing 
merely for the necessity of a formal conception of the good in an 
adequate account of practical rationality. He has not presented a 
particular and substantive conception of the good because he never 
intended to do so, and because he need not do so to make his case. 
Does the objection stand? 
154 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
To the objection that I have misunderstood Maclntyre's 
argument, and that he did not intend to and need not 
present a substantive conception of the good, I reply 
that this is to misunderstand my objection. A question 
must be answered, if only by simple assertion as a first 
principle. Is there an ultimate good that is not merely a 
product of convention or will? 38 Without committing 
himself to such premises, it seems to me, Maclntyre 
concedes the argument to anyone bold enough to 
question that any such basis exists. By not designating 
a telos transcending human flourishing, he not only 
leaves the door open for Nietzsche's interpretation, I 
think that he concedes the argument. Nietzsche's 
Übermensch is a self-referential final end in the 
absence of others, the will to power in the absence of a 
structure of the will directed toward any substantive 
good. 
Nietzsche and transcendence 
Nietzsche's treatment of the ethical does not succeed against Aristotle, 
says Maclntyre, because the arguments of chapters 14 and 15 of After 
Virtue draw on Aristotelian texts as canon and those arguments are 
successful. Nietzsche's Übermensch finds no objective good that 
holds authority over him in the social world, and looks instead only to 
himself as authority for the formulation of a new law and new virtues. 
He has no relationships and no activities of the kind described in 
Maclntyre's positive account. Such a man uses others, and lies rather 
than tells the truth. The Nietzschean great man cannot enter into 
communal relationships because to do so would be to recognize a 
common authority, and he is his own authority and law. His relations 
with others are an exercise of that self-authority. Yet if Maclntyre's 
38 We might even state this in terms of the Aristotelian causal structure 
with which I began in chapter 1. Is there in reality a formal-in the 
technical sense-conception of the good that is the final cause of 
human action? 
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account of the virtues is successful, he says, it is the isolation of the 
Nietzschean man that forces that man to create his own authority. If 
the conception of the good has to be conceived in terms of the three 
stages, "then goods, and with them the only grounds for the authority 
of laws and virtues, can only be discovered by" relationships forming 
communities "whose central bond is a shared vision of and 
understanding of goods. " (Emphasis mine. ) To isolate oneself is to 
"debar oneself from finding any good outside of oneself. " (258) Only 
in society and in socially-defined morality, that is, can one experience 
socially-determined goods. Does this answer Nietzsche? I don't think 
that it does, but I must say more about Nietzsche to show why not. 
Knowing precisely what Nietzsche advocates is problematic. Riidigger 
Safranski has developed a biographical interpretation of Nietzsche, 
showing that Nietzsche can be better understood if we interpret his 
work in light of his life. (Linker 2002; my account of Nietzsche here 
draws heavily on Linker's critical review of Safranski. ) Safranski 
portrays Nietzsche as a man indefatigably committed to understanding 
the world as inherently meaningless. He was not searching for hidden 
truth, but worked from the assumption that he had in fact discovered 
the truth and was determined to present this truth unflinchingly. 
Nietzsche claims to have initially moved away from belief in a God 
who "has guided me safely in everything as a father would his weak 
little child" to dawning unbelief because of "too much intense 
injustice and evil in the world. " From this position of unbelief he 
moved on to ask "how our view of the world might change if there 
were no God, immortality, Holy Spirit, or divine inspiration, and if the 
tenets of millennia were based on delusions. " He soon concluded that 
we should not suppose harmony between the true on the one hand and 
the good and beautiful on the other. Rather, the truth can be 
"detestable and ugly in the extreme. " In 1888, just one year before his 
mental breakdown, Nietzsche wrote in his notebooks, "For a 
philosopher to say, `the good and the beautiful are one, ' is infamy; if 
he goes on to add, `also the true, ' one ought to thrash him. Truth is 
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ugly. " This theme thus spans Nietzsche's career. (Cited in Linker 
2002) 
Yet Nietzsche strove for a way to affirm life despite its 
meaninglessness. As early as The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
proposes myth as a way of dealing with life's meaningless, but myth 
that also recognized some measure of the ugly truth. He desired to 
create a "beautiful illusion" by which the crumbling post-Socratic 
Western world could cope with the pathos of its meaninglessness. He 
turned to the origins of moral man. The anarchy and violence of the 
prehistoric world was ended by those victorious individuals who 
imposed their will on others. "The strong" imposed the original 
"moral valuation" on the human race in imposing their will. Here the 
good ("noble") is just the expression of the will of the victorious and 
bad is weakness, birds of prey devouring helpless lambs. But there is 
no "free will" involved and no blame in the act. Will here is merely 
the imposition of power. In time, these heroes came to be viewed as 
gods. 
But then came a "transvaluation of values" and the invention of free 
will as a choice, rather than just what the strong do, in the same way 
that the failure of the weak to triumph was also a choice to refrain 
from those behaviors. What was once bad (weakness) is now 
considered the highest good, and good (strength) has become "evil. " 
From the ressentiment of the weak, dominated slave classes was born 
the concept of God and consequently of original sin requiring grace. 
For Nietzsche, science is much more radical than Christianity in its 
negation of life. While Christianity's obsession with sin belittles man, 
science places man on the same level as lower species. 
The ascetic ideal culminates in Nietzsche's own thought, wherein 
science "unmasks" itself as the perfection of the ascetic ideal. This 
ideal is the arbitrary value we project onto the world in order to find 
meaning in the face of meaninglessness. The ascetic ideal thus gives 
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birth to the Christian God and ultimately leads to his "death. " The lie 
of the ascetic ideal ends in its own unmasking and exposure. 
Safranski contends that Nietzsche's response to the return to chaos is 
evident in the madman's speech in The Joyful Science: 
How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all 
murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that 
the world has yet owned has bled to death under our 
knives: who will wipe this blood off of us? What water 
is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of 
atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? 
Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must 
we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy 
of it? (Cited in Linker 2002; his emphasis) 
In Zarathustra Nietzsche introduces the Übermensch as the solution to 
our predicament and as our evolutionary next step. The concept of 
"the eternal recurrence of the same" makes this step possible. This 
idea is based on his notion that, given a finite quantity of matter 
existing in an infinite temporal context, every possible permutation of 
matter and events has already occurred and will endlessly recur. 
Whether Nietzsche held this belief as solid science or Wagnerian 
myth, his theory of anti-creation [my term] supplies the basis for 
man's self-affirmation and self-divinization. The affirmation of every 
moment of this world's existence, through willing its eternal 
recurrence, is his substitute for the dream of heaven, his means of 
realizing eternal bliss here and now. And since the past can be seen as 
prelude to the present, we can affirm the past, see it as necessary, and 
come to act as if we willed it: 
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... as creator, guesser of riddles, and redeemer of 
accidents, I taught them to work on the future and to 
redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem 
what is past in man and to recreate all "it was" until the 
will says, "Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it"-this I 
called redemption and this alone I taught them to call 
redemption. (Cited in Linker 2002) 
Thus the Übermensch replaces God. 
While Nietzsche speaks of the "will to power" of all living things, he 
opposes the scientific equation of human to non-human life. Other 
forces in the universe are malleable to the will of the god-like man, the 
superior-to-the-common-man, able to direct even the weak-willed and 
the ressentiment-filled, herd-minded common lot of men and women. 
Even if he experiences tragedy, this man alone dares to face the 
consequences of his will and to assume responsibility for them. But he 
does so, once again, as the solitary will in the cosmos. 
My purpose in introducing these analyses by Safranski and Linker is 
to underline the consequences-and consequences are ultimately the 
only criteria we have on Maclntyre's conclusion-of refusing to 
address the question of God or on some metaphysical presupposition 
relative to morality. The purpose of any human activity or good is 
given from outside the activity and if there is a purpose to the polis or 
to human society, it also must come from outside, if only from the 
conceptual distance of human will and rationality. In Maclntyre's 
construct, morality is transcendent only in the sense that it is a 
practical necessity for any given society, and only in the barest 
understanding of truthfulness, courage, and justice. It is a powerful 
argument as far as it goes. But if a person does not want to stand in 
society, on this view, then she does not stand in the context of 
morality. She is literally beyond good and evil. 
An outlaw is not morally different than a wolf or a bear wreaking 
havoc on a village. The brigand is a menace, but not immoral for any 
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reason unconnected with his position outside that particular society. 
For the person standing above any particular social setting, the rules 
no longer apply. 39 If we deny Aristotelian metaphysics and refuse to 
take a position on God or of some other transcendent frame of 
reference, then what else do we have but human will? 
My conclusion to this point is not that we therefore need God for 
morality. It should be clear from what I have claimed so far that we 
have some morality, however repugnant, in any rational individual or 
cohesive group of social, rational beings. Some minimally 
conventional form of morality is possible without God, though if and 
only if goods-and specifically the social goods of a particular, 
historical tradition-are taken aggregately as ultimate. 40 
Maclntyre has placed us before a choice of consequences: Aristotelian 
virtue ethics or Nietzscheanism. On their own terms, however, there is 
not enough common ground between them for disagreement. 
Maclntyre can show Nietzsche's historical errors, but he cannot 
undermine his basic position. Maclntyre's ordering of goods is not 
Nietzsche's ordering of goods. If we overlook Nietzsche's mistaken 
history of heroic aristocracy, he still confronts us with the basic 
question: Nietzsche's thought is premised on "the death of God. " The 
realization that God never really existed outside the human mind is the 
Nietzschean truth. Nietzsche's virtues, too, derive from his 
understanding of the human telos, which derives in turn from his 
understanding of transcendent reality, which we might term "not- 
God. " Whereas the moral philosophers of the Enlightenment retain the 
Christian morality of their predecessors; Nietzsche places the 
Übermensch in the position of God, in the most conscious and 
thorough way possible. 
39 In the same way, society is not bound by rules toward others that 
are not fully socially actors. Unless the alien, for example, can be 
shown to have a contributing role to our particular understanding of 
the good life, she has no protection. 
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The Nietzschean man looks to himself because he does not believe 
any other morality is anything more than a social construction. To 
submit to the herd is to adopt the herd's goods, yes. But nothing 
prevents such a man from embracing other goods, of his own making. 
MacIntyre has ignored the question of God, Nietzsche's most basic 
question. Nietzsche may be finally unsuccessful for other reasons, but 
none of them can ultimately be divorced from a decision concerning a 
human telos standing outside human society. On Nietzsche's terms, in 
declining to provide reasons for, or simply the presupposition of, such 
a point of reference, MacIntyre seems to have conceded the argument. 
The analogical reference at the end of After Virtue to a "doubtless very 
different" St. Benedict poses the obvious problem that there could 
have been no original St. Benedict without the Catholic Church, no 
Church without a resurrected Christ, and no resurrected Christ without 
the Triune God of whom Christ is the second person. What form a 
very different Benedict might take in the modem world will be a 
function of the supra-human as well as social horizon a particular 
community sees. 
The strictly naturalistic-historicist case for the virtues implied by 
Maclntyre's passing comments on the good life cannot supply an 
adequate teleology for Maclntyre's three stages themselves because 
any such closed system precludes any such external reference. The 
context of a larger frame of reference is missing. I have attempted to 
show that not only is the link missing as it relates to society as a 
whole, but also that each stage is more directly dependent on that final 
link than Maclntyre's argument indicates. 
It is not part of my negative conclusion that Nietzsche's position is the 
necessary stopping place for non-theistic ethics, or that Nietzsche 
40 To be sure, Christian philosophers such as MacIntyre cannot have a 
substantively Christian ethics without God-in-Christ, not even in the 
most mundane matters. 
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presents a case for his version of morality that is ultimately coherent. 
41 
But without identifying a conception of the good that stands outside 
the social, we are not faced with " Nietzsche or... ", it seems to me. It 
is not "either ... or... " if we 
have nothing more than what Maclntyre 
stipulates as presuppositions. Choice presupposes a rational being who 
chooses, and therefore concedes the confrontation with Nietzsche 
from the outset. If it is a choice between Aquinas and Nietzsche, then 
it's Nietzsche. For it is precisely Nietzsche's point that we decide. We 
choose. By an act of the will, we chart our fate. It can only be our will 
that decides morality. What is "for our good" is irrelevant if we do not 
will the conception of the good from which is derived our good. 
As rational beings endowed with free will, we cannot refute 
Nietzsche's position in favor of some other position unless that 
position presupposes a source of human function. If we are the only 
rational, volitional beings in the universe, then why must my will 
accord with the rationality of social goods? Without God in the 
picture, and without the assumption that social goods are ultimate, 
what necessitates that I will any particular ordering of goods? 
Nietzsche saw that without God (or a God-substitute) as the ultimate 
reference of good, man alone creates and orders goods. Without God, 
there is no divine will. Without divine will, human will is alone in the 
universe, setting aside for a moment the possibility of extra-terrestrial 
rational beings, predatory or benign. No other will than human will 
exists. Human will operates freely-individual will vis-a-vis 
individual will, collective will vis-ä-vis collective will, and individual 
will vis-ä-vis collective will. 
Without God there are solely human accomplishments, goods, and 
excellences. It is humankind excelling and creating to the credit of the 
race. In an individual, this characteristic would be quickly labeled as 
hubris. In the aggregate, Augustine saw it as the pride and the glory of 
41 His argument is incoherent, partly because it is not an argument at 
all. As Maclntyre points out repeatedly, argumentation is only 
possible within a tradition. 
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the city of man. But his critique assumes the existence of the civitas 
Dei. If there is nothing higher than the race as a whole, and given the 
mediocrity of so many, nothing but the will of others prevents an 
exercise of the will by one bold enough to realize that s/he need not 
be 
accountable to the likes of these. 
The oppression and exploitation by Western vis-ä-vis "primitive" 
cultures has been justified, incorrectly as it so happens in this case, on 
the basis of racial fictions. Those cultures were supposedly less than 
human or otherwise inferior. If I or my group were actually superior, 
however, and able to dominate the other, then does morality apply? If 
I can become stronger than others or independent of the aggregate on, 
say, technological bases, then why should I care about them? 
It is part of my conclusion that conceptions of the good based only in 
human flourishing do not have the resources to oppose the 
Nietzschean move. That is, they have no recourse to the challenge he 
presents to a socially constructed authority. It is essential to an 
account of morality to specify the objective source of a norm such as 
the common good. And because any such difference in that end entails 
differences in the dispositional means to reach that end, it is also 
essential to reconsider the subjective structure of morality, what is 
required of the agent to satisfy the conditions of morally right 
behavior. 
In Part Two, I set out my positive account of morality, one based in 
theological voluntarism. Professor MacIntyre has objections to such 
an account. 
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Chapter 7 
NATURAL LAW AND THEOLOGICAL VOLUNTARISM 
Review and preview 
In Part One I developed some implications of Maclntyre's project and 
underscored much of the thrust of his argument. I began by asking 
why some contemporary natural lawyers in the Thomistic tradition 
avoid addressing the question of God in the discovery of the good. I 
suggested that this might be due to a line of reasoning that makes 
three assumptions. First, they conflate human flourishing and the good 
life. Therefore these natural lawyers apparently assume that an 
account of human flourishing is adequate as an account of the good 
life. Second, they seem to assume that the fully rational human subject 
cannot fail to will flourishing. Third, they also assume that the 
particulars of what this flourishing entails are wholly or largely known 
in social goods across fundamental cultural differences in conceptions 
of ultimate reality. And because the particulars of flourishing are 
known, at least in large part, the particulars of the moral norms 
required to realize that end are thereby known as well, through the 
kind of practical reasoning described by Maclntyre in his positive 
argument. 
The earlier stages of Maclntyre's account show that the realization of 
any conception of the good does require at least the simulacra of 
genuine virtues. Far from guaranteeing the virtues as such, however, 
any given conception of the good requires only the dispositions 
relative to that conception. I have shown that virtues, goods, and 
practices all differ with respect to a social understanding of the good, 
so that none of these can be understood as freestanding. There is not 
just one practice of medicine, but multiple practices. Not just "the 
virtues" of courage, honesty, and justice, but context-specific 
understandings of virtues. Each varies according to the conception of 
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the good in question. This subordinate-to-the-ultimate-end structure 
underlines the determinative nature of the final end or telos. The 
virtues of each account are rightly considered simulacra by rival 
accounts of the virtues because of differences in the ends they serve. 
Differences in ends result in differences of motivation and intention 
constituting the dispositions serving those ends. 
An account of morality can only be fully coherent if lesser goods are 
correlated and ordered to greater goods, always looking to a larger 
frame of reference for the justification of their ranking as goods. 
Human flourishing is partly constitutive of the good life, I want to say. 
But its high ranking is a contingent, not a necessary, ranking. The 
human good is positively related to the good as such and is partly 
constitutive of the good as such, but this says nothing about the 
ordering of this good to other goods. And to address, at all, the 
relationship of the human good to the good as such, we must adopt a 
larger frame of reference than that of human social goods. Maclntyre 
has not shown or even asserted the existence of such a comprehensive 
frame of reference. He has set aside Aristotle's metaphysical biology, 
but has not offered a satisfactory replacement. He has not offered a 
basis for believing that there is a correct conception of the good life 
independent of human will. On these premises, if we must choose 
between Aristotle and Nietzsche, then it is Nietzsche, by forfeit. 
In Part Two, we switch ends. I set out a form of theological 
voluntarism as my positive argument. Maclntyre has often attacked 
theological voluntarism. I attempt to defend my position against those 
attacks. By making the ranking of human flourishing depend on the 
divine will, I say, theological voluntarism provides a better account of 
morality than eudaimonism, including theological eudaimonism. 
In this chapter I try to extricate biblical theology from some of the 
distortions of Greek philosophy, particularly concerning divine will in 
the creation of matter. This question shapes how we understand the 
goodness of God. More to the point of the present confrontation, it 
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suggests that human flourishing is not an infallible basis for morality. 
I try to exploit the abandonment of the search for final causes in 
scientific discovery in order to question the necessity of flourishing as 
our necessary final end in moral discovery. The only dictate of natural 
law, strictly speaking, derives from the goodness of God's nature, not 
the potentialities of human nature. Chapter 8 develops these premises 
and considers their implications for divine authority. I argue that any 
role-player has a right to do anything entailed by what s/he must do. 
Authority, the right to rule, is derived from what the purported 
authority must do. In God's "role" as God, God gives us reasons for 
action in deciding the means to our ultimate end, union with God. 
Chapter 9 shows what morality for the subject looks like on this 
construction. The eudaimonist account assumes the final end of 
human life to be flourishing, and in so doing, assumes certain 
limitations in the human will as well. It is a view of the human will 
denying that humans have the freedom to will goods other than those 
tied to their own flourishing. I will claim that although we have a 
natural inclination to human flourishing, moral freedom is tied to 
another inclination, the inclination to the pursuit of justice 
disinterestedly. This inclination can override the inclination to 
flourish. Humans have the volitional ability not only to conceptualize 
and to will human goods, but also the freedom to conceptualize and to 
will purposes independent of those goods of flourishing. Rectitude of 
will is more than simply the triumph of intellect over sensuality, the 
ability to seek our long-term flourishing in the face of the temptations 
of short-term gratification. It is the subject's ability to seek the good 
for its own sake. 
Chapter 10 attempts to state my positive conclusions more succinctly 
and formally. I say that obligation is dependent on divine 
communicated intentions, and that this relationship of dependence is 
one of reduction; the concept of obligation could be dispensed of in 
favor of divine communicated intentions. 
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A typological illustration 
We all know, Maclntyre claims, that "only laws that conform to 
reason and justice are genuine laws. " (2000, pp. 92f; emphasis added) 
But by "justice" here he apparently intends human flourishing, and 
human flourishing of a particular conception. In response to certain 
feminist and other criticisms of his theory of "practices, " Maclntyre 
suggests elsewhere that we may well criticize some practices as 
unjust. (1994, pp. 289f. ) I understand this to mean that what we take 
to be the ranking assigned to the goods of some practices may turn out 
not to be just. We maybe mistaken about their contribution to human 
flourishing. The additional point I wish to make is that, from the 
largest frame of reference, we could be mistaken about the 
contribution of such goods to the good life, as distinguishable from the 
flourishing life. 
"Flourishing" can have many meanings, each with respective 
implications for virtuous dispositions, as my earlier chapters confirm. 
I want to push this observation even further by emphasizing God's 
creative and legislative freedom. Nothing, other than the necessity that 
God be our ultimate good, could have posed an antecedent limitation 
on the divine stipulation of human ends in creation. That is, 
subordinate to our one final and necessary end of union with God, our 
ends could have been radically different. 2 And even given the ends 
actually stipulated in the ordinances of creation, nothing prevents God 
from stipulating means to those ends that are radically different from a 
straight-line course of realization of those ends. My emphasis will be 
on this second claim, concerning God's legislative freedom. 
Why would God do something so weird as ordering us along a route 
to our final end that frustrates basic human potentiality? I do not 
believe that God does order us along such a route, or at least not 
usually. Consider briefly, however, an exception, a dispensation from 
42 Stated more carefully and weakly, following Scotus, we don't know 
that God could not have stipulated wildly different ends subordinate 
to our final end. 
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the supposedly eternal prescriptivity of the natural law as captured in 
the Second Table of the Decalogue. The binding of Isaac is an 
example often cited in theological voluntarism. It poses problems for 
the eudaimonistic natural law position. The example brings into relief 
the necessity of making explicit the exogenous purposes of human 
life. And it calls into question eudaimonistic conclusions of reason 
concerning nature, flourishing, and moral law. 43 
Killing one's innocent child on God's command must qualify as a 
potential instance of making "good" what we would otherwise call 
"murder. " This is what God tells Abraham to do. (Genesis 22) A basic 
social good, parenting one's progeny, is threatened. Abraham acts in 
spite of that knowledge, yet evidently without regrets or against 
conscience. He apparently believes that it is a just act, by virtue of 
God's desiring it. The rectitude of the act, however, is not only due to 
his acting in obedience, but also and more importantly for the present 
discussion, in willing God's willing for his willing. His desires are 
aligned with the means to his ultimate end that God seems to have 
willed for him in sacrificing Isaac. Abraham's right reason is engaged. 
The act is not irrational or under compulsion. 
Nor does the act attribute capriciousness or irrationality to God, who 
has previously promised Abraham that it will be through this son that 
he will have descendants. How is that possible? Abraham thinks that 
God will resurrect Isaac. 44 All the textual and traditional evidence 
leads to this conclusion. Abraham tells his servants, "Stay here with 
43 In the "Treatise on Law, " Aquinas simply presents this incident as 
concordant with God's prerogative. (ST 1-2.94.5) He later posits that 
the precepts of the Decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation, 
but that they can be changed in their application as to what 
constitutes murder, theft, or adultery. If God commands these acts, 
they are due, and are therefore not sins. (ST 1-2.100.3) 
as Hebrews 11.17-19 explicitly reflects this common understanding. 
See also Levenson (1993). Traditionally, Christians further interpret 
the person of Isaac in the story and the particulars of this incident, as 
a typological prefiguring of the death and resurrection of Christ. Observant Orthodox Jews read and prayer over the aquedah, the binding of Isaac, at the Shacharit (morning) service every day of the 
year, and as the second Torah reading for Rosh HaShanna as the 
level of devotion possible to God. 
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the ass; I and the lad will go yonder and worship, and come again [1st 
per. pl. ] to you. " (Genesis 22.5. See Levenson 1993 for a 
comprehensive survey of the interpretive background. ) At this stage in 
the biblical narrative, subsequent to the ordinances of creation, God's 
ultimate intention is the full flourishing of humans, body and spirit, in 
order to be co-lovers (with God) of God. But the route by which 
Abraham and Isaac realize that end was a circuitous one indeed. 
A full exegesis of the text is beyond my purposes here. I can only 
point to the essential structure of objective morality and of morality in 
the moral agent that the story illustrates. Had Abraham not obeyed 
God, his refusal to sacrifice his son would have been wrong. He 
focuses on the end rather than the route to that end. Though the route 
deviated radically from the normal route to union with God, his 
action is still good. Moral goodness is not just repeating God's 
willing, mere conformity with God's will, but "willing God's willing 
for our willing. " (Hare 2001, p. 74) Not willing what God wants us to 
will in following the route God prescribes to our end, even if this 
refusal is in the pursuit of a (lesser) good, is evil. God's intention for 
Abraham's intention is that he should will God's will above his own 
well-being and the well-being of his son. 45 The structure of morality, 
including the rationality of Abraham's action, is best explained by 
as God changes the command to Abraham. Does God have a change of heart? I don't think so. The feature to track in the explanation of the 
change of command is the structure of moral rationality. God 
apparently wants Abraham to intend to kill Isaac, but not actually to kill him. Now, it seems impossible for humans to intend to do 
something that they have no reason to do. (The classic h 'pothetical 
case study is the Toxin Puzzle. See Kavka 1983. ) If this is the case, then God couldn't without self-contradiction command Abraham to have the intention without also having the reason. God doesn't 
actually say that God wants Isaac dead. God commands Abraham to 
go to the mountain and to kill Isaac-not quite the same thing. God 
commands Abraham to act in such a way as to kill Isaac. And that is 
what Abraham does, right up to the point of striking/cutting with the knife, at which time God intervenes. Abraham forms the intention to 
kill his son. God intends one outcome, A, but to accommodate human psychology, commands another outcome, B, that entails 
outcome A. God commands outcome B, knowing that at the proper time, once outcome A had been realized, God will dispense from the 
command to produce outcome B. God's ultimate intention remains 
the same, to realize only outcome A. 
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theological voluntarism. My aim in Part Two is to develop my version 
of this theory. 
My position is theistic and this determinatively shapes my theory. 
Theological voluntarism, however, does not entail theism. One need 
not be a theist to be a theological voluntarist. On a normative version 
of theological voluntarism, for example, someone 
might claim that a 
being with the characteristics of God would merit obedience. But, s/he 
might go on to add, such a being does not exist. On metaethical 
versions of theological voluntarism, someone might claim that the 
concept of obligation is irreducibly theistic, but that, again, since there 
is no God, there are no genuine obligations. (See Murphy 2002b, 
sects. 1.1-1.2) David Gauthier then, for example, might be viewed as a 
theological voluntarist, working from negative premises. (See 
Gauthier 1991, pp. 20f. ) With reference to the conclusions of Part 
One, theological voluntarism makes normative or metaethical claims 
about the necessary structure of moral argument. In the following, I 
hope to demonstrate that if flourishing is contingently an end of 
human life, as I think that it is, then flourishing cannot be the ultimate 
end of human life. Even if flourishing is contingently a sub-ultimate 
end of human life, as I think that it is, a straight-line course to this 
flourishing is not a dictate of natural law in the strictest sense. The 
possible routes to the realization of flourishing are innumerable. 
Introduction to the chapter 
Theistic eudaimonists in the Aristotelian tradition disengage human 
flourishing from God's purposes because they conceive of human 
beings as substances and substances as self-sustaining. Humans and 
other beings flourish to the extent that they realize their inherent 
potentialities as substances. They are initially created by God, to be 
sure, but are subsequently self-perpetuating. The same is true of entire 
systems of substances. So God's purposes are inherently actualized in 
the functioning of the being or system, unless foreign factors 
intervene, as in the case of human moral depravity. The formal 
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qualities of each being or system supervene on their functioning as 
substances. Thus, on this understanding, we need not bring God's 
purposes into the foreground. 6 My argument of Part One shows, 
however, that reference to such a background is indispensable, 
however inconspicuous its place in a theory. I have opened the 
possibility of a distinction between the flourishing life and the good 
life. Now I want to show why the background must be more explicit if 
we do not accept Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Our understanding of the virtues flows from our interpretation of the 
human telos. Maclntyre's central negative conclusion is the incapacity 
of modem philosophy to derive moral requirements from human- 
nature-as-it-happens-to-be. A conception of the human end is 
necessary. My objection to modem versions of eudaimonism is that 
they cannot provide a structure from which to view the exogenous 
ends of human existence. Their conception of human ends derives 
only, primarily, or first from the intrinsic interests, needs, and 
vulnerabilities of humans qua humans. In the case of Maclntyre, this 
makes his argument vulnerable to the critique it set out to address. In 
defining human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, we cannot avoid at least 
an implicit conception of the end(s) of human existence. To define the 
acorn's essence, we project the mature oak tree, as potential end, back 
onto the acorn. Human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be is the human end in 
potential. It is the oak tree as acorn. Our understanding of human- 
nature-as-it-is-if-it-reaches-its-potential determines what we 
understand of human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be. This is one 
implication of Maclntyre's argument. I agree with it. But what is the 
place of human flourishing relative to the good? As we saw in the last 
chapter, this relationship must at some point be made explicit. The 
necessity of evaluative judgment on the importance of human 
flourishing relative to other goods slips from view when eudaimonists 
draw only on human needs, interests, or vulnerabilities based in the 
human subject, in human flourishing. This link can only be assumed, 
46 1 am indebted to Tim Stanton for clarification on these points. 
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and not made explicit, if it is somehow conceived of as a necessary, 
rather than a contingent link. This is what I take to be happening when 
eudaimonists with theistic commitments, for example, put forward a 
case for human flourishing without reference to God or to God's 
purposes for human life. 
In this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that if flourishing is contingently 
an end of human life, as I think that it is, flourishing cannot be the 
ultimate end of human life. Following up my conclusions from Part 
One, I specifically invoke a theistic framework and consider God's 
intentions for human life. I say that the strict conclusions of natural 
law are much more limited than most natural lawyers assume. I 
suggest that these mistaken assumptions derive from a failure to 
appreciate the differences between classical and Christian 
understandings both of divine will and of the origins of the natural 
order. This difference eventually led to the abandonment of the 
Aristotelian approach to scientific discovery with respect to necessary 
final ends. Eudaimonistic natural lawyers should take this lesson to 
heart concerning the structure of morality. 
Given that flourishing is contingently a sub-ultimate end of human 
life, as I think that it is, a direct course to this flourishing is not a 
dictate of natural law in the strictest sense. The possible routes to the 
realization of flourishing are countless. 
But first I need to show that human flourishing is indeed not a 
necessary end, such that it can be known, assumed, and then passed 
over without mention or without reference to God's will. It is a 
contingent, not a necessary end. Human interests, needs, and 
vulnerabilities cannot be conceptually separated from human ends, to 
be sure, even if those interests, needs, and vulnerabilities were to be 
frustrated in the realization of our final end. The satisfaction of our 
interests, needs, and vulnerabilities is not, however, coterminous with 
our final end. To see why this is so, we need to juxtapose the classical 
and biblical accounts of the divine. 
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In what sense is God good? 
Given the uniqueness and prior existence of God, I will suggest a way 
of understanding the goodness of divine being and divine actions that 
does not depend on human standards of justice. Theists of the biblical 
traditions have no decisive reason to believe that a sovereign God 
could not have willed other means to our end. A different form of 
human flourishing with resultant differences in natural law is not 
logically excluded by our material constitution. As counterintuitive as 
it seems to us because of our habituation to the way things are, God 
does not will the means to our final end necessarily-the means under 
consideration here are the achievement of our common good/social 
goods-as a function of our nature. And indeed nothing necessitates 
that God should will human flourishing in any usual sense of the term. 
I claim that the concepts of omnipotence and ex nihilo creation 
preclude the attribution of evil to an omnipotent being. These 
observations can nevertheless be made to fit the three-part Aristotelian 
structure of morality, though on radically different assumptions about 
human ends, and specifically by distinguishing those ends from 
flourishing. 
Anselm addresses negatively the question of God's goodness as it 
relates to the attribute of omnipotence, by asking if God can sin. If 
God cannot sin, then how can God be omnipotent? His answer is that 
the ability to sin is not a power, but a lack of power. "So, then, when 
one is said to have the power of doing or experiencing what is not for 
his good, or what he ought not to do, impotence is understood in the 
word power. " The more a person had of this so-called power, the more 
power "adversity and perversity" would have over that person. A 
person who had such power would be "capable of what is not for his 
good, and of what he ought not to do.... " The more one had of such 
power, that is, the more powerless he or she would be over 
immorality. (Anselm 1926 (Prologiom 7)) This is not God's case. God 
cannot sin, and this is no limit on divine power. Positively stated, 
goodness is the power to accomplish one's good. 
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Two issues emerge here with respect to God's goodness: how God's 
power underlies, conceptually, any understanding we have of divine 
goodness, and what it means to say that God is good. Let's consider 
first what it might mean to say that God is good. 
On Maclntyre's understanding of morality, there is a problem in 
speaking of the goodness of God, especially as it relates to humanity. 
In the Aristotelian model of morality, once again, the moral is tied to 
function. The humanly good is the sum of all those roles and 
responsibilities and goods that are entailed in being a good man. It is 
on the basis of the function of roles that we can derive value and 
obligation. A man's end determines what morality is for him. I have 
been arguing up to this point that only "the good" as a whole affords 
an adequately broad frame of reference to identify all the virtues as 
genuine, and further that this implies a transcendent frame of 
reference. I understand that transcendent frame of reference to be God 
Almighty. 
If we attempt to evaluate the goodness of that transcendent frame of 
reference-in the present theory, God-we have to ask what the end 
of God is. It would be unacceptable to use "good" antecedently and so 
assume a deontological understanding of morality in this case alone 
when we have been using it otherwise up to this point. Yet the 
question also seems odd, misdirected, in light of all that I have said so 
far. The problem is the infinite regress of final causes. In what sense, 
then, is God good? On the Aristotelian understanding of "good" 
developed by Maclntyre, the goodness of the God who creates ex 
nihilo would consist in acting always in such a way as to accomplish 
the purposes of that on behalf of which God is acting. God would be 
good if God acts according to the inherent purposes of created things. 
But what are those purposes? It is God who establishes the purposes 
of everything. As the concept of God has been used in theism, God 
cannot have an end, a final cause, external to God. If God is good, 
then God is good in at least a somewhat different sense than the term 
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is used generally, since there is no larger frame of reference than 
God 
by which we can evaluate the goodness of God. 
Comparing the conclusions of classical philosophy with the scriptural 
self-revelations of God, Aquinas questions the accuracy of unaided 
reason concerning, especially, the identity of the 
God worshiped 
according to the first several commandments of the Decalogue. 
(ST 
1.1) And Aquinas argues for the necessity of Divine Law (i. e., sacred 
writ) in directing the agent in how to perform acts in view of his final 
end, which he says we cannot know by reason alone. (ST 1-2.91.4)) 
In view of this kind of limitation in reasoning by analogy "from 
below" concerning the nature of God's goodness, we would do better 
to begin by asking what divine goodness means with respect to a 
given conception of God. Otherwise, human judgments of divine 
goodness run the risk of an error like that of using a wooden kitchen 
ruler to assess the accuracy of the official metric measure according to 
the International System of Units. The identity of the standard 
measure and that which it measures would be reversed. The created is 
in no position to judge the Creator, as Job learned. Valid theological 
science is a posteriori reasoning, thinking God's thoughts after God. 
(See Torrance 1982/1999) In my account, there is only one antecedent 
constraint-a methodological constraint-to stipulate at the outset, the 
necessity of non-contradiction, or the necessity of non-self- 
contradiction. If God wills an end God must also will the means to 
that end. God is constrained by instrumental rationality as a logical 
necessity. (Or more precisely, perhaps, God is unwavering in resolve 
and undeterred in the realization of that resolve, so that logic itself is a 
function of divine constancy, not the reverse. ) This is a necessary 
methodological constraint on any account we can give of God's 
actions. 7 
47 Descartes thought an omnipotent being could do anything, including 
the self-contradictory, and that Aquinas' position dishonored God 
by making God subject to a law, the law of non-contradiction. The 
Cartesian position is unassailable. That is because it is 
176 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
So, following the patristic tradition, I take the scriptural assertion "No 
one is good but God alone" (Mark 10.18) as particularly relevant to 
our discussion. God's goodness is a brute fact. God is good in a 
unique and underived sense. Can we conceive of God's goodness as 
having any necessary content with respect to anything external to 
God? Does divine rationality constrain God? The other qualities of 
God do not impose constraints on what God can do that do not already 
follow from logical consistency. Given that God is God, the only 
constraint on those purposes is with respect to the divine person. 
There seems to be no way to set God's goodness as a conceptual 
constraint on what God can or cannot do relative to the creation. No 
purpose of a created being could negate God's goodness, for example. 
God, and only God, is the ultimate end and purpose of any created 
being. God is not constrained by divine rationality with respect to 
what God creates and how God deals with that creation. 
Many critics of theological voluntarism attack claims concerning 
God's legislative rationality, whether God's rationality puts 
constraints on what God can will with regard to the moral law. There 
is however the more general issue of God's creative rationality, what 
kinds of worlds and creatures God can create and how God can treat 
the creation. Williams (2000b) notes that when these two levels of 
divine rationality are not distinguished in the literature, it is usually in 
inconceivable. As Mackie says, any argument depends on the laws 
of logic and reasoning. To assert that God ordained the laws of logic 
and math that obtain in the world as we know it and yet could have 
done otherwise, is to remove the discussion from rational enquiry. It 
is fruitless to continue discussion. A self-contradictory action is not 
a thing. "A logical contradiction is not a state of affairs which it is 
supremely difficult to produce, but only a form of words which fails 
to describe any state of affairs. " (Mackie (1962) "Omnipotence" 
Sophia 1: 16, cited in Nash 1983, pp. 39-40. ) The position cannot be 
attacked, but neither can it be defended. The position is in fact not a 
position. It cannot even be articulated coherently. Whatever 
Descartes and other defenders of a supralogical God want to express 
is something that cannot be expressed in rational discourse, but is 
necessarily a self-defeating non-sense. As Nash says, "A 
supralogical God is a God about whom nothing can be said or 
known. (Nash 1983, pp. 39-40) Constraint or no, this qualification 
will be important to answering objections to theological 
voluntarism. 
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the context of a close (and broad) association between essential 
natures and natural law. Natural law, it is said, must fit our natures. 
The only end God necessarily wills, I say, is God's own good. (I 
follow Williams 2000b, sect. 3. a on Scotus' position here. ) Because it 
is God who creates everything, it is for God that everything (else) is 
intended, ultimately. God wills the existence of any thing, and brings 
it into existence, and the purpose or good of the thing just is that for 
which God has created it. 
God's will is good because it is without any external constraint by 
which it could possibly be otherwise. Nat God wills is necessarily 
good. God's will and God's power to accomplish that will therefore 
must be understood as conceptually prior to God's rationality and 
goodness. This claim involves a confrontation with classical views of 
divine will. 
Classical and biblical understandings of divine will 
The classical and biblical perspectives radically differ on the question 
of divine will and the status of matter (eternal or created). As a result, 
they radically differ on the implications of their respective positions 
concerning final ends and divine freedom. If basic matter is eternal, 
then at least some parameters or laws governing matter must also be 
eternal. The implications of the doctrine of creation for natural science 
and morality are therefore foundational. It was to no small extent the 
rejection of the classical perspective concerning divine will and 
freedom that led to modern empirical methodology in the natural 
sciences. Because we cannot presume to know with certitude God's 
purposes, Descartes, Newton, Galileo, and Bacon reasoned, we cannot 
antecedently determine final causes in the natural sciences. We must 
therefore proceed empirically. This conclusion followed from their 
cosmological presuppositions. As we will see, the turn from the 
methodology of final causes in the natural sciences is a consequence 
of, not a phenomenon arising independently of, theological 
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voluntarism. 8 The fruitfulness of this turn lends credibility to that 
theological shift. And just as natural science proceeds on the basis of 
empirical phenomena rather than speculation about God's necessary 
intentions, 49 so too should we proceed by a posteriori reasoning about 
what is or is not possible in ethics, rather than setting antecedent 
limitations on what God could will on a Platonically-influenced view 
of the material. I want to retrace the thinking of the "new men of 
science" to these presuppositions, then argue from those 
presuppositions that we cannot antecedently know the intermediate 
final ends of human nature. Following Scotus, I say that the only 
natural laws that can be known deductively, from the very terms used, 
48 This claim is contrary to Maclntyre's implication in Whose Justice? 
(1988, p. 209) 
49 It is in this light that we should understand, for example, comments 
by Francis Bacon about the sterility of inquiry into final causes 
(2004, chap. 7, sect. 7): 
For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquýiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real 
and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these 
satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery. [... ] For to say that `the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight; " or that "the firmness of the 
skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the 
extremities of heat or cold; " [... ] is well inquired and collected in 
metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent. [... ] not because 
those final causes are not true and worthy to be inquired, being kept 
within their own province, but because their excursions into the limits of physicalpcauses hath bred a vastness and solitude in that 
tract. For otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are 
extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at 
all between them. For the cause rendered, that "the hairs about the 
eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight, " doth not impugn the 
cause rendered, that "pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture- 
muscosi fontes, &c. " Nor the cause rendered, that "the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or 
cold, " doth not impugn the cause rendered, that "contraction of 
pores is incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence 
to foreign or unlike bodies; " and so of the rest, both causes being 
true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the other a 
consequence only. Neither doth this call in question or derogate 
from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For as in 
civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique that can make 
other men the instruments of his will and ends, and yet never 
acquaint them with his purpose, so as they shall do it and yet not 
know what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning to those he 
employeth; so is the wisdom of God more admirable, when Nature 
intendeth one thing and Providence draweth forth another, than if 
He had communicated to particular creatures and motions the 
characters and impressions of His Providence. And thus much for 
metaphysic; the latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it 
confined to his proper place. 
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are those that derive from the divine nature, those that relate to the 
inherent goodness of God, for example. I begin by contrasting Greek 
and biblical cosmologies on questions of natural law, 
necessity/contingency, final causes, and divine will. 
It is well-known that antiquity had no concept of human will as we 
think of it. Albrecht Dihle shows that the classical world had no 
equivalent of the biblical concept of divine will either. It was not until 
about 170 CE that the Greeks fully grasped the difference between 
Greek and biblical cosmology. This difference centered on these 
concepts of will, human and divine, and is most clearly seen in 
Seneca's statement, Non pareo deo sed assentior. ("I do not obey 
God; rather, I agree with Him. ") The Greek demiurge was not so 
much a creator as a fashioner or shaper of eternal matter, and was 
therefore limited by the laws of a given reality in a way that Yahweh 
is not with respect to the on-going activity of creation. The Elder Pliny 
wrote: "Not even for god are all things possible... he cannot bestow 
eternity on mortals... he cannot cause twice ten not to be twenty or do 
other things along similar lines, and these facts unquestionably 
demonstrate the power of nature. " And Seneca again: "They who 
believe the gods do not want to do harm are mistaken; the gods 
cannot. " (cited in Dihle 1982, p. 18) 
Although these conceptions are often polytheistic in contradistinction 
to Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, the essential point holds across the 
, 
spectrum. The question of will does not emerge in these conceptions 
because the rationality/reasons by which the divine is constrained to 
order the world are the same rationality/reasons that constrain human 
will. The Platonists follow a much more stringent philosophical 
reasoning than some popular notions of religion on divine activity. 
Yet even they cannot conceive of compliance with God's commands 
without understanding what God's intentions are beyond those 
commands. And the just intentions of both the human and the divine 
are constrained by the demands of justice conceived apart from the 
divine. 
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The biblical account, by contrast, depicts a God unaccountable to 
external standards of rationality. Yahweh does not lie or act in self- 
contradiction in any way, but neither does God offer any other 
assurance of this consistency than the consistency of the divine being 
and authority. Nor does God always offer to demonstrate how this 
consistency plays out. As their sovereign, God does however make an 
unconditional commitment to the welfare of those in the divine 
covenant. Turning the traditional covenant form on its head God 
invokes the penalties of covenant violation on the divine person as 
suzerain, rather than on Abraham as the subjugated vassal. (See 
Genesis 15. ) This commitment is self-imposed, not a given of Platonic 
justice. The Greeks discovered this difference so late because they 
inevitably analyzed and interpreted exotic religions on the basis of a 
supposed vestigial natural knowledge of the cosmos enjoyed by all 
humankind in primeval times. As Dihle notes, they were looking for 
agreement between Plato and Moses. 
Why is Dihle's observation important? Notice the resemblance 
between this natural knowledge and many natural law positions on 
one point: both assume the absolute standing of their presuppositions 
concerning necessary final causes. The Aristotelian conception of the 
world limited the growth of natural science until the modem era. The 
Aristotelian emphasis on final causes and eternal forms effectively 
turned attention from empirical phenomena. Progress in science was 
pursued through the search for eternal patterns from which particulars 
were deduced, and the search for insight into the essences of natural 
objects from which behavior was then deduced. Socrates posits that to 
discover how any particular thing is ordered, it suffices to consider 
how it is best that it should be ordered, because this turns out to be the 
way that the thing is ordered. (Phaedo 97d) This broadly rationalist 
approach characterizes the Aristotelian tradition in the natural 
sciences. 
Some Christian thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition took this view as 
an implication of the assurance of Paul the Apostle that all things 
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work together for good. (Romans 8.28) As John Baillie points out, 
though, the new scientists made two important caveats. First, even if 
all particulars are derived from a pattern in the divine mind, we do not 
know that pattern antecedently. Bacon, Descartes and others take it as 
a matter of faith that the pattern is hidden. We cannot by a priori 
reasoning or necessary truths assuredly know God's purposes. We can 
only know what is. Secondly, the supposition of an eternal pattern 
entails that God had to make the world just as it has turned out to be. 
This denied the kind of freedom that theological voluntarism claimed 
for divine action. (Baillie 1952, pp. 19-25) 
Despite an awareness since Galen (see On the Uses of the Parts xi, 14) 
of the differences between the Mosaic and Platonic cosmologies, 
Aristotelian conceptions of divine impassibility greatly influenced 
medieval notions of God. On those conceptions, all created things 
have existence only as the objects of the eternal knowing and willing 
of God and their creaturely existence is directly grounded in the 
eternity of God. As T. F. Torrance notes, the early schoolmen do 
indeed reject the notion of the world as the emanation of God and the 
necessity of the world as linked to the necessity of the divine nature. 
But their thinking retains much of the same notion of the hierarchy of 
being, obscuring somewhat the Creator-creature distinction. Their 
conception implies "an eternal positing or even co-existence of 
crcaturely being with God's eternal Being" making the denial of 
aeternitas mundi difficult. In De aeternitate mundi contra 
murmurantes, Aquinas argues that there is no contradiction between 
affirming that something is created and that it was never non-existent 
(Torrance 1969, pp. 59-60n1). 
This sense that creation is in some sense co-existent with God 
connotes the intelligibility of the natural order, an essential 
presumption of empirical science, but it also entails that real 
knowledge is only possible through the understanding of eternal 
patterns. It undercuts contingency, another pillar of modem empirical 
science. Aquinas, following Aristotle, believes that the intelligence 
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only knows universals, whereas the senses know contingents. To the 
extent that the intellect knows contingents, it does so only indirectly 
and as they contain elements of necessity. "Hence if we consider the 
objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of 
necessary things. " (ST 1.86.3) So discerning final causes is the surest 
form of exploration in the natural sciences. 
By contrast, there is strong evidence that the shift to modem 
empirically-based science can be traced to the theological voluntarism 
of Scotus and Ockham. Contrary to popular retelling, it is not at all the 
case that Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton reject the concept of 
final causes or God's purposes. Rather, they are frustrated with final 
causes as explanations. They want explanations that can allow 
cumulative insights into natural processes, efficient causes. 5° More 
importantly for this discussion, they reject the belief that we can know 
final causes with certainty through unaided reason. This rejection is 
theologically driven. God is not bound by rationalist presuppositions. 
It is this conviction that enables these pioneers and others to undertake 
their work without the constraints of an Aristotelian theory of nature. 
(Davis 1984; Foster 1936a; Foster 1936b; and see Boyle 1996) The 
result is not theoretical incoherence or conclusions detached from 
reason. Rather, this theological understanding prepares them to find a 
stranger form of consistency and harmony than was conceptually 
possible under Aristotelian rationalism. The methodological 
implications of the differences between the Aristotelian and biblical 
worldvicws are monumental. In a seminal essay, M. B. Foster says, 
so This criticism of Aristotelianism is more directed at scholastic 
metaphysicians than at Aristotle. For my purposes, however, the 
distinction is not relevant. The focus of the criticism is divine 
rationalism (Aristotle, Aquinas, et al. ) over against divine 
voluntarism (Scotus, Ockham, et al. ). 
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[T]he method of Galilean science [... ] presupposes (a) 
that it is impossible that nature should not embody a 
mathematically intelligible scheme and exhibit laws 
mathematically definable; but (b) that, which of 
possible alternative schemes it embodies, and which of 
several laws equally definable mathematically it 
exhibits, can be decided only by appeal to observation 
and experiment. (Foster 1936b, p. 34) 
Thus the new Scotist theological paradigm associates intelligibility 
with contingency. The world is understandable but consistently weird, 
challenging conventional assumptions. God's creative activity is 
contingent on divine will and therefore can only be known 
empirically. It is wrongheaded to assume that we can deductively 
discern purposes, in the common usage of the term, in nature. 
The relevance for moral philosophy is this. For precisely the same 
reason, we should not assume that humanoid flourishing is a 
metaphysical necessity. Its relationship to a comprehensive 
understanding of the good cannot be antecedently deduced. Cultural 
conclusions concerning human flourishing differ significantly. More 
basically, we have no reason to think that human flourishing is 
rationally a cosmological given any more than is the flourishing of the 
dinosaurs. Just as the natural order is contingent beyond the 
imagination of Aristotle and his heirs, so also is the moral order as it 
relates to the natural order. There is no reason to think that the moral 
order could not have been otherwise. Nothing prevented God from 
stipulating other means to our final end as co-lovers of God. The 
contingency of both the natural and the moral orders stands in 
contradistinction to the Aristotelian paradigm of antecedently- 
knowable final causes. The full significance of this claim will only be 
apparent in conjunction with a difference in the Scotist understanding 
of subjective human freedom to will other than our flourishing, to be 
examined later in chapter 9. For objective morality, the significance is 
this. We should not assume that we can arrive by reason at a certain 
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knowledge of God's purposes for human life even in the natural 
realm. 
To be sure, moral psychology necessitates coming to conclusions 
concerning our final end. We form hypotheses about our final ends for 
the purposes of ordering our common life together. And as Part One 
demonstrated, these conclusions provide at least the simulacra of the 
moral virtues, divergent as these conclusions are. According to the 
biblical traditions, God has made something of divine purposes known 
in what harmonizes with our developed nature. The extent of that 
knowledge is notoriously controversial, even within those traditions. 
Natural lawyers typically underestimate the direct and indirect 
influence of the Bible itself on conclusions about moral norms, and 
therefore underestimate the diversity of conclusions possible in 
reasoning to natural law. Even the injunctions of the Second Table are 
problematic. Scotus thinks that Paul the Apostle, for example, is 
saying what he seems to be saying when he says that without "the 
law" (the Decalogue), he would not have known that coveting was 
wrong. (Duns Scotus 1997, p. 199) 
We might hope that the moral order happens to coincide with the 
flourishing of our nature as social/biological/rational/spiritual beings. 
Without reason to think otherwise, we might even assume that this is 
the case, and such a postulate would turn out to be correct, I think. 
God's will is for our natural flourishing, at least in general. It would 
be correct to infer a "fit" between our dispositions and our 
environment, following exactly the kind of rational processes for the 
achievement of human goods seen in the previous chapters, ff this 
inference were viewed as a function of gracious providence, not as a 
given of metaphysical necessity. s' 
51 The biblical authors seem to take this fit between our dispositions 
and our environment as an act of grace, not a given, even with 
respect to human life prior to human d ravity. (See, for example, 
Psalms 8.4ff.; 104.18ff; cp. Job 39.13 Nothing in these comments 
or in my argument should be interprete as an explanation of how 
("efficient cause") this fit comes about. 
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It turns out that human goods are high-ranking goods from a divine 
perspective. Because God wills human flourishing, deductions about 
the requirements of morality from human flourishing turn out to be 
correct, as far as they go, contingent upon that divine will. But God 
should not be understood to have been under any external compulsion 
to will our flourishing. And whether because it is God's will or by 
virtue of some other cosmology, the ranking of the human good is 
relative to what we understand to be the good. Without that contingent 
dependence, human flourishing as a grounding of morality is merely 
an anthropocentric presumption. The purpose of human life cannot be 
conclusively derived from flourishing understood on its own merits 
without reference to God's will. 
At this point I must begin to address positively and directly my theory 
of theological voluntarism in the biblical tradition. A central 
conclusion of this theory will be divine freedom with regard to the 
ends of human existence. 
Classical and biblical understandings of origins 
Biblical theological voluntarism presents the structure of moral 
argument in the form of an assertion about the genesis of the moral 
order. What Part One gropingly referred to as "the good", I am 
asserting now, is the God of the biblical narrative. The relationship 
between the good and the good life is definitional. The good life is the 
life directed toward God and that according to the will of God. The 
framework or "context" in which we should understand the 
establishment of the moral order is an absence of context. God 
Almighty existing in self-sufficiency prior to time, space and matter 
freely creates and legislates out of the plenitude of God's being. 
Everything other than God, whether temporal or material or 
conceptual, is a function of God's will and power. So, as John Duns 
Scotus puts it, "[E]verything other than God is good because it is 
willed by God, and not vice versa.... " (Duns Scotus 1997, p. 16) If we 
consider the concept of Yahweh in the original context of Genesis, 
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and not only in the medieval developments and syntheses of that 
concept, we can more easily see the importance of this God's identity 
as Creator. 
The Hebrew prophets constantly refer to the differences between their 
God and the local deities of the Ancient Near East, differences 
following from the biblical account of creation. Over against the 
polytheistic theomachy and theogamy of the Mesopotamian deities, 
the personification of the planets and the elements, and above all the 
underlying moral dualism of those cosmologies, God is unique. 
Yahweh creates alone. There is not a hint even of the existence of evil 
in the creation story. As the tragic events unroll leading to separation 
from the good life and especially from God, evil does not make a 
dramatic entrance as a counterbalancing force. It appears in the form 
of deception and doubt, so that it is not even clear there exactly how 
evil comes into the picture, except as a misdirection of goodness. 
Throughout the Hebrew scriptures, but especially in rivalry with other 
pretended deities, it is God's creative power that sets Yahweh apart 
from and above rival deities, which the Hebrew prophets usually 
deride as non-existent. It is the conception of God as Almighty 
Creator that is foundational to divine authority. 52 
Building from this premise, the biblical God is the beginning and the 
end of everything else, and any purpose God has in creating those 
things must be self-referential. God is perfectly happy prior to 
creation. God does not act therefore out of need, constraint or external 
obligation, but freely and out of the plenitude of divine joy and being. 
"All that the Lord pleases, he does, in heaven and on earth, in the seas 
and all deeps. " (Psalm 135.6) God therefore takes pleasure in all that 
52 What is a point of commonality between the religions of the rest of 
the Ancient Near East and the Hebrews, and every moral theory to 
the present, is the notion that first principles in social theory are in 
some relation of dependence to a tradition's theory of origins. For a 
postmodern example in how this observation applies to secular 
theory, an approach in the tradition of Augustine's theory of the two 
cities, see Milbank (1990). 
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God does and all God's acts are overflowing demonstrations of that 
plenitude. (Piper, 2000, pp. 501) 
In view of the excellences of the divine being, God loves God. This 
love is perfect; God unfailingly pursues God's own advantage. 
Goodness and justice in this context must be understood with respect 
to the infinite value and worth of God. To the extent that we can 
conceive of such a state of affairs, it makes no sense to speak of God's 
justice prior to creation as anything other than God's love for God's 
own interest and unfailing pursuit of that interest. Absent something 
external to God, this divine love for God's own interest must be 
unconstrained. Whatever God desires, whatever pleases God, just is 
right. In the subsequent condition of subjective moral creatures, the 
difference between the love of what is good and right on one hand, 
and the love of what is to the creature's advantage, on the other, are 
critical to morality. But the desire for God's own interest and the 
desire for justice cannot come into tension in God's self, if indeed it 
makes sense to speak of God's desire for justice as distinct from 
divine interest. (See Williams 2000b, sect. 2. b. ) 
What changes once we begin to consider God's goodness with respect 
to creation? How do the divine love, justice, and rationality constrain 
divine actions with regard to creation? In effect, nothing significantly 
changes. If to act justly is to give everything its due, then how is God 
just to creation? God cannot be understood as owing anything to 
creation, since God creates everything from an unconstrained will, and 
for no other purpose than whatever God wills. (Maclntyre concurs in 
1985, p. 368. ) 
Many scholars have tried to mitigate the conclusions of noted 
voluntarists in order to make them more palatable. Thomas Williams 
(2000b) illustrates the failure of these mitigating attempts, in 
demonstrating just how radical John Duns Scotus, for example, is. 
Williams evokes an analogy of a type often used to demonstrate 
constraints on God's creative rationality. Suppose there is a professor 
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of philosophy whose sole commitment is to the pursuit of truth. This 
high-minded and Platonistic inclination entails that she has no 
obligation to her students as such. But, the argument goes, this 
obviously does not mean that the professor may attain her purpose 
regardless of how she treats her students, since mistreatment of her 
students could compromise the attainment of that purpose. She will 
treat her students well, though only as a means to her purpose. 
Likewise, while God's only a priori interest is in God's own interests, 
God's treatment of creatures will rise above the absence of obligation 
these creatures can impose of themselves in order to fulfill divine 
purposes. 
But, says Williams, if the professor in the analogy could reach her 
purpose regardless of her treatment of her students, then there could 
be no obligation on her part to treat her students in any particular way. 
This situation is much closer to that of God. God can love Godself 
regardless of how God treats creatures. There seems no way of God's 
dealing with creatures that is necessary to the fulfillment of the sole 
obligation to the divine person. If, antecedently, God is constrained 
only to love the divine being, then nothing God does with respect to 
anything God has created could be wrong. 
If God has in fact subsequently made commitments to certain 
intermediate ends with respect to the creation, a great deal changes. 
These willed goods and ends would form a self-imposed constraint of 
whatever duration has been promised. On my understanding, God has 
in fact treated human beings with anything but the indifference 
corresponding to this analogy. In fact, God's treatment is the highest 
beneficence imaginable, and what we do not yet know of it, Paul the 
Apostle says, is beyond human imagination. Furthermore, this divine 
commitment is not subsequent to God's creative act ("... the Lamb 
slain from the foundation of the world. " Revelation 13.8) 
The argument here is about what God's justice entails necessarily. 
God's treatment of the creation cannot be constrained by divine 
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justice. Human flourishing is contingent, not a logical necessity 
following from eternal patterns or laws of nature. How far can this 
claim be carried? What can God, without self-contradiction, rationally 
do in creative and legislative freedom? 
Are there limits to what God can rationally and justly legislate? 
Scotus thinks that the only necessary final end determined by nature is 
God. This natural law is a function of the unchangeable nature of God. 
Any intermediate ends are up to God's will. 
Critics such as Maclntyre (1985) agree with much of what I have just 
said concerning God's creative freedom. But they concentrate on 
God's legislative freedom, what God can legislate that we should do. 
The most common criticism of theological voluntarism is that it 
entails arbitrariness on God's part. It is to this accusation of 
arbitrariness that I now turn. So far I have tried to establish that it is 
God who sets the ends and purposes of all creatures and that it is 
misconceived to think of God's goodness before the existence of 
created entities and the ends for which they are created. But 
theological voluntarism also seems to endorse the possibility that God 
can make an evil action good by fiat. The classic objection to 
theological voluntarism is that God could tell us to commit murder, 
adultery or theft. 
From the standpoint of theological voluntarism, many objections to 
that theory represent the obverse and reverse of a single coinage. 
Either these objections contain implicit assumptions that entail a 
contrary account of morality, or they contain implicit assumptions 
derived from a contrary account on morality. Theological voluntarism 
entails that the coin of our moral order could have been different, and 
indeed could change somewhat from what it is now. Other than the 
obligation to reach our final end, the truths of morality are objective 
truths, but we have no reason to assume that they are necessary truths. 
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Two matters of linguistic housekeeping must be addressed at the 
outset. First, "murder, " "adultery, " and "theft" are all actions wrong 
by definition, so that a "rightful murder" is an oxymoron. It is a non- 
sense that of course cannot be defended. Notice that the basic problem 
with this characterization of the theory does not change if we 
acknowledge that it is an oxymoron, but then insist that divine 
voluntarism makes God capable of commanding acts we believe to be 
unjust. Of course it's counter-intuitive. But is it right? If the criticism 
is simply intended as a warning that the theory runs counter to our 
basic intuitions, then it should be stated thus. Such a warning 
summons us to examine the validity of the argument for the theory, 
but then is not mistaken for an argument against it. Stated as an 
argument, the objection simply imports an understanding of justice 
independent of God in order to attack a theory that claims that 
morality is not independent of God. Every theory of ethics leads to 
conclusions that rival theories call unjust. If the theory in question is 
correct, then the others are wrong. 
Second, we should use the term "arbitrary" carefully. For the purposes 
of this argument, "arbitrary" could be understood in ortt; of two ways. 
If arbitrary means "without reference to a standard or law other than 
those established by God's own will"-arbitrium, in Latin-then it is 
of course no substantive objection that the theory makes morality 
arbitrary, since this is precisely the claim of theological voluntarism. 
If, on the other hand, arbitrary means "whimsical" or "capricious" and 
therefore "contradictory" or "irrational" then this is an important 
objection. 53 Does the theory entail irrational or contradictory decision- 
making? Can the biblical God make what we might otherwise 
understand as an instance of injustice a rightful act? God does not act 
53 Harr notes also that this second meaning of "arbitrary" connotes a 
reason that is not being given due consideration. (2000, p. 3) Objectors to theological voluntarism say that the accommodation of human flourishing constitutes a decisive reason for God's choice of 
routes to human union with God. This claim presupposes the 
rationalist position. I deny it below. 
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irrationally or contradictorily, yet is not constrained to act in a way 
that will satisfy our intuitions here. 
Maclntyre's most complete objection to theological voluntarism 
appeals to our knowledge of God's promulgated law as it relates to 
our nature. This nature is not presented as descriptively value-free, he 
says. (1986, p. 367) We must assume human goods and ends here in 
order to deduce morality from human nature. 
Scotist moral philosophy reformulates the relationship between 
morality and nature. As in Aristotelian eudaimonism, Scotus gives a 
relational account of our ends and means to those ends. 54 The central 
relationship is not with other humans, however, but with God. The 
love within the Trinity is paradigmatic. God must love the divine 
essence, according to Scotus. Since God creates everything else, God 
must will also that everything else seek God as its final end. Humans 
are uniquely able to do so as a free act. It is God who designates the 
way to this end. The only necessary end a human or any other entity in 
creation has by nature is the love of God as underived good. Scotist 
ethics are grounded in nature, but only in this most basic sense of 
divine nature. The only necessary laws of human nature are those 
relative to God. Only the First Table of the Decalogue (the first three 
commandments directly concerning God), therefore, is the law of 
nature in the strictest sense. "What pertains to the law of nature is 
either a practical principle known immediately from its terms or 
necessary conclusions that follow from such principles. In either case 
they possess necessary truth. " (Duns Scotus 1997, p. 199) All other 
natural law is only so in a secondary way. The Second Table (the last 
seven commandments concerning how to love our neighbor) is only 
fitting and contingent and thus a loose sort of natural law. This 
conclusion is at odds with Thomistic natural law theories that see all 
sa My understanding of Scotus is indebted to the accounts of John 
Hare (2001) and Thomas Williams (1998; 2000). 
192 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
Ten Commandments, at least, as necessary and irrevocable dictates of 
ss the natural law. 
In previous chapters I have tried to show that goods and ends flow out 
of a larger understanding of the good, and are ranked as. goods by 
virtue of their contribution to that larger good. Here also I want to 
emphasize the contingent nature of the relationship between our 
natural good and our final end, with the conclusion that morality is not 
tied to specific means to that end. We are quite used to the way things 
are. Our thinking is premised on the given-ness of the current order 
and sets about trying to understand this order. Theological voluntarism 
questions the necessity of this order. The fact that union with God is 
our final end does not make any natural good protected by the second 
table the way to reach that final end. Nothing prevents God from 
willing another route to our final end as co-lovers with God of the 
divine nature. 
Unconventional understandings of human flourishing are conceivable. 
The variations in the "social interaction" of animal species suggest 
that human flourishing could be at least somewhat different, were our 
ends different. Natural law thinking and some questionable forms of 
scientific hypothesizing may push us to see necessary norms in the 
Second Table where they do not exist. Scotus notes that if the primary 
end of marriage were childbearing, for example, polygamy would 
seem to be indicated. (Duns Scotus 1997, p. 210) He believes that 
commandments such as honoring one's parents and respecting the 
lives, property and spouses of others fit well with our ultimate end Yet 
we do not know that God could not have stipulated another way in 
each instance. (Ord. 3, d. 37, n. 8 cited in Williams 1998) Perhaps we 
could have essentially the same natures as now, but also have different 
means to reach those ends and purposes of our nature. It is not 
inconceivable that humans could thrive under a context of communal 
ss Scotus' understanding of the Second Table as the dictates of 
practical reason is similar to Aquinas'. The difference is that Scotus 
doesn't think that natural law with respect to the goods inherent in 
the fulfillment of human nature is natural law in the strict sense. 
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property and even communal families, thus voiding the relevance of 
commands against theft, adultery, covetousness, and especially 
honoring one's biological parents. It requires more effort to imagine 
circumstances under which killing the innocent would not impede the 
fulfillment of our nature. And an example of dispensing from the 
necessity of truth-telling would require a separate argument, perhaps 
built on a world where mind-reading were possible, again with the 
stipulation against logical contradiction. And as the story of the 
binding of Isaac shows, divine intervention limitlessly expands the 
options, in extremis. Theists open to such a possibility must account 
for it in the structure of the morally possible. 
It should also be noted that several conclusions reasonably drawn 
from our natures are not confirmed by divine revelation. People with 
no physical or psychological anomalies, for example, may live rich, 
full, celibate lives without following the obvious indications of their 
nature in genital sexuality. Martyrs, heroes, hermits, prophets, 
geniuses, artists often do not attain anything like the standard of the 
good life as we conceive of it. Some lives seem to make up in 
brilliance what they lack in duration. These examples suggest a looser 
connection between what our natures indicate and conventions in 
moral norms. 
The point here is not that the constraints found in the Decalogue are 
not binding. God has willed their obligatory status and so they are 
binding. The point is that, contrary to the Thomist account, the 
dictates of the Second Table are binding neither by metaphysical 
necessity nor by natural law in the strictest, analytic (per se nota ex 
terminis) sense. The distinction here enables Scotus to distinguish the 
morality of the act from the act itself more sharply than in the Thomist 
theories of natural law that preceded his. It is not merely acting in 
accord with our nature or any natural good that makes an action 
moral. Nor does mere obedience or conformity with right behavior 
ensure that an action demonstrates virtue. Genuine virtue requires not 
only the right action, but also right intention. An act may appear 
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virtuous, but we can only know that it was virtuous if we know why 
the person acted thus. (MacIntyre 1991) 
Are omnipotence and evil compatible concepts? 
Is this shaping up to be the characterization of God that so repels 
critics of theological voluntarism, a god capable of the most horrible 
things imaginable, an evil being, by any other account? 56 For many 
critics, particularly non-theists, this seems to be exactly the result 
expected. I will begin to defend my position against this criticism by 
modifying an argument by Paul Rooney. This thought experiment is 
not the focus of my argument because it deals in possible worlds 
different from ours. Nevertheless, it calls into question some of the 
basic presuppositions of eudaimonistic rationalism. 57 
Rooney (1996b, pp. 39ff) proposes three ways in which we might 
conceive of an "omnipotent demon. " I here modify the argument to 
ask if an omnipotent being capable of doing evil is a coherent concept. 
I say that it is not. 58 
56 This may or may not be part of Maclntyre's critique in "Which 
god...? 985). On one hand, he recognizes that God owes nothing 
to creation; he says his objection concerns what God can order us to do, contrary to morality as he understands it. On the other hand, it 
contrasts with Maclntyre's comments there and in Three Rival 
Versions (1990: 155) about how we jud&e the goodness of God as a 
test of practical authority: "If a believer in an omnipotent 
Nobodaddy is apparently confronted by a divine action which seems 
to him or her from the standpoint which he or she has hitherto 
adopted the infliction of an unjust gratuitous and unmerited harm 
upon him or her by Nobodaddy, he or she has no good reason to rule 
out the possibility that matters just are as they seem to be: 
Nobodaddy has inflicted or has commanded the infliction by 
someone else of just such a harm. " (1985, p. 360) 
57 This section is highly speculative. Its theological novelty is 
mitigated somewhat by its purpose as a via negativa, rather than as a 
positive conclusion concerning the divine nature. 
58 In his objections to theistic voluntarism, Daniel Goldstick (1974) 
says that the claim that whatever God happens to will is good is 
equivalent to the claim that there could not be an omnipotent demon. 
Paul Rooney accepts the validity of this equivalence. While one evil 
act by any other being would not necessarily make that being a 
demon, one evil act by God could have the same effect. If, Rooney 
illustrates, God gave the entire body of sacred writ but maliciously 
neglected to inform us that its assertions are only correct if preceded 
by the phrase, "It is not the case that... ", then this would seem, in 
effect, to have the same consequence as repeated demonic activity. 
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How might we conceive of an omnipotent being doing evil? 
1. The being determines what is to be called good and what is to 
be called bad, and then acts such that its actions are bad. 
2. The being creates a world and humanoids to live in it, decides 
what will lead to humanoid flourishing, and then acts so as to 
make it impossible for humanoids to attain that flourishing. 
3. The being inflicts pain on its creatures, torturing animalic 
creatures and humanoids in particular. (Adapted from Rooney 
1996b, p. 41) 
The first case entails a simple contradiction in the being's will. 
"Good" and "bad" must entail, "willed to be done" and "willed to be 
avoided" and therefore presumably "wants to be done" and "wants to 
So if an omnipotent demon is impossible, then the first claim is 
correct. Whatever God wills is necessarily good. (Rooney 1996b, 
pp. 39ff) 
Rooney makes a logical error here in accepting Goldstick's 
equivalence of "Whatever God wills is good" and "There could be 
no omnipotent demon. " The former entails the latter, but not vice 
versa. An objector might wonder, that is, if this being could do one 
or more evil acts that did not in effect make the being the equivalent 
of an omnipotent demon. Such a being would not be good in the 
way divine voluntarists claim that God is good, but would the being 
really be an omnipotent demon? Could it be shown that if an 
omnipotent being could do any evil, then it is in effect an 
omnipotent demon? Perhaps, but in any case, I deny the antecedent 
and that is all that is necessary. Because I think that both claims are 
impossible, it is sufficient to show that it is impossible for an 
omnipotent being to do evil. Goldstick's equivalence should be 
modified as follows. To say that whatever God wills is necessarily 
good not only means that there can be no such thing as an 
omnipotent demon, but also that there can be no omnipotent being 
that does evil. If the concept of an omnipotent being that does evil is 
incoherent, then a fortiori so is the concept of an omnipotent demon. 
In addition to modifying his conclusion as just mentioned, I use a 
key term differently. Divine voluntarists such as Rooney pose an 
unnecessary barrier to the theory's acceptance when they use the 
term "human" with respect to alternate worlds. On a Christian view 
of things, "human" connotes "made in God's image, " "fallen, " "the 
substance of the incarnation, death, resurrection, glorification, 
second advent, and future form of Christ, " and so forth. To speak of 
the "human" is therefore to invoke, by connotation, divine promises 
and purposes, and therefore a vast number of self-imposed limits on 
what God can do. Jewish and Christian notions of what it means to 
be human greatly influence the moral presuppositions of those 
within the Western world, even those who do not accept those 
notions. And if the Christian view is correct, then those outside the 
Western world probably recognize something following from these 
characteristics also. So I refer to these speculative creatures as 
"humanoid" rather than "human. " 
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be avoided. " It makes no sense-it involves a self-contradiction-that 
an omnipotent being would want something to be done and then avoid 
it, or not want it done and then do it. (Rooney 1996b, p. 41) 
Rooney's reply to the second case is to underline the error of equating 
the frustration of humanoid flourishing with evil. To frustrate any 
creatures' attempts to achieve what is "good for them" is not wrong 
unless it is previously determined that their flourishing is a high- 
ranking good relative to all other ends. I add that if conflict is possible 
between humanoid flourishing and other ends, then they must be 
ranked. That ranking would seem to be a matter of the omnipotent 
being's will. If the being wills that humanoids flourish, it could not 
without contradiction frustrate their flourishing. If however the being 
determined that conditions leading to the hindrance of humanoid 
flourishing are a good thing, then it would not be evil to frustrate that 
flourishing. 
What Rooney does not supply is an example of how an omnipotent 
being could determine the sort of humanoid behavior that leads to 
humanoid flourishing, yet without also willing that flourishing. This 
may be the most difficult part of the theory to grasp because of its 
counterintuitive nature. Though he does not refer to Scotus, Rooney's 
argument here echoes yet another argument by the schoolman. Scotus, 
too, believes that the creation of a being does not necessarily entail 
willing that the creature flourish. How could a being determine what it 
means for some class of things to flourish and yet also will the 
frustration of those things? I offer two illustrations to show that this is 
a rational possibility. 
A woman plants a grove of pine trees. The "natural good" of a pine 
tree, at least as we conventionally conceive of it, is maturation and 
reproduction. Left to the positive processes of its native environment, 
this good will be the result of the course of the life of each tree in the 
grove. The woman might have other purposes for the grove, however, 
that frustrate this end. She wants the trees for firewood, Christmas 
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trees, or furniture-anything other than the unqualified good of the 
trees. 
There are two problems with this illustration, it might be objected. 
First, the woman did not create pine trees as a species, as the 
omnipotent being in question is supposed to have done, but simply 
uses the tree for her own purposes. Second, the omnipotent being of 
the thought experiment could just as well will that every pine tree on 
the planet be similarly prevented from achieving its natural good. This 
seems irrational. On what rationale would this being determine a 
natural good for a class of things and then frustrate that end without 
exception? My second illustration shows how it could be rational to 
frustrate the natural good or end of a thing without exception. 
A man conceives of, designs and builds machines for throwing 
lacrosse balls. The machines throw balls within a specific range of 
speeds, distances, and trajectories that simulate the passes and shots of 
lacrosse offensive players. The man has made the machine to help his 
daughter, a lacrosse defensive player, develop her defensive stick- 
handling skills. The "natural good" of the machines is to make good 
offensive passes and shots. The man's purpose is to enable his 
daughter to frustrate those passes and shots, and it is the man's hope 
that she frustrate every throw, no matter how difficult to stop. If a 
machine makes flawless throws, but for any reason does not develop 
the skills of the daughter, the machine cannot be considered as having 
reached its final end. If my illustration succeeds, it shows how a 
creator could rationally create something whose purpose or final end 
opposes its natural end. The natural end places no a priori constraints 
on how each instance reaches its final end. 59 And if the illustration 
succeeds, then its application to the ends of a rational entity requires 
59 The illustration also suggests that it might be misleading to stress 
classes of things over individual instances of those things. If the 
final end or purpose is prior to the natural end or purpose in the way 
that I claim, it is possible to individuate radically each instance of 
the class. Although I can't explore the implications here, in the case 
of human beings, they are of great significance for personal 
freedom. 
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only a distinction in the entity's will corresponding to this distinction 
in ends. This counterintuitive possibility will be examined in chapter 
9. 
Let's get back to Rooney and his third case. If torture and the pointless 
infliction of pain as such are evil, and evil is defined as what the 
omnipotent creator wishes to be avoided, then the being could not 
inflict evil on its animalic and humanoid creatures without 
inconsistency. Could the pointless infliction of pain or the creation of 
creatures just to torture for fun not involve a contradiction? I don't see 
how. In conclusion, an omnipotent being that can do evil is not a 
coherent conception. 
Is this argumentation circular? Ultimately, perhaps, but not viciously 
so. It shows why nothing but goodness can emanate from an 
omnipotent being when omnipotence includes the determination of 
morality external to that being. "That something is good carries the 
implication that in some circumstance it ought to be so; that an action 
is good implies that in some circumstance it ought to be done.... If 
goodness is what ought to be then omnipotent God must be good; and 
if goodness is not what ought to be then the result is a confusion, and 
incoherence. " (Rooney 1996b, p. 42) It is because of the complete 
absence of antecedent or conceptual framework, moral or otherwise, 
that God's will and power cannot be understood as subordinate to 
divine goodness. 
At this point, Thomistic natural lawyers such as Maclntyre should 
raise a powerful objection concerning the object of practical 
reasoning. There seems to be fundamental disconnect in the Thomist 
and Scotist references to human nature and social goods. 
Applicability to Maclntyrean natural law 
Scotus/Hare are saying that God could have prescribed that we reach 
our final end of union with God through other means than those 
dictated by the second table of the Decalogue. (Or more precisely but 
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weakly, we do not know that God could not have prescribed a 
different route. ) Scotus specifically mentions that the prohibition 
against theft assumes the existence of private property. God might 
have insisted that we hold all property in common despite our 
tendency not to treat communal property with as much care as we treat 
our own. (Duns Scotus 1997, p. 200) Hare imagines the possibility of 
a celibate society in which sexuality was expressed in ways other than 
genital sexual intercourse. Say that humans were spontaneously 
generated as seventeen-year-olds. In such a case, many of the 
supposed dictates of natural law would be moot. "What I am objecting 
to is the deduction of the ten commandments from our created nature. " 
And: "The point is that there is no necessary connection between our 
created natures and the way we reach our final end. " Hare's 
theological voluntarism flies in the face of those natural law theories 
in which "if we know the truths about our nature, the injunctions 
follow. " (2001, pp. 68,69) 
Thomists in the mold of Maclntyre might object that the "nature" in 
question seems to be our physical make-up and psychological 
disposition-on Maclntyre's terms, elements of our nature-as-it- 
happens-to-be. This is not Maclntyre's version of natural law, and 
Maclntyre is indeed following Aquinas here. 60 Maclntyre, Aquinas, 
and Aristotle do not argue for the dictates of morality merely from 
our-nature-as-it-is. Indeed, as we have seen, Maclntyre has given good 
reasons for thinking that theories that do so inevitably fail. The three- 
part structure of Aristotelian moral justification argues instead for the 
necessity of the virtues as the means for moving from our nature-as-it- 
is to recognized social goods as constitutive of our nature-as it-ought- 
to-be. It is arguing from specific social goods as ends. If we recognize 
these social goods, Maclntyre says, then we must, as a matter of 
practical rationality, act and cultivate the moral dispositions necessary 
to attain them. For example, if we recognize the good of raising 
60 The three-part structure of Aristotelianism is indeed that of 
Aquinas. See Rhonheimer 2000, pp. 1-15. 
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children to take some place in society, then stable homes are 
necessary, meaning minimal standards of long-term marital fidelity, 
personal sacrifice, and truth-telling-in short, the Second Table. 
By contrast, the objection continues, Hare's Scotist theory envisions 
other possible ways of reaching our ultimate end, but these other ways 
entail other goods-hypothetical goods in hypothetical worlds- 
relative to our nature, as intermediate ends. Scotus' and Hare's 
hypothetical ends may require different "virtues" as means, but that is 
because they are such radically different ends. The moral requirements 
of both sorts of theory are different, but so are their intermediate ends. 
A hypothetical world of spontaneously-generated seventeen-year-olds 
may entail something other than the Second Table, but that says 
nothing to our world. So even if my argument succeeds as a 
hypothetical, it merely confirms some of the claims of my Part One, 
though with respect to other worlds. If the goods of child-raising as 
part of the flourishing of our nature are the social goods of our world, 
however, then the Hare/Scotist moral theory does not seem capable of 
scoring points here against the Aristotelian theory. It's not that 
Scotism wins in a confrontation, but that there seems to be a failure to 
bring the Scotist and Thomist claims into disagreement with regard to 
our world. For there to be a confrontation, it must be shown how the 
claims of theological voluntarism relate to this three-part structure and 
especially to social goods. 
I respond as follows. The point of confrontation is in the 
Thomist/Aristotelian assumption that the life of flourishing just is the 
good life, such that no distinction between the two is possible, let 
alone necessary. I have denied this conflation, from the perspective of 
God's creative and God's legislative freedom. I have argued that from 
the perspective of creation, the relationship between the two is 
contingent. We don't know that God could not have willed the 
flourishing of humanoids. Only the demonstration that God's willing 
against humanoid flourishing is a logical or metaphysical 
impossibility can justify the assumption that the flourishing life just is 
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the good life, and therefore that the pursuit of flourishing, as distinct 
from the good life, just is morality. 
As noted, however, God's creative freedom is not the focus of my 
claims. Setting aside considerations of possible worlds, there is 
another point of confrontation-divine freedom in divine legislation 
for our world. The binding of Isaac, again, belies the claim of Thomist 
natural law. In brief, nothing obliges God to direct humans along a 
straight-line route to flourishing. Explicit reference to God's will is 
not rationally redundant to the identification of our telos. 
If not, then it follows that the moral psychology of pursuing 
flourishing as our ultimate end is not the moral psychology of 
pursuing the good life for the sake of the good as our ultimate end. 
Before I can outline a structure of morality in the subject 
corresponding to the objective distinction between the good life and 
the flourishing life, however, I must explain divine authority better. 
A perennial criticism of divine command theory has been that it treats 
agents like infants rather than adults. (See Nowell-Smith 1967. ) In 
order to refute this objection and to build a bridge to the structure of 
morality in the subject, I have to show how God is both a theoretical 
and a practical authority in stipulating the means to our final end. 
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AUTHORITY IN THEOLOGICAL VOLUNTARISM 
Theological voluntarism raises issues concerning divine authority. 
Since authority concerns both belief and practice, authority can be 
theoretical or practical or some combination of the two. A theoretical 
authority is a person whose sincere assertions give others strong 
reasons for believing the claims asserted, on the basis of the 
authority's knowledge in the subject area: "Katz thinks that this is a 
genuine Monet. " "Walters says that we would not have a chance of 
winning a lawsuit. " A practical authority is a person whose sincere 
directives give others reasons to do what the authority demands, on 
the basis of a right to rule in a particular domain of activity: (Father to 
son: ) "Clean up your room. " (Police officer to gawking driver: ) "Keep 
moving. " If God's will is determinative in moral obligation, then is 
divine authority theoretical or practical? If both, then in what is it 
theoretical, and in what is it practical? 
With respect to the moral agent, my theory raises another set of issues 
as well concerning divine authority. In the obligations that it claims to 
impose, does theological voluntarism treat the person under authority 
as a rationally-mature subject? Is my form of theological voluntarism 
compatible with the direction of one's life according to justice and 
reason rather than mere coercion or benefit? 
The issues here are the identity of the good life and our motivation to 
attain it. As noted since chapter 2, eudaimonism conflates the 
flourishing life and the good life. Theological voluntarism denies this 
conflation. As a result of this disagreement, theistic eudaimonism and 
theological voluntarism see divine authority differently. Because they 
see no further distinction necessary to identifying human goodness 
than the goods of human flourishing, eudaimonists of course conclude 
that explicit reference to divine will is not necessary to motivate us to 
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the human end identified either. In the context of his objection to the 
moral psychology of John Duns Scotus, MacIntyre says, 
Aquinas, like Aristotle, can find no room for any 
question as to why, given that one recognizes that 
something is one's true good, one should act so as to 
achieve it. Neither further reason, nor-for the morally 
educated, virtue-informed person whose will is rightly 
ordered by the intellect-further motive, is either 
necessary or possible. Hence to know that God 
commands those precepts of the natural law, in 
obedience to which one's good is to be realized, gives 
one no further, additional reason for obedience to 
those precepts, except insofar as our knowledge of 
God's unqualified goodness and omniscience gives us 
reasons-as it does-for holding his judgments of our 
good, as promulgated in the Old and New Laws, to be 
superior to our own. The `ought' of `One ought to obey 
God' is the same `ought' as the `ought' of `To do so 
and so is the good of such a one; so such a one ought 
to do so and so'-the same `ought, 'that is, as the 
`ought' of practical reasoning. (MacIntyre 1990, p. 
154; emphases added) 
So on the eudaimonist picture, the expressed will of God adds nothing 
to moral psychology, and the role of God is, at most, that of the 
original Promulgator of a necessary natural law in the Divine Mind 
and of Legal Advisor concerning that necessary law. God's authority 
is purely theoretical. Were we morally pure and sufficiently informed, 
unaided practical rationality directed toward our good could tell us all 
we need to know about moral obligation, and thereby motivate us to 
comply. 
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I deny that this is the case. A distinction between the flourishing life 
and the good life is both possible and necessary. Therefore God's 
authority is not just theoretical. 
Maclntyre (1986) says that theological voluntarism is incapable of 
providing an account of just authority, based in the sense of justice we 
have inherent to our flourishing. I argue that beliefs concerning the 
nature and identity of a purported divine authority are conceptually 
prior to, and therefore determinative of, the agent's conclusions of 
right reason concerning the justice of that authority's demands. 
Reason and belief-practical authority and theoretical authority- 
come together in theological voluntarism in the following ways. 
Following G. E. M. Anscombe's role-specific theory of rights, I say 
that obligations are a source of authority. Authority is the right to rule. 
In the fulfillment of her/his roles, an agent has a right to do whatever 
is necessarily entailed by what s/he must do. Therefore, an authority 
has a right to rule to the extent that ruling is necessarily entailed in her 
or his obligations. In application, practical authorities actualize 
reasons for others. In directing us to the divine person as highest good, 
God is fulfilling an obligation to recognize that goodness. I link 
theoretical and practical authority to show that in actualizing these 
reasons, divine practical authority does not just coordinate means to 
ends, it originates those means. 
The relationship of practical reason to theoretical reason is one of 
dependence, in the following respect. Our understanding of "the 
good" shapes, at every level, our understanding of the right. God is 
uniquely good. Our final end is fixed and necessary, but only by virtue 
of and with respect to the nature of God as good. 
How we realize that good, however, is contingent. The particularities 
of the route that takes us to our final end, our sub-ultimate ends to that 
final end, are contingent. So at the level of those subordinate ends, the 
relationship between theoretical and practical authority is reversed, so 
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that theoretical authority is dependent on the free decisions of 
practical authority. 
Maclntyre on "just authority" 
Alasdair MacIntyre's objections to theological voluntarism or 
"Occamist" theories can be found in numerous writings. He addresses 
these theories specifically in "Which God Ought We to Obey and 
Why? " (1986) 
Maclntyre's argument stands in opposition to "all those moral theories 
according to which divine commands provide a standard for right 
conduct independently of and antecedently to a non-theological 
knowledge of what justice requires. " (1986, p. 359) His argument is 
composed of three theses. I am primarily concerned to answer the 
second thesis, concerning "just authority. " 
First, in order to distinguish between the claims to our allegiance set 
forth in the name of diverse deities, we must have standards of justice 
independent of and prior to acknowledging the authority of any set of 
commands purported to be divine. Any theory that precludes this 
possibility will prevent us from distinguishing false gods from the true 
God. MacIntyre is concerned here to distinguish such caricatures of 
the divine as Freud's father projection and Blake's "Nobodaddy" from 
the God of the Bible. Freud identifies one possible understanding of 
justice with the psychological echo of an authoritarian father. On this 
theory, whatever arbitrary command the father issues to the child, no 
matter how contrary to justice, is elevated to the status of divine 
commands. 
With relevance to our discussion here, this is the same false god Blake 
identified as "Nobodaddy, " a god capable of commanding what is 
commonly known as "theft" or "adultery, " actions its followers must 
admit they otherwise recognize as unjust. "That is to say, [those 
followers] are committed to acknowledge that Nobodaddy's 
commands could involve the infliction of unmerited harm upon 
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human beings of a kind incompatible with what some of us now call 
justice, the justice of desert. " (1986, p. 360) 
Jupiter is another pretender to the title of true God. When Aeneas 
obeys Jupiter's command to leave Dido for Italy, he nonetheless does 
so with conflicted emotions and will. "It can on Virgil's view be right 
for someone to obey Jupiter and yet also to have justified regrets for 
so doing. " (1986, p. 362) 
Maclntyre sets these deities in contrast to the God of the Bible. The 
God of Abraham would never command him to do something with a 
divided mind. The God of Job could never inflict unmerited harm, and 
when Job rightly calls God to account for his afflictions, it is on the 
basis of this presupposition that God answers. Yahweh is a god that is 
just and cannot be otherwise, "just because these are essential 
attributes.... " A standard of justice independent of our knowledge of 
God's commands therefore must be established to distinguish God 
from pretenders. Moral theories of the type advanced by Ockham and 
other divine command theorists will not be able to evaluate the 
demands of rival gods. 
In response to these objections, I note first that nothing in theological 
voluntarism precludes the possibility that at least some persons have at 
least some knowledge of justice prior to specific knowledge of divine 
commands as divine commands. (See chapters 9 and 10. ) In a 
moment, however, I will deny that one can adopt an understanding of 
justice independent of beliefs about these gods, and thereby deny that 
there is a neutral perspective from which to evaluate their demands. 
MacIntyre's second thesis: we should not recognize the legitimacy of 
any supposedly divine commands without adequate rational grounds 
for believing the being to have just authority over us. Supreme 
authority would thus require the supreme measure of justice. Any 
theory that denies that there are adequate rational grounds for such 
belief in God prevents us from distinguishing authority that is divine 
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from authority that is merely tyrannical. Maclntyre's concerns here 
are divine justice and rationality. 
Maclntyre emphasizes that only a god commanding with "just 
authority" can require our obedience. Since "authority" is sometimes 
ambiguous about the distinction between power and right, his 
condition that authority be "just" is not redundant here. The issue at 
hand is the rational superiority of justice over brute coercion, or even 
promised advantage. We may have reasons to obey a powerful god 
who issues commands without justice (e. g., fear), or to obey a 
beneficent god who issues commands without justice (e. g., future 
benefit), but such commands are not obligatory unless just. Power is 
only just when wielded for the ends of justice. Divine command 
theories, he says, lack the notion of just authority. Therefore any 
account making divine commands foundational to morality, defining 
justice by fiat, must fail. "[I]t is only insofar as the commands of just 
authority are themselves just, that is, are in accord with the justice 
expressed in justly promulgated law, that the utterance of commands 
imposes any obligation. " (1986, p. 364) The essential condition is that 
the action of commanding, and of enforcing obedience to commands 
made, and making ultimate decisions be within the standard of justly 
promulgated law. 
MacIntyre recognizes God's unrestricted freedom in God's actions 
toward humans as part of creation, but he sees limitations on what 
God may rationally legislate for that creation in keeping with human 
nature. God freely creates human beings and gives them a nature, but 
since God also promulgates laws relative to that nature, any 
commands given subsequently must conform to those laws. And it is 
on the basis of those laws, determined by our nature, that we can 
judge which god we ought to obey and why. MacIntyre's argument 
that theological voluntarism requires but lacks a foundation of "just 
authority" can be summarized as follows: 
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1. Power over others is "just authority" if and only if it serves the 
ends of justice. 
2. The ends of justice are served if and only if power is exercised 
in accordance with "duly promulgated law. " 
3. Fear or expectation of benefit are not proper reasons for 
obeying the commands of a deity. 
4. The claim "God's commands are just" in theological 
voluntarism is only true by tautology. 
While MacIntyre's claims here bring up a number of important issues, 
notice that they do not form a valid and cogent argument for the 
conclusion that theological voluntarism must fail as a justification of 
morality. Such an argument would require the justification of at least 
two more claims: 
5. Theological voluntarism necessarily asserts that either the 
motivations of fear of punishment, or of expectation of benefit, 
or both, provide sufficient reasons for obedience to the 
commands of God. 
6. "God's commands are just" is not tautologically true. 
Maclntyre demonstrates neither of these. The two modem theorists 
mentioned in Maclntyre's essay, Adams and Barth, do not make the 
claim that fear of punishment and expectation of benefit provide 
sufficient reasons for obedience. Adams (1981) at one point says that 
gratitude may motivate obedience, but this is not his justification of 
the theory. Karl Barth explicitly denies that it is the threat of God's 
power that compels our obedience (1957, pp. 5520. As for #6, I will 
present reasons for concluding that "God's commands are just" is 
tautologically true, as it turns out. The relationship is not one of 
analysis, however, but of reduction. See chapter 10. Meanwhile I say 
that on the presuppositions of the rival cosmologies Maclntyre cites, 
we have no basis for supposing that "justice" is other than those 
cosmologies indicate, for precisely the sorts of reasons he later gives 
in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) 
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The third thesis of MacIntyre's essay is that divine command theories 
cannot make the necessary distinctions to identify just authority 
because of a presuppositional deficiency. They are blind to the 
historically and analogically ordered character of concepts such as 
goodness, justice and the divine. (1986, p. 370-371) The concepts of 
justice, goodness, and the divine form "one single complex history. " 
(1986, p. 367) He is situating the discussion in the context of the 
transition from Jupiter/Zeus to the Unmoved Mover to Yahweh. Or 
more precisely, from Virgil to Aristotle to Aquinas. 
The problem before the person in such a transition is how to apply the 
standards of justice, goodness, and the divine from one to the next, 
MacIntyre says. Say a person rejects the Unmoved Mover in favor of 
Yahweh, using standards of justice. In what ways do those standards 
apply to Yahweh? In what ways are they inappropriate? We can apply 
human standards with respect to Yahweh's covenants and promises, 
for example, but not to God's person as lawgiver and judge. We can 
only learn about God as creator from the scriptures and from rational 
reflection on our own natures. (1986, p. 368) 
What we learn is that the standards we use with respect to God and 
ourselves have the force of law, MacIntyre continues, and that it is 
God who promulgates these laws through human rationality. We 
follow two lines of argument in arriving at this conclusion. In the first, 
we ask how the standards of justice constituting the life of our 
particular community might be reformulated as standards for any 
communal activity for pursuing the good and the best. In the second, 
we criticize the original conception of the good life (consisting at first 
in the life of the political virtues supplemented by contemplation of 
the Unmoved Mover) and we move to a conception of the good life 
consisting in rational friendship and therefore ultimately in friendship 
with God. In moving from Aristotle, to Aquinas, as it were, we modify 
our understanding of that life as the good and the best and reject some 
of that understanding. "But we also learn that part of what we took to 
be true is indeed true and that the justice in terms of which we judged 
210 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
God's claims, in order to distinguish them from those of Jupiter and 
Nobodaddy, is a justice which is commanded by God Himself. " 
(1986, p. 369) We can come to Yahweh and see that this God is just, 
as we understand justice, as well as that God is just in ways that 
modify our understanding of justice. Some concepts can be applied 
analogically from the human to the divine. In the story of Job, for 
example, says Maclntyre, both God and Job's self-styled comforters 
presuppose that God cannot and has not inflicted unmerited harm 
upon Job. (1986, pp. 360f. ) 
Barth therefore puts himself in a contradictory and untenable situation, 
MacIntyre says, when he (1) claims that apart from God's self- 
revelation we have no concepts justly applicable to God, and then 
goes on to say (2) that God can reveal the divine nature to us in those 
same concepts. The standard by which we judge God is itself a work 
of God. "God, it turns out, cannot be truly judged of by something 
external to his Word, but that is because natural justice recognized by 
natural reason is itself divinely uttered and authorized. " (1986, p. 370) 
My primary concern here is to reply to the issue of "just authority" in 
theological voluntarism. To address this question, however, I have to 
call into question the other two theses. I think that these two stand in 
tension in a way that Maclntyre fails to recognize. The first invokes 
standards of justice independent of divine authority that can be used to 
evaluate that authority. The third insists on the historically and 
analogically ordered nature of concepts such as goodness, justice, and 
the divine. Any perspective from which we can analyze the ultimate 
ends of justice, it seems to me, pits the third thesis against the first 
thesis. That is, our historically-informed concepts of justice, goodness, 
and the divine provide us with the perspective from which we evaluate 
divine commands. But precisely because our concepts of justice, 
goodness, and the divine are historically and analogically ordered, 
those standards of justice are not independent of and prior to the 
authority of divine commands in the way that he implies. Let's see 
why this is the case. 
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Belief and justice 
If the good is only obedience, Maclntyre says, then we do not have a 
notion of goodness whereby we can justify obedience to one god over 
another. Our decision concerning which God to obey should not be 
separated from the question of the attributes necessary of a god 
worthy of obedience, as he believes theological voluntarists have 
done. Without the distinctions in these attributes, "Nobodaddy, 
Jupiter, Satan, and God all compete for our allegiance on equal 
terms-apart, that is, from inequalities in their power. " (1986, p. 365) 
I deny Maclntyre's claim. The deities in this list cannot be conceived 
of as competing equally for our allegiance other than in power. Even 
prior to explicit reference to attributes supposedly making a deity 
worthy of obedience, the differences relative to divine power connote 
whole theoretical systems. Those systems do not have common 
conceptual terms of reference. To say that Jupiter and Satan compete 
for our allegiance is not to compare apples and oranges, but to 
compare ambrosia and the Eucharist, or ambrosia and blood as it is 
used in a Black Mass. We can look to Maclntyre himself and the 
powerful arguments of Whose Justice? (1988, p. 350) for reasons to 
think that any conclusion of practical rationality is inextricably 
interdependent on the conception of justice associated with that theory 
of practical rationality. The question here concerns just such 
conclusions and their relationship to their respective conceptions of 
justice. The content of the agent's personal belief concerning a given 
deity in its contextual cosmology is prior to the question of obedience 
to the commands of that divinity. And by extension, as my arguments 
in Part One show, the shape of the virtues-courage, honesty, and 
now justice-will follow necessarily on the respective conception of 
the good in a given theory, as a matter of practical rationality. 
The proponents of theological voluntarism, as such, all do presuppose 
some conception of God that includes all the attributes Maclntyre sees 
as necessary. I am not aware of any theological voluntarist arguing 
that any other divinity than an all-powerful creator is to be obeyed, 
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and most are referring to the God of the biblical narratives. 
Theological voluntarists often do not set down the essential attributes 
of the God to be obeyed because the identity of this deity is not in 
question. If they do not do so antecedently to their theory, it is also in 
part because to do so would effectively concede part of their 
argument. To affirm that "God is good" or "God is just" seems to 
imply a standard of goodness independent of God's nature by which 
we can judge the goodness of God. And Maclntyre actually concurs, 
in the final analysis. It turns out "that the justice in terms of which we 
judged God's claims, in order to distinguish them from those of 
Jupiter and Nobodaddy, is a justice which is commanded by God 
Himself. s61 My objection is that this claim presupposes the existence 
of the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" in presupposing goods and 
standards of justice that are derived from that biblical conception. I 
have no problem with the presupposition. I have a big problem with 
Maclntyre's implication that his conclusions concerning the justice of 
purported divine commands do not depend on this presupposition. 
We cannot ask what it means to obey a divinity in the abstract, for the 
belief in a given being already carries with it a number of 
presuppositions and commitments that are incompatible with belief in 
a different deity. The belief in question will not only be belief about 
the qualities of the divinity but also about the entire cosmology 
surrounding such a divinity. Here's what a divine command theory 
might look like relative to beings other than God. 
It might initially appear to make sense to ask in the abstract whether 
we should obey Satan, for example. In practice, however, it does not. 
If we do not believe in the existence of Satan, the question is 
answered. If we do believe in the existence of Satan, then the question 
is also answered, on any of several rival accounts. As the concept of 
61 MacIntyre is using "commanded" metaphorically here. He means 
the "dictates" of practical reason to be used as criteria of evaluation 
of literal commands. But as Hittinger points out, natural law cannot be considered as law except metaphorically without reference to a lawgiver. (1994) 
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Satan appears in the biblical and then koranic contexts, it is never 
reasonable to obey Satan. Only on a radical reinterpretation of those 
understandings could it be reasonable. This reinterpretation might 
evoke Satan either as symbolic of a cosmological survival-of-the- 
fittest, or as the dark side of a Manichean struggle, or a figure in some 
other view. A Satanist does not ask whether Satan's commands are 
just, unless ironically. Non-Satanist conceptions of justice are not 
tenable to Satanists. To admit justice as a concept would be to 
undermine their own position. Even Milton's Lucifer, attempting to 
redefine evil as his good, condemns himself in the instant he names 
God's good and reacts rather than creates. In any case, theistic or not, 
to situate Satan in a conceptual scheme is to imply reasons for obeying 
him or not. If the world really is what a believer in Satan-ancient, 
medieval, or modem-believes it to be, then the question is already 
answered. 
Similarly, if a believer in Jupiter believes himself to be commanded 
by that deity, he obeys or suffers the consequences. But on what 
coherent conceptual scheme could he simultaneously endorse belief in 
Jupiter and in a non-Olympian justice? To believe in the latter is to 
begin to disbelieve in the former. Virgil may be sowing doubts in the 
reader's mind concerning the acceptability of the Olympian 
conception by validating Aeneas's regrets as justified. Or perhaps he 
is showing that such regrets are fully compatible with heroic justice 
and unavoidable tragedy, yet is not casting doubt on the rightness of 
Jupiter's command. I do not think that he can coherently do both. 
So also, if a theist in the biblical tradition believes she has an authentic 
command from God, then the question of whether she should obey 
that command is already answered. To ask if the command is just is 
either to question that the command is in fact a genuine command, or 
to question that it comes from God. She cannot coherently both 
acknowledge that the Almighty Creator God of any orthodox 
understanding has commanded her to do something and also explain 
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why that command is unjust. 62 Nor, I say, can she coherently explain 
the justice of this God's commands without acknowledging the 
uniqueness of this God's creative and legislative freedom. 
In comparing gods and the justice of their commands, Maclntyre's 
exception-"apart, that is, from inequalities in their power"-is of 
immense importance. The biblical God is not simply more powerful 
than any existent or non-existent rivals. If this form of theism is 
correct, God is all-powerful and this has consequences for the ends of 
justice. Even more importantly, God is Creator creating ex nihilo, in 
distinction from those rivals in Maclntyre's argument. 63 The initial 
creative activity in the divine mind is not constrained by the medium 
in which God is working, there being no medium prior to that creative 
activity. God is not antecedently limited by any natural laws, either of 
the type consequently associated with the natural sciences (excepting 
of course those of logical necessity) or of the type linking practical 
rationality to goods, there being no antecedent good other than the 
divine goodness. So I argued in the last chapter. 
I will only add here that God's reproach of Job is not based in Job's 
prior understanding of justice, nor even in the justice-as-desert 
presumed by his detractors, whom God reproaches even more 
severely. In the end, God's explanation is that Job is in no position to 
judge because he was not present at the creation. I take this to mean 
62 Maclntyre names two other deities in his essay: the Unmoved 
Mover and Nobodaddy. Blake's Nobodaddy is not intended to imply 
a conceptual scheme, but is just a pejorative caricature. To recognize 
that a purported conception of a divinity is, in effect, "Nobodaddy" 
is to deny its existence. It is to point out the incoherence of such a 
conception and to deny the validity of the commands supposedly 
issuing from such a being. The Unmoved Mover does not issue 
commands, nor does it even interact with human beings. 
Nevertheless, both figures illustrate my larger point. To name a 
divine entity and the context it entails and what it means to believe 
in that divine entity is to have implied an answer about whether it 
should be obeyed. (See Rooney's related comments on Christian 
theistic theological voluntarism. (1996, pp. 15-21)) 
63 Though a standard theological term, ex nihilo has increasingly been 
recognized to be inadequate, since it conveys that something came 
from nothing. The important notion is that God was not working 
with pre-existent or eternal matter, as all non-biblical creation 
mythologies have their deities doing. 
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that because Job was not present at the creation, he did not and could 
not know God's ultimate purposes in creation generally and in 
allowing what Job suffered in particular. 
How then would someone make a transition of the sort mentioned by 
Maclntyre, from Jupiter or the Unmoved Mover or the central entity 
of any conceptual scheme, to obedience to God, or the reverse? The 
question is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I can do here is 
reaffirm Maclntyre's denial in other contexts that we can argue from 
outside the presuppositions of our conception. (See especially 
Maclntyre"1998. ) 
As noted already, Maclntyre avers that in moving from the Unmoved 
Mover to Yahweh (or Aristotle to Aquinas) we modify our 
understanding of the good life and reject some of that understanding, 
but contends that we also see that "part of what we took to be true is 
indeed true and that the justice in terms of which we judged God's 
claims, in order to distinguish them from those of Jupiter and 
Nobodaddy, is a justice which is commanded by God Himself. " 
(1986, p. 369; emphasis added) 
So I ask, which part of what we previously believed about the claims 
of justice do we still find to be true? And judging by which reasons or 
rationality do we perceive that that part is true? Isn't it only in 
retrospect, and from the perspective of the new paradigm, that we can 
determine both the points of validity and the limitations of the old 
paradigm? The difference between the conception of justice of the 
average Yahweh-believer prior to belief and her subsequent 
conception of justice on a thoroughgoing biblical foundation is 
radical, as Maclntyre recognizes elsewhere. (1988, pp. 192f) Her prior 
concepts may give her access to the subject of conversation, but they 
are thereafter decisively reoriented and changed. Maclntyre 
acknowledges that we come to see God's justice as different in 
important ways from our prior understanding. I contend that once that 
shift is made, our conception of justice itself changes. Unless we can 
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antecedently know God's purposes-and I deny that we can know 
such purposes antecedently-it will not do to take any human good as 
an absolute standard of justice by which to judge the commands of 
this God, as the story of Job shows. 
Belief and justice are thus inextricably linked. What is true and what 
is right, that is, are inextricably linked. By extension, theoretical and 
practical authority are inextricably linked. The relationship of 
dependence, however, corresponds to what is necessarily true and 
what is contingently true, what is necessarily right and what is 
contingently right. 
Authority, practical and theoretical 
Theological eudaimonism emphasizes God's theoretical authority: 
God's commands reiterate reasons that we already have. Theological 
voluntarism gives a relatively greater role to God's practical authority. 
In order to defend my theory, then, I must show what practical 
authority entails, how it relates to theoretical authority, and how both 
apply to theological voluntarism. What is practical authority? 
A practical authority, I say, is a person or entity whose communicated 
intentions actualize decisive reasons for another's action in the 
realization of the authority's role. 64 
Most theories of theological voluntarism have been presented as 
divine command theory. (Adams 1981; Mouw 1990; Rooney 1996b) 
This identification of obligation with divine commands is inadequate. 
While it captures one part of human obligation with respect to God's 
will, it misses others, such as the obligations inherent in reciprocal 
love. More importantly for the present discussion, a practical authority 
is an entity that can actualize reasons for action through commands. It 
64 We could also say that a person has practical authority if her 
communicated decisions actualize decisive reasons for another's 
actions in the realization of her role. As will become obvious, this 
definition owes much to Anscombe (1990) and Murphy (2002a), 
though it is radically different from the theories of both. 
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is not the command itself that is the locus of obligation. If we look 
more closely at commands, we can see why not. 
First, commands may be non-verbal. Picture the field marshal sending 
a field of soldiers into battle with a wave of the arm. Second, a 
practical authority may make utterances in the form of verbal 
commands jokingly, say-that are not meant to be taken at face 
value. And, third, a genuine practical authority is rightly affronted 
when a subordinate follows the letter of a command, rather than what 
the subordinate knows is the intent behind the command. 
From these observations we can infer that it is not, strictly speaking, 
the command itself that constitutes a reason for action. A command 
communicates to the commanded an intention. In so doing, the 
command itself gives a reason to believe that there is a reason for 
action. The reason takes shape something like this in the mind of the 
commanded: "The authority did/said such-and-such. I interpret this to 
mean that she intends for me to do thus-and-so. " It is the intention 
being communicated by the command that the person under authority 
discerns. 
Let's look at an example. Suppose that a traffic officer has genuine 
practical authority in the safe and efficient conduct of transportation 
vehicles. In case of traffic accidents, this authority extends to the 
impromptu ordering of traffic flow. Suppose also that at the scene of 
an accident there are at least two equally adequate, contrary routes that 
are possible detours around the accident. Her authority then extends to 
the choice between those routes. Let's say that she chooses the 
southern route. Using hand signals she then directs drivers that enter 
into her domain to follow that route. 
A genuine practical authority, by her decision, chooses a route- 
candidate and thereby originates a route. A route-candidate is a 
possible state of affairs, such that if it obtained, then it would be a 
possible means to an end. Conjoined with a route-candidate, her 
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communicated intention as practical authority is the only element that 
is lacking in order to originate an actual route. A route is not a route, 
but only a route-candidate or possible route, unless the practical 
authority actualizes it. Once she originates a route to an end or good, 
there is a morally right route, the one actualized. In the example, it is 
the southern route. Any other route is wrong, and it is morally wrong 
for someone under her authority to take it, especially with full 
knowledge of her decision. 5 This obligation did not exist before her 
decision. 
A practical authority first forms an intention within the range of her 
domain of authority, then issues a command or otherwise 
communicates that intention. Even if the command is issued by the 
same entity that formed the intention, and even if the entity has 
formed the intention immediately prior to giving the command, the 
command and the intention are distinct. 
As a result of this distinction, we can see that the difference between 
theoretical and practical authority concerning a particular instance of 
obligation does not always entail a difference in commanding persons 
or entities. The same person, that is, may be both a theoretical 
authority and a practical authority with respect to the same command. 
Suppose, for example, that a driver asks the traffic officer described 
above about which route to take. She answers the driver's question. Is 
she a practical or a theoretical authority? Obviously both. If she tells 
the driver that the southern route is the right route, she is acting as a 
theoretical authority, although on the basis of her own decision as 
practical authority. But this example is different from the original 
example only in the time elapsed between when she first made the 
decision and when she gave the two commands. Both in the original 
command and later on, the command informs the commanded of the 
65 If the rational being is not under the practical authority of another, 
but has practical authority in a particular domain, then it is his 
intention that actualizes the route as means. This would be the case, 
for example, if the traffic officer communicated her intention that 
which of the route-candidates would be the route actualized was left 
to the intention of each driver. 
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obligation inherent in the intention of the authority. A theoretical 
authority may not be a practical authority, but a practical authority is 
always, in the following respect, a theoretical authority. 
The command informs the commanded of an obligation by giving a 
directive. It is easy to see how this informing takes place with regard 
to purely theoretical authority for morality. A theoretical authority 
informs someone under her authority of reasons he already has 
(though is not usually cognizant of). ("Stop! The light is red. " 
[Implied: "And as you should know, running a red light is illegal and 
dangerous. "]) Commands reflecting a pre-existing order of reasons 
exemplify theoretical authority, not practical authority. (Raz 1986, pp. 
28-3 1, cited in Murphy 2002a, p. 15) The command of a practical 
authority also, however, informs the commanded of an obligation. The 
obligation does not exist prior to the decision of the practical 
authority, but it does exist prior to the command. It is in this sense that 
a practical authority is always also a theoretical authority, whether 
concerning obligations reflecting a pre-existing order of reasons, or 
concerning the intention s/he has formed as a practical authority, and 
whether the intention she has formed is immediately prior to the 
command, or some time before the command. 
In cases like that of the inquiring driver, the person commanded may 
not know that the authority informing him of the right route to take is 
also the practical authority that has designated that route as the right 
one. She may not tell him, for example. He might mistakenly think 
that she is only a theoretical authority. If we were focusing only on 
commands rather than intentions, as do Raz and Murphy, we might 
miss this point. By distinguishing the command of a practical 
authority from the practical authority's freely formed intention that 
actually constitutes the reason to act, we see that the practical 
authority may sometimes appear to be merely theoretical. 
Now although she is a theoretical authority concerning her own 
decisions of practical authority, those decisions are subordinate to one 
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or more instances of authority concerning which any commands she 
gives can only be theoretical. Our traffic officer has authority to 
choose the route around the accident. In the situation described she 
does not have authority to direct drivers along a route that sends them 
off the end of ä pier. Pre-existing goods limit her authority. As we will 
see in a moment, the goods protected and attained by her role as a 
traffic officer determine the extent of her authority. Before going 
there, notice the relationship between the ranking of goods and the 
priority of theoretical and practical authority. In our example, the 
practical authority sequentially comes first, followed by the theoretical 
authority. The officer decides on the route, and then she advises 
drivers of this decision. But this sequence could be misinterpreted. 
Since practical authority controls, at some level, reasons for action, it 
also controls goods, at a lower level. A practical authority designates 
or creates a means to goods, and thereby actually creates lesser- 
ranked, "for-the-sake-of 'goods. In specifying which is to be the right 
route around the accident, continuing the example, the traffic officer 
also originates the good of following that particular route. This good 
(the southern route) is for the sake of a greater good (let's say that it's 
safe and efficient transportation). The greater the authority she has, the 
greater or higher-ranking the goods she controls. The lesser the 
authority, the smaller or lower the order of goods controlled. 
Within a given 
domain 
of authority and in a given instance, the for- 
the-sake-of goods possible to practical authorities without overruling 
the original decision become lower and lower. in rank. A second traffic 
officer, coming to the scene of the accident after the first, learning of 
the first's decision, and seeing the need for a detour from the other 
direction of the road on which the accident has taken place, may 
decide to send eastbound traffic along the northern route in concert 
with the first decision. But he cannot, without overruling the prior 
decision of the first officer on the scene, designate a different route 
than the one she designated as the right one. One instance of practical 
authority builds on another, but must recognize those preceding it. We 
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could multiply the examples indefinitely for an indefinite number of 
authorities working in coordination, each decision contingent on those 
preceding it. 
Viewing this structure from the opposite direction, obligation and its 
explanation always look toward a larger frame of reference, to a 
larger, for-the-sake-of good. The right is derived from the good. The 
contingent always derives, ultimately, from the necessary. At what 
level are goods and their corresponding obligations contingent, and at 
what level are they necessary? 
Goods in relation to which they can only be a theoretical authority will 
always limit the traffic officers' practical authority. They will always 
be, first, theoretical authorities concerning greater goods and their 
decisions of practical authority must recognize those goods in order to 
be genuine. Each decision of genuine practical authority must 
recognize existing goods, including for-the-sake-of goods created by 
previous decisions. What-is-the-case at any point determines what 
constitutes right assertions for theoretical authority. Existent goods 
determine what are right actions. Both theoretical and practical 
authority have a "debt" to what-is-the-case, in the same way as the 
virtues are necessary to attain goods. In fact, the two are not parallel 
kinds of relationship, but are two ways of describing the same 
structure. (See the section on Anselm in chapter 5. ) A theoretical 
authority's intellectual excellences are required to realize the goods of 
communicating what-is-the-case. Those excellences are understood in 
function of communicating what exists. And as we have seen in Part 
One, some semblance of justice, truthfulness, and courage are required 
to attain internal goods, and these dispositions to action are defined in 
terms of those goods. 
In conclusion, in order to fulfill its role in signifying rightly, a 
theoretical authority must rightly communicate what-is-the-case to 
those under that theoretical authority, so that their thought can rightly 
conform to what-is-the-case, as does the thought of the theoretical 
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authority. Practical authority must rightly originate a course of action 
as a good for the sake of a greater good, a greater good that is the case, 
so that those under that practical authority can cooperatively and 
rightly act in order to realize that greater good. Practical authority, 
concerning right action, is only legitimate to the extent that it rightly 
designates a right route to that good, a genuinely existent good. These 
are their roles as theoretical and practical authorities. It is in 
understanding the fulfillment of roles that we can complete this sketch 
of authority. 
Authority, roles, and ends 
Before asking whether such authority is actually recognized, and how 
it is recognized, let's look at another question. Specifically, setting 
aside for a moment the controversial question of consent and where it 
is required, consider the rational basis for practical authority in those 
relationships not instituted by explicit contract or convention. What 
justification might we find for the authority of parents and 
governments, for example? "Stop bossing your little brother around 
and do what I told you to do 30 minutes ago. " What is the moral 
difference, if any, between these two attempts to rule? The same 
question arises about the difference between the state and a crime 
syndicate. What gives the state the right to rule, but not the mafia? 
G. E. M. Anscombe has made important comments in locating the 
source of authority in such relationships. Anscombe explains the 
concept of a right by reference to modals. Expanding on Aristotle, she 
notes that one sense of "necessary" is that without which some good 
will not be obtained or some evil averted. "If someone has a role or 
function which he `must' perform, or anything that he `has' to do, then 
you `cannot' impede him. " If a person's role requires that she do 
something, then she has a right to do that thing unhindered. A person 
has a right to do, that is, whatever is logically entailed in what she 
must do. Authority is the right to rule in some domain. Authority 
derives from the necessary fulfillment of a role. 
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A parent must raise a child, for example, and cannot do so without 
obedience. She has the right to obedience, within the limits of the role, 
in the fulfillment of that role. A government must protect its citizens 
from at least some harms, suppose. It then has the right to compliance, 
within the limits of its role, in the fulfillment of that role. Within 
limits imposed by her function and those of others, a traffic officer can 
establish rules to direct drivers in her role in attaining public safety: 
"There's an accident up ahead. Make a detour onto Broad Street for at 
least two blocks to go around it. " Her authority follows on her 
legitimate tasks. As Anscombe notes, these tasks are either the tasks 
that that she alone must do, or those tasks for whom she shares 
responsibility for accomplishing with others, and therefore may do. 
(Anscombe 1990) 
Every rational being, it follows, has practical authority within the 
scope of its legitimate roles. Any rational being has the role of 
conducting her/himself toward her/his proper end, at least, and can 
therefore issue directives within that functioning. Even children have 
some responsibility for their own well-being, including their physical 
well-being. 66 So a child can issue commands that constitute reasons 
for action within that domain: "Billy, stop it! That hurts! " "Mommy, 
please pass the potatoes. (I need more to eat. )" Those with greater 
practical authority have a greater scope of tasks and responsibilities. 
All that remains to be explained on this account of authority, before 
applying it to my theory of theological voluntarism, is the 
actualization of decisive reasons. 
Authority and the actualization of reasons 
The actualization of reasons is best understood through the concept of 
what Mark Murphy calls reason-candidates. A reason-candidate is a 
possible state of affairs, such that if it obtained, then it would be a 
66 This supposes, as I believe to be the case, contingently, that human 
flourishing at least partly constitutes the human end. 
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reason for a rational being to do something. (Murphy 2002a, p. 11) 
The intention that the practical authority communicates is the only 
element in the realization of a reason-candidate that is lacking in order 
to make it a complete reason. A practical authority's communicated 
intention actualizes a reason-candidate for another rational being in 
the relevant domain. 
That reason is a decisive reason for action if it is a reason all-things- 
considered. An apparently decisive reason in one domain can be 
defeated by reasons stemming from a domain encompassing it. 
(Murphy 2002a, pp. 14f) A decisive reason actualized by the 
legislative authority of the state of Massachusetts, for example, can be 
defeated by reasons actualized by the federal government of the 
United States. 
Murphy (2002a, p. 11) tries to distinguish between causing reasons 
and constituting reasons as a mark of genuine practical authority. A 
bully's instructions to her victim to do something, backed by threats of 
violence, he says, are causal but not constitutive. This distinction is 
unsatisfactory. As John Hare notes, the victim has reason-candidates 
in avoiding pain by complying with the bully's demands, reason- 
candidates that are constitutively actualized by the bully's commands. 
(Hare 2004, p. 376) If the bully has accurately assessed her victim's 
practical rationality in avoiding pain, the reasons will be decisive. 
It is not because the bully's directives do not constitute reasons that 
the bully's actions are wrong, but at least in part because the bully is 
acting outside her proper role. There are reason-candidates that she 
may legitimately actualize in the course of realizing her legitimate 
roles and functions. In acting as a bully, she actualizes reason- 
candidates that are outside the fulfillment of those functions. Thus she 
is actualizing reasons that her victim should not have. A bully's 
commands do not actualize reasons that positively advance the 
realization of the good for her victim. Rather, her commands actualize 
reason-candidates that detract from the realization of the good. A 
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bully is someone who constitutively actualizes reasons unjustly. A 
Mafioso or other form of bully demands unnecessary sacrifices of 
goods. She counts on the victim's right ordering of goods while she 
realizes external or lesser-order goods. She benefits parasitically from 
his proper ranking of goods, and this parasitic relationship is wrong. 67 
She forces her victim, for example, to choose between the losses of 
money or of physical flourishing. As a result, social contexts strongly 
influenced by bullies are inevitably impoverished at many levels. 
The just practical authority, too, counts on a normal ordering of goods, 
but does so for the sake of realizing internal or higher-order goods. 
She actualizes only those reason-candidates that contribute to the 
realization of some good state of affairs, all-things-considered. The 
realization of such reason-candidates is part of the practical authority's 
role/function in the realization of the good. 
How does all this apply to my theory? 
Divine authority, practical and theoretical 
Theistic eudaimonism emphasizes the theoretical authority of divine 
commands. With respect to injunctions such as those of the 
Decalogue, God is advising created rational beings there concerning 
how to realize the good of flourishing. With respect to subordinate 
obligations, God may arbitrarily specify any of several equally 
satisfactory options in the realization of that end, for the purpose of 
expertly coordinating human actions. But on the eudaimonist claim, 
God exercises practical authority only to actualize reasons that lead 
more or less directly to the common good of human flourishing as the 
known final end of human nature. What I want to emphasize once 
again, to the contrary, is the importance of looking beyond the 
anthropocentric ends of human life to a function that transcends those 
67 For reasons that I gave in chapter 6, the realization of flourishing for one class of beings at the detriment of another class of beings is 
not necessarily an indication of an improper ordering of goods. 
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ends. As a result, the scope of divine practical authority is much 
broader than the eudaimonist claim recognizes. 
Recall Anselm's theory of doing the truth. (See chapter 5. ) It 
anticipates Scotus' understanding of primary and secondary goodness 
in the context of practical and theoretical authority. The upshot of that 
theory is that there are two senses in which a statement or an action 
can be true, one natural and necessary, one accidental/contingent. A 
sentence is "true" naturally and by necessity if it is whole or complete, 
has proper syntax, and diction. If these conditions are met, it 
accomplishes its function, considered narrowly. A sentence is "true" 
in this sense if it is syntactically correct and communicates what it is 
intended to communicate. It is true in the more common usage, 
accidentally/contingently, if it communicates rightly what is the case, 
if it is used in a right way. The same is true of human action, as I 
followed Anselm in claiming in chapter S. 
Any supposed limitation on divine practical authority based on human 
flourishing takes too narrow a frame of reference. It rightly 
acknowledges what Anselm and later Scotus refer to as the 
natural/necessary truth or goodness of objects, but overlooks the 
accidental/contingent truth or goodness of the use to which the object 
(the human species) is put. The error concerning divine authority 
resides in seeing human flourishing as a freestanding, eternally 
necessary truth, rather than as dependent on divine intentions. 
Nevertheless, my understanding of God's creative freedom does not 
preclude all constraints on the rectitude of the signification of "what is 
the case. " God's own existence is conceptually prior to any intention 
God has for created beings. Therefore God must signify what is the 
case concerning God's own nature, specifically God's goodness. 
Likewise, God as artificer must acknowledge the goodness of this 
nature in what God creates. God must also require all other entities, 
rational and non-rational, to stand in proper relation to this superlative 
nature. For all rational beings, the recognition of the truth of God's 
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nature as a good incontestably superior to all other goods follows 
necessarily on any knowledge of the divine nature. With respect to 
that ultimate end and good and truth, God can only be a theoretical 
authority. 
What the recognition of this end by rational creatures entails, 
however, is contingent on God's practical authority and freedom to 
establish the ground rules of the relationship between artificer and art. 
At any rate, we do not know that God could not have chosen another 
means of realizing our final end for rational humanoids with many of 
the same capacities that we have. In the role of practical authority in 
God's domain-everything external to God-God's communicated 
intention actualizes a route-candidate for a human being. It is in this 
sense that God originates or creates a route to God. God has chosen 
our flourishing, a flourishing that surpasses any flourishing that can be 
realized by unaided human potential. The actualization of human 
nature, viewed from the end contingently intended by God, represents 
the full realization of the imago dei, the Incarnation, Resurrection and 
Glorification of Christ by the gracious intervention of God. It is 
flourishing of the person holistically-body, will, emotions, sociality, 
and intellect. 
What the realization of this end-flourishing of a very particular 
sort-entails and how it is realized is also contingent on God's 
practical authority and freedom. Having actualized that route- 
candidate, there are self-imposed limits that God will necessarily 
respect in any decision concerning ends subordinate to that end. And 
those limits increase with each additional sub-route actualized as a 
for-the-sake-of good to our final end. Under normal subsequent 
relations and circumstances of authority, divine theoretical authority is 
reflective of these decisions of divine practical authority. On an 
account of orthodox theological voluntarism, for example, human 
biological flourishing is a good contingently and arbitrarily occupying 
a very high order in God's intentions. Because human biological 
flourishing requires at least minimal conditions of sanitation, God 
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might dictate such conditions of sanitation, for example, for the 
purpose of realizing biological flourishing. God may counsel human 
beings as to how to attain such high-ranking goods in matters where 
rationality tends to fail, due to the distortion caused by human self- 
directedness. 
So divine authority over human life is both practical and theoretical, in 
that God arbitrarily chooses the means to our end as co-lovers of God 
and then communicates that chosen end. In the theistic traditions, 
God's roles and relationship to everything else are those of creator, 
ruler, legislator, judge, benefactor, and caretaker. If the argument I 
offered in the previous chapter is correct, then God is free to dictate to 
humans any logically possible means by which to pursue this 
relationship. And we don't know that other means than the one 
actualized, the one we know to be in harmony with empirically 
observable flourishing, is not possible. The example of Abraham and 
Isaac, again, seems to confirm this possibility. Among logically 
possible options that realize humanoid flourishing, whatever that turns 
out to be, there will be no reason for God to choose one route- 
candidate over another in order to actualize a route. And any reason 
why a human might prefer one to the others will be decisively 
overridden by its incompatibility with achieving the good of a right 
relationship with God by the means actualized. 
Given this understanding of divine authority, I now have to consider 
the greatest objections that it might face. 
Divine authority and objections to salient coordination 
There are important objections to the salient coordination argument 
for practical authority and my account might seem to fall subject to 
them. (See Murphy 2002a, pp. 120ff. ) According to the usual 
formulation of the salient coordination argument, the practical 
authority of the state derives from the necessity of coordination of its 
citizens' actions. If some social end is best realized through 
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cooperation and coordination among citizens, and there are several 
equally acceptable, but incompatible forms of cooperation possible, a 
decision between the forms is necessary. Given the existence of a 
salient person or set of rules offering a decision concerning how the 
citizens are to act in view of the realization of their end, it would be 
irrational for citizens to pursue their end without regard to that 
decision. The state, it is claimed, is the salient institution for such 
coordination. If the end is mandatory, then the argument is 
strengthened. In the classic example, the end is that automobile drivers 
all drive on one side or the other of a given road. Assuming that 
neither a mandate to drive on the right nor one to drive on the left 
presents an appreciable difference in the realization of that end, it 
would be unreasonable for the drivers to disregard the decision of the 
salient coordinator. 
One huge problem for the coordination argument of political authority 
is that the means of reaching a given end are almost never arbitrary. 
The conditions of salient coordination do not apply because the means 
to the end are materially different. Even in the standard example of 
driving on one side of the road or the other, it could turn out that it is 
slightly easier for right-handed people (i. e. the vast majority of 
people) to steer standard steering wheels to the right side of the 
dividing line, or slightly more difficult for right-eye dominant people 
(again, the vast majority) to see where the dividing line is. So maybe 
there is an appreciable difference between the two. On many 
purported instances of coordination the material differences between 
courses of action are much greater. So reasons can be presented 
against any decision the would-be authority might make. Thus the 
coordination argument can in principle generate authority, but is in 
practice almost never indisputable. The means to any good are almost 
never arbitrary, and there is at least a prima facie case that the means 
to the common good are not arbitrary. 
The problem for a theistic account of divine authority is quite different 
than for that of a political authority. The objection does not apply to 
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the sort of theory I am advancing, since divine wisdom will not be 
stymied by deliberation and discovery of the most reasonable means 
to an end. Being omniscient, God knows the best way. But this raises 
another problem. Because means are rarely arbitrary, don't God's 
commands then merely constitute theoretical authority, rather than 
practical authority? 
Mark Murphy (2002a, p. 125f) raises a second objection, that even if 
God is the best candidate for salient coordinator, the need for the 
coordination of an authority does not entail the existence of authority. 
The need for an authoritative salient coordinator does not place us 
under that coordinator's authority. Just because humans need 
coordination it does not follow that we are under authority and 
therefore morally required to follow the dictates of a salient 
coordinator. We need an additional reason to put ourselves under the 
authority of that coordinator. Such reasons exist, Murphy says, but 
until they are recognized and acted upon, it is not that all created 
rational beings are under divine authority, he says, but that all created 
rational beings ought to be under divine authority. (See also Murphy 
2001, pp. 79-83. ) 
What is the importance of this difficult distinction? "The point is that 
created rational beings can see that it would be good to have certain 
reasons for action without thereby having those reasons. " Murphy 
illustrates this point as follows. Imagine a situation in which a friend 
for whom you are responsible is sick and in need of a medicine certain 
to remedy the causes of his suffering. A pharmacist will give you the 
drug only on condition that you are obligated to pay her twenty dollars 
within a week. It would be good for you to have this reason to pay her 
the twenty dollars. Your friend's health is at stake. Its being good to 
have this reason, however, does not yet quite give you the reason to 
pay the twenty dollars within the week. You need to do something 
more, such as make a promise, in order to generate a reason. Its being 
good to have a reason does not in itself give us a reason. All created 
rational beings, he says, are bound by reason to make God 
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authoritative over them through consent, but they are not under God's 
authority until each does so. 
So the assertion of divine authority over human beings seems to face a 
dilemma concerning the means to the human end. Either that authority 
consists in the choice of the best non-arbitrary option, and is therefore 
actually theoretical rather than practical authority, or it chooses 
between arbitrary options, but is not practical authority until humans 
consent to place themselves under that authority. 
Both objections miss the mark. My reply to the first objection is that 
because the ultimate human end is not flourishing as such but rather 
God, the actualization of the route is arbitrary. The claim that divine 
authority is merely theoretical, based on an analogy with the 
coordination theory of political authority, breaks down just at the 
point of their commonality. Both the salient coordinator theory of 
political authority and Murphy's adaptation of it to form a 
coordination theory of divine authority presuppose human ends, based 
in the common good or human flourishing, as ultimate. They therefore 
presuppose the existence of decisive reasons for preferring the one of 
several routes, none of which is worse than any others. This is a fair 
criticism of political authority based in antecedent conceptions of the 
good/best as human flourishing. It would be a fair criticism of divine 
practical authority if God were constrained by the good of human 
flourishing. But God is not so constrained. Within the broadly logical 
limits of the supreme good of the divine nature, there is no route to 
unity with God that is not entirely and arbitrarily actualized by God. 
God arbitrarily actualizes any of multiple logically possible routes. If 
humans have the capacity to will that end over their own good and so 
can rationally choose according to God's actualized route, as I will 
argue in the next chapter, then God is a practical authority over these 
questions. God is practically authoritative over a created rational being 
with respect to following the route so specified because the 
communicated divine intention that a created rational being follow 
that route constitutively actualizes both the route and also thereby a 
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reason for that being to follow that route. The reason-candidate that is 
actualized in God's intention is that following that route, and only 
following that route, leads to union with God. The reasons for taking 
whatever route will unite us with God are decisively stronger than 
those for achieving any other good. 
In reply to the second objection, Murphy's argument for consent may 
get traction against the argument from salient coordination for 
political practical authority, if it can be shown that the specification of 
our means (from among several equally adequate but incompatible 
means) to the common good could be reached without the 
role/function of the state. 68 This is not the case in divine practical 
authority. Divine practical authority is not a matter of coordination, 
but of origination. As a practical authority, God creates a good in 
actualizing a route that did not previously exist at all. There is no route 
at all until God actualizes one. 
Murphy does not specify the concept of the common good. Nor does 
he provide anything that would deflect the sorts of criticisms of the 
presupposition of human flourishing as our final end that I raised in 
chapters 6 and 7. Following a form of natural law argument, he 
describes a situation in which God has created human beings for 
whom various states of affairs are goods and therefore reasons for 
action, including conformity with God's will. Yet he contends, all- 
importantly and without justification, that being in harmony with 
God's will is not a decisive reason for action. (2002a, p. 49) I say that 
to have a conceptual grasp of who God is is to see that one must love 
God. Union with God for God's sake is the greatest good of all 
rational beings and created rational beings can only attain union with 
God by whatever route God specifies. As far as I can see, that route is 
completely arbitrary, within the limits of consistency. God has no 
68 Anscombe, to the contrary, says that a state of nature in which 
individuals executed punishment against attackers based on personal 
opinion could not obtain a context of peace. Therefore, there is not a 
private right to punish that is transferable to the state. Only the state 
can achieve justice. (1990, pp. 162-64) 
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reasons independent of Godself for choosing one coherent route over 
another. The route is right because it is the one actualized by God. The 
route does not follow necessarily from any feature of human nature. 
So divine practical authority does not depend on our need for 
coordination, but rather on the reasons constituted by the authoritative 
intentions communicated in divine directives. 69 
Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas can envision morality as distinct from 
human flourishing. In Scotus' theory, right reason is aligned to God, 
not to some for-the-sake-of good. An act is morally good, says Scotus, 
if it has "all that the agent's right reason declares must pertain to the 
act or the agent in acting. " Mere conformity to God's will is not 
sufficient. (1997, p. 180) It is not adequate just to do the right thing. A 
person who did the right thing out of fear or benefit or even ignorance, 
not believing that it was the right thing, but acting just because 
someone else wanted him to do so or coerced him into doing so, 
would not be acting morally. Each person must act on the basis of his 
or her own knowledge. Moral rationality is not only conformity to 
God's will, but also conformity to God's will for the sake of that will 
as just. Scotus says that the actor must "actually pass judgment upon 
the act and carry it out in accord with that judgment. " (1997, p. 170) 
Scotus says that the act must be done at the right time, and in the right 
manner and place. It must have the right object. The agent must also 
will the right ultimate end, and the behavior must be chosen for the 
sake of that end. (1997, pp. 171 f, 182) 
As in the Aristotelian tradition up to his era, the justice of the act is 
therefore not only contingent on objective behavior, but also on 
motives and intentions. Moral acts require a decision of intelligence 
and will. For the same reason that the action of an animal following its 
69 In the same place that I sketched Anselm's theory of doing the truth, 
chapter 5, I noted that an artist is not the final theoretical authority 
with respect to the artist's own work. Others may see things that 
s/he doesn't. This will not apply in the case of God as Artificer. God 
can accurately and comprehensively interpret any and all 
representations made by divine artifice. God does not falsely 
represent what is the case in any divine artifice. 
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natural inclination is not free, in that it does not also rationally choose 
this action by discerning the good involved and loving it for its own 
sake, nor the final end for its sake, neither also is the animal's action 
morally good. We must seek our ends for the sake of the ultimate end, 
and the decision to do so must be free. Inevitably the question arises: 
Is this humanly possible? 
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THEOLOGICAL VOLUNTARISM AND THE VIRTUES 
Maclntyre's emphasis on social goods is essential to a successful 
account of the virtues. Without such a common point of reference, 
there can be no basis for deciding between self-directed and other- 
directed actions. As we have seen, this sociality necessitates social 
virtues by definition. (chap. 2) Social goods are indeed goods. The 
crucial question, however, is the status of these goods. In the human 
relationship with God there exists another dimension of sociality and 
social goods that I say takes precedence over social goods of the kind 
described by Maclntyre. In Part One I pointed to the need for a 
framework beyond social goods in order to rank these goods. From the 
supra-human perspective of divine intentions, it turns out that they are 
contingently high-ranking goods. If indeed our flourishing is not a 
metaphysical necessity, then there is at least the conceptual possibility 
of a conflict between flourishing and the good life. And even if there 
is no conflict, the distinction is still in place. The pursuit of flourishing 
is therefore not coterminous with the pursuit of the good life. 
If these ends are distinct, then there must be a corresponding 
distinction in practical rationality. If the distinction between 
flourishing and the good life is to make any difference in practical 
rationality, then a corresponding distinction in moral psychology must 
be possible. Does the structure of the will accommodate this 
distinction? Having roughed out the framework of morality and the 
contingent ranking of human flourishing as a good, I now have to 
make the case that humans can be motivated to actualize something 
other than human flourishing. 
My position presents an alternative to the altruistic/egoistic dichotomy 
in practical rationality on the one hand, but also to the eudaimonist 
vision of social goods on the other hand. The third possibility is 
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Scotist. I argue for two broad conclusions. First, it is the dispositions 
required for the actualization of the good life that are genuine virtues, 
as distinguishable from those directed toward the flourishing life. The 
dispositions required for the actualization of flourishing alone are not 
adequately virtuous. The virtues are derived from the ends they serve. 
Genuine virtues serve the good. I look here at the origins of the Scotist 
structure of practical rationality in Augustine's theory of the will. I 
then outline Aquinas' moral theory and show the need for a better 
account of moral freedom than his, corresponding to the distinction 
between the flourishing life and the good life. I show how John Duns 
Scotus provides such an account through his theory of the two 
affections. It is our ability to pursue the good above our own good as 
final end that makes humans morally free. 70 
Second, I say that eudaimonism cannot adequately explain the 
rationality of what it typically recognizes as the demands of justice. 
The Scotist theory of the will can accommodate these demands. 
Moreover, the Scotist theory of the will can explain the inadequacies 
of the Thomist theory better than the Thomist theory can explain 
them. I offer some comments on what our disposition toward justice 
is, and how we know what justice demands. I finish with suggestions 
about some practical differences flowing out of these theoretical 
distinctions. 
Motivational distinctions 
As we have seen in previous discussions (see chapters 3 and 5), there 
are reasons of varied merit for apparently virtuous behavior. It is the 
person's intention and motivation that distinguish genuinely virtuous 
behavior from simulacra. Consider three possible mental states. 
1. The agent cultivates excellences merely as a means to 
obtaining something for his/her personal advantage. 
70 I cannot afford here to wander into soteriology, specifically the 
action of divine grace that alone makes this shift possible. See J. Hare (1996). 
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2. The agent cultivates excellences to realize goods internal to the 
cooperative human activity in question, goods that include the 
excellences themselves, goods that s/he enjoys with others. 
3. The agent cultivates excellences as a means to and constitutive 
element of the good life as distinct from goods either to her 
advantage or that she can share with others. 
Maclntyre's account of the virtues has sufficiently distinguished (1) 
and (2). The distinction between (2) and (3) emerges clearly neither in 
what I understand of eudaimonistic theory in general nor in 
Maclntyre's theory in particular. On his account, for example, the 
virtues are those personal dispositions that are required not only to 
achieve the goods of "practices" but also to the goods of an integrated 
life and of a tradition as well. My conclusions in the previous chapter 
serve to show that (3) does not necessarily describe the pursuit of 
these last two stages of Maclntyre's account. That is, one could pursue 
narrative unity in one's life and the goods of a tradition merely as ends 
in themselves, as in (2), rather than as constitutive of the good life (3). 
The social good should not be conflated with the good. There is no 
better argument against identifying justice with the collective good 
than Reinhold Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society. Society, 
says Niebuhr, is both an indispensable basis for, and the main obstacle 
to, justice. In realizing this justice, common conceptions of the 
common good are not good enough. The privileged classes justify 
their status by reference to their contributions to the common good, or 
to natural superiority, or to the relative virtues and vices of the classes 
involved, or to the conditions necessary for the goods of the arts. On 
the other hand, mere envy can motivate the aspirations of the 
underclass. Group interests dominate all levels of social interaction, 
including and especially international relations. "The selfishness of 
nations is proverbial. " (1932, p. 84) We accept in the name of country 
what we would never accept in the name of the individual. Napoleon 
bathed Europe in blood and created a personal tyranny under the flag 
of equality, liberty and fraternity. The Russian communists uprooted 
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the czarist overlords, but went on to become even worse. The defense 
of the "honor" of a nation can justify terrible sacrifices from its 
citizens. A soldier may nobly sacrifice himself in war for his country, 
while this unselfish act masks the wrongful interests of the nation. The 
citizens' lust for power can be projected on the nation and experienced 
vicariously. "Rationalism in morals may persuade men in one moment 
that their selfishness is a peril to society and in the next moment it 
may condone their egoism as a necessary and inevitable element in the 
total social harmony. " (1932, p. 41) 
Doesn't the perceived justice of the group's interests, it may be 
objected, often motivate these acts, and therefore aren't its members 
motivated to action by their perception of justice? Yes it does and yes 
they are, and this is part of Niebuhr's argument. Politicians may 
identify their nation's cause with ultimate values. Cultural imperialism 
can be found in the most generous of people, people who have no 
interest in economic advantage. This is true even in religious 
missionary endeavors. 7' 
There is more to be said to the objection that we may believe our 
(interested) cause to be just. First, the mistaken conflation of 
flourishing with the good elicits a corresponding confusion at the level 
71 The Italian statesman Count Carlo Sforza notes, 
[It is] a precious gift bestowed by divine grace upon the British 
people: the simultaneous action in those islands, when a great 
British interest is at stake, of statesmen and diplomats coolly 
working to obtain some concrete political advantage and on the 
other side, and without previous base secret understanding, 
clergymen and writers eloquently busy showing the highest moral 
reasons for supporting the diplomatic action which is going on in 
Downing Street. Such was the case in the Belgian Congo. Belgian 
rule had been in force there for years; but at a certain moment gold 
was discovered in the Katanga, the Congolese province nearest to 
the British South African possessions; and the bishops and other 
pious persons started at once a violent press campaign to 
stigmatise the Belgian atrocities against the Negroes. What is 
astonishing and really imperial is that those bishops and other 
pious persons were inspired by the most perfect Christian ood 
faith, and that nobody was pulling the wires behind them. 
(Carlo 
Sforza, European Dictatorship, 178, cited in Niebuhr 1932, p. 
109)) 
For this reason, I do not claim that a common religious ethic as such 
is any more just than, say, a common secularist rationalism. 
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of moral psychology, preventing us from conceptually distinguishing 
dispositions toward these ends. The formal appearance of any number 
of "virtues" therefore cannot ensure the justice of the ends they serve. 
Practical rationality must find a way to distinguish, as Scotus has 
distinguished, the desire for either personal or collective flourishing 
on the one hand from the desire for justice on the other hand. When 
they are thus distinguished, only one can be primary. The other must 
be secondary. 
Applying the conclusions of Part One, the judgments of practical 
reason aiming at social goods alone are not genuine virtues if they do 
not aim at social goods for the sake of the highest good. Virtuous 
behavior requires not only accurate reasoning about right behavior in 
pursuit of ends, but also rightness of ends, and above all, right will 
concerning the motivation toward the proper ends. Thus the proper 
motivation and end of virtuous behavior must be distinguished from 
those mediate social goods whose relationship to the good life is 
contingently ranked. 
Augustine on human will and morality72 
As MacIntyre has demonstrated in Whose Justice? (1988), the human 
will is integral to moral theory from Augustine forward. Augustine's 
theory of the will explains, better than Aristotle's theory can do, how a 
person could know what is best for him or her to do, and yet not do it. 
Aristotle would have attributed such a failure either to a lack of 
knowledge, or to inadequate training of the desires. Augustine can 
explain a third possibility, that the person's passions are misdirected 
by the will. (1988, p. 157) 
Augustine's theory is also radically different from the Greeks in his 
understanding of reason. Both Plato and Aristotle understood reason 
to have its own ends and to move those who possess reason toward 
72 I borrow heavily from R. A. Markus' account of Augustine in the 
following summary. 
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those ends. Augustine sees will as necessary to move intellect. The 
will, being anterior to reason, has no reasons for its bidding. The will 
is the determinant factor in human action. (1988, p. 156f) 
Augustine follows the Greeks in believing that every person desires 
eudaimonia, or flourishing. All humans are under the influence of a 
diversity of "loves. " These loves are neutral in themselves, but they 
result in good or evil when these desires became disordered as a result 
of human sin, pursuing lesser goods above greater goods, and 
pursuing any created good above God as goodness itself. "Love" 
includes both natural impulses and the desire to satisfy physical and 
emotional needs, on one hand, and also the deliberate and conscious 
choices that come to shape our character as we prefer some of these 
desires to others, on the other hand. We have at least some capacity to 
decide between these loves and thus to determine some of our actions. 
With exercise, these choices come to shape what we desire. It is this 
capacity of selecting one desire over another that sets humans apart 
from the beasts. This capacity is the will. 
It is the will that is the object of moral praise or blame. Because we 
have the capacity to shape and influence our desires through 
successive decisions, Augustine speaks of the will itself as "love" in 
its regulative and selective aspect. In this sense, love is not neutral, but 
blameworthy or praiseworthy. 
Loving things as they ought to be loved, according to their just place 
in the cosmic order, is the life of virtue. "Hence, as it seems to me, a 
brief and true definition of virtue is `rightly ordered love'. " 
(Augustine 1984, p. 637 (City of God 15.22)) Adapting his theory of 
goods from classical sources, Augustine classified goods according to 
what is desired for its own sake (honestum) and what is desired for the 
sake of something else (utile) or as a means to an end. We are to 
"enjoy" (frui) that which will satisfy our desire; we "use" (utimur) 
things that help us acquire things that will satisfy our desires. Ordering 
each in its proper place is the key to Augustine's ethics. Humans are 
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to enjoy God and "use" (utimur) everything else. The great mistake is 
to pursue any created good as an end in itself. (See Augustine 1996, 
pp. 107,114,117 (De. Doc. Christ. 1.3; 1.20; 1.27)) So he wrote in 
the Confessions: 
Truly it is by continence that we are made as one and 
regain that unity of self which we lost by falling apart 
in the search for a variety of pleasures. For a man loves 
you [God] so much the less if, besides you, he also 
loves something else which he does not love for your 
sake. (1961, p. 233 (Confessions 10.29); emphasis 
added. ) 
What does this mean? On the biblical understanding to which 
Augustine subscribes, the greatest obligation is to love God "with all 
your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all 
your strength. " Unless the comprehensiveness of this imperative is 
taken as mere hyperbole, any interpretation of the text must explain a 
problem. How can we then justly love anything else at all? There 
would not seem to be any remaining resources to direct to other 
persons or other goods than God. Avoiding secondary questions and 
objections, I offer a possible point of explanation. The solution I 
propose is to see that we are to love other things for the sake of the 
ultimate object of love. Augustine's ethical structure is ambivalent on 
the issue of self-love in discussion here. In the final analysis, his 
overall theory appears to be eudaimonistic. (See O'Donovan 1980. ) 
Nevertheless Augustine's theory of the will is important because it 
brings into relief an important distinction between will and disposition 
directed toward human goods, including the common good, on the one 
hand, and will and disposition directed toward the ultimate good, on 
the other hand. Right reason looks to the highest good, not just to 
social goods. 
In the following I hope to show that Aquinas cannot adequately 
address conceptually the distinction between beatitudo and God as 
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final ends, a distinction that he nonetheless recognizes, and a 
distinction that is explained better by Scotus. This distinction cannot 
be recognized in practical rationality without a corresponding 
difference in the structure of the will. 
Human will in Aquinas and Scotus 
Scotus says that moral goodness is a secondary property that is 
"accidental" or "over and beyond" (superveniens) the primary 
goodness that the scholastics equated with all being. The origins of the 
conception in Anselm are evident. Very crudely, a person, an animal 
or a thing is good in the primary sense if the person or animal is 
simply alive and whole, if the thing does not lack any constitutive 
part. It is good in its existence as a being. Something has secondary 
goodness because it has certain properties that are suited or 
harmonious to something else. Food, for example, is evaluated as 
"good" because it has certain properties that are conducive to health. 
Moral goodness is a type of secondary goodness. 73 
Suitability requires judgment. So moral goodness connotes evaluation. 
In keeping with what I said in chapter 7 about objective morality, the 
divine mind is the supreme arbiter of suitability, having a perfect 
knowledge of its limits and requirements. Again, according to Scotus 
the only strict requirement of natural law, known immediately from its 
terms, is that God is to be loved. Any combination of contingent 
ordinances consistent with that requirement, and with each other, is 
possible. There are no reasons for moral law apart from these basic 
considerations, and only the divine mind is perfectly situated to make 
such a judgment. Nevertheless, humans can make a judgment that 
replicates this judgment and is thereby rational. 74 
73 A more complete account would present a version of "prescriptive 
realism, " following John Hare. See Hare's development of R. H. Hare's prescriptivism and his exposition of its precedent in Scotus. (2001, chaps. 1-2) 
74 One interpreter of Scotus has understood him to say that human 
rationality constitutes moral goodness in the same way that God 
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A non-rational animal may perceive food as good in some sense, but 
animals lack the faculties to make judgment, including moral 
judgment. If an animal can "judge" goodness at all, it is only on the 
basis of its non-reflective perceptions and the inclinations suited to its 
nature. What exactly does the non-rational animal lack that humans 
have? The answer to this question resides in the structure of the will. I 
want to emphasize the difference in the theories of this structure 
proposed by Aquinas and Scotus. Thomas Williams (2004, sect. 5.2) 
notes that Scotus's theory of the will consciously rivals that of 
Aquinas in response to the question of what differentiates humans 
from non-rational animals. 
In eudaimonistic theories, our choices are only good or intelligible 
when they are made in pursuit of flourishing. "[T]he will, " says 
Aquinas, "tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills 
happiness [beatitudo] and all other desires are caused by this natural 
desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. " (ST 
1.60.2) (Aquinas does not distinguish beatitudo from the good as 
such here. 75) This conclusion flows from the following line of 
reasoning. Every action is taken in view of a good. There is no evil or 
defect of good in beatitudo. So we cannot fail to will it. 
Moral freedom in Aquinas merely refers to the distinction between the 
will as intellectual appetite over against sense appetite-intellectual 
appetite directed toward objects presented to the intellect, sense 
appetite toward objects presented to the senses. The good will is 
submitted to the intellect, which is necessarily aimed at beatitudo. 
Since the sense appetite only deals with particular objects of appetite, 
creates moral goodness. This misinterprets Scotus, for whom 
rationality in morality is neither external to the will nor constituted 
by it. We are behaving morally when we will what God wills for our 
willing. (See Hare 2000, p. 32, contra Ingham 1989, p. 161. ) 
75 In the following I take beatitudo as the conceptual counterpart to 
Aristotle's eudaimonia. Again, the essential characteristic for this 
discussion of eudaimonia/beatitudo is the perfection of a being's 
nature. In contrast to Aristotle, the scholastics of course see human 
perfection in the next life as the full expression of human 
flourishing. 
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it is not free. The intellectual appetite is free, Aquinas believes, 
because it grasps universals. This freedom consists in the choice from 
among multiple particulars presented to the intellect by universals. 
The will does not aim at this good or that good, but at goodness as a 
universal. Though at any given time the intellect presents one object 
as good and the will must choose it, over time the will chooses many 
different objects. Thus the will is free. Accordingly, moral failure for 
Aquinas is the failure of the will to be subject to what the intellect 
presents as the means to flourishing rather than pursuing that to which 
the senses are brutishly drawn. 
The problem with this explanation is that, while Aquinas holds the 
beatific vision to be our ultimate end, biblical revelation also clearly 
specifies a final end distinct from beatitudo. So his explanation must 
be supplemented with another element in his account, Aquinas's 
recognition of God as the ultimate end of all things. The doubt that the 
neo-Aristotelian moral framework is conceptually adequate to this 
task is what I have been underlining throughout my project. What is 
our final end and what is the place of the final end in moral 
psychology? 
With these questions in view, Alan Donagan (1985) detects two sorts 
of teleologies in the moral theory of Aquinas. The first we would label 
consequentialist, he says. It is directed toward results that we purpose. 
The second takes persons, God and fellow human beings, as ends for 
whose sake we accomplish results. Aquinas's structure of morality 
incorporates both. God is the ultimate end of all things. (And people 
are ends in a similar way. ) Beatitudo/felicitas/eudaimonia is also our 
ultimate end. How can both claims be true without conflict or 
contradiction? Donagan's interpretation of Aquinas, though it is the 
correct interpretation, I think, will not resolve this problem. 
In order to answer the question, Donagan says, it is crucial first to 
establish Aquinas' insight into Aristotelian final causes. A final cause 
cannot be something that does not yet exist, such as Jane's new table 
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or her eudaimonia. Something that does not yet exist cannot be the 
cause of anything. Because it does not exist, it cannot, obviously, be 
the efficient cause of its own construction. But neither can the actual 
wood-glue-and-screws table itself be the final cause, for the same 
reason-it doesn't exist yet. A final result (Jane's new table, the 
actualization of her eudaimonia) cannot be a final cause. The final 
cause, or whatever it is that sets in motion whatever it is that will 
produce that result, does so before the result exists. So the final cause 
of Jane's table is not the table itself, but rather something like the idea 
or purpose of the table in the carpenter's mind that puts him to work in 
constructing her table. (For Aristotle, the final cause of a table is the 
form of a table. ) Jane's new table is an end, but it is not the final cause 
of her new table. 
In the same way, on the understanding of the orthodox Christian 
traditions, it is not eudaimonia that is our final end, but rather God. 
For Aquinas, eudaimonia (beatitudo/felicitas) is to know and love and 
experience God "face to face"-without mediation or impediment-in 
the next life. God is our end. We obtain God in the experience of 
eudaimonia (beatitudo/felicitas). The importance of this distinction is 
that, as Donagan says, "Obtaining the end is not the end. " (1985, p. 
10; his emphasis) Eudaimonia, as the obtainment of God then, is not 
our true end. Eudaimonia is a result efficiently caused. 
My question is this: do Aristotle/Aquinas/MacIntyre have the 
conceptual resources needed to make a distinction in ends in their 
moral psychology that corresponds to this distinction? They do not. 
The pursuit of the good for its own sake is not conceptually possible in 
eudaimonism. 
Donagan proposes a reconstruction of Aquinas' reasoning, and it is 
worth summarizing here. The ultimate end of any artifact is the maker 
him- or herself. We as humans make things for ourselves, for our 
purposes and our good. A fortiori, God as maker of all things is the 
end of all created things. There is a difference between rational 
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creatures and other created beings, however. Non-rational creatures 
are moved as instruments without any rational participation on their 
part. On the other hand, rational creatures can move themselves 
toward their ends by their will and intellect, not as instruments, but as 
agents. God (or a human being) cares about instruments 
instrumentally. God (or a human being) cares about agents for their 
own sakes. For this reason only rational creatures can attain God 
intellectually, by knowing and loving God. And also for this reason, 
among all creatures, God uniquely wants rational beings for their own 
sake, and wants them not only as a species, but also as individuals. 
So rational beings are ends in themselves. This is the foundation of the 
moral law for Aquinas, according to Donagan. "Law is nothing but a 
certain reason and rule of operation. " (Summa Contra Gentiles 
3.114.3, cited in Donagan 1985, p. 13) In governing ourselves by 
reason and rule, we emulate and actually participate in divine 
providence. The purpose of the law is to make humans good, and what 
makes humans good is a good will. A good will is a will that loves 
God and loves fellow human beings. All morality then is predicated 
on the love of pre-existent ends, God and human beings. Eudaimonia 
is an end for us, but it is not our ultimate end. Only God is our final 
end in this sense. 
My objection to this theory, at least as Donagan reconstructs it, is that 
Aquinas cannot show how the pursuit of both eudaimonia and God as 
our final end is a possibility of practical rationality. In his summary of 
the solution to how apparently contrary ends, God and beatitudo, are 
harmonized, Donagan says, "Rational creatures... act for their own 
sakes. But what their own sakes require is that they obtain the 
ultimate end of the whole of things by loving and understanding it. " 
(1985, p. 15; emphasis mine) So, as in the case of Augustine's 
comments above, one end is subsumed under the other. Here, 
however, it is the self that is primary, and God, as final end, is 
secondary. We obtain God for our own sakes. 
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How can it be that rational creatures should obtain the ultimate end of 
all things-God, the ultimate maker and ultimate rational being-for 
their own sakes rather than for God's sake? God should not be 
understood as something made by humans, something instrumental to 
human ends. (Donagan rightly dismisses process theology as a 
possible solution. ) Just the reverse is true. On Aquinas' theory, as we 
have seen, a maker of non-rational entities makes those entities for his 
or her own sake. Rational beings are ends to be desired for their own 
sake. But if God wants rational creatures "for their own sakes, " God 
also and by priority wants them for God's sake (as the artifacts of a 
maker). As rational beings we can see this. Right reason must take it 
into account. I do not see how Aquinas's theory of the will enables the 
moral agent to do so. 
The Aristotelian structure of the will can will its own good. It can see 
how the realization of its own good relates to the good. But it cannot 
will the good as an end for its own sake, as distinct from its own good, 
as the ultimate end. It can only will the good inasmuch as the good is 
instrumental or even constitutive of its flourishing. For Aristotle, this 
deficit never becomes apparent, given the eternal fixity of a form 
(flourishing) as a final cause and the ability of unaided reason to 
deduce what that cause is. 76 I see a gap in moral psychology opened 
up by the distinction between flourishing and the good life. We can 
deny the possibility of a gap between flourishing and goodness by 
maintaining with Aquinas and against the presuppositions of post- 
Aristotelian science that the natural order is not only intelligible, but 
also necessary. If we don't deny it, then that gap must be bridged. 
Aristotelianism's moral psychology cannot bridge it. 
For Aquinas, the scriptures are supremely authoritative. Yet he does 
not seem to recognize the impressive evidence in the biblical literature 
76 Aristotle understands that gap to be filled as the intellect reaches its 
telos, in conformity with the reality of the form of flourishing as 
eternal and necessary. (See Maclntyre 1990, pp. 172f. ) For both Aristotle and Aquinas, the will never acts contrary to a fully correct 
moral judgment of the intellect. 
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that humans ought to pursue God as the ultimate good, for God's own 
sake. The writers of the Psalms implore God to intervene on their 
behalf for the sake of God's name or for God's own sake. The 
prophets sometimes have God explicitly denying that it is for the sake 
of any human or group (such as Israel) that God has intervened, but 
that God has done so for God's own sake. (See Ezekiel 36.22,32. ) 
Jesus warns his disciples of the harassment and death they will 
experience for his sake. "He who finds his life will lose it, and he who 
loses his life for my sake will find it. " (Matthew 10.18,22,39; 
emphasis added) The suffering that inevitably accompanies a life in 
pursuit of the ultimate good in the context of a world enamored with 
lesser goods is for the sake of God and in order to have a right 
relationship with God. It is never framed in terms of any reward or 
satisfaction external to that right relationship with God. Yet despite 
his modification of the Aristotelian framework, Aquinas's moral 
structure is constrained by that framework to a eudaimonistic 
principle. 
The problem of the pursuit of both eudaimonia and God in practical 
rationality can be viewed from another angle. The obtainment-of-the- 
ultimate-end is not the ultimate end, Donagan claims. If this is so, as I 
think it is, then we cannot obtain the end by pursuing the obtainment- 
of-the-end, but only by pursuing the end itself. An analogy may make 
this clearer. For a rational agent, the pursuit of flourishing 
(eudaimonia/beatitudo/felicitas) as our ultimate end is misguided in 
the same way that the direct pursuit of pleasure for its own sake is 
misguided. Pleasure of the best sort cannot be pursued directly. It 
supervenes on the achievement of goods internal to socially 
collaborative activities. I need add nothing more here to my summary 
of Maclntyre's Aristotelian theory in chapter 2. Likewise, to pursue 
the beatific vision for our own good is not, strictly speaking, to pursue 
God. To pursue beatitudo itself as an experience to achieve is to 
pursue something other than the end itself. It is to pursue something 
we can obtain, rather than to pursue God. 
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In sum, Donagan's explication of Aquinas has simply pushed one step 
further back his original question of whether our final end is God or 
eudaimonia, and rephrased it. In the question of pursuing the good, as 
distinct from pursuing our good, Donagan's interpretation runs up 
against a structural limit in Aquinas's theory of the will. On that 
structure, if I understand it correctly, humans cannot seek their 
ultimate end (God). They can only pursue their own beatitudo. At best 
they love God as their greatest good for the sake of their beatitudo. 
This is unacceptable. It reduces the place of God in moral psychology. 
It diminishes moral psychology to something less than full rationality 
in view of the good. 
I follow Scotus in contending that Aquinas' understanding of morality 
here is insufficient to explain genuine morality and genuine moral 
freedom. The mere alignment of desire with deductive intelligence in 
pursuit of our good can never amount to the morality and the freedom 
we ascribe to moral beings, the ability to pursue the good as distinct 
from our good. 77 
But, it might be objected, why can't our good be seen as a constitutive 
element of the good life in the way outlined earlier by MacDonald? 
(See chapter 4. ) As a matter of fact, it can be part of the good life and 
it is, contingently. But the ranking of the two is the difference between 
good and evil. 
Scotus' account of the two inclinations in the will 
The inadequacy of eudaimonist theories of the will can also be 
illustrated in their explanation of moral failure. Aquinas says we must 
will beatitudo as a universal, not in particular. We must love beatitudo 
as a universal because we necessarily love that in which there is no 
evil or defect of good. We do not necessarily love beatitudo in 
" Contrary to some characterizations of Scotus, his theory is not 
motivated by the need to explain how we can be free to do evil. (See 
my comments on Anselm in chapter 5. ) Rather, his concern is to 
show how we can be genuinely moral in exalting God as ultimate 
good. 
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particular, however. To do so would exclude the possibility of sin; we 
would never not be able to choose rightly. 78 On the Thomist theory, as 
noted above, sin is roughly the triumph of the sense appetite (toward 
objects presented to the senses) over intellectual appetite (directed 
toward objects presented to the intellect). 
Aquinas' theory of the will does not capture as well as Anselm's 
theory something additional that is needed for an adequate explanation 
of evil in the will. Anselm proposes a thought experiment, which 
Scotus invokes later, concerning a hypothetical angel "that had a 
purely intellectual appetite as such and not one that was free. " Since 
angels are understood to be spirits, they do not have a sense appetite. 
Accordingly, the hypothetical angel would be unable not to will its 
own benefit. It could not therefore be morally accountable. (1997, p. 
298 (Ord. 2, dist 6, q. 2)) Angels are morally accountable. Therefore 
something more than intellect must be necessary for morality. What is 
it? 
Scotus' understanding of morality incorporates a distinction already 
suggested in Augustine's theory of the two cities/two loves, and 
drawn specifically in Anselm to answer this question, the affectio 
iustitiae and the affectio commodi. What these terms mean has 
recently been the subject of much debate and the conclusions of this 
debate are critical to my own account. There seems to be no 
controversy about translating the first term, roughly, as "affection for 
justice. " What "justice" entails is disputed. The affectio commodi has 
conventionally been translated as "affection of advantage" or 
"affection for the advantageous. " This translation, however, begs the 
question of its meaning. Allan Wolter (Duns Scotus 1997, p. 298), 
Mary Elizabeth Ingham (1996, pp. 330, and John Hare 2001, p. 62) 
all understand the affectio commodi as the self-regarding inclination 
78 In response, Scotus says that this cannot be the case, because if we 
necessarily desire that in which there is no evil or defect of good, 
then we would necessarily desire particulars even more than the 
universal, since beatitudo in its particulars has even more of every 
aspect of good than it does as a universal. (1997, pp. 155ff.; Ord. 
IV, suppl., dist 49, qq. 9-10. ) 
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over against the other-regarding inclination of the affectio iustitiae, the 
inclination to the love of other things for their own sake. Yet these 
same interpreters acknowledge that the affectio commodi also refers to 
the perfection of nature. 
Thomas Williams (1995) does not offer a translation of the affection, 
but argues that the term encompasses not only the desire for what is 
beneficial to oneself but also the love of others for their own sake. The 
conclusive evidence for this interpretation, in my estimation, is found 
in Williams' combination of three claims by Scotus: 
1. One or the other of the two affections elicits every act. 
2. The affectio iustitiae never elicits a sinful act [and 
therefore all sinful acts are elicited by the affectio 
commodi]. 
3. There are sins that can result from loving others for their 
own sake (e. g., stealing something for a friend). 
Therefore, the affectio commodi includes the love of others for their 
own sake, at least under some circumstances, and the affectio iustitiae 
is not simply the love of people or things for their own sake. 
(Williams 1995) 
The relevance of this conclusion for my discussion is that Scotus' 
theory-and I follow him in this-represents an alternative structure 
of morality to both the self-regarding/other-regarding dichotomy, on 
the one hand, and also to the eudaimonist account based on social 
goods, on the other hand. The third possibility is an account that, 
following on the conclusions of the last chapter, pursues justice 
understood as conceptually distinct from both personal gain and also 
from the common good of humankind. 
The importance of the two inclinations in the will 
Genuine moral freedom requires an inclination to the good as well as 
an inclination to our advantage or to what fits our nature, as ends in 
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themselves. An animal is driven by the affectio commodi to consume 
its food, and recognizes in it a natural good. The animal is not free. It 
lacks the ability to conceptualize that consuming its food is not only a 
good, but right in view of realizing a greater good. More importantly, 
it lacks the ability to will that greater good for its own sake. Every 
rational creature has both inclinations and both are good. But every 
human being is born with a disordered relationship between the two. 
When the affectio commodi overwhelms our affection for justice, then 
we have an improper regard for what is to our benefit. People should 
want their own beatitudo, says Scotus, but not want it more than they 
want "God to have everything good. " (1997, p. 301) Ultimately, we 
can love God as our good and we can love God as the proper end of 
all things, but the difference is crucial. In proper moral psychology we 
love what is to our benefit because it is (contingently) just. Our good 
is not necessarily just and therefore we need to address the question of 
whether God has willed it, whether it is part of the good God intends. 
The ends of human flourishing do not determine the moral law. That 
distinction in objective morality, flagged by Scotus, has a 
corresponding distinction in his theory of practical rationality in the 
human subject. It is the affection for justice that allows us to choose in 
agreement with the moral law. It is the affection for justice that allows 
us, that is, to be moral. (Williams 2004,5.2) 
In his development of the two affections of the will, Scotus identifies 
the intellectual appetite in Aquinas' theory with the affectio commodi. 
As a result, the most important distinction for morality is not between 
inclinations to one's good as presented to the senses or by the 
intelligence, but between both of these inclinations together, and the 
inherent human inclination to the requirements of justice. 
This distinction implies at least the theoretical possibility that the two 
could come into conflict. In such a case justice would require 
choosing the good life over our good or the common good. Why 
should we believe that we could not will our flourishing? 
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In beginning a reply, it must be emphasized that there is no evil in the 
will to flourish as such. The human will properly contains both 
inclinations. Scotus, a. k. a. the Subtle Doctor, makes important 
qualifications here in keeping with the affectio commodi that we all 
possess. We cannot will against our beatitudo as a good without any 
defect or evil. It does not follow from this impossibility, however, that 
we must actively will those goods. We can fail to will our flourishing. 
Likewise, a person cannot will his/her unhappiness (miseriam), but it 
does not follow from this that s/he must will flourishing. We can fail 
to will against unhappiness. As a result we can will in accordance with 
the affection for justice over our affection for what seems to fit our 
nature viewed narrowly. Morally good and morally bad acts have in 
common that they are acts of a free will. (1997, p. 177 (Ord. II, dist. 
40). 79 
Scotus gives an example of how we can fail to will our own 
flourishing, even without following the affection for justice, and 
indeed in acting against it. A person can fornicate knowing that this 
cannot be squared with flourishing-knowing that it is a mortal sin 
that will lead to damnation rather than union with God-yet will to do 
so anyway, he says. (1997, pp. 155ff (Ord. IV, suppl., dist 49, qq. 9- 
10)) That we can wrongly fail to will our flourishing, Scotus is saying, 
is evidence that we can do so justly. In a moment, I will consider a 
difficulty for eudaimonism in explaining moral virtues in terms of 
flourishing. The larger question, however, is whether we can actually 
be motivated to act in accordance with justice when justice conflicts 
with our flourishing. We can conceive of it as a good, I say, and then 
will it as a good independent of our flourishing. 
Eudaimonia or justice 
Does the affectio iustitiae, or anything like it, exist? In elaborating his 
form of eudaimonism, MacIntyre has recently recounted the 
79 This, too, runs counter to Aristotle and Aquinas, who do not think 
that we can act contrary to a fully correct moral judgment of the intellect. 
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development of characteristics in the human. Some are identical with 
those of non-rational animals such as dolphins. Others are different. 
(1999, pp. 63-79) Dolphins achieve goods, and even though they do 
not reason, they can even be said to act for a reason. Flourishing as a 
concept is the same for human and non-human animals. For both 
rational and non-rational animals, to flourish is always to flourish in 
virtue of some characteristics. 
In delineating human distinctiveness, MacIntyre mentions three 
dimensions of the transition from infancy to the status of an 
independent practical reasoner. All three require language and a 
variety of conceptual uses of language. First, the satisfaction of bodily 
wants represents many human goods. Non-rational animals respond to 
this form of good. Humans, however, can also attain a stage at which 
they can evaluate their reasons for behavior in terms of goods that do 
not respond only to bodily needs. Second, we develop the ability to 
gain the necessary distance, to distinguish immediate infantile desires 
from our good/the good and to bring those desires themselves under 
evaluation. Without these capacities they would therefore reason from 
unsound premises and act from improper motivation. Third, we can 
imagine the future. 
I have no objection to these observations as such. Because the 
eudaimonist model cannot adequately distinguish from the good or 
eudaimonia from justice, however, it is unable to conceptualize a 
fourth dimension distinguishing human from non-human animals. The 
ability to abstract and conceptualize is also the person's ability to 
conceive of herself as object, to stand back from her situation. In this 
power, humans have not only the ability to conceptualize and abstract 
from our own situation, but also the ability to evaluate as "good" 
even that that cannot be imagined to benefit us, or that may even harm 
us, as these terms are commonly used. This is the ability to conceive 
of justice as distinct from flourishing. 
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The pursuit of justice 
The difference between the two inclinations is not the same difference 
as that between egoistic and altruistic motivation. The two pairings are 
disanalogous in at least three ways. First, it does not follow from the 
priority of the affectio iustitiae that the person should value herself 
either more or less than her neighbor. The nobility of self-sacrifice as 
such does not follow from the two affections, nor for that matter does 
the irrationality of self-sacrifice. On this question it is the end that 
determines the rightness of the disposition. In the example of a 
soldier, it is not sacrifice itself that accomplishes the good pursued, 
the defense of the country. General George S. Patton was correct: "No 
bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making 
the other poor dumb bastard die for his country. " Nevertheless, rightly 
defending her country may result in the soldier's death and that of her 
fellows-in-arms, whether in victory or defeat. And it may be the case 
that the soldiers see in advance that the right course of action will 
almost surely lead to their deaths. The requirements of justice hold 
even if my/our good is at stake. It is because of the contingently high 
ranking of social goods that the disposition to courage is rational. 
The two inclinations differ in a second way from the egoistic/altruistic 
dichotomy of self-regarding/other-regarding motives. In the 
dichotomy, one is a contrary of the other, so that the agent cannot 
have both interested and altruistic motivations simultaneously. The 
two Scotist inclinations need not necessarily be in tension. The Scotist 
structure concurs with eudaimonism in denying the validity of the 
dichotomy. Indeed, as it contingently turns out, God has ultimately 
ensured that the two are never in tension as long as the inclination to 
flourishing is subordinate to the inclination to justice. 
Aristotelian theories of ethics prior to Scotus recognize that many 
goods cannot be pursued directly. Pleasure of the best kind, as noted 
above and in chapter 2, is obtained only indirectly through the 
achievement of internal goods such as those of Maclntyrean practices. 
Eudaimonists might therefore protest that I have failed to see that 
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Aristotelian flourishing itself is, after all, best understood as the 
indirect result of the pursuit of the many constitutive and just goods of 
the good life. And so, the objection continues, there is a necessary 
self-effacement in the pursuit of flourishing that I have not 
acknowledged. 
My reply has two parts. First, the objection misidentifies my aim. The 
object of rationality, on my account, is not self-effacement. Self- 
effacement is not necessarily good, for the reasons just noted. It is the 
primacy of the good life over flourishing, whether personal or 
corporate, that is critical. Second, this primacy cannot coherently be 
upheld in eudaimonism, as far as I can tell, since on the eudaimonist 
account our ultimate end is flourishing. Now, it is true that on the fully 
informed Scotist perspective, we cannot fail to see that in loving God 
by the particular means that God has contingently specified, we are 
thereby achieving our flourishing. Nor can we fail to see that God has 
contingently willed our flourishing. It is also true that the association 
is not simply instrumental, since it is part of a complex interpersonal 
relationship between God and humans. We know God only because of 
God's self-revelation and love for us. As we become co-lovers of this 
God, we soon realize that we are not meeting any divine need or 
enriching God in any way. God's desire for our welfare and love for 
us is unconditional and is a result of the overflowing abundance of 
God's excellences. This, in turn, becomes a cause for adoration and 
love of those excellences. This love and adoration, in turn, is enriching 
and fulfilling and ennobling in rational creatures: we take on 
characteristics of that which we meditate on and admire. We see, in 
yet another turn, that this is God's intention. Both this intention and 
the fruition of this intention become a new source of love, gratitude, 
and wonder-filled meditation. The end of the story is a life of union 
with God, an existence in which our flourishing, in still another turn, 
consists in the unobscured admiration of God in body/mind/soul/work, 
and the cycle goes on and on. Under the actual formulation of the 
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moral law, the two affections do not conflict unless the 
inclination to 
our own benefit overrides the inclination to justice. 
Critics on the other side of the egoistic/altruistic debate might 
therefore object here: Since we know that in pursuing the good we 
are-even though I have said "contingently"-pursuing our good, 
isn't the inclination for justice merely a form of acting for our benefit 
after all? What do the biblical expressions of losing one's life in order 
to find it, for example, mean if not that our ultimate motivation is to 
realize our own flourishing? (e. g., Matthew 10.39; 1 Peter 5.4) 
In reply: losing one's life to find it does entail a sort of death, and the 
life gained cannot be found without that death. Yet it is a death to self 
and its tyranny, not of the self per se. What emerges is a regenerated 
self. This should not be confused either with acquiescence to social 
oppression or to the irrational demands of another. Even in the 
personal requirements to turn the other cheek and to go the extra mile, 
we see the assertion of a redefined will that refuses both ineffectual 
rebellion against unjust authority, and also mere acquiescence in 
frustrated defeat. In the assertion of a higher authority, the self is 
quietly affirmed without the destructiveness of frustrated pride. 
My reply here consists of the third way in which the egoistic/altruistic 
dichotomy of self-regarding/other-regarding psychology does not 
capture the Scotist conception any more than it captures the 
Aristotelian conception. Because the conception does not negate our 
inclination to our own benefit in its properly subordinate position, to 
point out that the person is sure to benefit or that morality realizes the 
subject's interests and desires, is not a telling objection. It is no 
criticism that the pursuit of flourishing is a motivating factor, as long 
as it is not the primary motivating factor, because the two affections 
are not necessarily contraries. Indeed, the virtues of faith and hope 
presuppose an interest in one's well-being. 
258 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
Yet the love of God for God's sake as the highest good, I contend, is 
the true end and engine of morality. Flourishing and justice are related 
in such a way that we cannot simultaneously will our flourishing for 
the sake of justice and also will justice for the sake of our flourishing. 
The conception of God as final end and the concept of eudaimonia as 
final end are contraries. If one is psychologically ultimate, the other 
can only be, at best, penultimate. As John Hare points out, in our 
primary concern for flourishing it is possible to focus on the 
secondary as means to that end, losing ourselves in attention to those 
means, although never really forgetting the end. (Hare 2000, p. 38) 
The secondary may even be constitutive of the primary in a way that 
is not simply instrumental. But if another's well-being is constitutive 
of my flourishing, for example, the centrality of my flourishing makes 
my interest in the other's welfare conditional on its contribution to my 
flourishing. This conditionality is inherent to eudaimonism. If 
flourishing is central in the way claimed by eudaimonists, then other 
considerations are secondary. If the conditional structure is not 
present, then it is not eudaimonism. If justice is secondary, even if we 
pursue justice in some sense "for its own sake, " we cannot truly make 
it central without self-deception. (Hare 2000, p. 38; Hare's 
conclusions here are somewhat different than mine. )80 It is precisely 
our ability to will the good as distinct from our good that marks the 
Scotist advancement. 
Objections 
But, it might be objected, we have the ability to foresee the realization 
of future goods and the future realization of goals, and to take 
vicarious pleasure now from what our future selves will experience. 
Can't we thus similarly enjoy through imagination what we may never 
actually experience when a good is realized? And therefore isn't the 
distinction on which I am insisting unnecessary? 
80 In considering their personal histories, it is quite likely that the life 
and practice of Aquinas et al. surpassed their theory on this 
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The objection does not apply. We know that there is a difference 
between making the end present to our imagination and really being 
present at the actualization of that end. This sort of imagination is part 
of our ability to abstract, but there is no self-deception involved. 
Though we know that we may not be present at the actual realization 
of the goal, this knowledge does not prevent us from acting in ways 
that seem likely to prevent our presence there. Nevertheless we can 
pursue ends such as these that transcend our benefit. 
Another objection questions if the Scotist position is sufficiently 
motivated. Can we do it? In reply, I say that the best reason for 
thinking that it can be done is that it is done. Again, my intent is not to 
set forth an ethic of supererogation or of self-effacement as a good and 
end in itself. And I have no illusions that a consistently self- 
disadvantageous or group-disadvantageous position would be easily 
motivated. But we know that it is possible because we see specific 
instantiations of it in dispositions and behavior for which there is no 
other plausible explanation. By dying for their cause, for example, 
atheistic Marxists (i. e., persons not motivated by possible rewards in 
an afterlife) have sacrificed their lives and any hope of personal 
participation in the society they envision. Certainly, the recurrent 
corruption and hypocrisy of the political leadership in Marxist states 
demonstrates the problems for long-term motivation to self-sacrifice. 
To the extent that the account I am presenting is actually realized, it 
stems first from an initial motivation in pursuit of goods that are 
external to the practice in question. Maclntyre's explanation of moral 
education mentioned earlier in this chapter stops short. Ultimately, our 
appreciation of these goods and our enlargement and projection of the 
self toward these goods is such that our former, untrained interests can 
be willingly sacrificed for the realization of those goods: an artist risks 
his closest relationships, personal health, and personal financial 
solvency in the realization of his craft; a victim of a natural disaster 
question. They often seem more interested in God than beatitude as 
end. 
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refuses evacuation without her pet dog; a woman willfully lives in 
poverty in the service of the poor, not for the feeling of reward that 
supervenes on the accomplishment of this mission-as reinforcing of 
her convictions as that feeling may be-or for any reward she may 
receive, but for the accomplishment of the mission. 
What goes for Maclntyrean practices can also be extrapolated to the 
framework of an entire existence. It is not only the ability of rational 
beings to achieve goods by stepping back from and delaying the 
gratification of strong physical needs in view of future goods that 
distinguishes us. It is also our ability to conceive of goods from which 
we cannot consciously imagine that we will ever profit. It is in part 
our ability to form concepts and to act on those concepts, independent 
of our own biological (or social or political) interests, that 
differentiates humans from other animals. (I will not attempt here to 
refute the claims of behaviorism. ) A dog may be killed in protecting 
its owner, but it will never consciously reflect on the possibility of its 
death and proceed in a course of action that almost guarantees that it 
will die. We are inspired by Samwise Gamgee and determine, if ever 
the choice is forced upon us, to emulate him when, just to cite one 
example, he leaves behind his beloved cookware and all the genuine 
goods of ordinary life that it symbolizes, in order to accomplish a 
mission to Mordor that he believes will entail his death. I do not think 
that contemporary eudaimonism can explain this act or the disposition 
that lies beneath it. 
I have questioned the assumption in eudaimonism that if we realize 
our flourishing, we are thereby realizing the good life. The 
eudaimonistic corollary under question at present is the assumption 
that in pursuing the good life I am inevitably pursuing my flourishing. 
If the self-directed/other-directed dichotomy is misguided, as 
eudaimonists believe, then there must be a plausible explanation for 
the demands of justice in terms of my flourishing. I don't see such an 
explanation forthcoming. Let's look at this problem more closely. 
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A problem for the eudaimonist conception of the will 
Flourishing is dependent on my personal appropriation of goods partly 
external to myself. 81 Unfortunately, the achievement of goods may be 
frustrated by uncontrollable circumstances. Despite this cold fact, 
Maclntyre says that genuine virtues persist. (198) I agree. I want to 
leverage this disjunction, however, to point out the explanatory 
advantages of the Scotist position. This position can explicate two 
phenomena that seem to pose problems for eudaimonism: the 
rationality of the persistence of the virtues even when the individual 
cannot attain a good, and the rationality of that persistence when she 
does not benefit in the good attained. 
An important problem for the eudaimonistic structure of the will 
grows out of its claim that genuinely virtuous dispositions persist 
whether or not goods are actually achieved. The virtues, it is said, are 
required to realize social goods. Maclntyre largely defines the virtues 
in terms of those goods, as I have shown. (See chap. 2. ) On the other 
hand, the realization of eudaimonia depends on some circumstances 
beyond the control of the moral agent. (Casey 1990, pp. v-vi) To 
become Aristotle's great-souled man (megalopsyche), for example, 
one needs material means, good fortune, and the Y-chromosome. Yet 
Maclntyre also says that the genuinely virtuous are virtuous 
regardless of consequences, that is, whether eudaimonia is realized or 
not. These two assertions sit ill together. How can the virtues both be 
tied to specific goods and yet persist even if those goods cannot be 
actualized, say, and the subject knows that they cannot be actualized? 
The classic answer to the question is manifold. First, it is claimed, the 
question mistakenly treats eudaimonism as a species of 
consequentialism. My perplexity centers on consequences, whereas 
eudaimonism is not consequentialist. Second, it is claimed, the 
81 Again, everything depends here on what is understood by 
"flourishing. " If it simply means whatever our end happens to be, 
for whatever purpose we have that end, then I have no real 
disagreement. If the realization of flourishing is only, or even 
primarily, conceived of as for our own sake, then it is merely an 
anthropocentric good and my criticism stands. 
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question reflects a failure to grasp that the virtues themselves are 
partly constitutive of the good life. In large part, to flourish simply is 
to lead a life of virtue. Third, continues the rebuttal, my insistence on 
a distinction between the flourishing life and the good life is partly 
due to my failure to recognize the human ability to enlarge the self to 
encompass a broad conception of flourishing, one that includes my 
context. The virtuous "self' includes all my significant social 
relationships (family, friends, country, humankind) and perhaps even 
relationships with non-human entities (animals, the inanimate 
environment, great works of art). The eudaimonist self is not 
conceived as the modern unencumbered individual, but as person-in- 
relationship. In application, this results in dispositions for specific 
types of behavior performed with specific motivations and intentions, 
all pointed at goods and ultimately at the good. This directedness 
distinguishes genuine virtues from simulacra. As my previous 
discussions here have noted, for example, a soldier who overcomes 
his/her fear only for a paycheck is obviously not courageous in the 
right sense. Neither is a soldier properly courageous who overcomes 
his/her fear only for his/her welfare, rather than for the common good 
in the pursuit of a just war. I shouldn't be thinking in terms of self- 
regarding and other-regarding motives, according to which thinking 
we would be motivated either egoistically or altruistically. 
Eudaimonism entails thinking in terms of social goods and of the 
shared common good. 
This answer to my question falls short in each case. In reply, first, I 
say that eudaimonism has to take a stand. It must affirm that human 
flourishing is not just good from an anthropocentric perspective, but 
also according to an eternal and necessary metaphysical truth. This 
affirmation will effectively close the gap that I have opened up 
between the ends of flourishing and goodness in moral psychology. If 
flourishing is good in an absolute sense, according to an eternal law 
from a supra-human perspective, then to pursue flourishing just is to 
pursue the good life. For the reasons given in chapter 7, this position 
263 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
runs counter to the presuppositions of modern scientific discovery. If 
eudaimonism does not make some such assertion, on the other hand, 
then it is indeed consequentialist in the relevant respect. (See chapter 
6. ) For if the good of flourishing is contingent, either on God's will or 
something else, then seeking flourishing is insufficient as an end from 
the perspective of moral psychology. Flourishing is, at most, 
penultimate. Flourishing in this sense is a result, not a form that acts 
as a final cause in the way that it does for Aristotle and Aquinas. So to 
pursue flourishing as an end is therefore to pursue it as a consequence. 
To the eudaimonistic position that the flourishing life is the life of the 
virtues, I say that Aristotelian virtue is not its own reward tout court, 
not the full expression of eudaimonia, as it is in Stoicism. There are 
greater goods in view, social goods in which the agent shares with 
others. It will not suffice to make the virtues and eudaimonia 
coterminous. 
The third eudaimonistic answer to my question about the persistence 
of the virtues in spite of circumstances was that the "self' of 
eudaimonism is not the unencumbered self. It can encompass the 
context of the self. My question, it might be said, presupposes a false 
dichotomy of self-directedness and other-directedness that 
eudaimonism denies in the concept of the common good. Goods are 
communal, not dichotomously either self- or other-regarding. In reply, 
I agree that the dichotomy is wrong-headed. A principal reason why 
the self-regarding/other-regarding dichotomy, though ultimately 
wrong-headed, often forms a part of plausible rivals to 
Aristotelianism, is that because for me to pursue others' interests or 
even "the common good, " it is sometimes necessary to forfeit any 
foreseeable realization of goods in which I can credibly be understood 
to be present and to participate. We saw this in the case of the Marxist 
martyr. The rationality of this forfeit must be explained. I used it 
defensively above. Now I wish to use it aggressively against 
eudaimonism. The difficulty for the eudaimonistic position is to 
explain how courage that requires risk to the conventional boundaries 
264 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
of the self, or even the sacrifice of the self, is always rational. 
Consider two sorts of cases of courage. 
In the first sort, a person makes sacrifices for a good and yet does not 
achieve it. A parent raises a child in exemplary fashion, for example. 
The child turns out to be a bad human being. The parent still loves the 
child, though years of sacrifice are apparently wasted, and yet declares 
himself to be without regret, indeed, declares himself willing in 
hindsight to repeat the whole labor of love. The only good realized is 
having loved the child. An Aristotelian understanding of the self 
surpasses modern individualism to encompass family, friends, 
country, and deities. Aristotle says, for example: "Parents, then, love 
their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their 
separate existence a sort of other selves). " (1947, p. 1072 (NE 8,12 
(1161b28)) But how can the dispositions coming from such 
identification be said to be in pursuit of the common good when the 
child does not share in the parent's conception of the good and does 
not contribute to the well-being of the parent or the community? An 
understanding of the virtues themselves as partly constitutive of the 
good life can only partly account for the rationality of this persistence. 
In fact, it may not enter into the parent's specific motivation in any 
important way in this instance. The only good realized has not been 
used or obtained by the self, since the goods attained are better 
understood with respect to giving than to attaining. Eudaimonism 
lacks the concepts to explain such "goods. " Or, given the knowledge 
of hindsight, it may simply deny that the parent's attitude is rational. 
The second instance of virtue amplifies this inadequacy. A person 
makes sacrifices for a good and does achieve it: a soldier dies 
defending her country. How can this soldier be said to have achieved 
something of the common good in which she participates? In what 
common good can she share if she is dead? Whence then the 
persistence of the obligation to courage? Eudaimonism might posit 
some further metaphysical or religious cosmology involving 
immortality or transcendence of the self, so as to guarantee that in 
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pursuing the good I am also realizing my good. Aquinas, attempting to 
synthesize Aristotelianism with biblical and Augustinian insights, 
identifies flourishing with the beatific vision of the next life. 82 Such a 
cosmology may be ultimately required as part of a comprehensive 
explanation for morality-Part One says that it is-but are persons 
without this cosmology excused from the demands of justice? Most 
such persons do not seek such an excuse. Such persons often 
exemplify dispositions to courage in pursuit of her conception of the 
good, dispositions that the Aristotelian model cannot plausibly explain 
as the natural and rational realization of eudaimonia, rather than as the 
pursuit of a just good conceived as distinct from her good. 83 That is, 
they can envision a frame of reference beyond human flourishing, yet 
short of positive claims about an ultimate metaphysical or theological 
framework. Such an ultimate frame of reference is still necessary, I 
say, but the sub-ultimate frame of reference in such a case could 
provisionally conceive of her good, or the good of human flourishing, 
as distinct from the good. She can envision a good in which she will 
not participate, except through the satisfaction of having acted in 
conformity to that vision of the good. The eudaimonist conception of 
the encumbered self is not adequate to explain this. The goods we 
pursue can transcend even the interests of the self-in-community, the 
common good as generally conceived, or the perfection of our being, 
to will our final end for its own sake. 
Eudaimonists might respond with the counterclaim that any such 
move is de facto proof we have not transcended "self, " not surpassed 
the interests of eudaimonia. The soldier mentioned above is, after all, 
still pursuing the enlarged understanding of her self. 
I question the usefulness of such a fluid concept of the self. If 
everything is the self (or potentially can be) then nothing is the self. If 
"self' can expand without limit, then it ceases to have any meaning 
82 See MacIntyre on the theological nature of the structure of morality in both Aristotle and Aquinas. (1990) 
83 See Duns Scotus (1997, p. 282) for a similar example. 
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that helps the eudaimonistic account against the Scotist account. Such 
a self is selflessly disposed to the extent that "self' is not conceptually 
adequate to the task of distinguishing motivations. And thus in a 
backhanded way, it concedes my central claim concerning our ability 
to love beyond the interests of the self, on any standard use of the 
term: the eudaimonist claim becomes unfalsifiable. 
A better account of the will is needed to explain how goods other than 
the virtues themselves are genuine goods even if they do not 
contribute to my flourishing-to my interests or to my-interests-as- 
part-of-our-interests. There is a third possibility both to this 
dichotomy and also to eudaimonism. I say that the moral being can 
pursue ends that transcend even the range of the self, at least as it is 
typically understood by contemporary eudaimonism. Humans have the 
capacity to form dispositions even to act in accordance with a vision 
of goods that they will not possess or share, in any but the most 
metaphorical or psychological sense of these terms. It is this ability 
that constitutes genuine moral freedom. Eudaimonism can 
conceptualize the difference between a final cause and a final result. It 
cannot conceptualize the contingency of final causes as Scotism can. 
Nor can it conceptualize a corresponding difference in the will that 
accounts for what it recognizes as humanly possible. 
I have managed to spin this account this far without saying much 
either about what the inclination to justice is, or to what it inclines us 
with any specificity. Nor have I said how we know what justice is. 
The epistemic question is not central to my thesis. Nevertheless, it 
behooves me to make some suggestions here and in the next chapter. 
In the following I will consider one proposal by Thomas Williams. 
Though I have followed many of his conclusions concerning Scotus, I 
will offer reasons to think that he is mistaken here. I then offer my 
own solution. 
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Written on the heart 
Scotus never expressly defines the affectio iustitiae. Thomas Williams 
suggests that the description of the affectio iustitiae most consonant 
with everything else Scotus says is "an inclination in the will that 
prompts it to act in accordance with the moral law simply as such. " 
(1995, sect. 4) The moral law cannot be "read off' of God's creation. 
Unaided reason can only know with certainty those moral truths that 
are per se notum ex terminis, says Scotus. It cannot seize on the moral 
law on its own. How then do we reconcile the affection for justice 
with Paul's claim that there is a natural law "written on our hearts"? 
(Romans 2.15) 
Williams says that even though Scotus ties the metaphysical 
dependence of the moral law to the will of God, and that there are 
therefore no reasons for concluding that the moral law necessarily 
stipulates one thing or another, this does not mean that we can only 
know the moral law by knowing God's will. Williams interprets 
Scotus as saying that we have an immediate knowledge of the moral 
law much like our immediate knowledge that we are awake. In 
responding to those who demanded proof that we are awake and not 
dreaming, Aristotle responded, "They seek reasons for things for 
which there is no reason. For there is no demonstration of a principle 
of demonstration. " According to Williams, Scotus believes we have a 
similarly immediate knowledge of the truths of the moral law. Though 
they depend on logically prior facts, they are not known by logically 
prior facts but are both immediate and certain. "The affectio iustitiae 
cannot of course tell us that God has commanded a particular moral 
law; it is not a cognitive faculty. But given that God has commanded a 
moral law, he has created in us an inclination to follow that law. " 
(1995, sect. 4) 
Williams immediately goes on to identify inclination with perception: 
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This inclination gives us a `sense' of what is morally 
required of us, a sense utterly independent of the 
satisfaction of our desires or even the perfection of our 
nature as rational agents. In this way we have 
immediate, non-discursive awareness that certain 
actions are right or wrong. The moral law is indeed 
written on our `hearts, ' that is, on the affective, rather 
than the cognitive, part of the soul. (Williams 1995, 
sect. 4; emphases added) 
Williams' explanation of this "sense" leaves us with more questions 
than answers. Most obviously, the term is being used equivocally. 
Williams seems to be saying both that this "sense, " the affectio 
iustitiae, is a sensibility or inclination requiring direction through 
intellection, but also that it can spontaneously generate moral content. 
That the affectio iustitiae prescribes the moral law in and of itself I 
find completely implausible, even if this turns out to be Scotus' own 
position, for at least four reasons. First, human nature is a part of the 
natural creation from which some natural lawyers believe we can 
"read" the moral law. 84 If intuitions concerning morality are perceived 
immediately and naturally, then the faculty that perceives them is an 
aspect of human nature that guides us in moral behavior. It is a feature 
of our nature that gives us the content of moral law, not contingently 
and simply as suiting the perfection of our being, but necessarily and 
immediately. So we are back to a law derivable from human nature 
and corresponding to the dictates of the second table, but without 
practical reasoning. Second, our intuitive perception of such moral 
demands is likely to be no less mysterious and problematic than the 
appeal to specific revelation that it is intended to obviate. It faces all 
the arguments typically mounted against claims of self-evident 
morality. In response to this sort of claim, J. Hare notes that morality 
84 Again, this is not the Aristotelian/Thomist understanding, advocated 
by Maclntyre, of how we derive the natural law from nature. It is 
not from human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be that we can derive the 
moral law, but from our grasp of human-nature-as-it-is-when-it- 
fulfills-its-potential. See Rhoneheimer (2000). 
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is not like perception. We do not wake up with a mistrust of our 
senses, but we do sometimes wake up without feeling the authority of 
moral demand. (2001, p. 55) Third, as Williams describes the sense, it 
is simply awareness, and therefore does not easily fit what Scotus says 
about the place of right reason in morality. Such an immediate 
awareness would not be a conclusion of practical rationality to will 
God's will for our willing. Fourth, we would then need an explanation 
of how God could command contrarily to this immediate cognition 
without violating right reason, as Scotus thinks God could have done. 
Such an explanation may be possible, but until it is provided, the 
notion of epistemic immediacy leaves more unanswered in Scotist 
moral theory than it explains. 
Here is my take on what the affectio iustitiae is. Scotus says that apart 
from knowing that the first table of the Decalogue is part of the 
natural law strictly speaking, "principles which are necessarily 
grasped by any intellect understanding those terms" (e. g.: "Any being 
having the attributes of God must necessarily be loved. "), we can 
know that other things are part of the natural law if they are 
"exceedingly harmonious" with what is known per nota ex terminus. 
What he says about this is mostly negative, as a reply to Aquinas' 
version of natural law. He draws an analogy to the relationship of the 
principles of positive law and actual codification. It does not 
necessarily follow from the requirement of civil order that private 
property be instituted. Even though because of corrupt human nature 
we tend to care more for our own property than for common property, 
and therefore common property could lead to conflict, and even 
though private property is quite consonant with the principle of civil 
order, it does not follow as a matter of necessity from that principle. 
(1997, p. 2190 
In the biblical traditions, the conclusions of natural law in its purest 
form are those derived in the state of humankind prior to the 
corruption of sin. What Scotus says here is vague and non-committal: 
"In the state of innocence also all were bound by these precepts, 
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which were either prescribed interiorly in the heart of everyone or 
perhaps by some teaching given exteriorly by God and passed on by 
parents to their children.... " (1997, p. 207) 
So in the absence of an unambiguous answer by Scotus, I propose the 
following solution instead. I have no reason to think that this is 
Scotus's position, other than that it is more consistent with Scotus's 
overall position than what Williams and others claim to be Scotus's 
position. 
The affectio commodi is specifically intended by Scotus to encompass 
Aquinas' entire theory of the will, with regard both to the senses and 
to the intelligence. With regard to the Second Table, I think that 
Scotus's position is Aquinas's position. Scotus just doesn't believe 
that Aquinas's position is natural law in the strictest, metaphysically- 
necessary sense. Aquinas sees his theory of the will as providential. 
The senses are providential for (non-human) animals. Both the 
intelligence and the senses are providential for humans. As far as I can 
see, there is no reason for Scotus to disagree with the characterization 
of these faculties as providential, given that God has willed their 
flourishing. Scotus clearly implies as much. (1997, pp. 155ff. ) 
Furthermore, humans can see that the senses alone are providential for 
all animals, including humans, and that the senses and the intelligence 
are providential for rational beings. All other things being equal, our 
inclination toward flourishing does guide us as rational beings to an 
end that is harmonious with human excellences, vulnerabilities, and 
sociality. If it is the case that God wills human flourishing, then 
flourishing is just. Practical rationality then dictates conditions such as 
those protected in the Second Table in order to attain flourishing. 
The affectio iustitiae-or the inclination that I believe Scotus points to 
in using this term-is that inclination to value, for example, the goods 
and excellences of human flourishing for their contribution to justice 
as an ideal or end, objectively, not simply because of personal or 
collective interest, if we have the conceptual resources to make this 
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distinction., We do perceive the harmony and suitability of human 
flourishing. We are naturally attracted to these ends. And in the 
absence of any reason to think otherwise, flourishing seems right. So 
the affectio iustitiae inclines us to the justice of flourishing as "a 
value, attribute, or option that is automatically supplied or assumed by 
the system or program when the user specifies no value. " Our "default 
setting" for morality, in other words, is for flourishing as just. Here I 
emphasize what Scotus says about the second table: it is not natural 
law strictly speaking per se notum ex terminus-but only in the 
sense that it is fitting to our nature on the basis of our limited 
understanding of harmony and suitability. In the absence of a 
contravening direction concerning the good, we are justified in 
pursuing flourishing. Yet even here, we do not pursue it primarily for 
its own sake. 
Three things, says Scotus, could draw us to God our final end. We 
could be drawn by love for the intrinsic worth of God as our end and 
purpose, even if we were not united with God. Here we are motivated 
by the desire for justice. Here we recognize that God is the ultimate 
good behind all things, regardless of our interests. Demonstrating the 
virtue of charity, this is love even if we, the lovers, were not benefited, 
to posit a counterfactual. This is the distinction between our 
contingent end, union with God, and our final and necessary end, the 
love of God as ultimate good. Our final end is to be co-lovers of God 
(with God), irrespective of our own benefit. 
Or, second, we could be drawn to union with God. Or, third, we could 
be drawn by the "satisfaction" of beatitudo. All three motivations 
properly draw us to our final end. Each is a motivation toward a good. 
The first motivation is motivation for the ultimate good. (1997, p. 277) 
In keeping with my theory as a whole, to sum up, my response to the 
question of how we know our obligations is as follows. First, 
rationality impels us to come to conclusions concerning the good life. 
(See chapter 6. ) Second, we have a natural inclination to human 
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flourishing, the affectio commodi. Third, given our limited 
understanding of the way things are and the apparent level of 
suitability of our dispositions to our environment, we work from the 
"default setting" that our flourishing is just. But, fourth, we can 
distinguish between our good (our flourishing) and the good. In the 
Aristotelian conception through Aquinas, there is no conceptual space 
between the good and our good, either objectively or subjectively 
(God's will or our response to it, on my account). There is such a 
distinction and the human structure of the will can make a 
corresponding distinction in practical reasoning, however, so on the 
basis of our understanding of what other theories might call the 
original position-the biblical conception of God and of God's 
creative freedom-we can pursue our good as just, and not only as 
befitting our inclination to flourishing. 
Practical differences 
Mere intellection, over against sensation, does not allow for genuine 
moral freedom. Morality is not necessarily tied to eudaimonia, but is 
conceptually independent from human flourishing. Something like the 
two affections in the Scotist structure of the will, the ability to pursue 
justice separate from our interest in eudaimonia is essential to this 
understanding of morality. These are the claims I have made so far. 
I have taken so much space in this argument to demonstrate the 
theoretical possibility of God's willing, and our pursuing, a good at 
the realization of which the person will not be temporally present, 
consciously or bodily, in order to answer an obvious objection to the 
anti-eudaimonist claim. That obvious objection is that the anti- 
eudaimonist claim is incoherent. God could not require of us to will 
against our flourishing, goes the objection, either because to do so 
involves a contradiction at the level of God's creative or legislative 
will, or because humans cannot fail to will their flourishing (which 
also amounts to a contradiction in the divine will). I have attempted to 
273 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
show that no such contradiction follows from the anti-eudaimonist 
position. 
Yet the instances in which we might understand God to have required 
humans to choose against our tendency toward flourishing are rare. 
Furthermore, they are controversial. 85 And as it turns out, I have 
claimed, God does will our flourishing-though freely, not 
necessarily. So for purposes of practical rationality, is the issue then 
moot? If there is a happy coincidence between God's will and our 
flourishing, why should we be concerned with the question at all? 
How much practical difference does this structural difference make 
with respect to morality? 
Four sorts of practical differences emerge from the difference in the 
Scotist structure of morality: concerning the ultimate end of human 
life, concerning the virtues necessary to reach that end and the ends 
subordinate to that end, concerning individuality, and with respect to 
the range of goods for which this structure can give account. 
The most important general difference between the eudaimonist and 
Scotist structures is in their respective conceptions of the good, both 
for the individual and for the community. Human flourishing is a great 
good. Indeed, it turns out to be the penultimate good. But that ranking 
relative to the good is all-important. If humans are creatures, then any 
human end must be understood, first of all, in terms of the Creator's 
intention. On the orthodox theistic traditions, humans are not only or 
primarily ends for their own sake, but are primarily for God's sake. 
Even if our end, penultimately, is to flourish, it is our end because it is 
God's will. God does not will our flourishing because it is, 
antecedently, our end. Our ultimate end is God and the purposes 
stipulated by God, not flourishing. The most important difference 
85 In the end, God did not require Abraham to sacrifice his son. So 
does the classic biblical example of theological voluntarism, even as 
accepted by both Aquinas and Scotus, unambiguously support my 
claim? What God was actually up to is debatable, at the least, 
though I think that the Scotist argument presents fewer problems 
than does the Thomist. 
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between eudaimonism and my theory, then, is precisely the respective 
place of God's intentions for the ultimate end of human existence, an 
end that transcends social flourishing. 
The subsequent question then is how this difference is reflected in 
moral psychology. Eudaimonist practical rationality, strictly speaking, 
is directed toward the lesser good of human flourishing. Morality 
depends on right rationality and right rationality, as MacIntyre notes, 
requires distinguishing between types of goods: instrumental goods, 
"goods for their own sake, " and goods that are appropriate to 
particular circumstances and lives. (1999, pp. 66f. ) 
On the Augustinian understanding to which I subscribe, evil does not 
represent a dualistic counterpart to good, but is rather a diminution of 
the good. All things have a basic non-moral goodness by virtue of 
their existence. Evil is not an opposing entity, but is instead a 
weakening of that goodness, much as "darkness" is defined by the 
absence of light (to the lower limit of the absence of all light), and 
"cold" is defined by the absence of heat (to the lower limit of absolute 
zero, the absence of all heat). It is in building on Augustine's insight 
here that Hannah Arendt develops her concept of the "banality of 
evil. " (Arendt 1964; Elshtain 1995, pp. 69-87) Contrary to a popular 
misconception, evil is not a negative excellence, but is rather a misuse 
of excellences that diminishes them. Evil is not and cannot be the 
constructive will of a negative entity in a dualistic scheme. Evil is 
rather the will directed toward some good of an inferior rank, despite 
the resultant harm done in the depreciation of the good of superior 
rank. 86 To will the penultimate good above the ultimate good is to will 
an evil. It is the desire for the fulfillment of human potential as an end 
in itself that is realized in the story of Babel/Babylon, the idolization 
of the human. 
86 It is through this insight that Anselm can explain the possibility of 
the fall of Satan in the absence of any prior evil. It was because 
Lucifer willed his own good above God. (Anselm 2000, p. 227) 
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If my demonstration is valid and cogent, then despite his recognition 
that obtaining-the-end is not the end, Aquinas' theory of the will does 
not have the conceptual resources to allow the agent to pursue the end 
(God), but only to pursue the attainment-of-the-end 
(flourishing/beatitudo/eudaimonia). Since on his model our good, 
strictly speaking, is attainment-of-the-end, not the end itself, it is our 
good that we seek. It is only this penultimate end that is the full 
actualization of the agent, according to eudaimonism, not her ultimate 
end. Ironically, if I am correct, we cannot achieve the good by 
pursuing attainment-of-the-good, so this pursuit is vain. 87 
This difference communicates a corresponding difference in the 
virtues. The dispositions necessary for human flourishing "for its own 
sake" are not the virtues of human flourishing for God's sake. In the 
case of courage, for example, each disposition is defective courage, 
not genuine courage, in light of the other. Eudaimonist courage is not 
the courage that the Scotist structure demands. Eudaimonist courage is 
a simulacrum of Scotist courage because its motivation and end are 
not the good life and the good as distinguishable from flourishing. 
Likewise, Scotist courage is also a simulacrum of eudaimonist 
courage, though for a different sort of reason. Eudaimonism says that 
it is rationally impossible to fail to will one's flourishing and therefore 
sees purported Scotist courage as involving some form of self- 
deception. One or the other of two deficiencies in strictly-applied 
Scotist moral psychology is the case. Either the agent is aware that 
she is actually seeking eudaimonia, even though she says she is not, 
and her courage is thereby tainted by pretense. Or, she merely thinks 
87 Although I want to insist on the importance of this difference, the 
corollary of previous observations that "good" requires a larger 
frame of reference, there is a paradox here concerning human 
flourishing. The paradox is that human life can achieve its highest 
powers only in pursuit of ends not limited by the common human 
good. It is the difference between a self that is limited by an 
anthropocentric view of its nature, and one that by attachment to 
what is outside its own nature transcends an thropocentric limits in 
the pursuit of goods not based in self. To pursue flourishing as our 
ultimate end is to limit its realization. It is only in pursuing goods because of their relationship to the good that we can attain the full 
measure of our own potential. 
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that she is pursuing disinterested justice when she is actually pursuing 
eudaimonia, and her courage is thereby tainted by ignorance and by a 
defective self-sacrifice. So on a eudaimonist picture, Scotist courage is 
deficient either because it entails something like false humility, or 
because it entails ignorance of what ought to be at stake, much like the 
ignorance that makes foolhardiness a false form of courage. 88 The 
virtues of each theory are not genuine virtues to the other. 
In affirming that Scotism gives the better explanation, I do not at all 
mean to imply of course that all Thomists, for example, are only 
apparently virtuous. Rather, based on my description of the two 
accounts, my claim is twofold. First, the Scotist structure more 
adequately accounts for human powers and excellences than does the 
eudaimonist structure. It explains better than the eudaimonist structure 
can do what we know of the best human behavior. And, second, the 
Scotist structure and telos, strictly followed, promotes a more 
genuinely virtuous character than the eudaimonist structure can do, 
strictly followed. So the practical differences between the two at this 
point are not derived from what self-proclaimed eudaimonists may 
actually do, but from what they or anyone would do if they were 
strictly following the eudaimonist model with its differences in end, 
motivation, and means. And what they would do is only that which 
contributes to an end in which they can foresee themselves as present 
and flourishing. The difference I am suggesting can be described 
simplistically as the difference between advantage and justice. The 
difference is the conditionality, imposed by eudaimonist limits of the 
will, on any action or disposition. I am positing the ability, unavailable 
to the eudaimonist theory, of transcending the interests of our own 
flourishing. If some version of the Scotist account is correct, the 
human will can reflect or replicate the divine will in willing our final 
end for its own sake. 
88 See MacIntyre's reference to the "vice" of self-sacrifice in 
Dependent Rational Animals. (1999, p. 160) 
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A third category of differences arises from the eudaimonistic 
dependence of all goods on human flourishing. If our motivation is 
dependent on human flourishing, then goods can only be counted as 
goods as a function of their contribution to the human good. Anything 
that does not contribute to human flourishing cannot be considered a 
good. The pursuit of the flourishing of non-human species and of the 
non-human environment in general, for example, can be rationally 
justified only on the basis of its contribution to human flourishing. 
To the contrary, I question that what is due to other species depends 
solely on their contribution to human flourishing. It is estimated that 
99.5 percent of all species that have ever existed became extinct 
before the human era. It seems quite probable then that thousands of 
species of life in the universe have come into existence and passed 
into extinction without any trace that will ever be perceived by 
humans. Eudaimonism does not have ready resources for appreciating 
these goods. 
The fourth practical difference concerns individuality. Because the 
possible routes to union with God are innumerable, only our final end 
limits diversity and uniqueness. And that diversity will be fully 
rational in every instance. To be sure, this will not be the diversity and 
uniqueness of, say, philosophical liberalism. It just is the uniqueness 
of God's will for each one. Nevertheless, this will provides the best 
basis, I believe, for genuine individuality. 
The perspective of theological voluntarism is a perspective antecedent 
to any ordinance of creation, any divine commitment to human 
welfare as seen fully in the incarnation, birth, life, death, resurrection 
and continued work of Jesus Christ. Prior to these, none of the human 
inclinations and harmonious ends in themselves constitutes a reason 
for God to will human natural flourishing. God has knowledge of all 
possible worlds and all counterfactuals. Using Scotus' language, God 
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knows what is possibly "suitable" or "harmonious" (conveniens) to 
our nature according to other ends than those to which we have 
become accustomed. Just as it was a mistake in the natural sciences to 
focus on final causes and to try to deduce from them what is "best" in 
nature, rather than proceeding inductively and empirically, so too it is 
a mistake to think that the harmony and suitability to human nature 
that we perceive are the only ones possible. God remains free to do 
anything consistent with God's overall intentions, intentions not 
known to us antecedently with certainty. We do not know that God 
could not will other than a straight-line route to our final end. Because 
of the inclination Scotus called the affectio iustitiae, we are free to 
respond to that override and recognize it as just contrary to our 
"default setting. " Unlike non-human animals or even hypothetical 
beings that do not have an inclination to see justice done, we can will 
something above our own flourishing. 89 
In the concluding chapter I would like to offer a more formal and 
concise explanation of what all this says about the identity of 
obligation. 
89 "Ought" implies "can, " but "can" does not mean "without divine 
enabling. " See J. Hare (1996). 
279 
Chapter 10 
THE NATURE OF MORAL OBLIGATION 
One of the most problematic features of moral philosophy in the 
context of modernity is how rival traditions can speak to each other. 
Much of natural law theory is an attempt at "moral Esperanto. " 
(Stout's (1988) expression on a somewhat different subject) For 
reasons given throughout this thesis, I think the project is no more 
likely to succeed than the ability to find a vestigial core of all 
languages. But if these efforts fail, then theological voluntarists might 
be thought to be completely at a loss to explain the nature of 
obligation in a way that ensures that they and their rivals are even 
discussing the same topic. 
Eric D'Arcy objects to divine command morality because he thinks 
that it implies that only people having religious knowledge can have 
moral knowledge. 
[F]or if immoral actions are immoral merely because 
God so wills it, merely because God legislates against 
them, it would be sheer coincidence if someone who 
knew nothing of God or his law happened to adopt the 
same views about particular actions as God did. 
(D'Arcy 1973, p. 194) 
If only those with religious knowledge have moral knowledge, then 
what those without religious take for obligation is only coincidentally 
obligatory. So any discussion between the two parties about obligation 
might seem to resemble a comedy of errors more than true moral 
discussion. Phillip Quinn (2000) offers a reply to this objection. I find 
Quinn's rebuttal unconvincing, but it serves as a helpful introduction 
to asking and answering basic questions concerning theological 
voluntarism (TV). On the basis of the preceding arguments, I respond 
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to three standard questions concerning theological voluntarism in this 
chapter: 
Which moral statuses depend on divine acts? 
On which divine acts are these moral statuses dependent? 
What is this relation of dependence between moral statuses 
and the divine acts that they depend on? 
I argue here that obligation is dependent on divine communicated 
intentions, and that this relationship of dependence is one of 
reduction: the concept of obligation could be dispensed of in favor of 
divine communicated intentions. This theory does not preclude 
discussion of obligation across rival traditions. Though we are 
disputing its identity, we are generally pointing at the same thing. 
Phillip Quinn's is a causation version of TV, a version claiming that 
divine intentions bring it about that certain things are morally 
obligatory. "It makes no claims in moral epistemology, " Quinn says, 
"and so it makes no claims about how we might come to know what 
God's antecedent intentions are. " It is consistent with his position, 
Quinn maintains, that moral agents first learn what is obligatory, as 
effect, and only subsequently discover the cause of this obligation 
(God's action), much as we often proceed from effects to causes in 
other spheres of knowledge. "It is not a consequence of our theory that 
only people who have religious knowledge can have moral 
knowledge. " So then is the knowledge that something is morally 
obligatory just coincidental? That depends on the explanation of the 
agreement, Quinn claims. "An explanation available to theological 
voluntarists is that God has benevolently endowed normal human 
creature with a moral faculty such as conscience that... reliably tracks, 
unbeknownst to those who know nothing of God, divine antecedent 
intentions. " (2000, p. 67) 
281 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
The problem with this response is that it runs afoul of Quinn's 
explanation of the causation of obligation. According to Quinn, God's 
action is the total, exclusive, active, immediate, and necessary cause 
of something's being obligatory. 
By totality, I mean that what does the bringing about is 
the total cause of what is brought about. By exclusivity, 
I mean that what does the bringing about is the sole 
cause of what is brought about. By activity, I mean that 
what does the bringing about does so in virtue of the 
exercise of some activity. By immediacy, I mean that 
what does the bringing about causes what is brought 
about immediately rather than by means of secondary 
causes or instruments. And by necessity, I mean that 
what does the bringing about necessitates what is 
brought about. (2000, p. 55; emphases added) 
In other terms, God is therefore by unspecified means the efficient 
cause of an obligatory state of affairs. 90 I see a dilemma for Quinn's 
causation TV in this attempt to respond to D'Arcy's objection. In the 
first place, since conscience need not be linked to divine intentions in 
the mind of the moral agent, it seems to make our perception of 
obligation a freestanding and mysterious perception without rational 
explanation. Surely it cannot be that either the feeling or the intuition 
of obligation, say, is a sufficient indicator of obligation. What is often 
labeled conscience, but is unaided by reason, does not reliably track 
morality. We often feel obligated without good reasons for thinking 
we are actually obligated, such as when we have the compulsion to 
answer a ringing payphone in a crowded airport. We might also have 
intuitions leading us to believe that something is obligatory, without 
90 The relationship between what Aristotle terms a final "cause" and 
the realization of the result or end of which it is the "cause" 
parallels that of efficient cause and effect. Contrary to Quinn, I say 
that a communicated divine intention does not, however, have the 
same relationship to obligation as an efficient cause has to its effect. A communicated divine intention is not, that is, the efficient cause 
of obligation. 
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reasons and without feeling one way or another about it. By the same 
token, a person might not feel obliged to do, or believe that she is 
obliged to do, what she is in fact under obligation to do. 
To justify the dictates of feelings or intuitions as correct, we must give 
reasons distinguishable from those feelings or intuitions: "It seems to 
me that such-and-such is obligatory, but why should I believe that it is 
actually obligatory? " The reasons given in answer to this question 
must correspond to the ultimate source of authority according to the 
proposed theory. Quinn says (causation) TV can forgo this 
explanation. 
In other spheres of knowledge, we might forego discerning cause from 
effect, because the effect functions in our lives without knowing the 
cause. I can use my mobile phone with no real understanding of the 
causes that bring about the effects I enjoy. But if obligation requires 
rational justification for its force, and if God efficiently causes 
obligation in the way Quinn claims, then how could obligation obtain 
without my understanding what brings it about? If Quinn's theory of 
causation were correct, it would be a rational error to believe the 
dictates of conscious to be obligatory without knowing that conscience 
tracks the divine antecedent intentions that are themselves the actual 
cause of obligation. An appeal to the conscience merely adds another 
level of justification. It lacks an explanation for a positive relationship 
of conscience to authority-in this case, to the authority of divine 
actions. Quinn is mistaken is trying to separate explanation from 
practical rationality. 
Yet to provide a rational explanation of obligation of the sort that I say 
is required is to throw Quinn's theory onto the other horn of the 
dilemma, D'Arcy's criticism. Causation TV thus explained would 
entail that only those with religious knowledge have non-coincidental 
knowledge of obligations. Non-coincidental knowledge would require 
knowing about this supposed relationship between obligation, 
conscience and divine authority. 
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On the reduction version of TV that I advocate, to concede the 
existence of rational persons without any knowledge either of God or 
of God's law would amount only to the concession of the existence of 
persons without knowledge of the underlying structure of morality. If 
my theory is correct, D'Arcy's objection is just as effective, or 
ineffective, against TV as it is against any other theory of morality 
purportedly correct, but of which someone might be ignorant. If 
utilitarianism were correct, for instance, and I didn't know that the 
happiness principle (or whatever) was the criteria of morality, then 
any true beliefs I held about moral obligation would be coincidental. 91 
Now I'll locate my theory among possible versions of TV. 
Three questions 
Theological voluntarism makes the claim that the divine will is 
relevant to the evaluative status of various entities. The focus of our 
attention here is moral statuses. Phillip Quinn has framed the question 
according to the claim that some moral status is in some way 
dependent on some divine act. (The schema of the question is: "(S) 
Moral status M stands in dependency relation D to divine act A. " 
(2000, p. 53)) A case for TV must then respond to three questions: 
Which moral statuses? Which divine acts? What is the relation of 
dependence? Mark Murphy (2002b, sect. 2) has expanded on Quinn's 
analysis. Although my conclusions differ from Murphy's-he opposes 
TV and offers a natural law version of morality, while my theory 
begins with natural law based on divine nature and argues for a TV 
based on that law-the following owes much to Murphy's fine 
analysis. 
91 Quinn makes a similar observation to show that D'Arcy's objection 
can apply broadly to any theory the workings of which were 
unknown to non-adherents of that theory. But for the reasons just 
givcn, and contrary to Quinn's reply, D Arcy's objection is uniquely 
cffcctive against causation TV. 
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Which moral statuses are dependent on divine acts? 
The question of which moral statuses depend on divine acts can be 
broadened to ask which normative statuses, or even which evaluative 
statuses depend on God's will. The broader the claim, the harder the 
claim is to defend. (Murphy 2002b, sect. 3.2) It would be absurd to 
contend that divine goodness is a function of divine will. As I argued 
earlier (chap. 7), only God is good in the way that God is good: 
originally, not derivatively. God cannot be other than good, nor can 
God's acts, notably God's creative acts, be other than good. On the 
theory I am advancing, neither God's goodness nor the goodness of 
God's acts themselves is dependent on God's will. With regard to the 
basic end of human existence and subsequently to the requisite basic 
human disposition, then, neither is a function of divine will. We must 
love God, just as God must love God. The shape and content of the 
right human response to that divine goodness is a matter of divine 
discretion, but its basic orientation is not. 92 My theological 
voluntarism does not therefore portray a God that is "nothing but 
will. " 
Human civil authority is constrained by the dictates of justice in the 
pursuit of the common good in the way that Aquinas outlined. 
Aquinas bases his theory of moral law in the Summa Theologica in the 
concept of the Eternal Law, which he identified with the person of 
God. From the Eternal Law are derived divine law (specific 
revelation) and natural law. From natural law (and from divine law for 
those societies that have access to it), we derive human law (positive 
law). Positive law is the contingent rational means chosen and 
promulgated by a given community in its particular circumstances to 
achieve its common good. Aquinas was careful to stipulate that human 
law is only valid if it is just, that is, if it reflects the dictates of natural 
92 God could not without contradiction will antecedently that rational 
creatures hate God. Humans are created with the capacity to love 
their own good more than they love God (and the reverse). To create 
a being antecedently intended to hate God would be to create a 
being that denied the goodness of God, and therefore to will a denial 
of this unchangeable truth concerning God's nature, and therefore to 
will an evil. 
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law (or revealed divine law, or both) in pursuit of the common good. 
Suppose that the common good includes public order and preservation 
of life. Reflecting the dictates of practical reason, then, human law 
will formulate particular traffic laws, for example, to secure those 
goods. In this respect, the difference between the Thomist and Scotist 
accounts are a question of degree. There is a natural law at work in 
both, but in the Scotist account it is predicated on the nature of God, 
specifically on the goodness of God, not on human nature. 
It is the moral statuses of the "obligation family" that concern us at 
present: rightness, wrongness, and permissibility. It is the 
specification of how we are to love God that is dependent on divine 
action and it is that specification that creates specific obligation. 
On which divine acts is obligation dependent? 
Obligation depends on the communicated intentions of a practical 
authority, I claim. That is, obligation depends on the successful 
transmission of the content of a practical authority's intention to a 
receiver. As Adams notes, the picture of an obligation that cannot be 
normally perceived, such as through an uncommunicated intention, is 
unattractive. (Cited in Quinn 2000) Beyond its unappealing picture of 
divine-human relationships, there seems to be no rational reason to 
expect someone to know what s/he has no reason to know. On the 
other hand, there are many uncontroversial obligations that are not 
explicit. My wife should not have to tell me that cultivating a good 
relationship with her entails certain acts and dispositions on my part. 
There are, moreover, obligations that we ought to perceive that we do 
not perceive. If I park my car in a clearly-marked fire lane, but I do 
not see the signs, my obligation not to park there persists, even though 
I did not know that I was under obligation not to park there. A 
responsible driver is attentive to such matters. Similarly, if I visit a 
foreign country whose laws are different from my home country, I am 
under obligation to inform myself on the local legal conventions, even 
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if there are no signs telling me, say, to drive on the left. If I am 
sanctioned for failing to do so, my ignorance is no excuse, as the local 
judiciary will tangibly help me to understand. 
This position is more than prudential, though it is that. (Otherwise 
laws would be unenforceable on the willfully ignorant. ) Every one of 
us does not know things that s/he should know. We hide things from 
ourselves through self-deception. And we are genuinely unaware of 
obligations that we would know if we had fulfilled prior obligations. 
A child may have emotional problems that her father should redress, 
but of which he is unaware because he has spent too little time with 
her. We should know things that we may have no way of knowing 
93 consequent to our ethical failings. 
By contending therefore that obligation depends on divine intentions, 
those that make the claim need not necessarily attribute to God the 
irrationality with which such a picture initially presents us, since there 
may be good reasons to think that we should know what we do not in 
fact know. Nevertheless, my theory requires only conclusions 
concerning intentions as actually perceived. 
What is the relation of dependence? 
Mark Murphy (2002a; 2002b) has expanded on Quinn's (2000) 
categorization of four relations of dependence in TV. I will briefly 
summarize the first three (causation, analysis, and supervenience) and 
then describe my version of the fourth (reduction) in more detail. 
93 This phenomenon may go much deeper than these examples 
indicate. A family of tourists was vacationing on a Thai beach in 
2004 when an earthquake took place. The young daughter 
remembered details from a science lesson on earthquakes and 
tsunamis and so urgently warned her parents that the family was in 
danger. They in turn warned others, and several hundred lives were 
saved when thousands of others died. It is unlikely that she was the 
only person on that beach or on all the other beaches in the region 
that had ever learned these details. In a related point, it was reported 
that almost no non-human animals were killed in the Asian tsunami. 
Non-human animals often sense natural disasters that humans do 
not. Given the moral difference between humans and other animals, 
it seems at least plausible that our moral state is a contributing 
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As noted above, the causation version of TV claims that God causes 
moral obligation. (See Quinn 2000. ) In addition to my objection 
concerning causation and conscience noted above, there are two other 
objections to causation TV that have not been adequately answered to 
date. 
On the causation version of TV, it is obligatory for human agent A to 
4 only because God wills it to be obligatory. It is God's willing it to 
be obligatory that brings about the obligation. 94 This position might 
easily be confused with other versions of TV. Note that its being 
obligatory for A to 0 cannot be identical to God's willing that (it be 
obligatory for A to 0), on pain of infinite regress. (2002b, sect. 2.3) 
But if its being morally obligatory to 0 is distinct from God's 
commanding/intending O-ing, then how precisely does God's 
commanding/intending us to 4 cause 4-ing to be obligatory? As 
Murphy notes, there cannot be, for example, a prior obligation to obey 
God, since God supposedly causes all obligatory states. (Murphy 
2002b, sect. 2.4) 
This leads to the second objection. Despite its claims, causation TV 
also seems to have a problem concerning authority. It doesn't make 
God a practical authority. Although God causes obligation, the 
subsequent reason for the agent to act is that it is obligatory to ý, not 
as a response to God's authority. This undercuts some of the most 
important motivations behind TV in the theistic tradition; causation 
TV does not make divine command/intentions even partly constitutive 
of obligation. (Murphy 2002b, sect. 2.4) 
Robert Adams, a central figure in the revival of TV, once claimed that 
the morally obligatory should be analyzed as being commanded by 
factor-along with important non-moral factors, to be sure-to our ignorance of many obligations we have. 
94 The symbol "4" is a variable that stands for some action verb such 
as "go, " "speak, " "see, " etc., including prohibitions ("do not go, " "do not speak, " etc. ). 
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God. (1973) Since Euthyphro, discussions of TV have often been 
framed in the synthetic/analytic dichotomy. On an analytic 
understanding, "4-ing is obligatory" is analyzed as "God has 
willed/commanded 4-ing. " One problem for such a claim is the 
unavoidable implication that people inside and outside of the 
monotheistic communities of discourse have never genuinely 
disagreed concerning moral obligation, because they do not mean the 
same thing when they say, "4)-ing is obligatory. " A non-theist can say, 
"4)-ing is not obligatory. " She does not mean, "God has not 
commanded 4)-ing. " A theological voluntarist following an analytic 
form of TV could not intelligibly distinguish the two assertions and 
therefore could not precisely disagree with her. Moral discourse 
between such communities is therefore not genuine moral discourse. 
A corollary problem for analytic forms of TV is that many thoughtful 
and otherwise masterful language-users within religious communities 
of discourse do not use "obligatory" (right, wrong, permissible) in this 
way. In fact, those inside and outside theistic communities of 
discourse apparently do disagree sometimes about whether 
"obligatory" applies to some state of affairs under consideration. 
Analytic TV therefore does not capture something necessary. 
It is primarily for this reason that Adams has moved from an analysis 
form of TV (1973) to a reduction form of TV (1979), to the 
contentions of which I will come in an instant. 
Supervenience TV makes the claim that obligation and divine 
commands/intentions are co-extensive. Unfortunately, it seems to be 
caught between the failures of causation and analysis. Murphy points 
out that the relation of dependence between divine 
commands/intentions and obligations must fall under one of two 
conditions. Supervenience TV may make obligations wholly distinct 
from divine commands/intentions. Or it must make divine 
commands/intentions partially constitutive of obligations: a divine 
commands/intention plus some extra state of affairs constitutes an 
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obligation. Both positions are untenable. If supervenience TV takes 
obligations to be wholly distinct from obligation, then it takes on the 
problems of causation TV. God is not an authority, since God's 
commands do not provide a reason for action. If supervenience TV 
takes divine commands/intentions as partially constitutive, we have to 
explain how the part that is constitutive is constitutive. (Murphy 
2000b, sect. 2.4)95 
The claim that divine commands/intentions are wholly constitutive of 
obligations in some way is the claim of analysis and reductive 
versions of TV. Reduction TV claims that the concept of obligation is 
dispensable in favor of divine commands/intentions. Human 
obligations just are whatever God dictates (with the exception of the 
basic obligation toward God as ultimate good, the only dictate of 
natural law per se nota ex terminis). The idea is that the use of 
`obligation" is neutral between theists and nontheists, but that the best 
candidate for "obligation" (rightness, wrongness, permissibility) is the 
objective property of actions being commanded/intended by God. 
Adams (1979) draws on papers by Donnellan (1966 and 1972), Kripke 
(1972), and Putnam (1975a, pp. 196-290). The Kripke/Putnam theory 
is difficult and complex. I draw here only on a few of its insights for 
my purposes. 
In the central illustration proposed by Putnam (1975b), we imagine 
the existence of another world, Twin Earth, identical in every way, 
save one, to our world. In Twin Earth there is a transparent, odorless, 
colorless liquid that its English-speaking inhabitants call "water. " The 
Twin Earth liquid functions as H2O does in our world as a solvent, 
95 I mention the supervenience theory only to signal a distinction 
between it and the way supervenience emerges in the Scotus/John 
Hare theory of sup ervenience. Murphy's understanding of 
supervenience follows Jaegwon Kim's (1993) Supervenience and 
Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press). The Scotus/Hare understanding of supervenience is not supervenience as the term is used in the philosophy of mind. (J. Hare 2001, p. 63) 
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agent of biological hydration, and so forth. The liquid is not H2O, 
however, but a chemical abbreviated, say, as XYZ 96 
Would we be correct to say that XYZ is water? No, we would not, 
because water is identical to the properties of the chemical H2O. 
Water = H2O and non-H20 is not water. Names and natural-kind terms 
(what we call water in our world, for example) are "rigid designators" 
(Kripke 1972) so that both of these identity statements concerning 
water, if true, are necessarily true in all possible worlds. 
Even inhabitants of our world 300 years ago (before the discoveries 
needed to identify water as H2O) would have been wrong if they had 
learned of that alien world and had believed that that alien liquid was 
water. If there is a hidden structure of a natural kind, it is that structure 
that determines what it is to be a member of the natural kind. Whether 
we have discovered its hidden structure or not, the nature of what we 
in our world call water-according to our best account so far, it is 
H20-is the same in all possible worlds. 
One implication of this observation is that terms such as "water" are 
not therefore precisely synonymous with any description we happen to 
have at the time. As in the case of the example of our forebears of 300 
years ago, it could turn out upon further discovery that the nature of 
what we point at with our description turns out not to be what our 
description said it was. Although we use operational definitions, and 
must do so, they are not analytically true of what they index. Criteria 
are not necessary and sufficient conditions for identity, but are only 
our best approximations of entities that exist independently of our 
theories. 
96 Compare this fictive chemical with "heavy water" which has the 
same structure as water, except that the hydrogen atoms are isotopes 
of hydrogen called "deuterium, " and has practically all the same 
properties as watef. It is a "form of water in which the hydrogen 
atoms of mass 1 (H) ordinarily present in water are replaced by 
deuterium (symbol D or H), the heavy stable isotope of hydrogen of 
mass 2. The molecular formula of heavy water is D20 (or H20). " 
(Katz 2006) 
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The application for the present purposes will be evident. Our 
identification of terms like obligation (rightness, wrongness, 
permissibility) follows these same lines. "Being wrong" is identical, 
according to reduction theological voluntarists, to "being contrary to 
the commands/intentions of God" even though they do not mean the 
same. The claim is not that "This is wrong" is analyzed as "This is 
contrary to the commands/intentions of God. " Rather, the claim is that 
the hidden structure of the obligation to 4 turns out to be that God 
commands/intends 4-ing as a means to unity with God, and so the 
obligation to 4 can be conceptually reduced to God's 
commandinglintending 4-ing. Utilitarians, Platonists, Marxists, and 
eudaimonists each contend that the structure of obligation to 0 (if it is 
actually an obligation) is identical with some criteria flowing from 
their theory of value. We can genuinely disagree (and agree) about 
what is obligatory, while the nature of obligation remains under 
contention. 
Objections to reduction TV 
Mark Murphy claims that reduction TV is disanalagous to the 
identification of properties and hidden structures as reduction forms of 
TV have compared it the example of water. The identity of water with 
H2O is a posteriori, he says, whereas the identification of obligation 
with commanded-by-God is a priori. Water plays its practical role in 
our lives whether or not we know that it is H2O or not. If theological 
voluntarists are correct, the obligatory cannot play its role in our 
practical lives if we do not know that it is identical with "commanded 
by God. " It is not just an "interesting extra fact, " as is the knowledge 
that water is H20, but the very key to understanding morality. "No 
unintelligibility creeps into the life of agents that do not grasp that 
water is H20; unintelligibility creeps into the life of agents that do not 
grasp that the morally obligatory is commanded by God. " (Murphy 
2002b, sect. 2.4) 
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I disagree with the assertion that the identification of divine 
communicated intentions, for example, with obligation is a priori. 
While it is true from the self-revelation claimed by the biblical God 
that this God's commands are uniquely authoritative, this conceptual 
picture is not one that can be gained without the experience of 
knowing the biblical account. The creator God is known only through 
self-revelation, and the evidence for this claim is historical: no other 
Ancient Near Easter creation myth approximates the ex nihilo and in 
nihilum account of Genesis. (Contrast with the myths recorded in 
Pritchard 1958. ) This would seem to make the reduction identification 
of divine commands with obligation a necessary (in all possible 
worlds) a posteriori (knowable only from the experience of 
revelation) truth. 
Murphy's objection also leverages a degree of imprecision with 
respect to a practical difference in Putnam's Twin Earth example. 
Murphy's claim that the identity of water makes no difference to our 
practical lives assumes that we actually have accurate knowledge of 
the properties of water. While this is true with regard to the uses most 
of us make of the liquid most of the time, it is not true with regard to 
the ways in which the hidden structure of water does affect our 
practical lives. Imagine a society that believes that water, in addition 
to its functions as a solvent, a thirst-quencher, fire extinguisher, and so 
forth, has the property of divinity. For reasons dependent on this 
belief, no one in that society ever intentionally attempts to enter 
corporally into the local river in order to move through the water using 
their limbs. There is not even a word for "swimming" in their 
language. Consequently, fishermen and others sometimes accidentally 
drown. In such a case, the identity of water as (merely) H2O would 
make a great deal of practical difference to their lives. 97 
97 Among some West African ethnic groups, spirits are believed to 
inhabit bodies of water, with consequences similar to those in my 
example. I am not aware of any actual system of belief that takes 
water to be uniquely divine. 
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We take this hypothetical society's belief to be in error about the 
identity of water, but the argument can easily be adapted to a correct 
understanding of its identity (on our best account). The knowledge 
that water is H2O makes a great deal of practical difference in 
predicting how water will behave under conditions that may not occur 
in many common uses of water. Plants and animals watered only with 
deuterium, for example, die prematurely. If we didn't know that water 
is H2O, and that non- H2O is not water, we could not make accurate 
predictions about its behavior. 
Putnam's example of Twin Earth stipulated a chemical that functions 
exactly as our water does on Earth in order to show that it is 
nonetheless not water, but rather Twin Earthian "water, " that is, XYZ. 
The objection raised by Murphy trades on this example at precisely 
the point where it cannot be taken as an actual possibility, at the point 
where XYZ does not function just like H2O. No chemical compound 
functions exactly like another. If, on a perfect understanding of its 
properties, XYZ functioned exactly as does H2O on a perfect 
understanding of its properties, then there would be no reason to think 
that there was any difference between the two, except in 
nomenclature. We would have to conclude instead that the distinction 
in nomenclature, the formula "XYZ", was mistaken. There is no 
difference without a difference. On a perfect understanding, something 
would enable us to distinguish H2O from XYZ and that something 
would have some practical implication, even if for most practical 
purposes the difference were not important. 
Similarly, and perhaps to push the Twin Earthian analogy beyond its 
usefulness, the function of obligation is not entirely dependent on 
knowing its identity, as the introduction to this chapter showed. True, 
those who do not know/recognize that obligation just is the property 
being God's communicated intentions do not use the term with full 
mastery. Nevertheless there are some respects in which the proper 
identification of obligation is not required in order for the term to play 
its role in our practical lives. If specific behaviors and dispositions are 
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correctly believed to be obligatory, even without knowledge that being 
God's communicated intentions is the property that makes them 
obligatory, much social and public order can be maintained, many 
negative personal consequences avoided, and many materially 
beneficial habits formed. 98 
If we seek to understand the concept and force of obligation, we 
proceed inductively, looking for a theory that can explain our 
experience. We assume that some actions/intentions/dispositions are 
obligatory and others are not and that, to a large extent, we know 
which is which. As a theory is formed, however, it will turn out that 
some actions/intentions/dispositions we previously considered to be 
obligatory are not obligatory, and vice versa, and that some 
actions/intentions we believed were obligatory are indeed obligatory, 
but for quite different reasons than those we first believed. This 
observation applies broadly to the argument in favor of TV over 
against eudaimonism. A person's initial inclinations are solely 
compulsions directed toward his/her good. Through a process of 
transformation these are expanded to include a broader good. Adams 
makes the case that obligation is necessarily social. (1999, pp. 2520 If 
s/he comes by some means to accept premises and arguments such as 
those put forward in my previous chapters-I cannot advance a theory 
here about how this might happen-then s/he will see that the hidden 
structure of obligation is the property of being God's communicated 
intentions. 
I have previously denied that we can know final causes with certainty. 
(See chapter 7. ) Furthermore, the concept itself is controversial, as of 
course is the concept of God and divine intentions that I advance in its 
place. But it seems clear from all that I have argued to this point that 
98 Murphy notes that reduction TV, if true, returns us to the 
observation made by Anscombe (1958) that the concept of 
obligation is inherently theological. (2002b, sect. 2.4) He does not 
weigh in on Anscombe's proposal that the Aristotelian project be 
revived. But if my argument to this point is compelling, that project has not succeeded in making morality less 
theologically/metaphysically dependent. 
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we cannot forego hypotheses concerning whatever holds this 
conceptual place. 
The "default setting" of human flourishing, as I posited in the last 
chapter, leads us to perceive obligations through practical rationality 
concerning goods understood as constitutive of the good. Through the 
processes of childhood socialization and participation in communal 
life, we come to some minimal conception or other of how life ought 
to be, and of the goods that make up that life. In my first several 
chapters on Maclntyre concerning practices, life narratives, and 
communal traditions I gave many examples. Goods are innumerable 
and allow of innumerable permutations in ranking. Evils are the 
pursuits of one good inordinately, to the detriment of other, higher- 
ranking goods. To tie obligations to the pursuit of goods provides little 
direction in moral decision-making therefore, since no one pursues 
evils as evils. The conception of the good is therefore determinative, 
once again. 99 
To summarize then, all human obligations other than those stipulating 
love of God's basic goodness are dependent on divine acts. That 
relation of dependence is one of reduction. Apart from those 
obligations to love God, obligation turns out to be reducible to the 
property of being God's communicated intentions. 
Conclusion 
God created everything, without antecedent raw material, context or 
remainder. An artist constructs an artifact with some purpose in mind. 
To know what the object is, we must know what it is for, why it was 
made. But intentions are difficult to discern. Maclntyre makes a 
powerful case in After Virtue for the necessity of narrative in 
99 I emphasize the Augustinian and Reformed position concerning the 
negative role of our conclusions of practical rationality in moral 
education. As Maclntyre recognizes, "The central human experience 
of the natural law... is our inability to live by it.... " (1988, p. 205) 
296 
The Flourishing Life and the Good Life 
discerning the intelligibility of actions. (204-225) This observation 
can be extrapolated to a larger frame of reference. A narrative is an 
explicit written or oral recounting of a story. It is a text 
communicating a sequence of events that form a meaningful pattern. 
The text establishes the meaning. Given a sufficiently objective and 
tightly controlled perspective from which to view events-such as the 
spectator's view in a play or film-we can sometimes discern intent 
without explicit information. Even here, however, a director is often 
forced to add voice-over narrative for the sake of clarity. And in real 
life, to interpret actions without verbal explanation is to court trouble. 
We lack the perspective necessary for discerning the purposes of 
human life taken as a whole. Our end cannot be grasped by a priori 
reasoning. 
It is for this reason that the Christian traditions have affirmed that the 
ultimate purpose and end of human existence cannot be known apart 
from revelation. My final end is external not only to myself, but also 
to society. Why then should I think that my nature can be adequately 
known apart from revelation? 
If my interpretation of the biblical account is approximately correct, 
then it is difficult to know what to make of the search for reasons to 
comply with God's communicated intentions other than this God's 
creative power and goodness. If God really exists, there is something 
nonsensical about saying, in effect, "I can give reasons for compliance 
with your dictates that do not depend on your intentions as basic. " 
There is something at least as strange in taking these purported 
reasons as the rational basis for obeying this God's commands. A 
denial of divine prerogative in God's purposes is implicit in the 
demand for such reasons. Yet this is what moral philosophers do when 
they demand reasons independent of God for obedience to God. '°° 
100 These comments closely parallel Lesslie Newbi&in's comments on 
theoretical authority and natural theology. (Newbigin 1996, p. 6) 
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From the perspective of the biblical traditions, the story of secular 
moral philosophy is a story of failure. There are many sources of this 
failure. The responsibility cannot all be laid at the feet of the 
Enlightenment. Many of the contributing influences are more 
sociological than conceptual. (See, for example, Berger 1974; 1990; 
Wells 1993) Were I capable of telling the whole story from the 
vantage point of intellectual history, however, I would emphasize the 
departure from the claims to authority offered by the biblical text. '°' It 
might turn out that this text is not what it claims to be. But the claims 
of this text to authority cannot be established on bases that question its 
authority. It treats God's communicated intentions as practically 
authoritative. If this God really exists, then no more foundational 
answer to the question, "How should we live? " can be found than in 
the communicated intentions of this God. 
101 Contrast Thomas Halyburton's position (1798) with Maclntyre's 
treatment of it in Maclntyre's account of the Scottish Enlightenment 
(1988, pp. 243-247). 
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